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SUMMARY 
Agricultural commercialisation via increased market participation and innovation 
adoption has been widely argued to reduce poverty. However, empirical evidence 
suggests that both of these are persistently low in developing countries. Recent analyses 
suggest that different types of transaction costs and social capital may influence both 
market access and innovation adoption decisions.  
This thesis investigates these two factors in agricultural commercialisation and poverty 
reduction. Using data from three GLSS survey rounds, Chapter 1 investigates the 
determinants of the decision to sell as well as the decision of how much to sell, focusing 
on the role of transaction costs. The empirical analysis is carried out at household level 
and for a specific crop (maize). A Heckman two-step model is used to control for self-
selection into market participation, using measures of fixed transaction costs as 
identifier variables. The overall results, although generally consistent with previous 
literature, show an unexpected positive relationship between remoteness and market 
participation, which might reflect peculiarities of Ghanaian crop marketing systems. 
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between social capital and innovation using 
primary data on 305 Ghanaian farmers collected during field work in 2012 (described in 
Chapter 2). The chapter analyses innovation (the decision to adopt, its timing and 
intensity) at crop level, focusing on a non-traditional cash crop, exotic varieties of 
mango. The analysis investigates the role of different types of social capital, both in 
disaggregated and aggregated forms. The results suggest that social capital should not 
be overlooked in the innovation process, supporting recent evidence that there exists a 
positive relationship between the “know-who” and adoption dynamics. 
Finally, Chapter 4 investigates the impact of innovation adoption on objective and 
subjective measures of poverty. Matching techniques are used to estimate the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated, using primary data. The results show that adoption 
does not impact objective poverty but it does have a significant positive impact on self-
perceived poverty status.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For most of the last three decades, Ghana has been considered the star economy in West 
Africa (Coulombe and Wodon, 2007). Sustained GDP growth and adoption of important 
economic reforms since the early 1980s have made Ghana one of the richest economies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (IFPRI, 2012; Figure 1).  
Notwithstanding the fast and high economic growth, which has led to a reduction in 
agriculture’s share of GDP (Figure 2), agriculture remains the dominant sector of the 
economy. The major contribution to the agricultural sector is provided by the export of 
traditional cash crops, such as cocoa. The process of economic transformation occurred 
in the past decades has considerably reduced the dependence of the Ghanaian 
agricultural sector from cocoa exports. As Figure 3 shows, from a peak of about 45%, 
the contribution of cocoa trade to the total value of exports is currently at its historical 
minimum level (about 10%). Hence, since the early 2000s, international donors and 
national government have heavily supported agricultural commercialisation in a wider 
variety of crops including both food and non-traditional cash crops.  
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Figure 3 Cocoa Trade, % (UNCOMTRADE) 
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In 2008, the Ghana Export Horticulture Cluster Strategic Profile Study (Jaeger, 2008) 
set up a systematic national framework for these developments. The study recognises 
the importance of supporting agricultural commercialisation and fostering the 
development of a wider agricultural crop portfolio, with a specific focus on horticultural 
crops.  
Within the main objective of increasing agricultural commercialisation, two priorities 
were identified: increase farmers’ market participation and support more innovation 
adoption. Higher farmers’ commercialisation via market participation is believed to be 
effective in fostering agricultural development and reducing poverty (Christiaensen and 
Demery, 2007; Ravallion and Chen, 2007). Similarly, innovation adoption, whether in 
the form of inputs or new marketable products, is believed to enhance agricultural 
productivity and farmers’ economic returns, which might impact agricultural poverty 
(Minot and Roy, 2007).  
Exotic varieties of mango, such as Kent and Keitt, are one of the target crops supported 
by recent government and donor initiatives. In the past decade both the production and 
the export of these varieties of mango have increased considerably as a result of the 
sustained national and international support. Figure 4 shows that the value and quantity 
of exports towards European Union, the main Ghanaian export partner, have 
considerably increased since the mid-2000s.  
Figure 4 Mango trade with EU (EUROSTAT) 
  
Although positive developments in the non-traditional cash crops sector constitute an 
important accomplishment of these initiatives, the notable effort by international donors 
and national government in fostering nationwide agricultural commercialisation via 
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market participation and product innovation adoption rates have not been as successful 
(Asmah, 2011). Numerous studies have pointed out that Ghanaian agriculture is still 
suffering from low levels of farmers’ commercialisation, low adoption of innovations, 
poor communication and transport infrastructure, and rainfed irrigation systems (e.g. 
IFPRI, 2012; Lay and Schuler 2007).  
The literature on market participation and innovation adoption provides important 
insights into what hinders farmers’ decision to increase their level of commercialisation, 
via market participation and innovation adoption. Aside from classical determinants, 
such as asset endowments and wealth, the more recent literature gives stronger attention 
to the role of transaction costs and social capital in the processes of market participation 
and innovation adoption (Key et al., 2000; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). 
I follow these latest developments in the literature to explain why farmers in rural 
Ghana are still facing difficulties in accessing the market and in adopting product 
innovation. I explicitly focus on the supply side of agricultural commercialisation, 
namely output markets, and as such input markets are out of the scope of this analysis. 
This is partly driven by data constraints as input data are relatively limited in the GLSS 
while crop level data are much more detailed as far as the type of crops investigated, 
their production and marketing values are concerned.  Moreover, the analysis of 
innovation adoption only covers product innovation (new crops) and not processes.  
More specifically, Chapter 1 investigates what factors affecting market participation in 
Ghana. The analysis covers both the decision to sell or not to sell as well as the extent of 
this market participation, i.e. the extent of commercialisation. I use data from three 
rounds of the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS4, GLSS5, GLSS6). I model the 
decision to sell using a probit model and then I explore commercialisation with a 
Heckman two step model to control for self-selection into market participation. 
Following the conceptual framework set out by Key et al. (2000) and Alene et al. 
(2008), I investigate the role of transaction costs in market participation decisions. Both 
fixed and proportional transaction costs are evaluated, using standard measures such as 
ownership of communication and transport assets for fixed transaction costs, and 
measures of distances for proportional transaction costs. The analysis covers both the 
household level and the crop level decision, with the latter focused on one of the most 
common staple crops in Ghana, maize. The advantage of carrying out a crop level 
14 
 
 
analysis is to unveil the different role that transaction costs might have in relation to 
food crops market participation decisions, which are commonly characterised by 
relatively higher transaction costs compared to cash crops. In addition, the crop level 
analysis allows the use of crop level data regarding the choice of marketing channels, 
available in the GLSS. The results of these analyses suggest that transaction costs play a 
relevant role in the farmers’ decision to participate in the market and how much to 
participate. More specifically, access to information via communication and transport 
assets, which are commonly used as measures of fixed transaction costs, are found to be 
positively associated with market participation. Amongst measure of proportional 
transaction costs, a positive association between remoteness and market participation is 
observed. This result, although contrasting with previous empirical evidence, might 
reflect the peculiar nature of the marketing system in rural Ghana. As Zanello et al. 
(2014) and Martey et al. (2012) point out, long term relationships between producers 
and traders that have evolved in contexts of remoteness as well as strong social 
networks play a considerable role in reducing transaction costs, including those 
measured by remoteness, especially in rural remote areas of Ghana.  
GLSS data do not provide detailed information on the role social networks on market 
participation and adoption of product innovation, and the sample size of farmers 
growing non-traditional cash crops is relatively small. This represents a serious 
limitation for studies of non-traditional cash crops which have been highlighted in 
recent years by the Ghana Horticultural Cluster Strategy study (Jaeger, 2008) as being 
important strategic goals for Ghanaian agriculture and poverty reduction targets. In 
order to investigate the role that social capital exerts on agricultural commercialisation 
via product innovation, I collected primary data in three regions of Ghana during the 
summer of 2012. Chapter 2 provides details on design and implementation phases of the 
data collection exercise. With financial support from GIZ, I spent about three months 
collecting data on the adoption of exotic varieties of mango. I surveyed both adopters 
and non-adopters in Northern, Brong-Ahafo and Eastern regions. The total sample is 
composed of 305 farmers, 196 adopters and 109 non-adopters, of which about 60% are 
very small farmers (with three or less acres of land). The field work experience 
provided me with a much better understanding of the major constraints related to the 
adoption of exotic mango, and, at the same time, enriched me with better insights on 
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how to deal with field work related challenges. This knowledge and experience 
constitute, for me, invaluable personal resources for future fieldwork activities. 
Using the data collected during the field work, I investigate, in Chapter 3, the role of 
social capital in the adoption of product innovation, exotic varieties of mango, 
following the seminal works by Bandiera and Rasul (2006) and van Rijn et al. (2012). 
The analysis aims to understand what the main factors that affect farmers’ decision to 
innovate are, and also describes the reasons why some farmers innovate earlier and 
more intensively than others, with a focus on social capital factors. Social capital is 
included in both its aggregated, as composite indexes, and disaggregated forms, and it 
covers its three main components: structural bridging, structural bonding and cognitive. 
The results are consistent with previous empirical evidence in supporting the relevance 
of social capital, especially in the form of social networks, in fostering the adoption of 
product innovation. The findings also show that different change agents might be 
relevant in the decision to adopt earlier or more intensively than others. For example, 
the results suggest that while development agencies accelerate the time of adoption, 
NGOs are more relevant in the decision to adopt more intensively. On the other hand, 
the results tend to support the idea that both farmers’ organisations and Ministry of 
Agriculture extension officers tend to delay the time of adoption.  
Finally, Chapter 4 evaluates the main assumption that adopting product innovation, such 
as exotic varieties of mango, has an effect on farmers’ well-being. The rationale for the 
widespread support of the adoption of exotic varieties of mango has been its potential in 
reducing poverty. I question this rationale using both objective and subjective measures 
of poverty, collected during the field work. The objective measure of poverty is based 
on the estimation of an asset index using principal component analysis. The subjective 
measure of poverty is based on the “Economic Ladder” question which asks farmers to 
locate their economic status on a step from 1 to 9 relative to other people in the village. 
The empirical analysis makes use of matching techniques in an attempt to identify a 
counterfactual. The estimations of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated show 
that the adoption of exotic varieties of mango has indeed had a positive effect on 
farmers’ well-being. However, this effect is almost exclusively observed for subjective 
poverty. Hence, the effect of adoption on poverty defined using the asset index is often 
not significant, suggesting that adopters are not better endowed or able to accumulate 
16 
 
 
assets more than non-adopters. I explore these results further comparing early and late 
adopters, respectively, to non-adopters, and also examine cultivation and marketing 
differences between poor and non-poor mango farmers, which suggest that early 
adopters benefited more than late adopters and that poor mango farmers do struggle in 
accessing positive returns from mango adoption compared to non-poor mango farmers. 
Conversely, the results support the idea that mango farmers do feel less poor than non-
mango farmers. The expectation of future positive returns and the awareness that 
innovation might have benefited themselves or other adopters in the past might have 
made adopters perceive their economic status in a more optimistic way.  
The last part of this thesis is the conclusion. This section summarises the most important 
insights from the analyses and it provides some policy recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Determinants of market participation in Ghana: an analysis of 
three rounds of the Ghana Living Standard Survey 
Introduction  
When we talk about market participation, we usually think about it as a simple, almost 
natural process by which an individual sells or buys goods or services in exchange for 
cash income. From boot sales of unused furniture in Western countries to petty trade of 
fruits in the streets of rural Ghana, market activities occur and look like the smoothest 
of any economic transaction. However, the reality in rural areas in developing countries 
is that access to markets is, instead, a very complicated process, and related risks and 
costs constantly hinder participation of those farmers whose endowments do not match 
market demands.                    
Notwithstanding the effort of both development agencies and national governments in 
“getting the price and market right”, farmers in developing countries still experience 
enormous difficulties in accessing formal market channels. Barrett (2008) reports that, 
across 16 studies, 9 African countries and a period of about twenty years, market 
participation rates among smallholder farmers vary by country and market type but they 
overall remain pretty low, from a minimum of 22% to a maximum of just above 40%.  
In Ghana, market participation rates also vary by type of crops, farm characteristics and 
location. For food producers, such as maize growers, it ranges from a minimum of 31% 
among very small farmers (less than one hectare) located in the savannah agro-
ecological zones, to a maximum of 70% among farmers with four to five hectares of 
land located in coastal agro-ecological zones (Ghana Statistical Services, 2007; Musah 
et al., 2014; Martey et al., 2012; Brempong et al., 2013).  
The extent of market participation, often defined as degree of agricultural 
commercialisation, is generally observed to be quite low in Ghana.  In 2007, the Ghana 
Statistical Service estimated that less than half of the produce was sold in the market. In 
a recent analysis on maize growers in Upper West and Upper East regions, Musah et al. 
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(2014) show that, although about 50% of the maize farmers do participate in the market, 
only 24% of the produce is actually sold, compared to the national average of about 
33%. Martey et al. (2012) show that the degree of farmers’ commercialisation in Central 
region varies depending on the crop marketed. For example, while 53% of the produce 
is sold by maize growers, about 72% of the produce is, instead, sold among cassava 
producers, suggesting a considerably higher degree of marketability of this staple crop 
compared to the national average. Moving away from the major staple crops, Brempong 
et al. (2013) show that higher marketability can be observed also for horticultural crops, 
such as tomatoes or pineapples. They estimate that about 64% of the horticultural 
produce is sold on average in Brong-Ahafo and Eastern regions
1
.   
Several studies have tried to identify the major facilitators and inhibitors of market 
participation and its extent and, more recently, a strand of the literature embedded the 
notion of transaction costs in the market participation framework. Transaction costs are 
often approximated with those measurable factors that are thought to mitigate fixed 
costs (ownership of communication and transport equipment) or explain proportional 
costs, as, for example, distance to market.  
In Ghana, there has been an intense work in the past decade by development agencies 
and government towards the reduction of transaction costs related to market 
participation. Communication assets, such as radios and mobiles phones are, indeed, 
becoming important vehicles of marketing information
2
. In addition, several other 
projects have been working on disseminating market information and improving market   
infrastructure to facilitate agricultural commercialisation (Figure 1)
3
. 
 
                                                 
1 These two regions are considered among the most commercialised in the country and as such could provide an 
overestimation of the rates.  
2 For example, Farm Radio International currently runs a project in Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti regions started in 2012 
for maize and cashew producers, while Radio ADA disseminates price information in the Greater Accra and Eastern 
regions.  
3 One important project aiming to increase market participation through the use of mobiles has been supported by the 
International Finance Corporation of the World Bank that specifically invested in the private mobile phone company, 
called Esoko, to extend its SMS-based mobile phone service to include weather information and prices, among other 
ad-hoc marketing service (World Bank, 2011). Currently, Esoko provides push SMS, a voice help line, extension 
service and weather information in all the local Ghanaian languages. Information on prices are collected regularly 
from 60 markets nationwide and disseminated to their subscribers for free, for a basic bundle, and for a small fee in 
the case of more ad-hoc services. The size of their coverage in Ghana is not clear although they have been 
cooperating with NGOs since 2007, with the program SEND, and with IFPRI and IFAD for the dissemination of 
information in the Northern region since 2011. In addition, cocoa and pineapple farmers are claimed to have been 
part of the platform in the past four/five years. 
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Figure 1 Dissemination on market information in Ghana 
 
 
This paper aims to analyse the major determinants of agricultural commercialisation via 
market participation in Ghana, with a specific focus on the role of transaction costs, 
usually measured by transport and communication assets ownership and households’ 
location. I use a sample of 14,736 rural farming households drawn from three rounds of 
the Ghanaian Living Standard Surveys (GLSS 4, GLSS 5 and GLSS 6). The analysis 
aims to investigate market participation with regards to the decision to sell or not (the 
discrete decision of market participation) and the decision of how much to sell (the 
continuous decision of the extent of market participation, i.e. commercialisation). Thus, 
this paper studies market participation as a two-step decision process whereby self-
selection confounding effects will be taken into account, using the Heckman two-step 
approach.  
The analysis investigates, first, the determinants of market participation and its extent, 
commercialisation at aggregate level, i.e. household level, as measures of transaction 
costs are only available at household and village levels in the GLSS data. Then, the 
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analysis turns the focus on one of the most important staples grown in Ghana, i.e. 
maize. The advantage of carrying out the analysis for a specific crop is that different 
effects of different types of transaction costs can be observed more clearly, as they can 
have specific crop related relevance. For example, food crops are normally associated 
with lower barriers to market participation because of the low quality and quantity 
requirements, but they are also claimed to have higher transaction costs, due to search 
costs, uncertainty related to quality and quantity and the need for the buyer to engage in 
frequent quality inspections (Boughton et al., 2007). GLSS data do not provide detailed 
information on single market transactions for the majority of the crops produced in the 
sample. However, information on preferred sale outlets for a selection of crops is 
available. Using these data, I investigate the decision of maize market participation 
using a multinomial logit model, which compares non-participation to participation in 
two different outlets: farm gate and market trader. 
This study aims to identify associations, and not causality, between commonly 
identified inhibitors and facilitators of market participation. It contributes to the market 
participation literature as it provides insights on the role of transaction costs in relation 
to the rural Ghanaian context using the latest secondary data available, which has, to my 
knowledge, not been done in the past. Also, the two levels of aggregation of the analysis 
carried out only using secondary data, available to government and development 
practitioners, contributes in providing an overall, household level, picture of the 
determinants of market participation but it also describes them in the context of one of 
the most important crop in Ghana, maize.  
The next sections are organised as follows. Section 1 summarises the market 
participation literature; Section 2 describes the conceptual framework of market 
participation under transaction costs; Section 3 presents the main descriptive statistics of 
the sample; Section 4 describes the empirical model and Section 5 and 6 present and 
discuss the results at household and crop level, respectively. Finally, Section 7 
summarises the main results and draws the conclusions of the analysis.  
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Section 1. A brief literature review 
The puzzling evidence that market participation rates remain persistently low especially 
among poorer and more remote farmers in Africa has motivated numerous scholars in 
the investigation of potential facilitators and inhibitors of access to markets. The 
literature covers both crops with high and low marketability, such as cash crops and 
food crops. Compared to cash crops, staple crops are usually associated with low market 
barriers to entry, high transaction costs and relatively low return per unit of production 
or low value for weight (Goetz, 1992; Makhura et al., 2001; Alene et al., 2008; Omiti et 
al., 2009; Bougthon et al., 2007; Longhurst and Lipton, 1989).  
Aside from location related inhibitors, poverty, assets and low adoption of technologies 
are among the main household’s characteristics that could hinder market participation. 
Several studies have shown that better endowed farmers find it easier to access markets 
because they can use their assets (and the disposable income generated by the use of 
these assets) as collateral for the purchase of productivity enhancing technology 
(improved seeds, machinery etc.). Better endowed farmers can also divert factors of 
production away from staples towards higher return cash crops, as they are able to 
secure food needs via market purchases. Assets, especially farm assets and land, are 
found to be strongly associated with market participation and its extent (de Janvry et al., 
1991; Fafchamps, 1992). Barrett (2008) shows that in Mozambique the probability to 
participate increases substantially for farmers with a land size bigger than four hectares. 
Several other studies censor their sample based on the size of the land cultivated. Key et 
al. (2000), in their study of Mexican corn producers, for example, only select farmers 
with more than 10 hectares because any lower land endowment is deemed to be strongly 
associated with self-sufficiency production. Brempong et al. (2013) show that land and 
labour productivity are important determinants of tomato market participation and its 
extent in two regions in Ghana, while, in addition to land productivity, access to savings 
facilitates market access in the pineapple sector. Similarly, Musah et al. (2014) and 
Martey et al. (2012) find that both farm size and wealth are significant predictors of 
both market participation and its extent among staple producers in the both Northern 
and Central Ghana.  
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Conversely, previous works show that other common sources of wealth, such as 
livestock ownership, access to credit and off-farm income, may act as market 
participation inhibitors, because of substitution effects with crop cash income. The 
expected negative association between market participation and, for example, livestock 
ownership and off-farm activities, may derive from the rational choice between crop 
farming and alternative livelihood activities. Although producing crops and selling 
some of the produce, some households might be running alternative economic activities 
as their main source of livelihood and, as such, the decision to participate in the crop 
market and how much to participate could be negatively affected when the household 
prefers relying on these alternative livelihood activities, instead. Moreover, livestock are 
commonly used as collateral in periods of income shortage and they act as a “walking 
bank” in substitution of other income sources (Bellemare and Barrett, 2006). Similarly, 
access to credit might be negatively associated with market participation as it can 
provide an alternative source of disposable income to secure food access and 
investments in farming productivity (Alene et al., 2008).  
On the other hand, studies also show that the role of these inhibitors might change with 
the type of crops under scrutiny. In fact, some studies show that access to credit might, 
instead, foster market participation in the case of food crops, as it can be used for 
investments in higher yielding varieties, longer cycle crops, seasonal inputs and 
improved technology, which in turns may facilitate market participation (Barrett, 2008, 
Musah et al., 2014). The same case is found for off-farm income in the maize and 
cassava market participation by Martey et al. (2012) in Central Ghana. There is also 
evidence that the association between higher food crops productivity, market 
participation and cash crops production may be explained by the fact that often farmers 
use credit and inputs obtained through cash crops contracts, also for staple production 
processes (Barrett, 2008).  
Another important inhibitor of market participation is the gender of the farm manager or 
household head. Some authors, such as Cunningham et al. (2008), argue that men are 
likely to sell more due to their acumen in bargaining and in negotiating and enforcing 
contracts. Also, there is a general consensus on the idea that there exists a set of “gender 
discriminated” crops whereby women are traditionally more involved in the production 
of staple or petty tradable crops, while men usually manage cash crops productions, 
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which have a higher marketable scope than food crops (e.g. Zamasiya et al., 2014). 
Although this is generally true, recent developments have shown that, through market 
cooperatives and access to higher value chains, as in the case of rice and shea-butter in 
the Northern region of Ghana, this agricultural gender divide might be evolving with 
time, towards a more equal distribution of production and marketing opportunities 
(Zanello et al., 2014).  
Despite the relevance of determinants described so far, a relatively recent literature 
strand focuses on the role of market related transaction costs. Several authors claim that 
the first set of constraints that farmers experience in accessing markets are risks and 
uncertainties related to prices and potential buyers, in presence of segmented or isolated 
markets, as it is in the case of rural areas. These uncertainties translate in transaction 
costs that could hinder market participation. In fact, due to the imperfect spatial price 
transmission, imperfect competition and asymmetric information, farmers may face 
multiple equilibria scenarios where also self-sufficiency might be an optimal choice, 
which could explain the low market participation intensity especially in rural areas 
(Fafchamps, 2004; Barrett, 1995).  
Transaction costs are not a new concept in economic theory as they have been 
introduced in the literature by Coase back in 1937. They are usually described as 
“unobservable and observable costs associated with the exchange of goods and 
services” (Jagwe et al., 2010). The role of transaction costs in the market participation 
literature had largely been overlooked until the work of Goetz in 1992 and Key et al. in 
2000. Since then, several authors have empirically and theoretically demonstrated that 
transaction costs matter in the explanation of why farmers have difficulties in accessing 
the market. They also explain how different costs affect in different ways the decision to 
enter the market and the extent of that participation, i.e. commercialisation.  
More specifically, two types of transaction costs have been identified in the past 
literature: fixed costs and proportional costs. The former include the costs of searching 
for buyers, of negotiating and bargaining as well as of screening and enforcing 
marketing contracts. Proportional transaction costs, on the other hand, are defined as 
transportation and marketing unit costs, and as such are proportional to the extent of 
market participation. Fixed costs, which are mainly related to access to market 
information, are claimed to affect only the decision to sell or not, while proportional 
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costs are deemed to affect both the decision to entry as well as the decision of how 
much to sell (Figure 2).  
Figure 2 Market participation and transaction costs 
 
While households, crop and location specific determinants of market participation are 
generally easily quantifiable through household’s surveys, it is commonly known that 
transaction costs are, instead, very difficult to measure for economic analysis for several 
reasons. First, if transaction costs are too high, market transactions do not occur and as 
such the analysis itself becomes not feasible. Second, when farmers do not have access 
to transportation or communication intermediaries these costs are very difficult to 
estimate. Even in the case when intermediaries exist, quantifying the cost of the time 
spent by farmers in marketing activities is extremely challenging (Key et al., 2000). As 
a consequence, transaction costs enter the empirical analysis through those observable 
factors that explain (e.g. distances to markets) or mitigate them (ownership of transport 
and communication equipment, age, level of education, etc.) (Alene et al., 2008).  
The evidence of the effect of fixed transaction costs, measured as the cost of accessing 
market information, is often not consistent across the literature. For example, age is 
usually associated with higher risk aversion and lower propensity to adopt new 
technology and as such it is found to be negatively associated with market participation 
(Alene et al., 2008; Adeoti et al., 2014; Musah et al., 2014; Makhura et al., 2001). 
However, other studies found an opposite association of age with market participation, 
as, for example, in the case of maize farmers in Nigeria (Adenegan et al., 2012) and 
among cotton farmers under contract farming in South Africa (Randela et al., 2008). 
These studies suggest that older farmers would sell more often and more of their output 
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to offset their increasing physical inability to produce their own crops. Also, older 
farmers might be more experienced in farming activities and this could increase their 
ability to participate in the market (Adenegan et al., 2012).  
Moreover, while education, ownership of radio and bicycles are found to facilitate 
market participation, via access to market information (Martey et al., 2012), the 
differential relevance that these costs might have in influencing market participation 
and/or its extent is not always clear. There is evidence that these fixed transaction costs 
may affect both the decision to sell or not and the decision of how much to sell. 
Heltberg and Tarp (2002) and Boughton et al. (2007), for example, both show that 
ownership of transport equipment (bicycle and motorcycle) increase both market 
participation and level of commercialisation among food producers in Mozambique. 
Similarly, Sibiza et al. (2010) show that, in Central and Northern Mozambique, for 
maize farmers ownership of a radio only affects the value of sales (i.e. extent of market 
participation), while it is associated with both market participation and its extent, in the 
case of cotton farmers. Alene et al. (2008), on the other hand, find a significant 
association only between these fixed transaction costs and market participation, and not 
its extent, among maize farmers in Kenya.  
Proportional transaction costs, often measured as distances to markets, to extension 
officers, or to motorable roads are generally found strongly and negatively associated 
with both the intensive and extensive margins of market participation (e.g. Alene et al., 
2008; Martey et al., 2014; Makhura et al., 2011). The direction of this association, 
however, can depend on the marketing systems of the area under analysis. For example, 
while, theoretically, a higher transaction cost (and a lower market participation and its 
extent) is expected with longer distances, Zamasiya et al. (2014) find that the extent of 
market participation increases the further away farmers are from the market. They argue 
that, because relatively lower prices are usually offered in sale outlets which are further 
away from the main markets, farmers might be pushed to reach distant markets where 
higher prices, and so higher value of sales, could be obtained. Zanello et al. (2014), on 
the other hand, argue that the majority of market transactions in Northern Ghana occur 
at farm gate or through personal relationship with market trader, especially in remote 
rural areas. Following this argument, even in remote areas farmers are able to 
participate in the market as they will be regularly visited by traders and therefore 
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remoteness to markets might not necessarily represent proportional transaction costs in 
the market participation decision in these contexts. In remote areas farmers may, indeed, 
rely on good social capital relationship when there is a certainty that a buyer will 
eventually turn up. These relationships are found to play a facilitating role in market 
participation in Ghana, especially in the Northern and Central regions among food crops 
producers (Zanello et al., 2014; Martey et al., 2014).  
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Section 2. A model of market participation in the presence of 
transaction costs  
2.1 Conceptual framework  
The conceptual framework draws from past literature and in particular from Barrett 
(2008), Key et al. (2000) and Alene et al. (2008). They use a non-separable agricultural 
static model where a hypothetical households, i, maximises its utility, defined over a 
consumption of a vector of agricultural commodities, 𝑦𝑐 for c = 1,. . . ,C, and a Hicksian 
composite of other tradables, x, subject to its budget and crop level production 
technology constraints. The cash budget constraint vector includes access to substitutes 
of crop cash income (such as livestock, credit and non-farm income, Wi). In addition, 
the household faces private (Ai) and public assets constraints (Gi), a parametric market 
price for each crop (p
m
i) and a vector of proportional transaction costs, 𝜏𝑝𝑖, and fixed 
transaction costs, 𝜏𝑓𝑖4. The optimization problem can then be written as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝑦𝑖
𝑐,  𝑥𝑖)      (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖
𝑐represents the consumption of a vector of agricultural commodities c and  𝑥𝑖 is 
a vector of other tradables. The optimization problem is subject to:  
1) The cash budget constraint: 
𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖 + ∑ 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑏𝑝𝑐∗𝑦𝑖
𝑐 = ∑ 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑐∗𝑐𝑐=1 𝑓
𝑐(𝐴𝑖
𝑐, 𝐺𝑖) + 𝑊𝑖
𝐶
𝑐=1   (2) 
where 𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖 is the value of other tradables bought; 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑏 is equal to 1 if the household 
buys any commodity, and 0 otherwise;  𝑝𝑐∗ is the price paid for commodity c and 𝑦𝑖
𝑐 
is the quantity bought; 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑠 equals to 1 if the household sells any commodity, and 0 
otherwise;  𝑝𝑐∗ is the sale price of the commodity; which is function of private, 𝐴𝑖
𝑐, 
and public assets, 𝐺𝑖
𝑐;  𝑊𝑖 is the access to substitutes of crop cash income. The left 
hand side represents household’s consumption and the right hand side represents 
total revenues from sales of own produced, which is function of private, 𝐴𝑖
𝑐, and 
public assets, 𝐺𝑖
𝑐, and earnings from substitutes of crop cash income, 𝑊𝑖. 
                                                 
4 Barrett (2008) also includes total value of sales in the conceptual framework. However, in the empirical analysis of 
this chapter, this variable is not included for endogeneity issues with the second stage of the Household 
Commercialisation Index as described below. As a consequence I am omitting this variable from any of the equations 
discussed here.  
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2) The non-tradables’ availability constraints: 
𝐴𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑐𝐶
𝑐=1 , subject to       (3)  
(1 − 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑏)𝑦𝑖
𝑐 ≤ 𝑓𝑐(𝐴𝑖
𝑐, 𝐺𝑖)∀ 𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑐 
where 𝐴𝑖 represents the vector of private assets (e.g. land) that is allocated for the 
production of crops, c. 
3) The parametric price, adjusted by the presence of variable transaction costs: 
𝑝𝑐∗ = (𝑝𝑐𝑚 − 𝜏𝑝𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑠 = 1    (4) 
𝑝𝑐∗ = (𝑝𝑐𝑚 + 𝜏𝑝𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑏 = 1    (5) 
so that proportional transaction costs, 𝜏𝑝𝑖, decrease the price received in a sale 
transactions and increases the price paid in a purchase transactions.  
4) The presence of fixed transaction costs:  
𝜏𝑓𝑖 ∫
>0 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑠=1 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑠=0
     (6) 
such that they can only be observed if market participation occurs and they do not 
affect the extensive margins of participation, i.e. the amount of sales. 
The optimization problem can be re-written as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝑦𝑖
𝑐 , 𝑥𝑖) = 
𝑈(𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖 + ∑ 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑏(𝑝𝑐𝑚 + 𝜏𝑝𝑖)𝑦𝑖
𝑐 − [∑ 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑠 ∗ (𝑝𝑐𝑚 − 𝜏𝑝𝑖)
𝑐
𝑐=1 + ∑ 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑠𝜏𝑓𝑖
𝑐
𝑐=1 ]
𝐶
𝑐=1 )  (7) 
From (8), the decision to participate, 𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑠, and the extent of participation in the market, 
𝑄𝑐𝑠, can then be written as follows: 
𝑀𝑖
𝑐𝑠 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖 , 𝐺𝑖, 𝑊𝑖 , 𝑝
𝑐𝑚, 𝜏𝑝𝑖 , 𝜏𝑓𝑖)     (8) 
𝑄𝑐𝑠 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖 , 𝐺𝑖, 𝑊𝑖 , 𝑝
𝑐𝑚, 𝜏𝑝𝑖)      (9) 
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2.2 Empirical model  
The empirical model follows the conceptual framework described above. Both the 
decision to participate and the decision of the extent of this participation are 
investigated. The household level decision to participate in the market can be expressed 
as follows: 
𝑀𝑖
𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖+𝛽2𝐺𝑖+𝛽3𝑊𝑖+𝛽4𝜏𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽5𝜏𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑟 + 𝛽7𝑦 + 𝜇𝑖   (10) 
Where 𝑀𝑖
𝑠 is equal to 1 if the household 𝑖 participated in the market in the survey year 
and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝑖, is a vector of household’s characteristics and private assets; 𝐺𝑖 is a 
vector of public assets; 𝑊𝑖 is access to non-crop cash income; 𝜏𝑓𝑖 and 𝜏𝑝𝑖 are vectors of 
fixed and proportional transaction costs, respectively;  𝑟 are regional dummies, 𝑦 are 
year dummies; 𝜇𝑖 is the error term
5
. 
While the decision of the extent of market participation i.e. commercialisation, will be 
estimated using the following specification: 
𝐻𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖+𝛽2𝐺𝑖+𝛽3𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽6𝜏𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑟 + 𝛽6𝑦 + 𝜇𝑖             (11) 
𝐻𝐶𝐼𝑖 is the Household Commercialisation Index (0-100) which is calculated as the ratio 
of total value of sales to total value of production for household 𝑖 (see paragraphs 
below).  
The goal of equation (10) is to estimate the binary decision to participate in the market. 
On the other hand, equation (11) is used to estimate the decision of how much to 
participate. The main difference between the two equations is the inclusion of 
proportional (τpi) and fixed (τfi) transaction costs in the right hand side as explanatory 
variables. Following the literature, the decision of how much to sell (11) is not function 
of fixed transaction cost. Nonetheless, considering the often contrasting empirical 
findings on their role in explaining the extent of market participation, the effect of fixed 
transaction costs on the level of commercialisation remains, to my view, an empirical 
question.  
                                                 
5 The vector of prices is not included either in the equation (11) or (12) because prices, although collected in the 
GLSS, were not available in the datasets used for this analysis. Also, due to the cross sectional nature of the data, 
including prices could have created serious additional problems of endogeneity and reverse causality. Farmers in this 
analysis are assumed to be price takers. Prices mostly vary by location, type of crop and time. Including controls for 
these indicators could approximate for the omission of price information. 
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The data 
The data I use are drawn from three rounds of the Ghanaian Living Standard Survey. 
The data cover three survey years: 1998/1999 (GLSS 4); 2005/2006 (GLSS 5) and 
2012/2013 (GLSS 6). To my knowledge no other previous analysis has been done using 
the latest GLSS survey for the analysis of determinants of market participation. GLSSs 
are nationally representative independent cross sectional surveys collected by the Ghana 
Statistical Service in collaboration with the World Bank, UK-DFID, UNICEF and ILO. 
The surveys collected detailed information on demographic characteristics of 
respondents and all aspects of living conditions including health, education, housing, 
household income, consumption and expenditure, credit, assets and savings, prices and 
employment. 
From the total sample of 31,457 households (5,998 households in GLSS 4, 8,687 
households in GLSS 5 and 16,772 households in GLSS 6), my sample is only composed 
of rural farming households for which data on crop level production and sales as well as 
community level information are not missing. Rural households are defined as those 
households that are located in rural areas as identified by the surveys. A farming 
household is, instead, defined as such if the main activity of any member of the 
household is farming on their own land
6
.  
The final sample is composed of 14,736 households, 3,117 households from GLSS 4; 
4,172 from GLSS 5 and 7,447 households from GLSS 6, which corresponds to 47% of 
the total number of households and 81% of the rural households of the pooled sample of 
the three rounds of GLSS. 
                                                 
6 This definition of farming households could be considered too broad as some households, although producing and 
possibly selling their produce, may not consider themselves “farmers” as they are predominantly engaged in other 
livelihood activities. In order to ascertain the degree by which this definition affects the results, I also estimate the 
empirical models of market participation and its extent using a more restrictive definition of farming household. More 
specifically, I run the analysis for the sub-sample of households whose agricultural income is bigger than 20% of the 
total income. Although this threshold is arbitrary, it seems reasonable to assume that it could at least provide insights 
on the differences that a more restrictive definition would make on the final results. The full estimations are attached 
in the Appendix 1.1. The results are overall consistent with the model presented in this paper, especially with regards 
to the transaction costs variables. However, some differences can be pointed out. First, the selection coefficients in 
the Heckman models are never significant suggesting that selection biases are less relevant for this group of farmers. 
Second, higher education and access to non-farm income is found positively associated with the extent of market 
participation suggesting a complementary role between education and alternative cash income with the market 
participation decisions. Finally, farm size and land ownership matters more for this group of farmers as they are 
found to be positive and significantly associated with the decision to sell or not to sell. However, using measures of 
income in the context of developing countries is often criticised because of the high degree of measurement error 
involved. Accordingly, these results might be affected by an a priori measurement error that informed the selection of 
the sub-sample of households. As a consequence, I think that the main model based on the entire sample of rural 
farming households could provide a better framework for the analysis.  
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The dependent variables 
Market participation  
The definition of market participation I use for this analysis only captures the “sale” 
transactions of any type of crop and, as such, a household is defined as market 
participant if it engaged in the sale of any of its crops in any market outlet during the 12 
months preceding the time of each survey. On the other hand, a household is defined as 
non-market participant if it did not engage in any sale transaction during the same 
period. 
The extent of market participation (commercialisation) 
While market participation identifies the discrete decision to sell or not to sell, 
commercialisation reflects the decision on the extent of the market participation. The 
measure of commercialisation that I am going to use follows Govereh et al. (1999) and 
Strasberg et al. (1999) who created a simple Household Commercialisation Index which 
is based on total value of sales and total value of production and it is formally expressed 
as the ratio of total value of sales 𝑇𝑆𝑖 to total value of production 𝑇𝑄𝑖 at household 
level, expressed in percentages: 
𝐻𝐶𝐼𝑖 =
𝑇𝑆𝑖
𝑇𝑄𝑖
∗ 100, 0 < 𝐻𝐶𝐼𝑖 < 100   (12)
7
 
Different measures of commercialisation have been proposed in the literature. Some 
studies focus on the degree of farm and crop specialization, as proxies for a more or less 
commercialised farming system (Bezabih and Sarr, 2012; Kasem and Thapa, 2011). 
There have also been attempts to formalise the measure of commercialisation into 
indexes. First, von Braun et al. (1994) suggest the use of three indexes: the proportion 
                                                 
7 Some authors apply a lower cut-off to the HCI or equivalent measures of commercialisation in a way to distinguish 
between “occasional” market participation and “real” commercialisation. Although in the main specification I do not 
apply any cut-off which could increase distortions by reducing my sample size, I also run a sensitivity check 
estimation using the 25th percentile of the HCI as lower cut-off in the estimation of the determinants of 
commercialisation. The full results are attached in the Appendix 1 and they show consistent results with the main 
model regarding the main variables of interest, transaction costs. However, some differences can be pointed out. First, 
land ownership becomes significant in the decision to sell or not to sell. Second, in the analysis of the extent of 
market participation, gender of the head of the household loses relevance as also farm size. In addition to the main 
determinants observed in the main models, higher education and food only production are positively associated with 
the extent of market participation while access to credit and distance to the extension officer are negatively 
associated. Another discrepancy with the main estimations, is the insignificance of the lambda coefficient which 
suggests that, for this group of farmers, selection bias is less relevant when controlling for the selected observable 
characteristics. Also, the sign of the lambda changes direction. If significant, that would have meant that the 
unobservables that determines market participation are negatively associated with the unobservables that affect the 
extent of commercialisation.  
32 
 
 
of output sold and input bought from the market to the total value of agriculture 
production; the ratio of value of goods and services acquired through market’s 
transactions to total household’s income; ratio of value of goods and services acquired 
by cash transaction to the total household’s income. Similarly and more recently, Gabre 
Madhin et al. (2007) use four approaches to measure household’s commercialisation 
(sales to output ratio, sales to income ratio, net absolute market position and income 
diversification) which includes measures of the degree of specialization of the 
agricultural production.  
The HCI index (calculated as in (12)) has been preferred for its simplicity and because it 
fits better the purpose of the analysis which only focuses on the “sale” side of the output 
market transactions at household level. Other measures of commercialisation, described 
above, extend the breath of the analysis to the demand side of market participation in 
trying to understand what the determinants of the choice to be a net buyer or seller are, 
most of the time at crop level. Other measures, instead, capture production constraints 
and demand for inputs which do not fit the objective of this analysis. My main 
investigation aims to investigate the decision to sell and how much to sell in aggregate 
for all the crops and for one staple crop (maize) produced by the entire household. 
Hence, the choice of HCI.  
The explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables were chosen following the past literature and they are listed 
in Table 1. The role of fixed transaction costs is going to be estimated through the effect 
of four observable household characteristics: age, education and ownership of transport 
and communication equipment. They are expected to affect only the discrete choice of 
whether to participate or not. Age is expected to have an ambiguous effect on market 
participation: it could reduce the probability to participate, due to risk aversion and 
lower propensity to innovate issues, or it could increase the probability because of the 
increasing needs for cash income with age and because it could capture longer farming 
experience. Education, on the other hand, is expected to have a positive effect on market 
participation via the improved capability in interpreting and using market information, 
and as such reducing fixed transaction costs (Makhura et al., 2001). 
The ownership of radio is expected to mitigate the costs of accessing markets in my 
sample, due to the increase of radio marketing information services in the past decade. 
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Finally, the ownership of a bicycle is also expected to mitigate fixed costs of accessing 
the market. However, as Alene et al. (2008) have pointed out, bicycles may also serve 
as facilitators in the decision of how much to sell as they could be used not only to 
physically reach the market for gathering information but also for transporting crops to 
the market itself. Hence, especially for this variable, the empirical question on whether 
it should be considered linked to fixed or proportional cost is particularly relevant.  
Proportional transactions costs are included in the form of distances to periodic market 
and extension officer. These distances are expected to affect negatively both the 
decision to participate in the market and the extent of the participation. Following Alene 
et al. (2008), I convert the continuous variables (expressed in km) in dummy variables 
to avoid threshold effects. Hence, each distance explanatory variable equal to 1 if the 
distance is larger than the median value and 0 otherwise. 
The main variable of interest in this group is distance to market. The expected effect, 
although usually negative, is not that clear in studies of the Ghanaian context. As 
several authors have pointed out, marketing transactions very often occurs at farm gate 
or in the village of residence (e.g. Zanello et al., 2014). Qualitative studies have also 
shown that the role of intermediaries or “market women”, even more nowadays with the 
diffusion of mobile phones, is quite strong and widespread across the country (Burrell, 
2014). It is, indeed, very common that traders travel to communities and farms to buy 
crops and sell them at the periodic markets or to other traders. Long lasting relationship 
and social ties with these market traders may increase the ability to sell more or at a 
better rate when farmers are further away from the main markets. Also, the price 
differential between local, assumed rural and remote, and further away markets, 
assumed more urban and dynamic, could justify a positive relationship between distance 
to market and the extent of market participation, i.e. value of sales (Zamasiya et al., 
2014).  
Aside from variables expected to explain or mitigate transaction costs, other explanatory 
variables include: gender of the head of the household (capturing gender differences in 
marketing choices), farm labour, farm size and land ownership (as proxies of wealth), 
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substitutes of cash crop income (livestock, access to credit, access to non-farm income) 
and measures of crop diversification (food only production)
 8
.  
Table 1 Explanatory variables 
 
Description 
Expected 
sign 
Expected 
relevance for*: 
Fixed transaction costs   
Age head Age of household head in years -/+ MP 
Primary  or lower 
education 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the highest level of education of 
household’s head is primary (some or all); 0 if household’s 
head has no education. 
+ MP 
Secondary or 
higher education 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the highest level of education of 
household’s head is higher than primary; 0 if household’s 
head has lower education levels. 
+ MP 
Ownership of radio Dummy variable equal to 1 if household owns a radio; 0 
otherwise 
+ MP 
Ownership of 
bicycle 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if household owns a bicycle; 0 
otherwise 
+ MP 
    
Proportional transaction costs   
Distance to nearest 
periodic market 
Community level variable, dummy variable equal to 1 if 
distance is bigger than the median value of distance in Km; 0 
otherwise. 
-/+ MP and CI 
Distance to nearest 
extension officer 
Community level variable, dummy variable equal to 1 if 
distance is bigger than the median value of distance in Km; 0 
otherwise. 
- MP and CI 
   
Other explanatory variables   
Male head Dummy variable equal to 1 if household’s head is a man; 0 
otherwise 
+ MP and CI 
Farm labour Number of household’s member working on own farm + MP and CI 
Farm size Hectares + MP and CI 
Land ownership Dummy variable equal to 1 if household owns any land; 0 
otherwise 
+ MP and CI 
Livestock Number of livestock owned - MP and CI 
Access to non-farm 
income 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if household had access to non-
farm income; 0 otherwise 
- MP and CI 
Access to credit Dummy variable equal to 1 if household had access to credit; 
0 otherwise 
-/+ MP and CI 
Food only 
production 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if household produced only food 
crops; 0 otherwise 
- MP and CI 
Processing Dummy variable equal to 1 if household processes any food or 
fish; 0 otherwise 
-/+ MP and CI 
*MP=market participation (0/1); CI=commercialisation (0-100) 
                                                 
8 The choice of the explanatory variables for the analysis of the discrete choice of market participation has been taken 
simultaneously with the choice of the variables that are relevant in the decision of the extent of market participation. 
This resulted, for example, in the exclusion of total value of production or prices which would have been endogenous 
in the analysis of the extent of market participation. The simultaneous choice of the explanatory variables has been 
driven not only by the nature of the econometric model used, Heckman two step, whereby the omission in the second 
stage would have meant treating these variables as instrument for selection bias, but also by the uncertainty on 
whether these two marketing decision are taken simultaneously or sequentially.  
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Section 3. Market participation in GLSS 4, 5 and 6 
Farmers in the sample participate quite actively in the market. On average about 77-
78% of the sample sold any output in the market during 12 months preceding the survey 
periods across all rounds of GLSS. These rates are much higher than what previous 
studies have observed. However, this result is somehow expected as, differently from 
previous analysis, the market participation definition used here is much broader, 
including any crop produced and sold by anyone in the household. When differentiating 
by type of crops, the data show, in line with the expectations, that market participation 
rates are lower for staple crops than for cash crops, such as cocoa (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Market participation rates, 
selected crops 
Figure 3 Market participation rates, by agro-
ecological zone 
Figure 4 Market participation rates, by region 
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Across location and time, market participation rates appear quite similar and stable, 
although some regional differences can be pointed out. Overall, the highest market 
participation rates can be observed in the Brong-Ahafo and Northern regions and in 
forest agro-ecological zones, where, however, a decline from 1998 to 2013 can be 
noticed. Conversely, in other regions, such as Greater Accra, Eastern and Ashanti 
market participation rates have increased through time (Figure 3, Figure 4), maybe due 
to their closeness and better connection to the main shipping, packaging and marketing 
facilities developed in the past years in the Tema harbour, in Accra. Finally, the lowest 
market participation rates are observed in the Upper East region, with a minimum of 
36% during 2012/2013. The rates have been declining since 1998/99 when the average 
market participation rate was about 68%, possibly due to the occurrence of serious 
agricultural stressors since 2004 (ASIS, 2014)
9
.  Figure 5 shows the distribution of the 
Household Commercialisation Index. The figure shows that, differently from the trend 
of market participation rates observed above (Figure 4), the extent of market 
participation among market participants has increased through time (from 35% in 
GLSS4 to 39% in GLSS 5 and 46% in GLSS 6).  
Figure 5 Household Commercialisation Index, market participants 
 
                                                 
9 A detailed discussion of these results can be found in the Appendix 1.3. 
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The location disaggregated distribution in Figure 6 confirms this trend
10
. Hence, the 
extent of market participation, i.e. commercialisation, is observed to have increased 
steadily from 1998/99, both within regions and agro-ecological zones.  
Figure 6 Commercialisation index, by region and agro-ecological zones 
 
 
Table 2 presents some summary statistics of selected household and community level 
characteristics that have been used in the literature to explain market participation 
behaviours. The data show that market participants are mainly men, not necessarily 
older or better educated than non-market participants. Similarly, household size does 
not seem to differ that much across market participation status and time. On the other 
hand, farm labour, defined as the number of household’s members working on their 
own farm, is consistently higher for market participants.  
Farm size is usually bigger for sellers (i.e. market participants), which could explain 
why more household’s members are engaged in farming activities on their own farm, 
but it is only significantly different from non-market participants at aggregate level and 
                                                 
10 Only GLSS6 reports observation for the agro-ecological zone GAMA, Greater Accra Municipality. This is why the 
figure only has GLSS 6 data.  
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for the period 2005/06. However, the size of the farm owned as well as land ownership 
are both significantly higher across the three surveys.  
A higher degree of production diversification is observed for market participants, who 
are less often food only producers. No significant difference is, instead, observed about 
processing activities. Market participants do not seem to be engaged in processing 
activities more or less than non-market participants.  
Similarly, the access to substitutes for crop cash income, such as livestock, credit and 
non-farm income is observed to be not significantly different for market participants, 
aside from the access to credit which is consistently higher compared to non-market 
participants.  
Among measures of fixed transaction costs, the summary statistics show that market 
participants own more commonly communication and transport assets, such as radio 
and bicycle, which could suggest that farmers who participate in the market may be 
facing lower costs in accessing market information.  
As for proportional transaction costs, or transportation and marketing per unit costs, the 
statistics show an unclear pattern, as market participants are located generally further 
away from periodic markets than non-market participants. Figure 7 shows the 
distribution of the distance to the periodic market for non-market participants and 
market participants and it also seem to suggest that, over the pooled sample, market 
participants are located further away from a periodic market. This distance seems to 
increase with time, as the major differences between market participants and non-
participants can be observed for the last round of GLSS (2012/13; in grey in Figure 7).  
This unexpected association between remoteness and market participation could cover a 
simple location effect and if so a disaggregation at regional level should be able to 
identify a consistent trend across time of different regions. However, Figure 8 which 
disaggregates the distance to the market by region and by GLSS round, does not show a 
clear pattern across regions that could explain the positive correlation between 
remoteness and market participation.    
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Table 2 Selected descriptive statistics 
  Total   GLSS4   GLSS5   GLSS6   
  NMP1 MP2  NMP1 MP2  NMP1 MP2  NMP1 MP2  
  Mean Mean P-value Mean Mean P-value Mean Mean P-value Mean Mean P-value 
Male head (0/1) 0.66 0.80 0.000*** 0.72 0.81 0.001*** 0.65 0.80 0.000*** 0.71 0.82 0.000*** 
Age head Years 47.87 46.74 0.013** 45.21 44.44 0.699 48.16 46.47 0.025** 47.05 47.63 0.299 
Primary or lower education (0/1) 0.22 0.28 0.000*** 0.36 0.37 0.123 0.22 0.28 0.001*** 0.25 0.27 0.183 
Secondary or higher education (0/1) 0.14 0.12 0.965 0.04 0.10 0.746 0.07 0.05 0.055* 0.34 0.36 0.142 
HH size # 4.54 5.03 0.000*** 5.39 5.60 0.862 4.33 4.86 0.000*** 5.13 5.61 0.002*** 
Farm labour3 # 1.66 2.08 0.000*** 1.34 1.52 0.163 1.72 2.20 0.000*** 1.47 1.68 0.140 
Farm size Ha 4.75 5.72 0.597 1.53 3.79 0.000*** 5.65 6.29 0.854 2.18 3.85 0.000*** 
Farm size owned Ha 0.19 0.92 0.000*** 0.25 0.99 0.038** 0.18 0.94 0.001*** 0.23 0.86 0.003*** 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.60 0.65 0.373 0.29 0.44 0.000*** 0.59 0.66 0.013** 0.62 0.63 0.085* 
Food only producer (0/1) 0.56 0.31 0.000*** 0.56 0.27 0.000*** 0.54 0.30 0.000*** 0.62 0.33 0.000*** 
Processing (0/1) 0.33 0.34 0.489 0.82 0.81 0.692 0.19 0.23 0.059* 0.72 0.68 0.822 
Livestock # 12.97 13.24 0.771 11.06 5.23 0.467 7.73 10.84 0.000*** 12.28 21.19 0.263 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.47 0.39 0.000*** 0.98 0.98 0.474 0.43 0.38 0.028** 0.61 0.44 0.000*** 
Credit (0/1) 0.31 0.37 0.000*** 0.37 0.45 0.176 0.25 0.33 0.001*** 0.48 0.53 0.001*** 
              
Radio (0/1) 0.62 0.74 0.000*** 0.51 0.61 0.007*** 0.65 0.77 0.000*** 0.54 0.63 0.000*** 
Bicycle (0/1) 0.30 0.34 0.077* 0.23 0.27 0.429 0.28 0.34 0.005*** 0.35 0.33 0.576 
              
Distance to periodic market Km, community  6.13 6.99 0.003*** 15.08 12.48 0.751 5.63 5.91 0.621 7.52 10.56 0.000*** 
Daily market (0/1), community 0.17 0.14 0.199 0.17 0.20 0.832 0.18 0.14 0.158 0.15 0.11 0.798 
Distance to extension officer Km, community  9.30 8.58 0.568 15.85 17.25 0.936 8.93 8.05 0.380 10.35 10.34 0.684 
N  3,736 11,000  743 2,374       986 3,186  2,007 5,440  
1NMP=Non market participants   
2MP=Market participants 
3N. household’s members working on own farm
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Figure 8 Distance to periodic market, by region 
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Aside from location drivers, one other reason why a positive association between 
remoteness and market participation is observed can simply be that the periodic market, 
whose distance is reported in the surveys, is not the preferred location of market 
transactions for the farmers included in the sample, who, maybe, sell their produce at 
the local market, within the community of residence. However, even in this case, 
comparing the existence of daily markets in communities where market participants and 
non-participants are located does not provide useful insights. Hence, the summary 
statistics in Table 2 show that the presence of daily markets in the community does not 
differ between communities where seller and non-seller are located and, as such, it does 
not help in explaining this unexpected association.  
Another possible explanation of this odd relationship may be embedded in the 
traditional Ghanaian specific marketing systems. As suggested by previous studies of 
the Ghanaian marketing systems (e.g. Zanello et al., 2014) it may be possible that, also 
in my sample, market transactions do not occur in what is commonly identified as 
“market” (neither periodic nor daily) but they instead occur at the farm gate or via 
market traders who collect directly from the community of residence of the supplier
11
.  
Figure 9 summarizes the distribution at crop level of the preferred sale outlets and it 
shows that, indeed, the most common sale outlets since the first round of the three 
surveys are market traders and farm gate buyers, for the majority of the crops. Cocoa is 
the only crop that stands out among all the other crops as it is mainly sold to state 
managed trading organisations. Direct sales transactions to consumers are only rarely 
chosen as preferred outlet and their relevance in the overall marketing systems is found 
to decrease with time. On the other hand, the graphs also show that intermediaries, such 
as market traders, often dominating the sale transactions of staple crops, whereas pre-
harvest contractors are more common for cash crops. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Although GLSS questionnaires do not allow for a direct comparison of type of markets (periodic and daily 
markets) and main sale outlets, a question in the agricultural production distinguishes between the following main 
sale outlets: pre-harvest contractor, farm gate buyer, market trader, consumer, state trade organisation and other sale 
outlets.   
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Figure 9 Preferred sale outlet-GLSS4, 5, 6 
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Section 4. Econometric models  
Following past literature, the preferred econometric models for the analysis of market 
participation and its extent are probit for the discrete choice of selling or not and 
Heckman two step for the decision of how much to sell (i.e. commercialisation or extent 
of market participation). While the choice of the probit model is quite straightforward in 
the case of bivariate analysis, the choice of the Heckman model has been driven by one 
of the main limitations of the market participation analysis: self-selection or selection 
bias.  In the analysis of market participation, selection bias refers to the very likely 
scenario that farmers who are market participants might be systematically different from 
non-market participants and this difference necessarily affects the extent of their 
participation, which is null in the case when farmers decide to not participate and cannot 
be observed.  
OLS produces biased and inconsistent estimates in presence of selection biases and, as 
such, cannot be used. In alternative to OLS, other models have been used in the 
literature, such as and double-hurdle approaches based on Tobit models, Heckman, and, 
sometimes, switching endogenous regressions.  
The Heckman two-step model is normally preferred to these other approaches as it 
allows for fewer restrictions than other models require. More specifically, compared to 
other MLE models, it relaxes the joint normality distribution of the error assumptions, 
which makes model such as Tobit type 1 less preferable to Heckman. In addition, Tobit 
models in the case of market participation would assume that “zero” values of the 
commercialisation level associated with “non-participation” are the result of a rational 
choice, i.e. non-participant farmers decide to sell “zero” in the market. Moreover, using 
a Tobit model in the analysis of the extent of market participation would mean 
assuming that transaction costs and other determinants affect in the same way and 
direction both the discrete decision to sell or not sell (“zero”) and the extent of market 
participation. Furthermore, as the decision to participate or not is only addressed in this 
analysis in a dichotomous fashion, Heckman models can be also preferred to 
endogenous switching regressions, which is often related to the investigation of 
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alternative non-independent marketing regimes choices
12
. Finally, following Alene et al. 
(2008), the two step procedure within the Heckman approach also allows the 
investigation of the role that transaction costs play in non-participation, on the discrete 
decision to participate and on its extent
13
.  
Notwithstanding its advantages, one main difficulty in using the Heckman models is the 
identification of exclusion factors that are deemed to affect the variable of interest only 
through the selection equation. Selection biases can derive from observables and 
unobservable factors. Unobservable factors are likely to affect this analysis as more 
motivated, more dynamic and more able farmers could self-select into market 
participation. It is well known that the choice of factors that could effectively capture 
the selection on unobservable is as complicated and as fundamental as finding a good 
instrument variable in any econometric analysis. Nonetheless, in the analysis of market 
participation, the conceptual framework predicts that fixed transaction costs, such as 
age, education and ownership of transportation and communication assets, should affect 
only the discrete decision to participate in the market and not the decision on its extent, 
i.e. commercialisation. As a consequence, those observable factors that are thought to 
efficiently proxy for often unobservable fixed costs have been considered in the past 
literature as valid candidate of identifier variables (IV) in the selection model
14
.  
Aside from the selection bias, problems of endogeneity are deemed to affect this 
analysis. The main variables that are more likely to be endogenous are the following: 
access to credit, access to non-farm income and crop portfolio choices. It is highly likely 
that there could be reverse causality between market participation and these variables. A 
higher access to credit, for example, might have been caused by the decision to 
                                                 
12 For example, Goetz (1992) analyse the determinants of three regimes: being a net buyer, being a net seller or being 
autarchic. In this paper I assume that there is a dichotomous decision and as such I keep my identification strategy as 
simple as possible.  
13 In order to validate my main results I have also estimated a Craggit – double hurdle model and a Tobit model. The 
results are shown in Appendix 1.5. The results of the first tier of the double hurdle model (market participation) are 
perfectly consistent with the probit estimations, while the analysis of the second tier (extent of market participation) 
shows that in addition to the determinants identified in the Heckman procedure, food only production and distance to 
extension officers become significant using this  model. On the other hand, the results from the Tobit estimation show 
that most of the explanatory variables are significant in the analysis of the extent of market participation. These 
differences with my main results might be a result of the constraints described above. Nonetheless, considering the 
amount of similarities in these estimations and my preferred models, I believe that the choice of probit and Heckman-
two step could be appropriate in this analysis.  
14 Although no official statistical test is available, one way to ascertain the relevance of the IVs in capturing selection 
bias, is to verify the significance of their coefficients in both the discrete and extensive decisions of market 
participation. If significant in the former and not in the latter model, the variable under scrutiny could be possibly 
considered a good instrument. 
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participate and its extent. If the expected positive return of market participation on 
living standards holds, the better economic status of market participants might have 
facilitated access to credit. On the other hand, market participants might have borrowed 
more money than non-market participants to support adoption of more marketable crops 
or assets as well as to face transaction costs that sales activities often require. One 
option to overcome this issue would be to use a lagged value of credit, two or three 
years before market participation and its extent are observed. However, the 
contemporaneous nature of the data used does not allow implementing this strategy. 
Another possible solution would be to use an instrument variable that would predict the 
effect of credit on market participation and its extent. However, the search for a valid 
instrument might be very difficult considering the type of data that I am using and the 
type of analysis that I am carrying out. It is indeed likely that all the most common 
variables used to instrument for credit affect or are affected by market participation as 
well
15
.  
A similar problem can be caused by the access to non-farm income and crop portfolio 
choices. A higher intensity of market participation could allow a higher access to non-
farm income and vice-versa, via the adoption, for example, of more marketable crops. 
Controlling for access non- or off-farm income is part of the traditional conceptual 
market participation and as a consequence I will follow the literature including it in my 
main specification
16
.  Nonetheless, in order to ascertain the degree of distortion caused 
by these problematic variables, I have estimated different specifications of the model of 
both market participation and commercialisation with and without these potential 
endogenous variables. The results, in the Appendix 1. 6, show that the significance, the 
size and the direction of the coefficients of the majority of the other covariates and 
especially the variable of interests, transaction costs, do not seem to be affected by their 
inclusion or exclusion. Thus, although acknowledging the unsolved endogeneity 
problems in the model I feel confident in including these variables in the final 
specification as their contribution to the interpretation of the effect of the variables of 
interests is somehow minimal. 
                                                 
15 Past studies use, for example, farm size, land ownership and other farm characteristics as instrumental variables for 
access to credit. These variables are most likely to be relevant in the market participation equation (Beke, 2011; 
Diagne and Zeller, 2001).  
16 It is probably worth mentioning that these variables are included in the model only as controls for both the analysis 
of market participation and its extent.  
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Section 5. Results 
5.1 Determinants of market participation 
Table 3 shows the results of the marginal effects of the probit estimation of market 
participation. Model (1) does not include measures of fixed transaction costs, aside from 
age and education. Model (2) includes all fixed transaction costs as measured by 
ownership of radio and bicycle and model (3) also includes proportional transaction 
costs. All of the specifications include regional and year dummies.  
The results in Table 3 show that common determinants of market participation are also 
relevant in this analysis. For example, the gender of the household’s head is highly 
significant and positively associated with market participation, supporting the argument 
that men are more likely to be involved in marketing activities. The availability of farm 
labour in the household is also positive and significant, suggesting that more people are 
engaged in own farming activities when the household participates in the market. 
Among substitutes of crop cash income, access to non-farm income has, as expected, a 
negative association with the decision to participate in the market. On the other hand, 
livestock ownership is not significant and access to credit is positively associated with 
market participation, which could suggest that farmers in the sample might be using 
credit for activities that are not necessarily substitutes of market participation, as, for 
example, improvement in the production of tradable crops or producing more 
marketable crops. Producing only food crops is, indeed, observed to lower the 
probability of market participation.    
Moreover, the results also show that some of those observable factors deemed to 
explain or mitigate proportional and fixed transaction costs are strongly associated with 
the decision to participate or not in the market. More specifically, fixed transaction 
costs, as measured by age, education, ownership of radio and bicycle, are all statistically 
significant at 1% confidence level. Age is negatively associated with the probability to 
participate, supporting the idea that older farmers are less prone to participate in market 
transactions, maybe because of a higher risk aversion as suggested by Alene et al. 
(2008). On the other hand, owning a radio or a bicycle are both positively associated 
with the probability to participate, and the results are consistent throughout the 
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specifications, suggesting that these assets lower fixed transaction costs by making it 
easier the access to marketing information and, thus, reducing uncertainties from market 
transactions
17
. Unexpectedly, education seems to affect negatively the decision to sell or 
not to sell. This result contrasts with previous literature where education is claimed to 
be a facilitator instead of an inhibitor of market participation. One of the reasons of this 
unexpected result may be that higher educated, instead of mitigating fixed transaction 
costs within agriculture activities, allows access to better remunerated non-farm 
activities (Gould et al., 1989).  
Different measures of proportional transaction costs are found to affect market 
participation in a different way. While, the distance to the extension officer is negatively 
associated with market participation, the results show a positive association of distance 
to market with the decision to sell, which is inconsistent with the theoretical predictions. 
This result suggests that the further away from the market the higher is the probability 
that a household decides to sell. However, as discussed above, the inconsistency of this 
association might be explained looking at the specific characteristics of the Ghanaian 
marketing system. Hence, as Zanello et al. (2014) point out, and as explored in the 
descriptive analysis, it might be possible that the majority of market transactions do not 
occur at the periodic market, included in the model, but, instead, sales occur mostly at 
farm gate or through intermediaries, such as market traders. However, this should have 
been better supported via lack of significance of the distance to market coefficient. The 
positive association, instead, might be explained by the possibility that the further away 
farmers are, the more likely buyers would travel to their farm gate, or different 
marketing arrangements (e.g. pre-harvest contractors or group marketing) would be put 
in place, such that higher market participation could be observed.  
                                                 
17
 The ownership of radio and bicycle might not be exogenous to the market participation decision as farmers, for 
examples, might buy a bicycle to reach the market or a radio to gather market information. In addition market 
participation’s benefits, via increase of disposable income, could by itself favour asset accumulation. Although 
acknowledging this limitation in the analysis, I believe that an instrumental variable approach to overcome this issue 
could prove quite difficult as the same factors affecting asset ownership could directly affect the decision to 
participate in the market. In an attempt to understand the extent at which endogeneity issues affect the final results, 
looking at the estimations of the models without these variables tends to suggest that that the main results do not 
significantly change (Table 3, p.48 model (1)). 
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Table 3 Determinants of market participation 
 Dependent variable: Market participation (0/1) (1) (2) (3) 
  
Probit Probit Probit 
VARIABLES 
 
mfx1 mfx1 mfx1 
          
Male head (0/1) 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age head Years -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Primary or lower education (0/1) -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Secondary or higher education  (0/1) -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Farm labour # member of household who work on 
own farm 
0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Farm size Hectares 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Livestock owned # -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Access to non-farm income  (0/1) - 1 if household has access to self-
employment non-farm income; 0 
otherwise 
-0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Food only producer (0/1) - 1 if household produces only 
food crops; 0 otherwise 
-0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Processing (0/1) - 1 if household processes any 
crop or fish; 0 otherwise 
0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Radio  (0/1)  0.03*** 0.02*** 
  
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Bicycle (0/1)  0.06*** 0.06*** 
  
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Distance to periodic market (0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
median; 0 otherwise1 
  0.04*** 
 
  (0.01) 
Distance to extension officer (0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
median; 0 otherwise2 
  -0.02** 
 
  (0.01) 
Region dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
14,736 14,736 14,736 
Obs.P % 
 
75 75 75 
Pred.P % 
 
78 78 78 
Pseudo/R-squared 
 
0.127 0.131 0.132 
LR chi2   2121*** 2179*** 2205*** 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   1Distance to market median=8km (GLSS4); 1.5 km (GLSS5); 6 km (GLSS 6)  
2Distance to extension officer= 8km (GLSS 4); 4 km (GLSS5) 8km (GLSS 6) 
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5.2 Determinants of the extent of market participation 
Table 4 shows the results of the OLS non-corrected and corrected for selection bias
18
. 
Three specifications are presented. Model 1 does not include any transactions costs, 
aside from age and education. Model 2 includes all fixed transaction costs and Model 3 
includes also proportional transaction costs. As for the bivariate estimations in Table 3, 
regional and year dummies are included in all the specifications. The dependent variable 
is the Household Commercialisation Index (0-100), estimated as in (12). From the total 
sample of 14,736 households, 3,736 observations are censored as they correspond to 
those farmers who do not sell any of the harvest.  
Three identifier variables have been used in the Heckman two step model: primary and 
secondary and/or higher education, and ownership of a bicycle. Following the 
discussion above, while education is expected to capture fixed transaction costs, the 
ownership of a bicycle is not found statistically significant in the estimation of 
household’s commercialisation. As a consequence, it is plausible to argue that in the 
context of this analysis, transport assets, measures by the ownership of a bicycle, could 
approximate fixed and not proportional transaction costs. If so, it is possible that 
farmers in the sample do not use bicycles to transport their crops for sales transactions 
but, instead, this asset serves the role of a facilitator of the access to marketing 
information and as such affects market participation but not its extent.  
Using these identifier variables, Table 4 shows that the lambda coefficient is significant 
in all pooled models, suggesting that the OLS uncorrected produced biased and 
inconsistent results. The significance of the lambda coefficients supports that idea that 
there exists selection bias in the estimation of market determinants and its extent. More 
specifically, the positive signs of the rho coefficients indicate that a positive correlation 
between the unobservables that affect the decision to sell as well as the decision of how 
much to sell, exists. Thus, in my sample market participants are not a random sample 
and possess unobservable or unobserved characteristics that make them more likely to 
be market participants, such as less risk aversion, higher ability and so on. The size of 
the selection bias, calculated following Gyourko and Tracy (1988) and Reilly (1991), 
suggests that the market participants in my sample sell from 7% points to about 4%  
                                                 
18 The first stage of the Heckman estimation corresponds to the estimations reported in Table 3. 
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points more than a household drawn at random from the population with similar 
observable characteristics would be expect to have. This can be due to their higher 
ability to reach a higher value of their sales or to their entrepreneurial skills in managing 
their farming activities better. The estimation of the market participation models by 
survey year might provide some insights on the reasons why this type of selection bias 
is observed. The results, in Appendix 1.7, show that selection bias only occurs in the 
latest round of the GLSS
19
. The fact that farmers are not self-selected in to the market 
participation status in previous rounds could suggest that unobservable characteristics 
have been developed in the past five to six years. These unobservables, such as ability 
and entrepreneurial skills but also better linkages within agricultural value chains, might 
have been the result of the interventions of development agencies and national 
government projects. As shown in Figure 1 in p.18, several projects have been trying to 
facilitate market access. The provision of trainings, information on potential buyers and 
better linkages within the relevant value chains might have improved farmers’ 
marketing ability and this could explain why a selection bias is observed.  
Aside from the selection bias issue, the results show that, overall, classical determinants 
of commercialisation are also significant in the context of this analysis. For example, 
the gender of the head of the household is found positively and significantly associated 
with the level of household’s commercialisation. The size of the effect suggests that 
male headed households sell 2 to 6 percentage points more than female headed 
households. Previous findings suggest that gender of the head of the household is a 
significant determinant of the extent of market participation. However, the size of this 
effect tends to vary quite considerably depending on the type of crop under scrutiny and 
the nature of the analysis. For example, while Sebatta et al. (2014) find that man headed 
households sell from 2 percentage points more than female headed households in the 
potato market in Uganda, Boughton et al. (2007) find a much bigger effect, as men 
headed households are found to sell 26% more maize than a female headed household. 
                                                 
19
 The full results, in the Appendix 1.7, show, first of all that the selection variables are never significant. Education 
variables did not qualify as identifier variables for GLSS 4 while only basic education did for GLSS 5. Aside from 
remoteness discussed below, the results also show that gender is not relevant in the marketing decision for both GLSS 
5 and 6 while education is only a relevant determinant in the discrete market participation decision in GLSS 6. 
Moreover, the importance of farm size decreases with time as it is observed to be positively associated with both the 
decision to participate and its extent for the GLSS 4 but not for the two more recent surveys. Land ownership, 
instead, is found not positively associated with the decision to sell or not sell in the latest GLSS but it is still observed 
to increase the amount of sales, consistently with the main estimation and with the other two survey rounds.  
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However, the effect becomes not significant when cotton and tobacco market 
participation are analysed.  
Among other classical determinants of commercialisation, Table 4 shows that farm size 
and land ownership are consistently positive and significant throughout the different 
specifications, suggesting that farmers with a bigger land are more likely to sell more 
harvest. This is in line with other studies of commercialisation in Ghana, as, for 
example, Martey et al. (2012). They found that an additional hectare of land increases 
the household’s commercialisation in maize and cassava by 10%. Similarly, Boughton 
et al. (2007) find that an addition hectare of land increases the extent of maize market 
participation by about 20 percentage points.  My results indicate that farm size has a 
smaller effect on commercialisation as an additional hectare of land would increase the 
Household Commercialisation Index by about 0.04 percentage points. A large effect is 
exerted by land ownership which is observed to increase the Household 
Commercialisation Index by about 4 percentage points. This could suggest that although 
farm size is an important component of the decision of how much to sell, owning land, 
and as a consequence avoiding the risk to share the benefits of any investments on that 
land, might affect more the value of sales, ceteris paribus.  
Substitutes for crop cash income were expected to affect negatively the extent of market 
participation. In line with the expectations, the number of livestock is found negatively 
associated with the dependent variable, suggesting that owning more livestock reduces 
the amount of crop sales. However, both access to non-farm income and credit are not 
significant in the decision of how much to sell, which were, instead, found significant in 
the analysis of the discrete decision of market participation. Similarly, producing only 
food crops does not seem to affect the extent of market participation but only the 
decision to participate in the market. This finding could support the idea that food crops 
might foster market integration as much as the traditional more marketable cash crops. 
However, the effect of processing food crops is negatively associated with the level of 
market participation, suggesting that if the household processes any food or fish the 
proportion of the value of sales to the total value of production is lower compared to 
households who do not process crops
20
.  
                                                 
20 This result is in contrast with the idea that primary producers should engage in value adding activities, such as, for 
example, processing, in order to have access to higher sale prices. However, in the context of this analysis there is no 
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Moving on to the effect of transaction costs, the results show that both proportional and 
fixed transaction costs are relevant in the analysis of household’s commercialisation. 
More specifically, the effect of transaction costs is observed to be strongly significant 
when measured by ownership of communication assets, radio, and distances to market 
and extension officers.  
However, the observed empirical effects, aside from the coefficient for the distance to 
the extension officers, are not always consistent with the previous literature. The first 
inconsistency is the relationship between measures of fixed transaction costs and the 
extent of market participation. According to the theoretical framework discussed in the 
previous section, fixed transaction costs should not be relevant in the decision of the 
extent of market participation but only in the discrete choice of participation. However, 
the findings in Table 4 suggest that, for example, ownership of a radio is significantly 
associated with the Household Commercialisation Index. Although conflicting with the 
conceptual framework, this result might be explained by the fact that marketing 
information diffused via radio could possibly affect the choice of the sale outlet in 
favour of the one that provides a higher price, which would, if chosen, increase the 
value of sales ratio to the total value of production. Similarly, access to this information 
could increase the negotiating power of the farmers with intermediaries, such as market 
traders, in local market transactions and this, again, could increase the value farmers get 
from sales. The diffusion of marketing information via radio and other communications 
assets is a quite recent development in Ghana and as a consequence this argument could 
explain the relevance of the ownership of a radio also in the analysis of the extent of 
market participation. 
Another unexpected result concerns, once again, one of the measures of proportional 
transaction costs: distance to market. Similarly to the results of the bivariate market 
participation analysis, (Table 3), the distance from the periodic market is found to be 
positively associated with the extent of market participation. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
clarity on what the processing activities really mean. This question was asked in the agricultural section of the 
surveys and as a consequence I believe that it mainly captures petty processing of mostly staple crops that are sold in 
small quantities and for low returns, as, for example, cooked rice or smoked fish. These crops are generally sold in 
the street by women at considerably low prices.  
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Table 4 Determinants of the extent of market participation 
Dependent variable: Household 
Commercialisation Index  
(0-100) 
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
VARIABLES 
 
Un-corr1 corr2 Un-corr1 corr2 Un-corr1 corr2 
   
      Male head (0/1) 2.19*** 3.21*** 1.68** 5.68*** 1.64** 3.61*** 
  
(0.70) (1.01) (0.72) (1.23) (0.72) (1.02) 
Age head Years -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Primary or lower 
education (0/1) 0.14 IV 0.08 IV 0.15 IV 
  
(0.66)  (0.66)  (0.66)  
Secondary or 
higher education  (0/1) 1.26 IV 1.15 IV 1.28 IV 
  
(0.85)  (0.85)  (0.85)  
Farm labour # member of household 
who work on own farm 
-0.53*** -0.35* -0.54*** -0.03 -0.56*** -0.27 
 
(0.15) (0.20) (0.15) (0.23) (0.15) (0.20) 
Farm size Hectares 0.04** 0.04*** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.04** 0.04*** 
  
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Land ownership (0/1) 3.72*** 3.75*** 3.67*** 3.80*** 3.69*** 3.72*** 
  
(0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.57) (0.54) (0.55) 
Livestock owned # -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00* 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Access to non-
farm income  
(0/1) - 1 if household has 
access to self-
employment non-farm 
income; 0 otherwise 
-0.13 -0.74 -0.20 -1.63** -0.14 -1.03 
 
(0.58) (0.69) (0.58) (0.78) (0.59) (0.70) 
Food only 
producer 
(0/1) - 1 if HH produces 
only food crops; 0 
otherwise 
1.09 -1.22 1.09 -4.55** 1.13 -1.92 
 
(0.71) (1.46) (0.71) (1.84) (0.71) (1.48) 
Access to credit (0/1) -0.45 -0.17 -0.53 0.37 -0.59 -0.04 
  
(0.55) (0.57) (0.55) (0.61) (0.55) (0.57) 
Processing (0/1) - 1 if household 
processes any crop or 
fish; 0 otherwise 
-4.35*** -3.63*** -4.32*** -2.60*** -4.35*** -3.38*** 
 
(0.65) (0.75) (0.65) (0.85) (0.65) (0.76) 
Radio  (0/1)   1.75*** 2.26*** 1.75*** 2.17*** 
  
  (0.55) (0.58) (0.55) (0.58) 
Bicycle (0/1)   0.47  0.49 IV 
  
  (0.63)  (0.63)  
Distance to 
periodic market 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is 
above the median; 0 
otherwise1 
    1.98*** 2.36*** 
 
    (0.54) (0.59) 
Distance to 
extension officer 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is 
above the median; 0 
otherwise2 
    -0.84 -1.01* 
 
    (0.53) (0.55) 
Lambda 
 
 18.69***  10.21**  7.98* 
  
 (5.63)  (4.42)  (4.39) 
Region dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
11,000 14736 11,000 14736 11,000 14736 
Censored obs 
 
 3736  3736  3736 
R-squared 
 
0.12  0.12  0.12  
Wald 
 
 1188***  1297***  1316*** 
Rho 
 
 0.654  0.381  0.302 
Sigma    28.57  26.77  26.45 
1OLS Un-corr= OLS on market participants only; not corrected for self-selection into market participation  
2OLS corr=2nd stage of Heckman two step; corrected for self-selection into market participation  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 1Distance to market median=8km (GLSS4); 1.5 km (GLSS5); 6 km (GLSS 6)  
2Distance to extension officer= 8km (GLSS 4); 4 km (GLSS5) 8km (GLSS 6) 
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More specifically, if the farmer is located in a village that is more distant to a periodic 
market, he/she would have higher ratio of value of sales to total value of production, by 
about 2 percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus. Among the few studies that 
find a positive relationship between remoteness and market participation, Zamasiya et 
al. (2014), find a bigger effect of remoteness in their study of soybean market 
participation in Zimbabwe. Their results suggest that being further away from the 
market increases household’s commercialisation in soybean by about 4 percentage 
points. Aside from the similarities between this study and Zamasiya et al. (2014), a 
positive relationship between remoteness and market participation contradicts the 
theoretical expectation that remoteness should reduce the extent of sales transactions.  
As mentioned above, following Alene et al. (2008) I use a dummy variable which takes 
the value of 1 if the farmer is located further away than the median distance observed
21
. 
In order to verify the robustness of these results I have also changed the specification of 
the distance variable (using the mean instead of the median as well as a continuous 
variable, Km, instead of a binary variable).  
Table 5 Remoteness and market participation 
   Market participation Extent of market participation 
    
Pooled Median Threshold (0/1) 0.04*** 2.36*** 
  (0.01) (0.59) 
Pooled Mean Threshold (0/1) 0.03*** 1.20* 
  (0.01) (0.63) 
Pooled Km 0.00 0.01 
  (0.00) (0.01) 
Pooled Km – no extreme values 0.00* 0.03** 
  (0.00) (0.01) 
GLSS 4 Median Threshold (0/1) 0.01 -0.73 
  (0.02) (1.12) 
GLSS5 Median Threshold (0/1) -0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (1.09) 
GLSS6 Median Threshold (0/1) 0.08*** 2.55*** 
  (0.01) (0.95) 
 
The results, summarised in Table 5
22
, show that the direction of the association between 
remoteness and market participation remains positive while the coefficients lose 
significance when distances in Km are used, possibly because of the existence of 
extreme values. When excluding the extreme values from the distance variables, the 
coefficients become significant again and remain still positive. I have also estimated the 
                                                 
21 The median values of distance to market are the following: 8km (GLSS4); 1.5 km (GLSS5); 6 km (GLSS 6). 
22 The full results are reported in Appendix 1.8, 1.9 1.10 for exposition purposes. 
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same models but using the mean distance, instead of the median, as threshold for the 
definition of the distance variables. These results are pretty consistent with the main 
estimations, in direction and size of the associations, suggesting that a positive 
relationship between remoteness and market participation might really exist.  
Although inconsistent with previous empirical evidence, this type of relationship could 
be explained looking at how marketing transaction occurs and have evolved in Ghana. 
As Martey et al. (2012) and Zanello et al. (2014) point out, it is very common in rural 
Ghana that market transaction occur via the establishment of personal relationship with 
buyers and traders, which could replace the need for farmers to physically reach a 
formal market place. Following this argument, it is plausible to argue that the further 
away from the market the farmers are the more they could be pushed towards the 
establishment of long lasting relationship with market traders or other buyers, which 
could favour market participation and its extent
23
. On the other hand it is also possible 
that distance to market might attract different buyers, as, for example, contractors, or 
induce farmers to engage in group marketing within farmers’ organisation. As 
suggested by Quartey et al. (2012) sales through these alternative outlets might provide 
farmers access to higher sales prices. 
In addition, the analysis of market participation by survey year (Table 5) suggests that 
remoteness was not always significant across time. More specifically, distance to 
markets is found not relevant in the analysis of market participation for both GLSS 4 
and 5 while it becomes positively associated and significant in the latest round of GLSS. 
The non-significance supports the idea that farmers did not need to physically reach the 
market, because their preferred outlet was maybe at their door step. Moreover, the 
positive association observed in the most recent survey suggests once again that in the 
past decades the effort of development agencies and national government in linking 
remote farmers with buyers has had an effect in reducing the transaction cost of 
reaching the markets. This could also explain why, for example, the coefficients for 
remoteness in the previous rounds have a negative sign, although not significant. 
                                                 
23 These personal relationships might translate in a stronger negotiating power with buyers. And a stronger 
negotiating power could allow access to a higher value for their sales, compared to what they would receive in 
“formal” markets where personal ties with buyers may be less common. This, as a consequence, could increase the 
ratio of value of sales to the value of total production as observed in this analysis.   
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Section 6.  An analysis of maize market participation  
As anticipated in the introduction, different effects of different type of transaction costs 
can have specific crop related relevance. Food crops, in particular, are normally 
associated with lower barriers for market participation compared to cash crops because 
of the low quality requirements. However, marketing food crops is sometimes 
characterised by higher transaction costs, due to higher search and enforcement costs 
(Boughton et al., 2007).  
In this section, I investigate the decision to participate in the market and how much to 
participate for a subset of maize growers. Focusing on one common staple also allows 
the analysis of additional data available in GLSS. Hence, these surveys have collected, 
for a selection of crops, information on preferred sale outlets. Using these data, I 
analyse the decision of maize market participation using a multinomial logit model 
(MNL), which compares non-participation to participation in two different outlets: farm 
gate and market trader
24
. 
Maize is the most commonly produced crops all across Ghana. In the sample used for 
this analysis, maize market participation rates are observed to be on average 51%, i.e. 
about half of the maize farmers sell maize. Across the survey years, market participation 
rates reduced by about 10% since 1998/99. The declining trend is mainly observed in 
coastal and forest agro-ecological zones, which include some of the most 
commercialised regions in the country, such as Eastern region and Brong-Ahafo region 
(Figure 10). Among maize market participants, the average Maize Household 
Commercialisation Index is 57%, meaning that about half of the maize produce is sold. 
However, differently from the estimations at household level, commercialisation levels 
seem to be declining with time (Figure 11).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Other econometric models, such as ordered probit, switching endogenous regressions or nested logit models, could 
have been used in this analysis. I chose the multinomial logit model for its simplicity as the aim of this analysis is 
mainly to validate the results of the main selection models.  
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Figure 10 Maize market participation 
 
Figure 11 Household Commercialisation Index, maize market participants 
 
Table 6 shows selected results of the analysis of determinants of maize market 
participation and its extent with and without corrections for selection bias
25
. The 
dependent variable for the probit analysis is “maize market participation” which equals 
1 if the household sells any maize and 0 otherwise. The Maize Household 
Commercialisation Index, the dependent variable for the OLS estimations, is estimated 
as the ratio of total value sales of maize to total value of maize production and it is, as 
                                                 
25 The full results are reported in Appendix 1.11 for exposition purposes.  
55% 
50% 
46% 
37% 
52% 
56% 
49% 
38% 
45% 
34% 33% 35% 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Total Coastal Forest Savannah
GLSS4 GLSS5 GLSS6
0
.0
0
5
.0
1
.0
1
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 20 40 60 80 100
Pooled 
GLSS 4
GLSS 5
GLSS 6
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 5.1376
58 
 
 
before, expressed in percentages. As in the analysis above, three identifier variables are 
used in the selection models: two education variables and ownership of bicycle. 
Compared to the all-household models, the selection coefficient in the analysis of maize 
market participation is found to be slightly smaller. Moreover, although the lambda 
coefficients is not always significant, suggesting that the unobservable characteristics 
not controlled for in this analysis do not always affect the decision to participate in the 
maize market, the direction of the selection bias is the opposite of what observed for the 
entire sample. Hence, maize market participants in this sample sell 3 to 4 percentage 
points less than market participants with similar characteristics had they been randomly 
selected. The nature of the crop under scrutiny might have affected this result, as maize 
is mostly a staple crop and it is generally retained for house consumption. Also, the 
reduction of the participation rates across time might suggest that policy interventions 
aiming to increase market access and farmers’ ability might have focused on other 
crops, as suggested by the Ghana Export Horticulture Cluster Strategic Profile Study 
(2008). 
The results of the corrected OLS show that, similarly to the analysis with the all-
household sample, farm size and land ownership are positively associated with both 
decisions of maize market participation and its extent.  Moreover, producing only food 
crops is observed to decrease the probability to participate in the market but it increases 
the size of the sales. On the other hand, the effect of processing food or fish is found to 
reduce the extent of market participation, suggesting once again that this variable might 
be capturing petty trade of cooked staple or smoked fish. Substitute of cash crop 
income, such as non-farm income, are negatively associated with market participation 
decisions while access to credit is found to increase the probability to participate but not 
its extent. Finally, the results support the idea that, also in the maize sector, marketing 
decisions are mainly a men dominated arena, as gender is consistently significant and 
positively associated with market participation decisions.  
Also similar to what observed in the household level estimations, some measures of 
fixed transaction costs also affect the extent of market participation. This result applies 
once again to ownership of radio. The ownership of a bicycle, instead, is only 
significant in the discrete decision of market participation and not for the decision of 
how much to sell, suggesting that also in this analysis this variable can be used as 
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identifier variable in the selection equation. This result is consistent with other studies 
on market participation determinants (e.g. Alene et al., 2008), suggesting that bicycles 
are used by maize farmers for accessing market information more than a mean of 
transportation of the produce. Moreover, as suggested by Figure 9 maize producers 
might not need to transport their produce at all as maize is commonly sold to market 
traders or at the farm gate.  
The results also show that proportional transaction costs are relevant determinants in the 
analysis of maize market participation. However, the distance to the extension officer, 
although with the expected sign, is not significant in the analysis of the extent of maize 
market participation, suggesting that, although it might reduce the probability to sell 
maize, it does not affect the size of the produce sold. This result contradicts in a way the 
expectations as maize farmers were expected to rely more heavily on extension officers 
compared to other producers and this is not only because maize is one of the major 
staple crops but also because extension officers work heavily in the technical assistance 
for staple production. However, production and the extent of the maize marketing 
decision might not be related in rural areas in Ghana. Hence, it might be plausible that 
extension officers might play a bridging role for the access to marketing opportunities 
but not much more than that.  
The puzzling results observed in the full sample above between remoteness and market 
participation is observed also in this analysis, as distance to market is still strongly and 
positively associated with a higher extent of market participation. This finding suggests 
that also for maize growers being located further away from markets does not reduce 
their market participation extent. As for the analysis of the entire sample, and as 
suggested by Figure 9, maize farmers do usually sell at farm gate or to traditional 
intermediaries, such as market traders. As discussed in the previous section, it is indeed 
possible that also for maize growers consolidated relationship with buyers might have 
reduced transaction costs measured by remoteness. In addition, it is also a common 
practice among staple producers located in remote areas to sell through other buyers 
which help overcoming the role of traditional intermediaries and as a consequence 
might allow access to a higher price than the one offered in the “formal” market. 
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Table 6 Determinants of maize market participation 
 Maize producers only  (4) (4) (4) (5) (5) 
 
 Probit OLS OLS MNL MNL 
VARIABLES 
 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
Market 
trader 
Farm gate 
           
Male head (0/1) 0.099*** 2.829*** 1.844* 0.603*** 0.465*** 
 
 (0.011) (0.769) (1.005) (0.071) (0.091) 
Age head Years -0.001** -0.015 -0.012 -0.007*** -0.002 
 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) 
Primary or lower education (0/1) -0.017* 0.358 IV -0.093 -0.085 
 
 (0.010) (0.692)  (0.070) (0.090) 
Secondary or higher education (0/1) -0.038*** 1.062 IV -0.299*** -0.061 
 
 (0.013) (0.913)  (0.090) (0.113) 
Farm labour 
# member of household 
who work on own farm 0.012*** -0.554*** -0.716*** 0.035* 0.080*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.158) (0.188) (0.018) (0.024) 
Farm size Hectares 0.004*** 0.040** 0.036*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.006 3.299*** 3.346*** -0.055 -0.156** 
 
 (0.008) (0.568) (0.573) (0.059) (0.075) 
Livestock # -0.000 -0.003*** -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007) 
Access to non-farm income 
(0/1) - 1 if household has 
access to self-employment 
non-farm income; 0 
otherwise -0.060*** 0.064 0.733 -0.367*** -0.395*** 
 
 (0.009) (0.619) (0.721) (0.061) (0.080) 
Food only production 
(0/1) - 1 if household 
produces only food crops; 0 
otherwise -0.168*** 1.188 2.933** -0.809*** -1.030*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.744) (1.269) (0.068) (0.090) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.034*** 0.033 -0.216 0.188*** 0.204*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.574) (0.607) (0.061) (0.077) 
Processing  
(0/1) - 1 if household 
processes any crop or fish; 0 
otherwise 0.066*** -2.844*** -3.457*** 0.326*** 0.431*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.704) (0.765) (0.068) (0.087) 
Radio (0/1) 0.017** 1.622*** 1.413** 0.118** 0.106 
 
 (0.008) (0.576) (0.595) (0.057) (0.075) 
Bicycle (0/1) 0.051*** 0.046 IV 0.302*** -0.093 
 
 (0.009) (0.677)  (0.068) (0.091) 
Distance to market 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above 
the median; 0 otherwise 0.035*** 2.487*** 2.063*** 0.168*** 0.487*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.570) (0.612) (0.057) (0.074) 
Distance to extension officer 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above 
the median; 0 otherwise -0.018** -0.569 -0.366 -0.041 -0.225*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.564) (0.582) (0.057) (0.075) 
Lambda     -7.370*   
 
   (4.317)   
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  12,156 9,386 12156 8741 8741 
Censored observations    2770   
Obs. P %  77     
Predicted obs %  81     
LR chi2  1738.93***   2131***  
R-squared  0.1333 0.096  0.12  
Wald    784***   
Rho    -0.286   
Sigma    25.75   
1Marginal effects are presented       
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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In order to investigate how market participation determinants change according to 
different sale outlets, I then estimate a multinomial logit model that compares the main 
sale outlets to the choice of not-participation. Within the market participation regimes I 
compare the traditional marketing system (via market traders) to less traditional systems 
(other farm gate sales, sales via cooperatives or farmers’ organisation and sales to pre-
harvest contractors). Following this, I have used a categorical variable which includes 
three mutually exclusive categories for the estimation of the multinomial logit model: 1) 
farm gate, cooperatives, pre-harvest contractors; 2) market trader; 3) non-market 
participation. Missing data problems reduced the available sample, as data on sale 
outlets are only available for 8,741 households of the total 9,386 maize producers who 
participate in the market.  
Among this sub-set of maize growers, the data show that, on average, about half of the 
maize growers in this sample sell their produce to market traders. Pre-harvest, farm gate 
and group marketing via cooperatives occur more often in forest agro-ecological zones, 
where Brong-Ahafo, Ashanti and Eastern regions are located. Across survey years, 
marketing transactions at farm gate or via contractors and cooperatives increased more 
compared to sales to market traders (Figure 12).  
Figure 12 Maize market participation, by outlet of sales 
 
Figure 13 shows that also the proportion of sales towards market traders has reduced 
compared to alternative outlets. 
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Figure 13 Maize Commercialisation Index, by outlet of sales 
 
 
Table 6 (last two columns) shows the MNL estimations where the base category is non-
market participation. Consistently with the all-household estimations, the results of the 
MNL show a positive relationship between market participation and remoteness.  
Nonetheless, an interesting result is that the magnitude of the coefficient of distance to 
market is bigger in the case of the choice of farm gate, contractors and cooperatives 
compared to sales to a market trader. This result might support the idea that avoiding 
sales intermediaries, such as market traders, compared to not selling at all, has a bigger 
association with market participation than selling to a market trader. Quartey et al. 
(2012) find that market traders generally offer a lower sale price for maize compared to 
pre-harvest contractors and cooperatives in Ghana. Also, these non-traditional 
marketing outlets might be more common when markets are located more far away 
from the farm. Figure 14 shows that in the sample used for this analysis, market traders 
are, indeed, the most common outlet of sales for farmers who live closer to the markets 
while farm gate, cooperatives and pre-harvest contractors are more common for farmers 
located further away.  
0
.5
1
1
.5
D
e
n
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
GLSS 4
GLSS 5
GLSS 6
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0553
Market traders
0
.5
1
1
.5
D
e
n
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
GLSS 4
GLSS 5
GLSS 6
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0650
Farm gate, pre-harvest contractors, coop
63 
 
 
Figure 14 Maize outlet of sales, by distance to the market 
 
Comparing these results to the findings of the all-household analysis shows that two 
arguments may have favoured a positive association between remoteness and market 
participations: social network and access to different sale outlets. Social network in the 
form of group marketing within cooperatives, established relationship with traditional 
buyers but also contacts with direct buyers at farm gate might make what is normally 
considered a marketing disadvantage, remoteness, a potential point of strength for 
farmers in the sample.  
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Section 7. Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the determinants of market participation 
and its extent in Ghana with a focus on the role of fixed and proportional transaction 
costs. The analysis aims to investigate market participation with regards to both the 
decision to sell and not (the discrete decision of market participation) and the decision 
of how much to sell (the continuous decision of the extent of market participation, i.e. 
commercialisation). Thus, this paper investigates market participation as a two-step 
decision process whereby self-selection confounding effects are taken into account 
using the Heckman two-step approach. Similarly to several other studies on market 
participation, this analysis aims to identify associations and not causality, between 
commonly identified inhibitors and facilitators of market participation. 
The dataset used is a pooled cross section from the three Ghanaian Living Standard 
Surveys (GLSS 4 – 1998/99; GLSS 5 – 2005/06; GLSS 6 – 2012/13). To my 
knowledge, no other previous study has used the latest round of the GLSS for the 
analysis of market participation. The final sample is composed of 14,736 households, 
3117 households in 1998/99; 4,172 in 2005/06 and 7447 households in 2012/13, which 
corresponds to 47% of the total number of households and 81% of the rural households 
of the pooled sample of the three rounds of GLSS. 
The analysis investigates first the determinants of market participation and its extent, 
commercialisation at aggregate level, i.e. household level, as measures of transaction 
costs is only available at household and village levels in the GLSS. Then, the analysis 
turns the focus on one of the most important staple grown in Ghana, maize. The crop 
level analysis has been motivated by the argument that different effects of different type 
of transaction costs can be observed more clearly, as they can have specific crop related 
relevance. Although measures of transaction costs are not available for every crop 
market transactions, GLSS collected data on preferred sale outlets for a selection of 
crops, mostly staple crops. Using these data, I investigate the decision of maize market 
participation using a multinomial logit model, which compares non-participation to 
participation in two different categories of sale outlets: 1) Non-traditional: farm gate, 
pre-harvest contractors and cooperatives and 2) Traditional: market trader. 
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The results support the relevance of transaction costs in market participation analysis. 
More specifically, both fixed and transaction costs are found to affect the decision to 
participation and its extent, although at different level. Moreover, the results also 
suggest that, in line with the previous literature, fixed costs are generally only 
associated with the discrete decision to participate and not with its extent 
(commercialisation). However, this result is only found for ownership of transport 
equipment, bicycle and not for the ownership of communication assets, such as radios. 
Hence, owning a radio is observed to affect both the discrete decision to sell and how 
much to sell. Conversely, owning a bicycle only affects the decision of whether to sell 
or not. This result suggests that owning a bicycle might facilitate the access to market 
information and as such facilitate market participation.  
On the other hand, proportional transaction costs, as measured by remoteness from 
periodic markets, are observed to be positively associated with market participation, 
both in the household and crop level analyses. These results are not consistent with the 
traditional conceptual framework of market participation as well as with the related 
empirical evidence.  
In order to validate the results and to try to explain the puzzling positive association 
between remoteness and market participation, I explore different options. First, I 
estimate the models of market participation using different specification of the distance 
measure. Then, I estimate the models separately by survey year. Overall, these 
additional estimations confirm that remoteness matters in the decision to participate in 
the market and that the direction of this association is positive. Farmers located further 
away are more likely to sell.  
One of the reasons why this could be the case of farmers in Ghana is that, farmers that 
are located in community further away from markets have established strong 
relationship with traditional intermediaries, such as market traders, which in turns may 
have favoured their market participation. This is consistent with what Zanello et al. 
(2014) and Martey et al. (2012) finds in their analysis of maize farmers in Northern and 
Central Ghana. They both support the importance of social networks and personal 
relationship with buyers, which could allow farmers access to better prices for their 
sales and as a consequence a higher commercialisation level. Moreover, development 
agencies have been working quite intensively in the past years towards the reduction of 
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transaction costs for a better market access. The positive association between 
remoteness and market participation might, indeed, be explained because of the 
improved linkages between farmers and potential buyers that development projects have 
been supporting and fostering throughout the past decade. This argument is supported 
by the analysis of market participation across traditional and non-traditional sale outlets 
for maize. The results of this analysis suggest that selling at non-traditional outlets, such 
as farm gate, cooperatives and pre-harvest contractors, favours market participation 
more than selling at traditional intermediaries, such as market traders. These findings 
are in line with what Quartey et al. (2012) find in the analysis of price differentials 
across different marketing channels in Ghana.  
In conclusion, I believe that, although within its limitations, this chapter contributes to 
the literature of market participation for several reasons. First, the analysis includes 
three rounds of Ghana Living Standard Survey, one of which, GLSS 6, has just recently 
been released for public use. To my knowledge, this dataset has not been used for a 
similar analysis as yet.  
Furthermore, the results re-affirm the importance of including different measures of 
transaction costs, fixed and proportional, in the market participation analysis together 
with classical determinants, such as farm and household’s characteristics. In line with 
previous studies, measures of fixed transaction costs, such as ownership of bicycles, are 
found to affect only the discrete decision to sell or not to sell and not the decision of 
how much to sell. Transport assets are indeed found to be used as a mean to access 
information and not as a vehicle for transporting produce to the market.  
Furthermore, the unexpected positive association between remoteness and market 
participation may also contribute to the literature of market participation, especially 
with regards to Ghana, where marketing transactions often occur via informal marketing 
channels. The results of this analysis are in line with the argument that Zanello et al. 
(2014) and Martey et al. (2012) market transactions in Ghana heavily rely on personal 
relationships with buyers, especially when markets are further away from the farm. 
Also, in line with Quartey et al. (2012), the findings suggest in the case of maize 
growers that farmers located further away might have the opportunity to sell their 
produce to better outlets, such as contractors and cooperatives.  
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Overall, this analysis reinforces the importance of developing value chains linkages 
between farmers located in remote areas and buyers, traditional or non-traditional. 
Whether or not this holds for all types of crops it is not easy to say as GLSS data donot 
provide enough information at crop level and tends to focus on marketing information 
specifically for staple crops, such as maize. The lack of detailed crop level information 
motivated the primary data collection described in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2  
The adoption of exotic varieties of mango in Ghana 
Primary data collection 
 
Source 1 Field trip, February 2012 
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Introduction 
In the past decades, non-traditional cash crops have been supported by the national 
government in Ghana as a way to foster agricultural commercialisation and reduce 
poverty. Among the crops supported, exotic varieties of mango have been welcomed by 
national and international agencies as one of the crops with the highest potential in 
addressing small farmers’ poverty in Ghana, due to its higher weather resistance 
compared to other cash crops. 
Currently available secondary data do not offer enough information on non-traditional 
cash crop production. For example, GLSS does not provide data on the varieties of 
mango produced, on related production and sales values as well as on the crop level 
market transactions. Considering the strong poverty reduction potential that has been 
advocated for these crops, improving our understanding of the dynamics of the adoption 
of these non-traditional cash crops as well as of the impact that the adoption itself has 
on farmers’ well-being, motivated the collection of primary data used in this thesis. 
This chapter describes the design and implementation of the data collection exercise, 
carried out in the summer 2012, whereby with the help of 8 enumerators, I collected 
data from 305 farmers (196 adopters and 109 non-adopters of exotic varieties of mango) 
in three regions: Northern, Brong-Ahafo and Eastern regions.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 1 provides an overview of the 
development of the mango market and discusses the motivation for the primary data 
collection; Section 2 describes the design and implementation phases of the field work 
and Section 3 concludes. 
70 
 
 
Section 1. Background and motivation for primary data collection  
Exotic varieties of mango, such as Keitt and Kent, were introduced relatively recently in 
Ghana. In 1997 a NGO, ADRA, with funding from USAID implemented the program 
called “Food for Peace”, which established the first commercial orchards of mango 
farming in the Volta region. Free seeds and training were distributed to farmers willing 
to participate. This program was then followed by a more successful and more export 
oriented program, also financed by USAID, the Trade and Investment Programme for 
Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE). Started in 2004, the program aimed to support 
non-traditional cash crop production within every region of the country. Mango was one 
of the non-traditional cash crops supported. A more systematic approach was adopted 
during this program, as technical training in pre and post-harvest management 
techniques was provided to a large number of farmers across the country. Also, with the 
use of GPS technology, TIPCEE started the first mapping of mango farmers in Ghana.  
At the same time, major international donors, such as GIZ and the World Bank, and 
national agricultural initiatives (e.g. HEII) joined their efforts to make sure that what is 
called the “golden fruit” fully realised its potential. Through the establishment and 
consolidation of farmers’ organisations, better extension services, training and so on, 
the adoption of exotic varieties of mango, among other non-traditional export crops, 
became, indeed, part of the Ghanaian strategy for poverty reduction via increased export 
market participation.  
The adoption and diffusion of exotic varieties of mango for export became part of a 
broader food security strategy based on the idea that perennial tree crops are long lasting 
and more weather resistant, especially during dry seasons, than food crops. In the case 
of lack of rainfalls, tree crops can still generate fruits and income that can be used to 
buy food
26
.  
                                                 
26 In 2008 the Ghana Export Horticulture Cluster Strategic Profile Study defined exotic varieties of mango as one of 
the non-traditional cash crops with the highest potential in reducing poverty via participation of small, poorly 
endowed farmers in export markets and as a consequence to premium international prices. The report claim that the 
production of mangoes suits well small farming compared to other non-traditional export crops, as, for example, 
banana, because it is less labour intensive. Furthermore, mango production can be easily adapted to the changes in 
consumer preferences at relatively low cost if compared to the other major non-traditional export crop, pineapple, 
even by very small holders. The grafting process, whereby farmers only need to cut one branch of their mango trees 
and “graft” the new variety in the trunks of the trees, is not very expensive and does not require specific skills or 
technology to be implemented compared to other cash crops. ADRA, for example, claims that when farmers had to 
shift their production from the Smooth cayenne to the MD2 variety of pineapples, the process resulted and it still is 
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Following the implementation of several projects in support of mango adoption, 
production and export rose substantially in the past years from almost nothing in 2000 
to about 1000 tonnes in 2008 and almost doubled in 2013 (p. 11). Nowadays, 
commercial production of exotic varieties can be found in three specific production 
belts: the Southern Belt, (Greater Accra, Eastern and the Volta Region); the Transitional 
Belt (Brong Ahafo Region and Ashanti Region) and the Northern Belt (Northern, Upper 
East and West Regions)
27
.  
Figure 1 Major mango producing areas in Ghana 
 
 
Source 2 TIPCEE (USAID) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
very expensive. Also, ADRA reported that each farmer had to spend at least 8000 Ghc to adapt their production to the 
new European demand. 
27 Differently from other mango producing countries, the southern belt of Ghana has two harvest seasons: the major 
season taking place from April to July and the minor one from December to February. Due to the higher humidity, 
the southern belt usually experiences more pest and diseases (e.g. fruit flies) than the other two areas, where the 
production conditions, especially in the Northern Belt, are quite similar to so called SKBo triangle (Sikasso, Korhogo 
and Bobo Dioulasso) in Cote d’Ivoire, major mango producing areas in West Africa. 
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The group of mango producers in Ghana is very diverse especially with regards to farm 
size, which mostly varies according to the location. While in both the Southern and 
Transitional Belts some of the producers are large businesses and they operate as 
producers and exporters (e.g. Bomarts), in the Northern Belt production is mainly 
composed of very small farmers who participate in either the Integrated Tamale Fruit 
Company (ITFC) contract farming or African Development Bank funded bloc farm 
system
28
. For both these schemes, only an acre of land per farmer is used for the 
production of mango.   
Notwithstanding this diversity, one of the few analyses of the Ghanaian mango sector 
argue that more than a third of mango farmers are “poor complex diverse-risk-prone 
farmers”  with small farm sizes (less than 4 acres, on average). Their assets are mainly 
land and low productivity family labour; they may be share-croppers and may not be 
able to adequately feed their families all year round. Moreover, the study also argues 
that the majority of mango farmers do generally heavily rely on staple crops for their 
nutrition and they usually are poor and risk averse (CATRD, 2006)
29
. 
Furthermore, Zakari (2012) argue that mango farmers do generally face a number of 
constraints in accessing export premium prices. Hence, export of fresh fruits to 
European Union or United States requires the satisfaction of stringent sanitary and 
phytosanitary requirements. According to these requirements, fruits must be faultless, 
with perfect colour, size and weight.  
The vast majority of mango production in Ghana does not satisfy these requirements. 
The produce is often of lower quality than expected and this is mainly due to the 
existences of market and production related inefficiencies, which can be summarised as 
follows: 1) pest and diseases, such as fruit flies; 2) weather shocks, such as lack or 
                                                 
28 Block farmers are large farms that are divided in blocks of one acre. Each acre is cultivated by one farmer. Inputs, 
trainings and output are managed and shared collectively within the framework of a purposively constituted farmers’ 
organisation.  
29 Aside from individual farmers, mango is also produced on a large scale in bigger plantations. This is, for example, 
the case of the nucleus farm of ITFC and the plantation managed by Farm Management Services Limited (FMSL). 
ITFC was established in 1999 and mainly operates in the Northern region. It produces, processes and exports fresh 
and dried mango, mostly to EU. The nucleus farm is of approximately 200 hectares with about 1,200 outgrowers, 
organised under an ITFC-umbrella farmers’ organisation called Organic Mango Outgrowers Association (OMOA), 
and located in three districts of the Northern region. The farm is irrigated and it is certified organic by Soil 
Association UK and Global GAP. Farm Management Services Limited (FMSL) was also established quite recently 
(early 2000s) and it is located in the Eastern region. FMSL is a mango plantation sharing scheme between six major 
clients for a total of 1,300 hectares of land under exotic varieties of mango, which is mainly exported to the 
Netherlands.  
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excess of rainfall which causes bush fires and flower abortion
30
; 3) lack of adequate 
inputs
31
; 4) poor infrastructure (inadequate form of irrigation; bad road conditions; 
unadapt trucks for transport of fresh produce; unadapt packaging; lack of refrigerating 
facilities; lack of clear quality standards); 5) high freight costs; 6) lack of marketing 
information systems
32
. Figure 2 shows a mango affected by fruit flies (top left); a young 
mango tree affected by a decaying disease (top right); an abandoned water tank in a 
mango farm (bottom left) and an example of the road condition in the Northern region 
(bottom right). 
Figure 2 Mango production challenges 
  
  
                                                 
30  The latest episode dates back to December 2014 when excessive rain caused flower abortion nationwide, which 
reduced drastically the production and its quality. As a consequence, some processors have been forced to import 
mango produce from Brazil (as in the case of Bomarts) to accommodate the demand of fruit juice and processed 
mango from EU. 
31 Inputs are often provided by farmers’ organisation. However, the main input suppliers are large nurseries and 
agrochemical dealers, such as Agrimat and Dizengoff, which are mainly located in Greater Accra. The long distances 
from some major production areas increases the challenges of getting the right inputs at the right time, especially for 
poorly endowed and small farmers located in the Transitional and Northern Belt.  
32
 Specialised traders in the mango distribution do not exist in Ghana, so that fruit traders include mango in their 
portfolio only during mango season. The distribution activities are mainly dominated by market women (local 
traders) who normally buy mangoes directly from the farms during the harvest season. Retailers then buy mangoes 
from traders to sell them to the final consumers. However, market women, also often involved in the harvest 
themselves, generally sell mangoes directly to the final consumers and less often to intermediaries or middlemen. 
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As a consequence of these inefficiencies, only farmers with certified production (Global 
Gap, organic, Fair Trade, or trader specific certifications) can effectively access the 
benefits of the exotic mango production
33
, whereas the majority of mango growers often 
face considerable harvest losses. This is, for example, the case of the outgrowers under 
ITFC who are claimed to lose 75% of their produce, annually (Zakari, 2012). Still in the 
context of outgrowers in the Northern region, farmers do not even realize sometimes 
that they will be facing such a high rejection rate as the grading of the fruits is usually 
done at the time the produce reaches the buyer and farmers are not involved in the 
selection process. In reality, farmers normally end up selling a very small amount of 
their produce at export prices while the majority of the harvest ends up being sold in the 
local market at a much lower price, or used for processing dried fruits. 
The situation tends to be slightly better in other regions, such as Brong-Ahafo and 
Eastern regions, where a more business oriented attitude allows farmers to manage their 
marketing strategies more effectively and, as a consequence, are more often able to 
benefit from higher prices. Nonetheless, the inefficiencies listed above do also apply in 
these contexts. 
As discussed before, several projects have been put in place since the early 2000s, 
which tried to address market and production related difficulties in the mango sector, 
one of which supported the establishment of the Shed 9 Fruit Terminal in the Tema 
harbour.  
However, despite the high attention that the mango sector has attracted among donors 
and government agencies, there is overall a general lack of knowledge about mango 
farmers themselves, their specific constraints, their experiences and their perception on 
the benefits, if any, of being involved in the mango production. Very often, national 
institutions and development agencies do not even know whether or not mango 
production is still operational in some farms. After almost a decade from the Ghana 
Export Horticulture Cluster Strategic Profile Study and the completion of TIPCEE, the 
                                                 
33 Farmers are usually certified in groups, under the GLOBAL GAP 2 option. For example, selected farmers in the 
Yilo Krobo Mango Farmers’ Organisation (YKMFO). Founded with the support of TIPCEE, this association mainly 
operates in the Eastern region and it includes some of the most productive mango farmers of the entire country, some 
of which also received Global Gap certification for organic export. Aside from YKMFO, high quality certified 
production is carried out also by farmers in the Volta Mango Growers Association, formed in 2005, whose first 
orchard was established by ADRA in 1997 and the Papaya and Mango Producers and Exporters Association of Ghana 
which is instead an association of privately owned companied that produce high quality papaya and mango. 
75 
 
 
impression is that nothing or very little is known about mango farmers’ production 
decisions and welfare.  
In trying to address this lack of knowledge on such an important sector of the Ghanaian 
small farming economy, I decided to collect primary data. I have designed and carried 
out a field study and collected detailed information on mango and non-mango producers 
in the three main mango producing areas in Ghana: Eastern, Brong-Ahafo and Northern 
regions.  
From these three regions, I have surveyed 305 farmers, selected using a snowball 
sampling procedure, with an over-representation of mango and very small farmers 
(about 64% and 62% of the sample, respectively). Hence, the total sample included 196 
mango and 109 of non-mango farmers, of which 189 were very small farmers (less than 
three acres of land) and the rest medium and large farmers (more than three acres). In 
total, 17 villages were surveyed in seven districts (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 Geographical distribution of the sample 
 
Table 1 Sample distribution by farm size 
Region 
Small  
(farm size equal or less than 
three acres) 
Large  
(farm size more than 
three acres) 
Total  
Northern  77 (77%) 23 100 (100%) 
Brong-Ahafo  84 (56%) 67 151 (100%) 
Eastern  28 (52%) 26  54 (100%) 
TOTAL  189 (62%) 116 305 (100%) 
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Section 2. Primary data collection in detail 
The field work was mainly composed of two phases: the “Design” phase the “Data 
Collection” phase. The “Design” phase lasted approximately seven months during 
which I designed the fieldwork and it included a 10 day-exploratory visit in late 
February 2012 with the main objective of identifying a local partner for the main “Data 
Collection” phase, which instead lasted for two and half months.  
2.1 The Design Phase 
During the design phase, I planned and organised the field work. Aside from desk 
reviews for the design of the survey tools and plan, I carried out an exploratory visit in 
Ghana from the 14
th
 to the 22
nd
 of February 2012. The main objective of the exploratory 
visit was to gather information on the feasibility of the data collection and analysis. 
More specifically, the visit intended to identify a partner for the implementation of the 
survey activities and to gain a deeper understanding of the mango value chain in Ghana. 
I carried out several key informant interviews whose content was designed before 
arriving in the country and adapted according to the new information obtained. The key 
informant interviews involved some of the major stakeholders of the mango value 
chain, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, SNV, GIZ, ADRA, USAID and some mango 
farmers’ organisations.  
The exploratory visit was very successful in accomplishing both the objective of 
identifying a partner as well as in improving my understanding of the mango sector in 
Ghana, which informed the planning of the data collection. 
The German Development Agency in Ghana (GIZ) showed a great interest in 
supporting the field work. GIZ is one of the main actors in the mango value chain with 
the Market-Oriented Agriculture Programme implemented in Ghana since 2004 and 
expected to be completed by 2016. The objective of this programme is to enhance the 
participation of small farmers in selected value chains, including mango, and their main 
interventions are the creation and strengthening of mango farmers’ organisation, the 
development of value chain committee (composed of farmers, processors and other 
relevant actors, at district and at regional level) as well as the provision of training in the 
most essential pre and post-harvest management techniques specifically tailored for 
mango production, such as, for example, tree pruning, weed control, plant protection 
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and fertilisers’ use. They work in all major mango producing area, apart from the 
Eastern Region. Considering the relevance of GIZ in the mango sector and their 
established activities in the sector, I have identified them as partner of my research 
activities. A preliminary budget and field work plan was shared with them at the time of 
the meeting in Accra and a revised plan was then submitted after my return in UK.  
The revised plan included also insights gathered from other key informant interviews 
and the brief field trip I have carried out in the last two days of the exploratory visit in 
the Yilo-Krobo and Dagme districts in the Eastern and Greater Accra regions, 
respectively. The final expected budget was agreed to about £10,000 for a sample of 
360 households (later reduced to 305 households for logistic reasons). During the field 
work I managed to reduce the budget to about £9,000. The agreed duration of the field 
work was about three months over three regions: Eastern, Brogh-Ahafo and Northern 
regions.  
The choice of these regions was driven by their relevance in the mango production in 
Ghana. According to the TIPCEE estimations, these regions produce more than 40% of 
the Ghanaian mangoes (Figure 1). Due to their strategic location they also represent the 
three belts of the mango production: Southern Belt, Transitional Belt and Northern Belt, 
with the Southern Belt being the first to be introduced to mango and Northern Belt the 
latest. Differences in locations translates in dissimilarities in problems and inefficiencies 
of each marketing system and production activities with the Southern Belt mainly 
affected by humidity-related fruit diseases and the Northern regions by dry weather and 
bush fires.  
The relevance of the selected regions was also driven by the fact that they reflect 
different modalities of participation in the market for mango. The Southern Belt is 
mainly dominated by independent farmers closely located to the Tema Harbour and to 
the main processors and exporters in the country and so somehow advantaged with 
respect to the other belts. The Northern Belt is the only place where contract farming 
has been implemented and, finally, the Transitional Belt, of more recent development, 
stands somehow between the two.  
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The survey tools 
The design phase also included the finalization of the following survey tools
34
: 1) 
Village Level Questionnaire; 2) Household Level Questionnaire. The tools were shared 
with and reviewed by the central and regional GIZ offices. Some adjustments were 
made in the length of both questionnaires, in the content of specific mango related 
modules, as well as on the expected schedule and logistic arrangement for the main data 
collection.  
The Village Level Questionnaire aimed to capture the main characteristics of the 
villages sampled, with a focus on potential inhibitors and facilitators of adoption of 
mango. The following modules were included in the final questionnaire: 
1. Roster (with demographic, infrastructure and shock information) 
2. Agricultural production 
3. Agricultural inputs and storage 
4. Agricultural marketing 
5. Farmers’ organisation 
6. Development programs  
7. Access to information 
8. Contract farming 
The Household Level Questionnaire aimed to capture a more comprehensive set of 
household, farm and crop level information and it was composed of the following 
modules: 
1. Roster (with demographic information at individual level) 
2. Agriculture (plot level information) 
3. Agricultural production (crop level information) 
4. Agricultural input (input level information) 
5. Mango production (for only mango producers) 
6. Agricultural marketing (crop-buyer level information) 
7. Trainings and certification (crop level information) 
8. Relationship and trust (household level information) 
9. Farmers’ organisation (household level information) 
10. Adoption of innovation (household level information) 
11. Risk aversion and inter-temporal preferences (household level information) 
12. Assets, credit and savings (household level information) 
13. Sources of income (household level information) 
14. Subjective poverty (income and consumption level adequacy, economic ladder; 
household level information) 
                                                 
34 I also developed focus group discussions and key informant interviews guides, and a protocol for the 
implementation of the survey activities (Manual for enumerators). A copy of each tool can be found in the Annex to 
this thesis. 
80 
 
 
15. Recall section (on land acquisition, number of mango adopters and subjective 
poverty before mango arrived in community; household level information). 
The selection of the questions for each section was based on desk reviews of available 
secondary data from agricultural and Ghanaian surveys, with a focus on market access, 
social capital and value chain studies. The choice has also been driven by the type of 
variables that the data collected allow to construct. For example, the agricultural 
modules allows to construct variables such as farm size, land ownership, crop portfolio 
choices, at plot and household levels, as well as measures of households’ market 
participation. The module 8 collects information on social capital in a disaggregate 
fashion, which will inform the construction of social capital variables in Chapter 3. 
Module 11 collects information on risk aversion and inter-temporal preferences 
following the methodology by Binswanger (1980). However, only three of the seven 
levels of risk aversion used by Binswanger were retained for this survey, because of 
time and budget constraints. Finally, modules 12 and 13 will be used for the 
construction of a wealth index (module 12) and a subjective measure of poverty 
(module 13), the impact variables of interest of Chapter 4.  
The design of the survey tools has been a quite long iterative process in order to 
guarantee a fair trade off between the information that I wanted to collect in the field 
and what it could have been reasonable to include in the formal questionnaire. Aside for 
the quality of the data collected, my main concern was to avoid respondent fatigue. 
Respondent fatigue is a very common cause of measurement errors, incomplete or 
refusal to participate if the survey activities are expected to be too long. After several 
iterations, the main household questionnaire was estimated to last for not longer than 
one and one half hours. All the tools were tested during the pilot described below. 
2.2 The Data Collection Phase 
This phase started with data collection in Diari, Savelugu-Nanton district in the 
Northern region, in the first week of August 2012. In total, the data collection in the 
three regions selected lasted for about two and half months and it concluded with a 
presentation of the preliminary findings and impressions from the field work to GIZ 
Central Office and to the main representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. A mid-
term review was also presented at the end of the data collection in the second region, 
Brong-Ahafo, in the end of August 2012.  
81 
 
 
The pilot 
Before the main data collection, I carried out a four day long data collection pilot in one 
of the enumeration areas, the village of Manguli in the Tamale Municipality in the 
Northern Region. The objective of the pilot was to test the research tools, to let the 
enumerator familiarize with them and to make the necessary changes to the research 
tools, if needed
35
.   
The pilot lasted for four days starting on the 28
th
 July 2012, immediately after the 
conclusion of the training of the enumerators, described below. The first day was 
dedicated to selection of farmers, village level questionnaire and focus group 
discussions. The following days were dedicated to the collection of data with the 
farmers’ survey. Farmers received a pack of biscuits and a bottle of cola as a 
compensation for their time spent in the survey activities. 
Overall, the outcome of the pilot was quite good. Aside some logistic delays, the data 
collection was carried out without major interruptions. Also, the enumerators proved to 
have understood the main survey dynamics and no major mistakes were made in the 
data collection itself, which at the end of the four days, lasted on average 1 and half 
hour, as expected during the design phase. Nonetheless, testing the survey tools 
provided considerably important insights which improved both the delivery of the 
survey instruments as well as the quality of the data collected during the main 
enumeration phase. 
The main data collection 
Once the pilot was completed and the tools finalised and validated, the data collection 
started. For each enumeration area, I organised the field activities around five main 
components:  
1. Training of enumerators  
2. Sample selection  
3. Orientation phase  
4. Farmers’ survey  
5. Key informant interviews, where appropriate  
                                                 
35 The village of Manguli was selected because GIZ had contact with the leader of the local group of mango farmers 
who was able to provide a list of mango and non-mango farmers prior to our trip to the village and because the 
village is relatively close to Tamale. 
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Training of enumerators 
After the first meeting with the enumerators at the regional GIZ office, enumerators 
were asked to attend a three days training. The training usually covered two sessions. 
The first session was dedicated to the description of the research and its objectives. A 
second session thoroughly described all the research phases, tools and instruments. 
During the training, every enumerator was encouraged to raise issues and problems with 
the understanding of the research instruments. A special session was dedicated to the 
practice of administrating both the village and household level questionnaire during and 
after the training hours. Enumerators were also asked to practice with friends or family 
in their own village and return the day after with a filled questionnaire. After the 
completion of the training each enumerators was provided with the necessary research 
tools (printed questionnaires and codebook, pens, calculators, ID card, etc.).  
Figure 4 Team of enumerators 
 
Enumerators were also divided into two groups: one group (composed of two 
enumerators) was responsible for the implementation component 2 (sample selection 
and mapping exercise) and the second was made responsible of the component 3 
(orientation phase). At the end of the training each enumerator was also provided with a 
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Personal Work Plan with a list of activities and responsibilities for the entire duration of 
the data collection exercise. The Plan also included a section for the recording of the 
households interviewed during the farmers’ survey. Names, addresses and contacts of 
each farmer were recorded in this section and cross-checked with the submitted 
questionnaire at the end of each survey day. Figure 4 shows the team of enumerators for 
the Northern region
36
.  
Sample selection and mapping exercise 
The sample selection was originally designed to follow a random, stratified sampling 
procedure, using region and farm size as main criteria for the stratification. However, 
since the exploratory visit in Ghana, it became evident that getting a comprehensive 
listing of farmers containing this type of information would have been extremely 
challenging. Data on the location of mango farmers in Ghana are rare, scarce and not 
reliable. Where existent, most of the times they are about newly established mango 
farmers that are not harvesting yet and so they do not qualify for this research. In 
addition, they are not up-to-date. In some cases, farmers are not producing mango any 
more
37
.  
Furthermore, getting the list of all the farmers and their farm size for the districts 
selected proved to be almost impossible. Every year a farmer’s registration is supposed 
to be implemented at district level with the collection of all sorts of information about 
every farmer in the district. These data are then sent to the regional capital’s MOFA 
office that forwards it to Accra. However, the retrieval of these data was complicated by 
the following difficulties: 
1. MIS (Market Information System) officers in the districts’ MOFA offices were not 
often available. After being asked to send the list of farmers with the farm size, only 
a few of them replied and one of them sent a list in a format that could not be 
opened with the usual Windows software.  
2. In general, emails are not feasible for the purpose. Physically reaching and 
scheduling a meeting with MIS officers proved to be difficult and time consuming.  
3. In some cases, the offices did not even have electricity and so it was not possible to 
retrieve data from the local computers and paper copies were not available.  
                                                 
36 More details on the training can be found in the “Manual for enumerators”, attached in Appendix 2.2. 
37 For example, based on GIZ information, the district of West Mamprusi in the Northern region was supposed to be a 
quite well established mango production area. However, after trying to reach the few contacts I managed to find, I 
finally realised that the group of mango farmers was not existent anymore, mainly due to bush fires that had 
destroyed the cultivation. Only one mango farm was still operational at the time of the survey.  
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As a consequence of these constraints, a purposive, linear snow-ball sampling procedure 
was used for both mango and non-mango farmers, using location, farm size and mango 
production as main selection criteria
38
. Mango farmers and very small farmers (three or 
less acres of land
39
) were over-sampled, 60% and 80% of the sample respectively.  
Where no farmers could have been identified ex-ante, we conducted a mapping exercise 
with the help of local Agricultural Extension Officers and representative of farmers 
associations. This exercise aimed to identify farmers in the village who, based on the 
selection criteria, could fit the purpose of the analysis. Two days were usually dedicated 
to this preliminary mapping exercise. Specific directions were provided to the 
enumerators in their Personal Work Plan regarding the number of households to 
identify, the number of mango and non-mango farmers as well as the number of small 
and non-small farmers. 
Orientation Phase 
The orientation phase immediately followed or overlapped with the mapping exercise. 
Two of the four enumerators were responsible for the implementation of this 
component. The main activities of this phase were: contacting the village, preparing our 
arrival, implementing focus group discussions (one with mango farmers and one with 
non-mango farmers) with farmers identified during the mapping exercise and carrying 
out the village level data collection.  
More specifically, before arriving in the village, one enumerator usually contacted a 
village representative for organising the field work activities of the day. A chief of the 
village or other informed representative of the village were the preferred interlocutors, 
                                                 
38 Although it allows identification of hard-to-reach populations in a cost efficient and relatively simple way, the 
snowball sampling procedures poses substantial challenges with respect to the representativeness of the sample as 
very little information was available about the true distribution of the true population. Sampling bias is likely to affect 
the sample used for this analysis. It is indeed possible that sampled subjects present similar traits and characteristics 
and, as a consequence, represent only a selected group of the true population. Moreover, the use of snowballing 
sampling procedures has also implications for exchangeability and iid assumptions of the econometric analysis 
because of the lack of independence between observations. As a consequence, the regression estimates might be, 
indeed, biased. However, without knowledge of the underlying distribution of the population of mango and non-
mango farmers it is difficult to conclude the direction or magnitude of this bias. 
39
 In the definition of the farm size criteria I could have not used secondary data, such as, for example, the Ghana 
Living Standard Surveys, for two reasons: 1) the number of mango producers in this datasets is extremely low, 
suggesting that these surveys might be representatives of the mango population; 2) there is no distinction between 
local mango and exotic varieties of mango. Instead, I have followed the only mango study available at the time of the 
field work design: CATRD (2006) that argue that the majority of mango farmers had 4 or less acres of land. As my 
research focus aimed to include also very small farmers I have lowered this average value to 3 acres to make it 
consistent with official data from the Ministry of Agriculture, which identify the average land holding in Ghana 
agriculture of about 1.2 hectares (about 3 acres). 
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who were then asked to organise farmers, identified through the mapping exercise for 
the focus group discussions and the main survey.  
Figure 5 Focus group discussions 
 
 
86 
 
 
The focus group discussions were normally run with about 10 farmers for each group 
(Figure 5). Enumerators were trained as both moderator and assistant for the focus 
group discussions. The moderator was responsible of asking questions and animating 
the discussion while the assistant was in charge for taking notes and making sure that 
the recording equipment was working fine. Transcripts of the discussions were then 
prepared and submitted at the end of the enumeration exercise together with correctly 
filled questionnaires. The two focus group discussions aimed to gather information on 
the decision to adopt mango, the main issues related to production and post-harvest 
issues as well as farmers and village level general socio-economic characteristics. 
Specific instructions were given to the enumerators to make sure that farmers and locals 
knew that we valued their time very much and that their help was extremely precious. A 
thorough description of the research preceded any activity in the field and before any 
data collection every farmer was asked to sign a consent form, in the case they accepted 
to participate. Confidentiality was guaranteed at every level of the field activities.  
Farmers’ survey 
The farmers’ survey was implemented after the village survey and the focus group 
discussions. The survey collected in-depth data on farmers, households’ members, 
farms, crops produced and sold, buyers, relationship with other market actors, income 
and assets. A specific module was dedicated to the production of mango. Generally, 
each enumerator was able to finish four questionnaires per day. During the enumeration 
days, my supervision role mainly consisted of implementing a thorough quality check. 
The quality check strategy was based on two main activities: 1) accompanying one 
enumerator at the time during their data collection; 2) thoroughly validating each 
completed questionnaire the end of each enumeration exercise. The enumerators were 
asked to submit the clean and fully filled questionnaires, for entry and consistency 
checks. If errors or inconsistencies were found, enumerators were then asked to go back 
to the household and fill the specific section again. This strategy proved quite efficient 
as mistakes were corrected as soon as possible, reducing at the minimum the additional 
time that, in these cases, farmers would have needed to dedicate to the data collection.  
 shows an example of how the data collection occurred in the field. 
Generally, each enumerator was able to finish four questionnaires per day. During the 
enumeration days, my supervision role mainly consisted of implementing a thorough 
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quality check. The quality check strategy was based on two main activities: 1) 
accompanying one enumerator at the time during their data collection; 2) thoroughly 
validating each completed questionnaire the end of each enumeration exercise. The 
enumerators were asked to submit the clean and fully filled questionnaires, for entry and 
consistency checks. If errors or inconsistencies were found, enumerators were then 
asked to go back to the household and fill the specific section again. This strategy 
proved quite efficient as mistakes were corrected as soon as possible, reducing at the 
minimum the additional time that, in these cases, farmers would have needed to 
dedicate to the data collection.  
 
Figure 6 Enumeration in the field 
 
The data collection activities started in the middle of the rainy season in Ghana. 
Although this was not generally a problem with travel between cities, the bad road 
conditions coupled with excessive rains, made it impossible sometimes to carry out our 
daily schedule. Rains also affected the propensity of farmers to participate in focus 
group discussions as happened in Diari, one of the first districts surveyed in the 
Northern Region, where after reaching the village, we had to face the reality that 
farmers had all gone back home. However, luckily, after waiting a couple of hours, my 
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team of enumerators managed to gather the farmers back at the village and the activities 
were implemented as planned. 
Another challenge faced during the main data collection was the considerable distance 
between farmers and the difficulty in accessing them via public transportation. While in 
the Northern region, GIZ provided a car for the data collection, in the other two regions 
of the field work me and my team had to rely on public transportation, in the form of 
taxis, buses and mini-buses, which is not always available in remote areas. Although not 
always easy, the team proved once again to be able to face these difficulties and the 
enumerators very rarely missed a scheduled appointment. In addition, I also managed to 
visit few mango farms which were located further away from the enumeration areas. 
Furthermore, more than 11 official local languages are spoken in Ghana. The 
enumerators did not speak all of the languages spoken in the sampled areas. Fortunately, 
this did not cause problems in the enumeration as in the Northern and Brong-Ahafo 
regions asenumerators were fluent in the local languages while in the Eastern regions 
the enumerators could also rely on an official translator who worked with us for the 
entire duration of the survey. In order to make sure that the activities were implemented 
at the right standard, during the enumeration, I often asked one of the enumerators to 
give me a summary of the conversations and, if needed, I asked him to intervene in the 
conversation. After an initial period of adjustment, notwithstanding the language 
barrier, I was able to understand what was asked and to cross check the answers on 
time.  
Another challenge of the data collection concerned the relatively difficult times that 
mango farmers had faced during the harvest season that preceded the field work. Since 
the beginning of the data collection, it became clear that farmers, especially, in the 
Northern region had been struggling in their mango production because of the 
occurrence of bush fires, fruit flies and other diseases. As a consequence, the data used 
in this thesis are likely to reflect these challenges and the consequent poor harvest 
estimates. 
Finally, during the main data collection I had to face some health problems. Already in 
the first week of the field work I had to be hospitalised for a case of malaria. Health 
problems, although less serious that this first time, accompanied me for entire duration 
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of the survey activities
40
. Luckily, the enumerators were able to work alone in those 
days that I could not follow them in the interviews. However, on a total of two-months a 
half, I have been able to be in the field during enumeration all the time apart from 
probably 7 to 10 days in total.  
Overall, the main data collection has been a quite intense and tiring experience, with 
activities starting as early as 4 am in the morning and finishing not before sunset, after 
which I would normally work on the preparation of the next day activities. However, 
the strong motivation and enthusiasm that my enumerators and I had during the field 
activities helped us carrying on even in difficult circumstances and achieving the timely 
and in-budget completion of all the planned activities. 
Key informant interviews  
Finally, when appropriate, I carried out key informant interviews with the relevant 
stakeholders, such as ITFC, HPW, Blue skies, Bomarts and local farmers’ organisation. 
Figure 7 shows two mango pack houses visited in the Eastern region.  
Figure 7 Mango packhouses (Bomarts; MiDa - Akorley) 
 
                                                 
40 In addition, one of my enumerator suffered heart problems while we were in the field in the Brong-Ahafo region, 
and he had to go back to his town for health checks and rest. 
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The top picture shows the Bomarts’ pack house, one of the few exporters in the sector, 
while the bottom pictures show the newly built public pack house in Akorley with 
financial support by the Millenium Challenge Account. This pack house can be used by 
local farmers and it was managed, at the time of the survey, by a Dutch/Ghanaian 
company (Kingdom Premium Fruits). 
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Section 3. Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of mango market in Ghana and describes the field 
study in Ghana, during which I collected the data used for the analyses in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
The fieldwork, with financial and logistic support by GIZ, was organised around two 
phases: a design and main data collection phase. The design phase lasted for about 
seven months during which I organised the activities and designed the survey 
instruments. The main data collection phase lasted for about two and half months, 
during which I collected data from 305 farmers, 196 mango farmers and 109 non-
mango farmers in three regions in Ghana, with the help of eight enumerators.  
The sampling strategy was based on a snowball procedure due to the lack of available 
listing at the time of the survey, which did not allow for the ideal random selection. 
Nonetheless, three criteria were used for the selection of farmers: farm size, location 
and mango adoption. Small farmers (less than three acres) and mango farmers were 
over-sampled.  
Two main survey tools were used: a village and a household questionnaires. In addition, 
in each village visited two focus group discussions were carried out, one for mango 
farmers and one for non-mango farmers. 
All 305 household level and 17 village level questionnaires were filled during the data 
collection. The completeness and the consistency of the data were quite consistent 
across the three regions, although a couple of times enumerators were asked to re-fill 
the entire questionnaire due to major inconsistencies and mistakes. In most cases, minor 
mistakes were corrected in the field with additional short visits to the farmers in the 
sample. Additional quality checks were also run at the end of the field work, when 
preliminary results of the field work were presented to GIZ and representatives of the 
Ghanaian Ministry of Agriculture.  
Despite some logistic, weather and personal related difficulties, the overall results of the 
data collection exercise proved to be quite satisfactory not only for the quality of the 
data collected but also from a personal experience point of view.   
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CHAPTER 3  
The adoption of exotic varieties of mango 
A case study from Ghana 
Introduction 
Innovations are essential part of anybody’s life. Henry Ford once said “If you always do 
what you’ve always done, you’ll always get what you’ve always got.” I believe that this 
short quote summarises perfectly the idea that there is an irresistible desire of trying the 
new and the unknown imbedded in the human nature, no matter gender, social status or 
location differences. And this desire is intrinsically motivated by the ambition to 
improve ourselves as balanced by the need to minimize risks and losses.   
Farmers in developing countries are often exposed to innovations, such as new crops, 
resistant varieties of known crops or new technologies that donors, NGOs or national 
governments think could be beneficial for their livelihoods. Some of them decide to 
adopt and some others just don’t and probably they never will. This puzzling evidence 
has motivated scholars for decades and, although a great deal of knowledge has been 
produced on the reasons behind numerous adoption and non-adoption processes, there 
always are niches of “unexplored” and “new” that need further attention.  
This is the case of exotic varieties of mango in Ghana, which, as explained in Chapter 2, 
have been introduced in the country on a massive scale in the late 1990s and as such can 
be considered an innovation. Although unsustainable in the early stages, international 
donors and national government in Ghana have joined their efforts in supporting mango 
adoption and in reducing farmers’ constraints in accessing its benefits, especially for 
small and poor farmers. As shown in the introduction of the thesis, this effort effectively 
managed to increase mango production and export quantity through the years. 
Nonetheless, the frequent pests and diseases and unexpected weather related shocks 
occurrence have shown that production trends are not stable but, instead, extremely 
vulnerable to common and idiosyncratic shocks.  
Lack of experience and knowledge about the mango production itself are some of the 
main factors that currently constraint exotic mango producers, often forcing farmers to 
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engage in dis-adoption processes. Data from the Ghanaian Living Standard Surveys 
suggest, indeed, that, although production increased through the years, the number of 
mango producers reduced drastically in the past decades (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Mango producers in Ghana (GLSS) 
 
However, available secondary data, such as GLSS, do not provide detailed information 
on the variety of mango produced and as such it becomes difficult to understand what 
had really happened in the subsector of exotic varieties of mango. Moreover, the strong 
political interest and the amount of national and international financial investments in 
the sector have not found a commensurate attention in the academic arena or in field 
research. In the past, quite a few studies on determinants of product innovations have 
focused on traditional cash crops, for example cocoa, or non-traditional cash crops, such 
as pineapple and horticultural crops
41
, but only few, mainly qualitative analysis, have 
been specifically carried out on the adoption of exotic varieties of mango. To my 
knowledge mango adoption has been investigated by only two studies: CATRD, (2006) 
and van Melle and Buschmann (2013). Both studies use a value chain and case study 
approach, which mostly translated in a qualitative analysis of the sector.  
This paper contributes to the innovation adoption literature as it investigates the 
adoption process of exotic varieties mango (adoption, time of adoption and intensity of 
adoption) using primary data collected from mango and non-mango adopters, as 
                                                 
41
 For example, Conley and Udry (2010) investigated the adoption of pineapple in Ghana with a focus on social 
networks, or Afari-Sefa (2006, 2010) who analysed the horticultural export sector or high value chains access by 
small farmers.  
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described in Chapter 2. As far as I know, aside from project related small M&E surveys, 
few other studies have collected detailed data from mango producers and as such this 
analysis could contribute to the understanding of the main mango production and 
marketing related challenges in Ghana.   
The analysis especially focuses on the role of social capital factors. Usually overlooked 
in the classic adoption literature, the importance of including factors such as existing 
relationships and trust, often solely the domain of the sociological studies, has gained 
reconnaissance also in the economic literature in the past decade. The lack of official 
information channels, the consequent high risks involved and the long gestation period 
that characterise the adoption process of exotic varieties of mango make social capital 
an important factor in the adoption of these cash crops. The decision to adopt mango, 
aside from assets constraints, could, indeed, depend on the existence of relationships 
with the key innovation agents (development agencies, NGOs or previous adopters), 
and with how much these innovation agents and facilitators are considered trustworthy. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 describes the theoretical 
framework; Section 2 reviews the most common empirical findings that inform the 
empirical analysis (Section 3); Section 4 presents the econometric models and 
challenges; Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.  
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Section 1. Theoretical model of adoption with social capital 
The literature on adoption is quite vast and diverse. Maertens and Barrett (2012) 
summarise the different conceptual approaches to innovation adoption around five 
questions: (i) What do farmers value and over what time period? (ii)What type of 
information does the farmer absorb and from whom? (iii) How does the farmer learn, 
i.e., how does he update beliefs? (iv) How do beliefs translate into actions? And (v) Do 
agents interact strategically?. Depending on the answers to these five questions, 
theoretical and, as a consequence, empirical models may differ quite substantially. The 
model presented here mostly relates to the discrete decision to adopt or not. However, 
similar theoretical intuitions can be associated with different dimensions of adoption, its 
time and intensity, and similar models are deemed to have implications also for 
different levels of the adoption process. 
The most common theoretical model for innovation adoption is the expected discounted 
utility model which assumes that farmers value the expected profit with and without the 
adoption of innovation and decide accordingly. In order to take this decision a farmer 
needs to address several uncertainties that are embedded in the adoption process. These 
uncertainties are related to difficulties to predict the returns, or future stream of 
expected benefits generated by the innovation, expressed as: 
𝐸[𝑈(𝜋𝑓 − 𝜋𝑝) ≥ 0       (1) 
where 𝜋𝑓 is the expected present value of the future stream of net benefits under 
adoption; 𝜋𝑝 is the subjective estimate of the expected present value of the enterprise’s 
future stream of net benefits under no adoption. 
Classical models of adoption predict that the expected profitability of the innovation 
may depend on objective constraints (differences in agro-ecological zones and climatic 
conditions – Deressa et al., 2009); supply-side constraints (heterogeneity in farmers’ 
absorptive capacity – Berger, 2001); market inefficiencies (limited access to credit– 
Coady, 1995) and information barriers (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and 
Udry, 2010; Wossen et al., 2015). These constraints, z, for household h, can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝑧ℎ = 𝑓(𝐴ℎ, 𝐺ℎ, 𝐼ℎ)     (2a) 
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where z is function of private, 𝐴ℎ (land, equipment, etc – absorptive capacity), and 
public, 𝐺ℎ (institutions and markets, infrastructure – supply side constraints), assets and 
information barriers 𝐼ℎ.  
The information barriers, 𝐼ℎ, (about inputs and/or outputs) may differ with the type of 
the innovation. The “target input” models, for example, assume that farmers might need 
to learn about the optimal use of the input for the new technology and choose to adopt 
conditional on this information and as such they investigate the role of “learning by 
doing” in the innovation adoption (Besley and Case, 1993)42. Other authors focus, 
instead, on a different, often more complex, learning dynamic which involves “learning 
by seeing” the output generated by the innovation itself. This process may involve 
awareness exposure to the innovation (Adegbola and Gardebroek, 2007; Diagne and 
Demont, 2007), imitation and interaction with adopters of the innovation (Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 1995). Conley and Udry (2001) claim that the “learning by seeing” 
generates an incomplete flow of information on the adoption and that farmers, cognizant 
of the potential for missing important information, weight this “incomplete” learning by 
the value of each innovation.  
Once farmers have acquired the relevant information, either on input or output, for the 
adoption process, a Bayesian updating process is usually assumed. The Bayesian 
updating process informs not only the decision to adopt but also its timing and its 
intensity. Hence, it postulates that farmers might use the information learned for 
strategic delays in adoption instead of engaging in “imperfect” learning from others’ 
experiences. This behaviour is assumed to increase with the forward-looking farmers’ 
attitude (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). 
More recently, attention has been given to the social components of the adoption 
dynamics which goes beyond the simple learning process. The renovated interest in 
social capital in connection with innovation has increased due to often occurring 
                                                 
42 Learning has been introduced in the adoption of innovation literature since the seminal work by Warner (1974) 
who was among the first scholars to claim that learning processes, through trials and imitation, are fundamental in 
adoption. Fischer et al (1996) use a Bayesian random model for the adaptation through time using the information of 
yield and prices related to the innovation and the difference of them with the old technology or crop. They found that 
the “effective” information can be measured by the number of years of using the innovation. An extended theoretical 
framework by Ghamin and Pannell (1999) includes both risk aversion and information in the maximization of the 
utility of the net present value of the profits using two main indicators: learning by doing (skill improvements: the 
more skilled with the innovation, the more land or input will be used for the innovation); information on the 
performance of the innovation (learning by using - this information can lead to an increase or decrease of the land 
allocated to the new crop or to the innovation). 
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difficulties to interpret inconsistencies in the adoption process using the standard 
economic models (Landry et al., 2002). Asymmetry of information, failing or missing 
markets and institutions are the norm in most of developing countries. Individuals, firms 
or communities have to rely on other sources to smooth risks and uncertainties 
embedded in the innovation adoption process. And these sources are often social in 
nature. Information, resources and safety nets can, indeed, be gathered via formal and 
informal social channels, in the form of relationship and networks. Social interactions 
are also claimed to overcome institutional and markets vacuums, influencing people 
preferences and constraints, lowering transaction costs and facilitating exchange of 
information which in turns enables individuals to overcome social and economic 
dilemmas (Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002; van Rijn et al., 2012).  
Bandiera and Rasul (2006), following the framework set up by Bardhan and Udry in 
1999, formally re-introduced social components in the innovation adoption theoretical 
literature, in the form of social networks. Their framework is then expanded by Matuske 
and Qaim in 2009 to address the role of similarities within social networks in innovation 
adoption. These authors support the idea that instead of investigating the “know-how” 
component of the adoption process, the “know-who” should deserve more attention. 
Social networks are claimed to be more conducive of essential adoption requirements 
than other types of capital, as they can foster adoption via a consistent flow of 
information within the network, which reduces search and screening costs of adoption 
(Dakhly and de Clerk, 2004; Kaasa, 2009). Social networks can also improve the 
innovation process via the occurrence of “synergy effects”, where different innovative 
ideas produce an even higher innovative collective action, and the “realization effects” 
due to the access to combined resources (Boahene et al., 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 
2006; van Rijn et al., 2012).    
Social networks are often defined as the “structural” component of the social capital and 
it mainly refers to the number and type of relationship that an individual is involved 
into. These relationships are further classified into two categories: bonding and bridging 
structural social capital. The former refers to ties between people with similar 
characteristics (e.g. between farmers, or between people from the same ethnic or 
religious background, etc.) while bridging structural social capital refers to relationships 
and ties between people with different livelihoods, economic status and role in the 
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community, for example, between farmers and community leaders, extension officers, 
development agencies (Grootaert, 2002).  
However, social networks are only one of the two main components of the social 
capital. Another important component, often overlooked in the adoption studies is the so 
called “cognitive social capital”, which mainly refers to a more subjective dimension of 
social capital, and it is expressed in the form of trust and norms. Three types of trust 
have been identified in the literature: the general trust in the future, the society and so 
on; the trust in other individuals and the trust in the institutions. Trust is believed to 
facilitate innovation as it fosters cooperation, reduces transaction costs such as 
bargaining and enforcement costs, reduces risks and uncertainty and allows individual 
to rely on others in the case of need, i.e. self-insure against risk (Narayan and Prichett, 
1999; van Rijn et al., 2012). Sociologists define trust and norms as the essential 
enabling mean for social cooperation and collection action (Woolcock and Narayanm, 
2000; Bowles and Gintis, 2002) and economists claim that innovation exchange cannot 
occur without trust and vice versa (e.g. Tsai and Ghashal, 1999; Kaasa, 2009).   
Although trust and norms are claimed to be strongly correlated, the role of norms in the 
adoption framework is, however, not straightforward. For example, the reciprocity norm 
predicts that people act for the benefits of others and expect the same in the case of need 
(Fountain, 1998), which assumes that people are trustworthy and as such should foster 
innovation (Isham, 2002; van Rijn, et al., 2012). However, there are other norms that 
could act as barriers for the adoption of innovation. This is the case of, for example, 
conformity and sharing. Conformity to community norms and to authority as well as the 
norm of “social sharing” can indeed hinder the capability of an individual to adopt 
innovations if the community norms or what supported by the authority in the 
community does not allow for it or if it is commonly accepted that benefits from 
innovation have to be shared within a wide network of relatives (Moser and Barrett, 
2006; Kassie et al., 2013; Wossen et al., 2015).  This coupled with the difficulties to 
measure norms explain why the role of norms in the adoption process still remain an 
unanswered and challenging question.  
These recent developments in the adoption literature suggest that the adoption process 
should also be conditioned to social capital components. Hence, equation (2) can be re-
written as follows: 
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    𝑧ℎ = 𝑓(𝐴ℎ, 𝐺ℎ, 𝐼ℎ, 𝑆𝐾ℎ)      (2b) 
Where 𝑆𝐾ℎ represent the social capital in the form of relationships and trust of the 
farmer h. Finally, following the expected discounted utility model, the optimization 
problem can be written as (3): 
    𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸[𝑈ℎ(𝜋𝑓𝑖 − 𝜋𝑝𝑖) = 𝛾𝑧ℎ + 𝜀
𝑖    (3) 
where 𝜀 is the error in the expectation on the return from innovations i. From (3), the 
decision to adopt the innovation i by farmer h occurs if the expected utility of the net 
present value of profits is positive, conditional to the constraints in (4):  
𝑌ℎ
∗𝑖 {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐸[𝑈(𝜋𝑓 − 𝜋𝑝) > 0,  𝛾𝑧ℎ  ≥  −𝜀
𝑖 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐸[𝑈(𝜋𝑓 − 𝜋𝑝) ≤ 0,  𝛾𝑧ℎ <  −𝜀
𝑖
             (4) 
Following Wossen et al. (2015), 𝑌ℎ
∗𝑖 represents the latent decision to adopt that is 
empirically estimated using an observable binary discrete choice 𝑌ℎ
𝑖  of whether the 
farmer adopts or not adopt the innovation under analysis, expressed as: 
𝑌ℎ
𝑖 {
1, 𝑖𝑓  𝑌ℎ
∗𝑖 > 0
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
     (5) 
Using (2b), then the empirical equation of the adoption decision conditional on the 
different constraints can be re-written as a reduced form of the equations (2b) to (5): 
 𝑌ℎ
𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴ℎ + 𝛽2𝐺ℎ + 𝛽3𝐼ℎ + 𝛽4𝑆𝐾ℎ + 𝜀    (6) 
where 𝐴ℎ is a vector of private assets (land, equipment, etc – absorptive capacity), 𝐺ℎ is 
a vector of public assets (institutions and markets, infrastructure – supply side 
constraints), 𝐼ℎ I a vector of variables that controls for information barriers, and 𝑆𝐾ℎ is a 
vector of social capital variables.  
100 
 
 
Section 2. Empirical evidence on determinants of innovation 
adoption 
Classical economic models of adoption focus on the supply-side and market 
inefficiency constraints. These models find that adoption is mainly driven by factors of 
production (farm size, farm labour, land ownership and so on), farmers’ characteristics, 
such as risk aversion, household’s demographic characteristics as well as public assets 
that capture market inefficiencies (such as access to credit) (Coady, 1995; Berger, 2001; 
Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Wossen et al., 2015). 
As discussed in the previous section, the effect of social capital in the innovation 
adoption has been gaining wider recognisance in the empirical literature in the past 
decade. Laundry et al. (2002) found a strong evidence that different forms of social 
capital positively influence the innovation adoption across 440 manufacturing firms in 
Montreal. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) with their seminal paper on the role of structural 
bonding social capital, find a strong evidence of a positive effect of the adopters’ social 
networks in the adoption of a new crop, sunflower, in Northern Mozambique. They also 
find that there exist a threshold size of the network after which the adoption rates reduce 
due to overcrowding effects.  
A positive effect of bonding social capital is also found in a study of adoption of 
sustainable agricultural practices in rural Tanzania (Kassie et al., 2013) where 
membership in farmers’ organisation is used as a proxy of closeness to peer social 
networks. In Ghana, Barr (2000) analyses the effect of social capital and technical 
information flow in the manufacturing sector. She also found that bonding social 
capital, measured as the number of contacts a firm has with similar firms, increases firm 
productivity, performance and innovation adoption.  
Matuscke and Qaim in 2009 extend Bandiera and Rasul (2006) model in a study of the 
adoption of hybrid wheat and hybrid pearl millet in India. Their main finding suggests 
that information flow occurs along homophilous rather than heterophilous lines and as 
such only the “closest” possible social networks should be investigated in the adoption 
decision. Hence, they found that what they call “exogenous social network” analysis, 
which controls for the specific characteristics of the closest possible social network and 
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not only for its size as in Bandiera and Rasul (2006), has a bigger effect on the adoption 
decision.  
However, other authors such as van Rijn et al. (2012) do not find consistent effects of 
bonding social capital on innovation adoptions across seven Sub-Saharan African 
countries. Also, other authors, such as Moser and Barrett (2006), point out that these 
studies all ignore the possibility that the information conveyed by previous adopters 
may also be negative and as a consequence the effect of the bonding social capital could 
be negative and, as such could discourage, instead of encouraging, adoption. This could 
explain inconsistencies of results about bonding social capital. 
More consistent findings are found for the bridging social capital which, for example, is 
found to be strongly and positively associated with innovation adoption and this result is 
consistent across all the countries under scrutiny in the analysis by van Rijn (2012). 
This finding challenges the idea that homophilous lines are that most important 
information sources as suggested by Matuscke and Qaim (2009). Conversely, the result 
by van Rijn et al. (2012) supports the argument, introduced by Granovetter (1973), that 
weaker lines, often not between peers, are more conducive of innovations than 
potentially stronger ties between similar households (peers). Weaker and vertical ties 
may, indeed, foster synergy and realization effects described above and may help 
overcome community level norms of conformity.  
The empirical evidence on cognitive social capital is mixed. Trust is often found not 
significant in explaining the adoption process. For example, in their study of firms in 
Montreal, Laundry et al. (2002) finds that trust in clients, suppliers, government and 
other agencies do not affect the propensity to adopt innovations and its intensity. The 
sign of the effect, although not significant, is negative and as such also contradicts the 
expectation that a trustworthy environment should facilitate innovation. In the same 
direction is the study by Kassie et al. (2013) who find a significant but negative effect of 
trust in government in the adoption of crop and risk diversifying practices, such as 
legume intercrop. Similarly, trust has a negative effect on innovation in the cross-
country analysis by van Rijn et al. (2012) in Sub-Saharan Africa. These findings support 
the argument that a high level of cognitive social capital might result in an in-ward 
looking behaviours in communities which in turns reduces the propensity to innovate. 
Nonetheless, other authors found a positive relationship between trust and innovation. 
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This is the case, for example, of Kaasa (2009) who studies the effect of social capital on 
innovative activities using regional level data. He found that both general trust and 
institutional trust increase the probability to adopt innovation. Similarly, Wossen et al. 
(2015) show that general trust is positively associated with the adoption of farm land 
management practices in Ethiopia. However, as for Laundry et al. (2002), their measure 
of trust is never significant at the conventional level.  
The empirical evidence on the effect of norms on innovation adoption is more scarce 
compared to the other social capital components. One of the main reasons for this is that 
norms generally pertain to a group of individual, community or to a society in general 
and this wide dimension usually does not match the unit of analysis, which is commonly 
at individual, household or firm level.  
Nonetheless, the existing evidence is quite informative of the potential role of this type 
of cognitive social capital in the adoption process. For example, Kaasa (2009), one of 
the few studies to investigate adoption innovation at the regional level, shows that 
different norms have different, if any, effect on innovation activities. Four types of 
norms are investigated: the norm of civic participation, i.e. the norm and practice of 
voting; the norm of helping and decency; the norm of active social participation and the 
norm of orderliness. His results show that the most important facilitator of innovation 
activities is the norm of civic participation which is found consistently significant and 
positively related to innovation. This finding supports the argument that a stable and 
reliable legal system provides the necessary expectation of protection in the future 
whereby firms are more prone to engage in innovative activities (Dakhli and de Clercq, 
2004; Tabellini, 2006).  
On the other hand, while the norm of helping and decency and social participation are 
not significant, the norm of orderliness is significant and negatively associated with the 
innovation adoption. This negative relationship supports the idea that norms of “good 
citizenship” usually do not match with deviation from the status quo via innovative 
activities (Dakhli and de Clercq, 2004). This result confirms that conformity could play 
an inhibitor role in the adoption process
43
. 
                                                 
43
 Other studies investigate the link between “procedural formalism” and social networks. For example, Bonleu 
(2014) studies how the size of social networks affects procedural formalism in the OECD housing market.  
103 
 
 
In conclusion, social capital factors in the form of relationship, trust and common norms 
have been found relevant in the farmers’ and firms’ decision to innovate. The next 
section describes how I plan to investigate the adoption decision with regards to the 
product innovation under scrutiny: exotic varieties of mango in Ghana. 
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Section 3. Analysis of the adoption of exotic varieties of mango in 
Ghana   
Following the conceptual framework and empirical evidence discussed above, I 
investigate the role of four main determinants (supply side constraints, market 
inefficiencies, learning and social capital) with regards to the decision to adopt exotic 
varieties of mango, its time and its intensity
44
, using primary data collected during the 
fieldwork in 2012.  From (6), the adoption decisions will be estimated using the 
following equation: 
𝑌ℎ
𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴ℎ + 𝛽2𝐺ℎ + 𝛽3𝐼ℎ + 𝛽4𝑆𝐾ℎ + 𝜀  (6) 
𝑌ℎ
𝑖 takes value of 1 if the farmer adopted mango and 0 otherwise in the case of the 
discrete adoption decision; it takes value of 1 if the adopter is an earlier adopter and 0 
otherwise in the analysis of the determinants of the time of adoption. For the analysis of 
the intensity of adoption, a count variable, the number of mango trees cultivated or 
planted by each mango farmer, expressed in natural logarithm, will be used. In addition, 
𝐴ℎ is a vector of private assets (land, equipment, etc. – absorptive capacity), 𝐺ℎ is a 
vector of public assets (institutions and markets, infrastructure – supply side 
constraints), 𝐼ℎ controls for information barriers and 𝑆𝐾ℎ is a vector of social capital 
variables.  
The following paragraphs describes how I define the dependent and explanatory 
variables and provides an overview of the characteristics of the farmers according to 
their adoption status (adopters vs non-adopters; early (earlier) vs late (later) adopters; 
less vs more intense adopters. 
                                                 
44 The decision to model additional levels of the adoption analysis  (time and intensity) has been motivated by the 
evidence that some farmers can free ride and delay adoption in order to accumulate more knowledge before 
innovating or before deciding to invest more intensively in the innovation.  
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3.1 The dependent variables  
The decision to adoption exotic varieties of mango 
Exotic varieties of mango are defined as those varieties that are not indigenous to the 
Ghanaian context, which include a number of different varieties, such as Keitt, Kent, 
Palmer, Julie.  
In this analysis, mango adoption is defined as the discrete decision to adopt exotic 
varieties of mango and it is measured by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
the farmer produces mango and 0 otherwise. 196 households in the sample produce 
mango, 95 adopters are located in Brong-Ahafo region, 63 in the Northern region and 
38 in the Eastern region. The most common exotic varieties adopted in the sample are 
Keitt and Kent, which are produced by 77% and 35% of the adopters in the sample, 
respectively.  
In order to better understand the factors that influenced adoption of these varieties in my 
sample, I have explicitly asked mango farmers what was the original reason for the 
adoption. As Figure 2 shows, the majority of the adopters declared that the main reason 
of adoption was the expected higher price that they would have had access to. 
Nonetheless, on average 30% of the adopters claimed that the most important propellant 
for their decision to adopt has been the success of neighbouring farmers, suggesting that 
a social component of learning and knowledge accumulation was experienced. The role 
of this knowledge accumulation process seems to vary across regions and it looks 
substantially stronger in the Eastern and Brong-Ahafo region, while it seems negligible 
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in the Northern region (Figure 2). These regional differences are somehow expected, 
and they can be explained by the relative shorter experience in mango production of the 
farmers in the Northern region, as described below. 
The decision of the time of adoption 
Over the total sample of adopters, the majority of the farmers adopted exotic varieties of 
mango in the early 2000s (Figure 3). Exotic varieties of mango were adopted earlier in 
the Eastern region (Southern Belt) while the latest adoptions occurred in the Northern 
region. Using the distribution of the time of adoption, the definition of earlier and later 
adopters is based on the imposition of two arbitrary cut-offs, an absolute and a relative 
cut-off. 
According to the absolute cut – off, a farmer is defined as a late adopter of mango if 
he/she started the production of mango after 2006. The year 2006 is an important date 
for the diffusion of mango throughout the country: it is a few years after the beginning 
of two important programs for the diffusion of mango in Ghana: TIPCEE and MOAP 
by USAID and GIZ, respectively; it is also the year when other schemes, such as bloc 
farms
45
, became common in the Northern region. Also, this cut-off allows including in 
both early and late adopters, farmers who have harvested at least once before the data 
collection. Hence, the gestation period of mango trees usually lasts for four years. 
Because the data collection occurred in 2012, farmers who adopted in 2006 or later may 
have harvested mango for two years (late adopters – 37 farmers) or less (very late 
adopters – 56 farmers), for a total of 93 late adopters. Early adopters are, instead, 
farmers who may have harvested for three years or more and this group may include 
both the very early adopters – innovators (24 farmers who adopted before 1999 – when 
ITFC started its operations in the Northern region) and the intermediate adopters 
between 1999 and 2006 (79 farmers), for a total of 103 early adopters. 
According to this threshold, on average 64% of the farmers in the Eastern and Brong-
Ahafo regions were early adopters of exotic varieties of mango, while 73% of farmers 
in the Northern region adopted after 2006 and as such can be defined as late adopters. 
This finding is in line with the expectations that farmers in the Northern region were the 
                                                 
45
 Bloc farms are large farms that are divided in blocs of one acre. Each acre is cultivated by one farmer. Inputs, 
trainings and output are managed and shared collectively within the framework of a purposively constituted farmers’ 
organisation.  
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latest to adopt the exotic varieties of mango compared to the Southern and Transitional 
Belts (Eastern and Brong-Ahafo regions).  
Figure 3 Time of adoption 
 
Although the absolute cut-off provides interesting insights on the inter-regional 
differences in the time of adoption, I also use an alternative measure of the time of 
adoption, which aims to unveil intra-regional differences. Instead of using 2006 as cut-
off, the median value of the year of adoption at regional level is used to define what I 
call a “relative” measure of the time of adoption46.  The median year of adoption is 
2005 for Brong-Ahafo region; 2003 for Eastern region and 2006 for the Northern 
region. According to this measure, 78 farmers can be defined as earlier adopters (about 
40% of the total sample of adopters) and 118 are defined as later adopters. One 
advantage of having a more localised threshold is to unveil the relative time of adoption 
                                                 
46 In the recall section of the questionnaire I collected data on the year when mango was first introduced in the 
district. This information can be useful for the identification of a regional cut off for the time of adoption because it 
represents the starting point for the farmers’ awareness exposure to this innovation46. One option for identifying a 
“regional” cut off would be to use the values of the year of first introduction as the threshold for the definition of 
earlier adopters. However, only few farmers adopted before or at that specific year and this is also true for more 
established mango producing areas in Brong-Ahafo and Eastern regions. In my sample the majority of the farmers 
interviewed in these regions adopted 12 to 20 years after the year of the first introduction of mango in the district, 
while farmers in the Northern region adopted quite soon after the introduction of mango in the district. This may 
mean either that earlier adopters stopped the production, or they were not sampled because very busy and big or, 
finally, that diffusion really started only in the mid-late 1990s. 
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within the same region. Thus, when using this regional defined cut-off, 56% of the 
farmers in the Brong-Ahafo region adopted later relatively to the other farmers in the 
same region. Moreover, while earlier and later adopters are of equal size for the Eastern 
region, the distribution between later and earlier adopters in the Northern region 
remains the same as when an absolute cut off of time of adoption is used, as the two cut-
offs coincides. Even accounting for intra-regional differences the Northern region 
stands out for the highest proportion of later adopters.  
The decision of the intensity of adoption 
Different measures of intensity of adoption are available in the literature and they tend 
to differ depending on the type of the innovation. For example, while Ben-Houassa 
(2011) and Matuschke and Qaim (2009) use a measure of the area under the innovation 
(quantity of fertilizer per hectares and share of area under hybrid wheat and pearl millet, 
respectively), other authors, such as Beltran et al. (2013) in their study of the adoption 
of herbicide in the production of rice in the Philippines, use expenditures on innovation. 
On the other hand, Pomp and Burger (1995) measure the intensity of adoption of cocoa 
simply with a count variable of the number of cocoa trees planted, for a sample of 
farmers in Indonesia. 
Notwithstanding the validity of the measures which take into account the farm size or 
the expenditures for the innovation, the preferred measure of intensity to adopt mango 
in this analysis follows the paper by Pomp and Burger (1995). I believe that this 
measure fits better the purpose of this analysis as mango trees, similarly to cocoa trees, 
are perennial trees whose cultivation requires specific spacing between trees and less 
scope for intercropping than other crops. It is indeed a common practice to plant 100 
trees per acre of land where not often other crops are cultivated at the same time. As a 
consequence, it is reasonable to assume that farmers who adopt more intensively would 
do it via acquisition of more land instead of planting more trees in the available land. 
Thus, a measure that takes into account the area under innovation could not be 
necessarily a better measure than the simple measure of the number of trees planted.  
Following Pomp and Burger (1995), I here defined the intensity of adoption as a count 
variable of the number of mango trees planted. Figure 4 shows that the majority of the 
adopters have less than 1000 trees which correspond to approximately 10 acres of land 
cultivated under mango. Nonetheless, the two graphs in the right hand side of Figure 4, 
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also show that intensity of adoption is, once again, extremely different between regions. 
Hence, farmers in Brong-Ahafo and Eastern regions produce mango more intensively 
than farmers in the Northern region. More specifically, looking at the overall average 
number of trees across the three regions confirms that the average number of trees per 
farmer is the smallest in the Northern region (92 trees on average) and it is the highest 
in the Brong-Ahafo region (more than 369 trees).  
Figure 4 Intensity of adoption 
 
 
Similarly, using terciles of distribution of the number of mango trees, Northern region 
stands out again as the majority of farmers are either less or intermediate intense 
adopters and none of them can be defined as “most” intense adopter (Table 1). Overall, 
the sample of mango farmers includes 67 least intense adopters (1
st
 tercile), 70 
intermediate intense adopters (2
nd
 tercile) and 59 most intense adopters (3
rd
 tercile)
47
.  
                                                 
47 The distribution in terciles also show that in the Brong Ahafo region, the majority of the farmers are distributed at 
the two ends of the intensity levels, cultivating either on average 50 trees (half acre) or more intensively, with on 
average 802 trees (8 acres). A similar story can be observed in the Eastern region, where, however, more than half of 
the farmers can be classified as most intense adopters.  
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Because of the substantially rigid space requirements inherent in the mango tree 
cultivation, these differences in intensity of adoption are reflected in the size of the area 
under mango production. Mango farms are extremely small (1 acre on average) in the 
Northern region, while they are substantially bigger in the other two regions (on average 
6 acres in the Brong-Ahafo region and about 7 acres in the Eastern region). Relatively to 
the total farm size, the share of the mango farm is the highest in the Eastern region 
(65%), suggesting a higher degree of specialization for farmers in this region while it is 
the lowest, once again, in the Northern region (35%).  
Table 1 Intensity of adoption 
 Total Brong-Ahafo region Eastern region Northern region 
 Mean 
(sd) 
Mean 
(sd) 
Mean 
(sd) 
Mean 
(sd) 
     
N. trees 270 368 320 92 
 (578) (729) (576) (21) 
1st tercile - n.trees 53 51 55 54 
 (22) (20) 21) (34) 
2nd tercile- n.trees 103 112 116 100 
 (8) (11) (9) (2) 
3rd tercile- n.trees 716 802 546 0 
 (913) (992) (729) 0 
Mango farm size (acres) 4.57 5.82 7.33 1.02 
 (9.53) (10.45) (12.95) (0.14) 
Share mango farm size (%) 47.46 48.61 64.98 35.18 
 (23.99) (25.54) (25.25) (9.84) 
N 196 95 38 63 
111 
 
 
3.2 The explanatory variables 
The choice of the explanatory variables has been informed by the empirical and 
theoretical literature described in section 1 and 2. The list of explanatory variables as 
well as their expected sign is reported in Table 2. In addition, the following paragraph 
discusses the measures of social capital that have been used in the past literature as 
explanatory variables and describes how social capital is defined in this analysis.  
Table 2 List of explanatory variables 
Variable Description Expected 
sign 
Age head* Years* +/- 
Male head =1 if head is a man; 0 otherwise + 
Higher education =1 if head awarded secondary or higher education; 0 otherwise +/- 
Farm labour Number of household’s members working on own farm + 
Farm size* Acres* + 
Land ownership =1 if any land is owned; 0 otherwise + 
Production of other cash 
crops 
=1 if other cash crops are produced; 0 otherwise + 
Livestock ownership Number of livestock owned - 
Access to non-farm 
income 
=1 if any household’s member earn non-farm income; 0 otherwise - 
Access to credit =1 if any household’s member had access to credit in the past 12 
months; 0 otherwise 
+/- 
Ownership of tractor  =1 if a tractor is owned; 0 otherwise + 
Ownership of mobile =1 if a mobile phone is owned; 0 otherwise + 
Ownership of radio =1 if a radio  is owned; 0 otherwise + 
Ownership of bicycle =1 if a bicycle is owned; 0 otherwise + 
Ownership of motorcycle =1 if a motorcycle is owned; 0 otherwise + 
Ownership of car =1 if a car is owned; 0 otherwise + 
Roads conditions Number of months of impassable roads - 
Moderate risk aversion =1 if head is moderately risk averse; 0 otherwise 
[Base= extreme risk aversion] 
+ 
No risk aversion =1 if head is no  risk averse; 0 otherwise 
[Base= extreme risk aversion] 
+ 
Impatience = 1 if head is impatient; 0 otherwise - 
Experience in farming* Number of years of experience in farming + 
Training = 1 if any household’s member received any training; 0 otherwise + 
Social capital See variables in  
Table 3 
+/- 
*At the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Measures of social capital 
The measurement of social capital is empirically quite challenging. An important 
decision that needs to be taken in the study of adoption decision is the identification of 
the appropriate reference group (Maertens and Barrett, 2012).  Membership in farmers’ 
organisations, insurance groups or even funeral insurance groups and labour sharing 
arrangements are often used as proxy of social capital (Wossen et al., 2015; Moser and 
Barrett, 2006; Kassie et al., 2013).  Other authors, such as Bandiera and Rasul (2006) or 
Martens and Barrett (2012), who also focus on the structural bonding component of 
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social capital, use an explicit measure of social network which is based on farmers’ 
contacts and links with previous adopters of the innovation
48
. Overall, these authors 
only look at the role of farmers or peers as change agents in the innovation adoption 
process.  
However, as Hartwich and Scheidegger (2010) claim, the adoption of innovation 
requires a systemic set-up whereby the knowledge accumulation process does not occur 
only through a single change agent, but a set of innovation agents may be relevant for 
the decision to engage in adoption dynamics. These players may include buyers, input 
providers, farmers’ organisation, development agencies as well as local extension 
officers, and so on. They suggest that a measure of social capital should capture not 
only the number of interactions with each change agent but also the strength of each 
interaction. 
In Ghana, Barr (2000) uses two measures of social capital: total number of contacts with 
nine types of change agents, which include bridging and bonding social capital types of 
agents
49
 and a “social capital diversity index”, which goes from 1 to 9, and it is 
estimated as the sum of the existing relationship between the firm and each of the nine 
types of change agents.  
Similarly, van Rijn et al. (2012) use a measure of frequency of contacts of farmers with 
other farmers in the village (structural bonding social capital) and with extension 
officer, NGOs, and R&D project staff (structural bridging social capital). They also try 
to control for the strength of these contacts and interactions, maintaining a neat 
distinction between the different levels of social capital, which also includes several 
indicators of the cognitive component (trust and village norms). Finally, Kaasa (2009) 
strongly supports the argument that social capital variables should be investigated 
separately and the construction of indexes should be discouraged, as different change 
agents or norms might affect differently the process of innovation adoption.  
Following the argument that the innovation process requires a set of change agents, in 
the section 7 of the questionnaire used for this analysis, I collected detailed data on the 
                                                 
48 Different methods can be used to empirically identify these links but the main idea is that farmers are asked about 
their closest sources of information on farming. Usually, the three most important links are asked for in social 
network surveys. 
49
 Firms in the same line of business; firms in different line of business, firms in other regions; firms from different 
ethnic origins; firms from other countries; bank officials; politicians and government officials. 
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frequency and strength of the relationship and trust that each farmer had with and in 
several change agents. The change agents included in the data collection were the 
following: 1) input suppliers;2) credit providers; 3) land owners; 4) extension officers; 
5) other government officers; 6) farmers’ organisations; 7) development agencies; 8) 
NGOs; 9) other producers. For each change agent, three questions were asked:  
1) Do you have any relationship with [change agent] (Yes/No)?  
2) How would you rate the strength of your relationship with [change agent]? (1 
very weak - 5 very strong). 
3) How trustworthy they are? (1 not trustworthy - 3 very trustworthy)50. 
 
Using these data, I construct different variables for each component of the social capital 
and for different levels of aggregation. Following van Rijn et al. (2012) and Kaasa 
(2009), I retain a high level of disaggregation across seven of the change agents listed 
above
51
 and three clusters of variables: contacts and relationship; strength of 
relationships and level of trust. I also use more aggregate measures of social capital 
following the work by Barr (2000) and Kaasa (2009)
52
. The aggregate measures are the 
following:   
1) Two measures of diversity of social capital defined as the sum of the 
relationships with all or selected  change agents; 
2) Two measures of intensity of diversity of social capital, defined as the sum of the 
strength of the relationships with all or selected change agents; 
3) A measure of general trust, defined as the sum of the level of trust across all or 
selected change agents; 
4) Three indexes of social capital estimated with principal component analysis53: 
a. Structural Bonding capital Index 
b. Structural Bridging capital Index 
                                                 
50 The definition of the levels of trust and relationship have been informed by value chains studies, as, for example, 
Purcell et al (2008). During the field work, the enumerators were provided with a description of each level and they 
were asked to read them during the enumeration directly to the farmer. The levels of strength of relationship were 
defined as follows: 1) Very weak: Meet once a year, no formal agreement, no intention of continuing the relationship; 
2) Weak: Meet more than once, no formal agreement, not sure whether to continue the relationship; 3) Moderate: 
Meet regularly in the year, verbal agreement, intention to continue the relationship; 4) Strong: Meet often during the 
year, written agreement, commitment to continue the relationship for a determined period; 5) Very strong: Meet very 
often during the year, written agreement, intention to renew relationship after the agreement. The levels of trusts were 
defined as: 1) Not at all trustworthy: Very bad past experience personal or of known people, no expected fulfilments 
in the future; 2) Good past experience but some uncertainty about future fulfilments; 3) Very trustworthy: Very good 
previous experience and complete trust in future fulfilments.  
51 Land owner and other government officers did not provide enough variation in the sample and as a consequence 
they were dropped from the analysis. 
52 One of the major drawbacks in using such level of disaggregation is the existence of high multicollinearity. In the 
past studies this issue is explicitly addressed with statistical tests, such as Variance Inflation Factor analysis and the 
Condition Index analysis.  Following Kaasa (2009), I have run different specifications of the multicollinearity tests 
using the stata command “collin”. This command reports both the VIF values and the condition index. I have run the 
analysis using both household level variables as in Kaasa (2009) and village averages as in van Rijn (2012). The 
results of this analysis are quite mixed and a selection of results can be found in details in the Appendix 3.1. 
53 A detailed description of the construction of these indexes can be found in Appendix 3.2 
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c. Cognitive capital Index 
 
Table 3 lists the social capital variables that I use for the empirical analysis
54
.  
Table 3 Measures of social capital 
Type of social capital Name of variable Description  Expected 
sign 
    
Disaggregates    
Structural bonding capital 1 Relationship with other 
members of FO  
=1 if farmer has contacts with other 
farmers in FO; 0 otherwise 
+/- 
Structural bonding capital 2 Membership in FO =1 if farmer is member of a FO; 0, 
otherwise 
+/- 
Structural bonding capital 3 Social network  =1 if any previous adopter was 
known; 0 otherwise* 
+/- 
Structural bonding capital 4 Strength Relationship with 
other farmers 
(1/5) +/- 
    
Structural bridging capital 
1 
Relationship with input 
suppliers 
=1 if farmer has contacts with input 
suppliers; 0 otherwise 
+ 
Structural bridging capital 
2 
Relationship with credit 
providers 
=1 if farmer has contacts with credit 
providers; 0 otherwise 
+ 
Structural bridging capital 
3 
Relationship with extension 
officers 
=1 if farmer has contacts with 
extension officers; 0 otherwise 
+ 
Structural bridging capital 
4 
Relationship with 
development agencies 
=1 if farmer has contacts with 
development agencies; 0 otherwise 
+ 
Structural bridging capital 
5 
Relationship with NGOs =1 if farmer has contacts with NGOs; 
0 otherwise 
+ 
Structural bridging capital 
6 
Strength Relationship with 
input supplier  
(1/5) + 
Structural bridging capital 
7 
Strength Relationship with 
credit provider  
(1/5) + 
Structural bridging capital 
8 
Strength Relationship with 
extension officer  
(1/5) + 
Structural bridging capital 
9 
Strength Relationship with 
development agencies  
(1/5) + 
Structural bridging capital 
10 
Strength Relationship with 
NGOs  
(1/5) + 
    
Cognitive social capital 1 Trust in other farmers  (1/3) +/- 
Cognitive social capital 2 Trust in other members of FO (1/3) +/- 
Cognitive social capital 3 Trust in input supplier (1/3) +/- 
Cognitive social capital 4 Trust in credit provider (1/3) +/- 
Cognitive social capital 5 Trust in extension agent (1/3) +/- 
Cognitive social capital 6 Trust in development agencies (1/3) +/- 
Cognitive social capital 7 Trust in NGOs (1/3) +/- 
                                                 
54 In the empirical analysis I have also tried to estimate the determinants of adoption and its dimension using dummy 
variables of the social capital categorical variables (strength of the relationship and trust). The use of categorical 
variables in econometric analysis is often discouraged as their inclusion would mean assuming that there is no 
difference in the effect that each level has on the dependent variable. For example, in the case of the strength of the 
relationship it would mean assuming that the differential effect of having a weak instead of a very weak relationship 
would be the same as the difference between a strong and a very strong relationship. Following this argument I have 
estimated the econometric models described below using dummies instead of categorical variables. The base 
categories are the very and low levels of each variable. The results are not attached to these documents for exposition 
purposes. Overall, the results indicate that, although with some actor specific differences, having a higher or the 
highest level of trust or relationship increases the effect on the dependent variable compared to the lowest categories. 
The coefficients are often the highest in the case of the highest categories and generally only the two highest levels 
are significant. Also, from the exploratory analysis of these variables it looks like there is not much variation between 
all the levels of the categorical variables, with the majority of the observations concentrated at the two ends of the 
categories. As a consequence, I believe that using the categorical variables in the main analysis as in the case of this 
data, although categorical variables, the distribution of the observations across the categories is pretty much 
concentrated at the two ends and as such resembles enough the characteristics of dummy variables.  
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Type of social capital Name of variable Description  Expected 
sign 
    
    
Aggregated   
Structural social capital  Diversity social capital  Total number of relationships + 
Structural social capital Intensity of diversity of social 
capital 
Total strength relationships + 
Cognitive social capital General trust Total trust score +/- 
    
Structural social capital  Diversity of selected change 
agents 
Total number of relationships + 
Structural social capital Intensity of diversity of 
selected change agents  
Total strength of relationships + 
Cognitive social capital Trust in selected change 
agents 
Total trust score +/- 
    
Structural Bonding capital Index PCA  +/- 
Structural Bridging capital Index PCA + 
Cognitive capital Index PCA +/- 
3.3 Overview of selected characteristics of adopters 
Using the definitions of adoption and its sub-components described above, this section 
describes the main differences in selected farmers’ characteristics between adopters and 
non-adopters, and within the group of adopters, between different time and intensity of 
adoption. For comparison purposes, the intensity of adoption is reported in terciles, and 
as such the descriptive analysis is based on the comparison between the least intense 
adopters (1
st
 tercile) and the most intense adopters (3
rd
 tercile).  
The results in Table 4 show that mango farmers (including early, earlier and more 
intense adopters) are most commonly men, older and living in bigger households than 
their comparison group. However, at the time of adoption mango farmers were, instead, 
younger and their household, in the case of early adopters, was significantly smaller 
than later adopters. Although current family size is bigger for adopters, the degree of 
involvement of family members in own farm activities is, instead, smaller compared to 
non-adopters. A similar result is found in the case of early and earlier adopters, while no 
significant difference is observed according to the intensity of adoption
55
. 
                                                 
55 The lower family involvement in the farm activities could be justified on two grounds: 1. Adopters’ households are 
generally wealthier and can afford to hire labourers for their farm activities and as such family members can work in 
other sectors, which generates resources that could potentially feed into the expenditures on innovation; and 2. More 
family members are working in other sectors to generate financial resources needed for the adoption of innovation 
and as part of a risk-reducing strategy for coping with less than expected returns from the innovation itself. In other 
words, the size of farm labour and access to non-farm income can be linked and access to non-farm income by 
households’ members could act as complement of the adoption of innovation.  
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Table 4 Selected summary statistics by adoption statuses 
 
 Adoption Time – absolute cut off Time – relative cut off Intensity 
Variable  Non adopters  Adopters  
 
Early  Late  
 
Earlier  Later  
 
1st tercile  3rd  tercile  
 
 
 Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
Age Head Years 46.77 50.28 0.019** 51.83 48.57 0.054* 53 49 0.015** 50.97 53.25 0.283 
Age at the adoption Years 46.77 42.59 0.005*** 41.62 43.66 0.230 42 43 0.371 43.84 43.85 0.996 
Male Head 0/1 0.85 0.93 0.022** 0.94 0.92 0.635 0.95 0.92 0.494 0.85 0.95 0.071* 
Higher education 0/1 0.14 0.24 0.034** 0.31 0.16 0.014** 0.29 0.20 0.144 0.21 0.47 0.001*** 
HH size # 5.55 6.12 0.038** 5.91 6.34 0.169 6 6 0.254 6.03 6.54 0.215 
HH size at the adoption # 5.55 5.14 0.134 4.63 5.71 0.000*** 4 6 0.000*** 5.19 5.37 0.661 
Total family labour # 3.39 3.04 0.065* 2.64 3.47 0.000*** 2.62 3.31 0.001*** 3.09 3.08 0.986 
Farm size Acres 3.98 9.98 0.001*** 13.61 5.96 0.003*** 14.62 6.91 0.004*** 3.68 24.43 0.000*** 
Farm size at the adoption Acres 3.98 8.82 0.004*** 12.86 4.35 0.001*** 13.63 5.65 0.002*** 3.53 21.60 0.000*** 
Land ownership  0/1 0.51 0.66 0.010** 0.79 0.53 0.000*** 0.74 0.61 0.053* 0.84 0.85 0.860 
Production other cash crops 0/1 0.22 0.28 0.290 0.35 0.19 0.015** 0.31 0.25 0.415 0.43 0.39 0.628 
Livestock  # 18.94 24.51 0.159 27.89 20.75 0.171 29.24 21.37 0.139 13.49 38.56 0.001*** 
Experience  Years 15.74 16.62 0.513 17.25 15.92 0.403 18.03 15.69 0.149 15.31 16.53 0.543 
Experience at the adoption Years 15.74 8.93 0.000*** 7.05 11.01 0.012** 6.88 10.28 0.035** 8.18 7.12 0.575 
Training 0/1 0.26 0.79 0.000*** 0.77 0.81 0.504 0.81 0.77 0.544 0.60 0.86 0.001*** 
Extreme risk aversion 0/1 0.33 0.29 0.418 0.31 0.26 0.418 0.29 0.28 0.819 0.37 0.32 0.552 
Moderate  risk aversion 0/1 0.54 0.60 0.304 0.56 0.65 0.243 0.60 0.61 0.900 0.57 0.51 0.513 
No risk aversion 0/1 0.13 0.11 0.676 0.13 0.10 0.517 0.13 0.10 0.567 0.06 0.17 0.051* 
Impatient  0/1 0.29 0.31 0.749 0.31 0.31 0.986 0.31 0.31 0.931 0.30 0.22 0.323 
Access to credit 0/1 0.14 0.27 0.010** 0.22 0.31 0.163 0.22 0.30 0.224 0.21 0.31 0.219 
Access to non-farm income 0/1 0.57 0.72 0.094* 0.67 0.78 0.324 0.69 0.75 0.654 0.58 0.98 0.007*** 
Ownership of tractor 0/1 0.02 0.02 0.902 0.04 0.00 0.055* 0.05 0.00 0.013** 0.00 0.07 0.030** 
Ownership of mobile 0/1 0.76 0.88 0.009*** 0.89 0.86 0.484 0.87 0.88 0.843 0.88 0.97 0.078* 
Ownership of radio 0/1 0.90 0.91 0.796 0.91 0.90 0.821 0.91 0.91 0.935 0.85 1.00 0.002*** 
Ownership of bicycle 0/1 0.62 0.70 0.182 0.69 0.71 0.758 0.72 0.69 0.640 0.58 0.63 0.610 
Ownership of motorcycle 0/1 0.20 0.30 0.061* 0.34 0.26 0.215 0.37 0.25 0.080* 0.19 0.42 0.005*** 
Ownership of car 0/1 0.06 0.15 0.015** 0.18 0.11 0.131 0.19 0.12 0.157 0.07 0.36 0.000*** 
Road conditions # months 3.56 2.93 0.005*** 2.95 2.90 0.824 2.78 3.03 0.310 2.82 3.48 0.020** 
N  109 196 
 
103 93 
 
78 118 
 
67 59 
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The data on asset endowments show that ownership of mobile phone, motorcycle, car is 
more common for adopters compared to non-adopters, and, within the group of 
adopters, early (earlier) and more intense adopters also own more often a tractor
56
. Also, 
adopters have a higher access to non-farm income (and credit) than non-adopters, which 
could suggest complementarities between substitute to crop cash income and innovation 
adoption. However, while an analogous trend can be seen for more intense adopters, no 
differences are often found according to the time of adoption.   
The main livelihood activity of adopters is farming. Farm size is consistently bigger for 
adopters, early, earlier adopters and more intense adopters, both using current values 
and values at the time of adoption. Land is also owned more commonly by adopters, 
early and earlier adopters, while it does not differ according to the intensity of adoption. 
The production of other cash crops and the number of livestock owned, instead, do not 
often differ according to the adoption statuses.  
The length of experience in farming is, also, much longer for adopters, early, earlier and 
most intense, although the difference with their comparison groups is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. It is, on the other hand, significant the difference in 
the experience in farming at the time of the adoption. Using past values of years of 
experience until the time of adoption, shows, indeed, a reverse scenario, where adopters 
were less experienced in farming than non-adopters, and this is also true for all the 
adoption sub-components (time and intensity). Indeed, it seems that farmers who 
adopted mango had practiced agricultural activities for fewer years than non-adopters at 
the time when they took the decision to innovate.  
Nonetheless, although less experienced, overall adopters (and more intense adopters) 
received much more training than non-adopters (or less intense adopters), while no 
statistically significant difference is observed in training experiences according to the 
time of adoption. 
                                                 
56 However, although the ownership of this type of assets is generally associated with a higher economic status, the 
lack of data on the value of these assets is per se a limitation in the definition of this association.  However, although 
bearing this in mind and considering that the sample is mostly composed by very small farmers, it is reasonable to 
assume that assets such as tractors or car could, overall, be a signal, although imprecise, of a better economic status. 
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Risks and time preferences do not seem to differ much across adoption statuses, 
although more intense mango farmers are observed to be more risk neutral then less 
intense adopters
57
.  
Finally, the number of months during which the village roads are considered impassable 
are significantly lower for adopters and less intense adopters which suggests that these 
farmers might face lower transaction costs in accessing good transport links and 
infrastructures. However, road condition seems not to differ according to the time of 
adoption. 
Table 5 reports summary statistics of the social capital variables across different 
adoption statuses. The results show that social capital differs substantially across 
adopters and non-adopters and within its dimensions and it is significantly higher for 
mango adopters. While almost all the variables show significant differences between 
adopters and non-adopters, less differences are observed across the subsample of later 
and earlier adopters as well as less and more intense adopters. More specifically, the 
data show that, potentially, different change agents can be related to the decision of the 
time and the intensity of adoption. For the time of adoption, contacts and the strength of 
the relationship with input suppliers and NGOs are significantly higher for early and 
earlier adopters than late and later adopters. On the other hand, contacts with 
development agencies and FO are found to significantly differ between less and more 
intense adopters.  
Finally, aggregate measures of social capital are shown to be substantially different 
between adopters and non-adopters and between less and more intense adopters, but 
they are not observed to be often significantly different according to the time of 
adoption.  
In conclusion, adopters seems better endowed with both physical, human and social 
capital than non-adopters and that the degree at which these different endowments are 
observed might differ according to the time and the intensity of adoption. 
                                                 
57
 The lack of significance of differences in risk aversion might be related to the imprecision of the variables used. 
The module on risk aversion in the questionnaire followed the methodology by Binswanger (1980) but only three of 
the seven level of risk aversion used in his paper were retained for this survey. This choice was mainly driven by the 
time and budget constraints of the field work. In addition, the majority of studies who use this methodology estimate 
risk aversion levels using Constant Partial Risk Aversion coefficients. This procedure was not followed for this 
analysis. Hence, the variables used are simply dummies created straight from the answers in the questionnaire, and so 
they are likely to be affected by imprecisions. 
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Table 5 Social Capital summary statistics by adoption statuses 
   Adoption Time of adoption - abs Time of adoption -rel Intensity of adoption 
 
 Non adopters Adopters   Early Late 
 
Earlier Later   1st terc 3rd terc 
 
   Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
Structural bonding capital   
  
              
   
Relationship with Farmers Organisation (FO) 0/1 0.14 0.63 0.000*** 0.58 0.68 0.172 0.67 0.60 0.360 0.34 0.71 0.000*** 
Membership in Farmers Organisation (FO) 0/1 0.15 0.63 0.000*** 0.57 0.69 0.096* 0.67 0.60 0.360 0.33 0.73 0.000*** 
Social network # 0.53 0.53 0.943 0.55 0.51 0.37 0.52 0.55 0.471 0.58 0.63 0.184 
Strength of relationship with other farmers 1/5 3.47 3.66 0.070** 3.6 3.73 0.25 3.62 3.69 0.488 3.63 3.75 0.336 
Structural bridging capital  
  
    
    
  
   
Relationship with input suppliers 0/1 0.83 0.95 0.000*** 0.99 0.9 0.006*** 1.00 0.92 0.008*** 1 0.98 0.288 
Relationship with credit providers 0/1 0.11 0.26 0.002*** 0.23 0.28 0.458 0.24 0.26 0.765 0.16 0.29 0.096 
Relationship with extension officers 0/1 0.36 0.78 0.000*** 0.78 0.78 0.89 0.77 0.79 0.756 0.7 0.81 0.147 
Relationship with Dev Agencies 0/1 0.04 0.53 0.000*** 0.49 0.57 0.239 0.54 0.52 0.769 0.24 0.69 0.000*** 
Relationship with NGOs 0/1 0.1 0.35 0.000*** 0.45 0.25 0.003** 0.44 0.30 0.046** 0.37 0.37 0.998 
Strength of relationship with input suppliers 1/5 1.99 2.87 0.000*** 3.02 2.7 0.036** 3.09 2.72 0.018*** 2.88 3.05 0.275 
Strength of relationship with credit providers 1/5 0.34 0.8 0.003*** 0.75 0.86 0.584 0.77 0.82 0.802 0.54 0.92 0.120 
Strength of relationship with extension officers 1/5 1.11 2.72 0.000*** 2.75 2.7 0.833 2.73 2.72 0.965 2.4 2.86 0.113 
Strength of relationship with Dev Agencies 1/5 0.09 1.88 0.000*** 1.81 1.96 0.571 2.00 1.80 0.455 0.84 2.76 0.000*** 
Strength of relationship with NGOs 1/5 0.28 1.18 0.000*** 1.52 0.8 0.002*** 1.46 0.99 0.049** 1.22 1.37 0.629 
Cognitive social capital  
  
    
    
  
   
Trust in input suppliers 1/3 1.69 2.17 0.000*** 2.25 2.08 0.083* 2.33 2.06 0.008*** 2.12 2.19 0.461 
Trust in credit providers 1/3 0.21 0.62 0.000*** 0.53 0.71 0.259 0.55 0.66 0.490 0.37 0.63 0.133 
Trust in extension officers 1/3 0.78 1.9 0.000*** 1.8 2.01 0.18 1.83 1.94 0.512 1.54 1.9 0.059* 
Trust in Farmers Organisation (FO) 1/3 0.28 1.7 0.000*** 1.53 1.89 0.066* 1.76 1.67 0.664 0.87 1.81 0.000*** 
Trust in Development Agencies 1/3 0.07 1.38 0.000*** 1.21 1.56 0.075* 1.36 1.39 0.877 0.57 1.69 0.000*** 
Trust in NGOs 1/3 0.22 0.79 0.000*** 0.97 0.59 0.017** 0.94 0.69 0.139 0.78 0.81 0.844 
Trust in other farmers 1/3 2.4 2.54 0.057* 2.42 2.67 0.000*** 2.46 2.58 0.091* 2.46 2.42 0.664 
Aggregates  
  
    
    
  
   
Diversity social capital  # 3.05 4.94 0.000*** 4.84 5.04 0.4 5.05 4.86 0.438 4.04 5.1 0.000*** 
Intensity of diversity of social capital # 9.37 17.11 0.000*** 16.85 17.4 0.559 17.67 16.75 0.332 13.55 18.25 0.000*** 
General trust # 6.97 12.31 0.000*** 11.54 13.15 0.030** 12.24 12.35 0.891 9.3 11.98 0.000*** 
Diversity of selected change agents # 3.05 4.94 0.000*** 4.84 5.04 0.400 5.05 4.86 0.438 4.04 5.1 0.000*** 
Intensity of diversity of selected change agents  # 5.4 11.91 0.000*** 12.02 11.78 0.732 12.51 11.51 0.150 9.31 13.58 0.000*** 
Trust in selected change agents # 3.75 8.31 0.000*** 7.93 8.72 0.125 8.35 8.28 0.899 6.21 8.64 0.000*** 
Structural Bridging Index # 1.29 2.94 0.000*** 3.08 2.8 0.109 3.14 2.82 0.070* 2.53 3.37 0.000*** 
Structural Bonding Index # 2.02 2.77 0.000*** 2.66 2.89 0.177 2.86 2.71 0.390 2.23 2.75 0.005*** 
Cognitive Index  # 1.61 3.4 0.000*** 3.19 3.64 0.029** 3.41 3.40 0.960 2.53 3.53 0.000*** 
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Section 4.Econometric model and main challenges of the 
econometric analysis 
The innovation adoption decision is often estimated using binary models, such as probit 
(Pomp and Burger, 1995; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Isham, 2002), linear probability 
models (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006) or OLS (Barr, 2011). When different dimensions of 
adoption are investigated, a double-hurdle model is often used (Noltze et al., 2012; 
Beltran et al., 2013) where Tobit is the preferred estimation procedure for the intensity 
of adoption (Pomp and Burger, 1995; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009). Heckman and 
instrumental variables models are also used for the control of self-selection in 
innovation adoption (Adegbola and Gardebroek, 2007; Jagwe et al., 2010; Ben-
Houassa, 2011). Finally, duration models are used for the analysis of the time of 
adoption (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Schipmann and Qaim, 2010).  
Following the literature on the analysis of innovation adoption using cross sections and 
taking into account the limitations of the data described below, I will model the analysis 
of adoption decision and its dimensions using a simple methodology, mainly based on 
probit and OLS models. I will also control for selection biases using Heckman two step 
and maximum likelihood models, when appropriate. The preference for these models 
follows the same considerations discussed in Chapter 1. 
Main challenges 
The main challenges of this econometric analysis are the lack of time-varying 
information on the variables of interests (in this cross section dataset), as well as 
endogeneity, heterogeneity in the unit of comparisons and multicollinearity of the social 
capital variables.  
The adoption of innovation is a dynamic process which involves knowledge 
accumulation and adaptation of expectations through time. The use of a cross section in 
the estimation of mango adoption could affect the results of the analysis. Hence, panel 
data offer the best set up for an unbiased estimation of the adoption models. However, 
the difficulties and the high costs involved in the collection of this type of data have 
motivated scholars towards alternative solutions to these issues. An alternative to panel 
data in the adoption analysis has been suggested by Besley and Case (1993) who claim 
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that it would be possible to re-create the dynamic nature of the adoption process via 
recall data on each farmer’s adoption history and on as many time-varying variables as 
possible. Another option could be the use of available secondary data on the average 
year of adoption. Using these data, matching techniques can be explored to match 
adopters and non-adopters with households surveyed in past years.  
Another major issue of the adoption analysis is endogeneity, due to reverse causality 
and selection biases. The majority of the determinants of adoption may have been 
affected by the adoption decision. For example, farm size, land ownership as well as the 
ownership of some assets, might have changed through time explicitly because of the 
adoption of the innovation. In the analysis of mango adoption, for example, farmers 
may have had to acquire more land for the cultivation of mango or have been able to 
acquire (or sell) new (old) assets depending on the returns of the innovation. Another 
source of endogeneity comes directly from the social capital variables as relationship 
and trust might have been affected by the adoption process. Also, mango adopters might 
be systematically different from other farmers due to their higher ability and 
entrepreneurship skills. Selection bias is, indeed, likely to affect the analysis of the time 
of adoption and its intensity if self-selection into innovation adoption is not controlled 
for.  
Dealing with this type of endogeneity problems has received  wide attention in the 
literature where recall data on specific variables, in line with the procedure suggested by 
Besley and Case (1993), could reduce the reverse causality issues, and where specific 
econometric models, such as Heckman models, which are normally preferred to Tobit 
and maximum likelihood models (as described in Chapter 1) have been used to 
attenuate selection biases. Less often endogeneity of social capital variables has been 
addressed. Among the few that attempted to control for this issue there are Wossen et al. 
(2015) and Barr (2000). They both use instrumental variables within the two stage least 
square framework.  
Finally, farmers’ heterogeneity is also deemed to affect this analysis. The heterogeneity 
originates from the fact that the sample of non-adopters may be incorrectly composed of 
dis-adopters, i.e. farmers who adopted mango in the past and then dis-adopted; future 
adopters and “never” adopters, which could affect the precision of the estimations. 
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Farmers heterogeneity needs to be control for at the time of the adoption and ideally 
adopters should be compared to “never” adopters at the time of adoption.  
The following paragraphs describe the strategies that I have put in place to try 
addressing some of these concerns.  
Firstly, in line with Besley and Case (1993), the data collected for this analysis did, 
indeed, include some recall data. However, due to time and budget constraints, the 
collection of a comprehensive list of recall information proved to be unfeasible. Hence, 
only selected recall data were collected at household level with the recall year being the 
year of adoption. Due to the limited amount of information at the time of adoption for 
only adopters, the data do not allow for any panel-like analysis. The use of secondary 
data is also excluded for the purpose of this analysis because, although Ghana Living 
Standard Survey data are available for the year 2006, which corresponds to the average 
year of adoption in the sample, this survey does not have any module on social capital.  
Nonetheless, the contribution of the recall data in the analysis of mango adoption needs 
to be seen in the attempt to reduce biases caused by reverse causality and farmers’ 
heterogeneity, with respect to some observable characteristics that the available 
qualitative studies suggested as the most likely to have been affected by the adoption 
process itself. These variables are land acquisition and farm size. Farm size is included 
in the econometric model with current value for non-adopters and values at the time of 
adoption for adopters. Similarly, also age and experience in farming are modified to 
take in to account the different characteristics of adopters at the time of adoption. 
Hence, these two variables are defined as years of the head of the household at the time 
of adoption for adopters and current years for the non-adopters. In the analysis of time 
and intensity of adoption, the values of farm size, age and experience date back to the 
year of adoption for both groups of adopters in the sample.  
In addition to the use of recall data, I also estimate Heckman models for addressing 
selection bias for the estimation of the model of the time of adoption and its intensity, 
i.e. systematic differences between adopters and non-adopters that can be driven by 
unobservable characteristics. The choice of this model instead of Tobit models follows 
the same practical considerations explained in the Chapter 1. However, differently from 
the analysis of market participation in Chapter 1, there is no clarity on a consistent 
theoretical framework for the selection of the identifier variables necessary for the 
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estimation of the Heckman models in the innovation adoption context. Some authors 
use more generic farmers and location characteristics (such as location and age in Ben-
Houassa, 2011), while others use proxies of other transaction costs as captured by 
ownership of assets and road conditions, as in the case of Schipmann and Qaim (2010). 
Following previous examples and using similar theoretical considerations used for the 
analysis of commercialisation in Chapter 1, I explore the possibility of using proxies of 
transaction costs to control for self-selection in the innovation adoption. However, 
compared to the analysis of market participation, the analysis of the time and intensity 
of adoption could also require an element of risk aversion in the selection process. 
Following the theoretical framework above, farmers may, indeed, delay the choice to 
adopt and to adopt more intensively innovations because they are not willing to take the 
risk inherent in the adoption process per se or because they would like to acquire more 
information on the innovation through time. As a consequence, for Heckman models of 
the analysis of the time and intensity of adoption I also explore the possibility to use 
risk aversions dummies as identifier variables in the first stage. In addition, as land 
ownership is often claimed to be a necessary asset for trials and learning by doing I also 
use land ownership as an identifier variable in the selection equation.  
Finally, I address the issue of the endogeneity of social capital variables. It is worth 
mentioning that recall data on social capital were not collected based on the 
assumptions that, first, relationships and social network tend to be quite stable across 
time and second that mango adoption would have occurred relatively recently and as 
such changes in the social capital were not foreseen at the time of the data collection. 
However, the data collected show that, indeed, some farmers have adopted mango much 
before than the expected period and as such social capital variables might be 
endogeneous. However, an instrumental variable model could be impracticable with the 
data that I am using as any of the instruments used in the previous literature either were 
not collected during the survey or do not apply to the innovation of exotic varieties of 
mango. For example, Wossen et al. (2015) instrument their social capital variables using 
the following variables: 1) idiosyncratic shocks (experience of death of a household 
member); 2) head born in the village 3) migration of adult members of the household 4) 
social status of head of the household in the village. Although data on shocks were 
collected during my field work, I am not convinced that it would be a good instrument 
for social capital in the context of mango adoption and especially because, differently 
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from Wossen et al. (2015), who measure social capital with memberships in funeral 
insurance groups or other similar groups, my measures of social capital are not directly 
related to shocks and as such I do not believe they can be considered a valid 
instrument
58
. Aside from endogeneity of social capital variables, I try to contain the 
issues of multicollinearity of these variables, estimating different types of social capital 
separately in the adoption models. Although maybe imprecise, this approach aims to 
limit the imprecision caused by multicollinearity related problems in the estimations.  
In conclusion, the analysis of adoption processes poses several empirical challenges that 
have been recognised and, often, addressed in the past literature not without caveats and 
limitations. In this chapter, I try to follow previous approaches within the limits of the 
collected primary data. The following section discusses the results of the estimations.  
 
                                                 
58 On the other hand, Barr (2000) instruments her variable on frequency of contacts with change agents using the 
following instruments: 1) ethnic origins; 2) his measure of diversity of social capital 3) sectoral and time dummies. 
Although I have been able to construct a measure of diversity of social capital with my data, the lack of additional 
variables, such as ethnic origins and the different unit of analysis (firms in Barr (2000) and small farmers in this 
analysis), make also this strategy not applicable to this study. 
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Section 5. Results 
Given the data available, this section does not aim to identify any causal relationship but 
rather to highlight existing correlations and associations between common farmers’ and 
village level characteristics and the adoption of the innovation under scrutiny, exotic 
varieties of mango.  
Table 6 and Table 7 show the estimation results for the adoption of mango, the time of 
adoption (using either the absolute cut-off, 2006, or the relative cut-off, regional 
median) and its intensity (natural logarithm of number of trees planted) of the basic 
model. The basic model in Table 6 includes demographic, household and farm level 
characteristics, where robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are used. 
Social capital variables are not included in this model. The model reported in this table 
is the most comprehensive of seven different specifications (in Appendix 3.3) run for 
the four dependent variables, where the group of characteristics have been added in a 
step wise fashion. The results are generally consistent between the seven specifications 
and as a consequence, only the most comprehensive model is discussed here for 
exposition purposes.  
Table 7, instead, reports the results of the adoption models which include in the 
specifications the explanatory variables already included in the basic model in Table 6 
as well as social capital variables as listed in Table 3. The social capital variables are 
included in the models in a separate and clustered fashion
59
. In the Appendix 3 a more 
comprehensive list of results can be found
60
. For exposition purpose Table 7 is a 
summary of the results and only lists the coefficients related to the different social 
capital variables.  
Marginal effects are reported for the models of adoption and the time of adoption using 
the absolute cut-off, while selection bias corrected probit marginal effects and OLS 
coefficients are reported for the analysis of the relative time of adoption and intensity of 
                                                 
59
 I have also estimated the models with village level social capital variables in trying to address endogeneity issue of 
the social capital variables. However, the coefficients estimated became extremely large suggesting that the model 
was not correctly specified and that an upward bias was instead generated. As a consequence I decided to use simpler 
variables as in Table 3. 
60
 As shown in the tables in the Appendix 3.3, in the model A8, I included dummies of relationships with all the 
change agents; in the model A9, I included the variables on the strength of relationship; in the models A10-A13 
bonding social capital are included in the estimation; in the model 14 I included the level of trust, and, finally, in the 
models A15 to A23, I included aggregate variables of social capital, one at the time. 
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adoption, when appropriate. Selection bias was only found to be relevant in the analysis 
of the intensity of adoption and the time of adoption when a relative cut-off is used. 
Three identifier variables are used for the analysis of the intensity of adoption (land 
ownership and two variables of risk aversion) and four for the time of adoption 
(ownership of radio, land ownership and two variables of risk aversion). Measures of 
fixed transaction costs, such as ownership of radio, did not qualify as identifier variables 
in the analysis of the intensity of adoption and, as a consequence, were also included in 
the second stage.  
Table 6 shows that the lambda coefficients in the analysis of intra-regional time of 
adoption (relative cut-off) is positive suggesting a positive correlation between 
unobservables in the adoption decision and the decision of when to adopt. On the other 
hand, the negative lambda coefficient for the analysis of the intensity of adoption 
suggests the opposite, i.e. negative correlation between unobservables. The positive 
correlation between unobservables can be explained with the argument that more able 
farmers would be more likely to adopt and to delay the adoption and this is in line with 
the idea that farmers may sometimes free ride and delay adoption to acquire more 
information on the adoption itself and this could be positively related to the higher 
ability and entrepreneurship of the farmers themselves. A similar argument could 
explain the negative correlation observed in the analysis of intensity of adoption, as 
more able farmers or farmers with higher entrepreneurial skills could invest less 
extensively in the mango cultivation, which finds also justification in the fact that 
several interventions supporting mango production may not target large farmers.   
The results in details 
The estimations of the basic models in Table 6, which do not include social capital 
variables, show that common determinants of innovation adoption are relevant in the 
analysis of adoption of exotic varieties of mango. Farm size is observed to be 
consistently significant and positive in the adoption process and its dimensions (time 
and intensity). Hence, the findings suggest that a bigger farm size facilitates the discrete 
decision to engage in mango production, it reduces the time of adoption and it increases 
the number of trees cultivated. These results support the empirical literature that farm 
size positively affects the adoption process (Feder, 1982; Just, Zilberman, and Rausser, 
1980).  
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Table 6 Determinants of adoption - basic model 
 Basic model  (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
  
Adoption 
Time  
Absolute cut-off61 
Time  
Relative 
cut-off62 
Time  
Relative 
cut-off 
Intensity Intensity 
  
Probit Probit 
Uncorr-
Probit 
Corr-Probit 
Heck 
Uncorr – 
OLS 
Corr- 
OLS 
Heck 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
   
  
    
Age head63 Years -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.004 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Male head (0/1) 0.181*** -0.074 -0.092 IV 0.421* 0.208 
  (0.062) (0.252) (0.108)  (0.254) (0.255) 
Higher education (0/1) -0.003 -0.080** -0.006 -0.013 0.372* 0.389*** 
  (0.013) (0.039) (0.049) (0.070) (0.195) (0.145) 
Farm labour # -0.017 0.147*** 0.131*** 0.134*** -0.063 -0.035 
  (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.055) (0.047) 
Farm size64  Acres 0.013** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.021*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.230*** -0.206 -0.080 IV -0.133 IV 
  (0.063) (0.139) (0.150)  (0.216)  
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.091*** -0.101*** 0.035 0.087* -0.311 -0.303** 
  (0.035) (0.007) (0.047) (0.046) (0.199) (0.142) 
Livestock ownership # 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.064* 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.089 0.061 
  (0.038) (0.023) (0.034) (0.027) (0.101) (0.078) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.112 0.154 0.122 0.112 0.143 0.090 
  (0.085) (0.137) (0.114) (0.134) (0.160) (0.143) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) -0.346*** dropped dropped dropped 0.042 0.228 
  (0.066)    (0.535) (0.489) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.087 0.085 0.128 0.132 -0.154 -0.230 
  (0.118) (0.169) (0.165) (0.149) (0.126) (0.192) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) -0.093*** 0.137*** 0.073 IV 0.324** 0.381* 
  (0.027) (0.032) (0.136)  (0.146) (0.211) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 0.057** -0.040 -0.053 -0.050 0.139 0.025 
  (0.026) (0.114) (0.122) (0.116) (0.156) (0.134) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) 0.006 -0.068 -0.101 -0.107 0.415*** 0.341*** 
  (0.053) (0.142) (0.128) (0.150) (0.130) (0.129) 
Ownership of car (0/1) -0.032*** 0.028 0.023 0.052 0.386** 0.467** 
  (0.009) (0.093) (0.074) (0.060) (0.194) (0.182) 
Road conditions # -0.035** 0.020 0.046 0.053* 0.056 0.096*** 
  (0.018) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.037) (0.037) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 0.123*** 0.042 0.035 IV -0.080 IV 
  (0.036) (0.065) (0.063)  (0.138)  
No risk averse (0/1) 0.034 -0.033 -0.053 IV 0.123 IV 
  (0.078) (0.078) (0.125)  (0.224)  
Impatient  (0/1) -0.022 -0.060 -0.017 0.005 -0.270** -0.238* 
  (0.064) (0.095) (0.081) (0.077) (0.136) (0.126) 
Experience in farming64 Years -0.012*** 0.006 0.008*** 0.010*** -0.009 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
Training  (0/1) 0.503*** -0.043 -0.125** -0.200* 0.619*** 0.224 
  (0.112) (0.221) (0.063) (0.112) (0.186) (0.256) 
Constant  
  
  3.398*** 3.682*** 
  
  
  (0.444) (0.551) 
Lambda     1.217*  -0.629* 
     (0.678)  (0.350) 
Observations  305 196 196 305 196 305 
                                                 
61
 =1 if late adopter; = 0 if early adopter. Cut-off year=2006 
62
 =1 if later adopter; =0 if earlier adopter. Cut-off year= regional median of year of adoption 
63
 At the time of adoption for mango farmers; current for non-mango farmers. 
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On the other hand, the results also show that land ownership, although relevant in the 
discrete adoption decision, does not affect the time of adoption. This result contrasts 
previous findings in the literature, where land ownership is valued as important asset in 
the definition of the expected returns of innovative activities, and as such one would 
expect that owning land would accelerate the time of adoption. Nonetheless, a possible 
reason for this inconsistency with past studies can be related to the customary land 
market set up that is specific for the Ghanaian context. Communal land is, indeed, the 
traditional feature of the land market in most of the villages in Northern Ghana. 82% of 
the farmers in my sample in the Northern regions do not own any land while 91% and 
79% of the farmers do in the Eastern and Brong-Ahafo regions, respectively
64
.  
Aside from land ownership and farm size, the results also show that other asset 
endowments might be relevant in the process of adoption. Ownership of a bicycle is 
positively associated with mango adoption but it is not relevant for the decision of when 
and how much to adopt. On the other hand, ownership of a car is negatively associated 
with the decision to adopt but positively associated with the intensity. Similarly 
ownership of tractors is negatively associated with the discrete decision to adopt but it is 
not significant in the analysis of intensity of adoption
65
. The negative association of 
these assets with adoption may be capturing the economic status of the households that 
are producing mango
66
. Thus, ownership of assets, such as car and tractors, are normally 
associated with a higher economic status
67
. However, the target population of the 
majority of the programs supporting the adoption of mango is composed of small and 
poor farmers, who are likely to be relatively less endowed than other farmers. These 
could explain why an unexpected negative relationship between generally considered 
predictors of wealth is, instead, observed in the case of mango adoption. 
Among household’s characteristics, family labour and access to non-farm income are 
also important determinants of adoption. However, family labour is observed to affect 
only the time of adoption: the higher the number of household’s members working on 
                                                 
64 Using regional clustered standard errors, especially when using a “relative” regionally defined cut-off, might have 
affected the results.  
65 It is also automatically dropped from the estimation of the time of adoption suggesting that mango farmers rarely 
own a tractor (only 4 farmers in the mango farmers’ sample). 
66 One other reason why these variables are negatively associated with adoption (or not significant) may be related to 
the sampling choices. Hence, as described in Chapter 2, very small farmers were over-samples during the field work 
and as such it is highly likely that these small farmers do not own these assets as it might not be economically 
efficient, as in the case of tractors, or they might be relatively poorer than other bigger farmers.  
67 Indicators of value and quality of the assets might be a better predictor of these relationship. However, this data 
was not collected during the fieldwork. 
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the family farm, the longer is the time the household would wait to adopt. The lack of 
significance for the discrete adoption decision might be explained by the fact that family 
labour is not necessarily a requirement for mango production, which is claimed to be 
less labour intensive than other cash crops. On the other hand, as anticipated in the 
descriptive analysis, access to non-farm income is observed to be a complement of the 
adoption process but it does not affect the time and the intensity of adoption.  
Also in line with the expectations, the results show that experience in farming (at the 
time of adoption for mango farmers) is an important predictor of the adoption decision. 
More specifically, the findings suggest that a longer experience in farming is negatively 
associated with the adoption decision and it is observed to delay the decision to adopt. 
Farmers with a long history of agricultural activities may decide to not engage in 
innovative activities or to engage later. This result, although may be capturing the effect 
of age in the adoption decision, could also be related to the substitution effect of other 
production decisions. Hence, the production of other cash crops is found to be strongly 
significant and negatively associated with the mango adoption, the relative time of 
adoption and the adoption intensity. Nonetheless, producing other cash crops might also 
capture the access to the information that could be useful for the mango production too. 
This might explain why producing other cash crops reduces the time of adoption, when 
an absolute cut-off is used (column 2). 
Among demographic characteristics, gender of the head of the household is only found 
to affect the initial decision to adopt or not adopt. Being a man increases the likelihood 
of adoption of exotic varieties of mango. This result supports the argument that export 
crops are indeed a male dominated sector in agriculture. Education instead is found to 
be positively related with the time of adoption and its intensity, supporting the empirical 
evidence that education is a sign of a higher absorptive capacity and as such is a 
facilitator and an accelerator of innovative activities. 
Finally, risk aversion plays a significant role in the adoption of exotic varieties of 
mango. Compared to extreme risk adverse farmers, being moderately risk adverse is 
found to be positively associated with the decision to adopt or not adopt. Nonetheless, 
this variable does not affect either the time or the intensity of adoption where, instead, 
impatience is found to be relevant. This result suggests that impatient farmers would 
plant less tress than more patient farmers. The long gestation period of mango trees and 
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the risks associated with the high and intense pre-gestation activities coupled with the 
current unexpected shocks may be the reason of this negative association. Farmers may 
accept to adopt mango but not to invest extensive resources in it because they might 
prefer more immediate returns from other cultivations, possibly cash crops, whose 
association with the intensity of mango adoption is indeed negative and strongly 
significant.  
After the analysis of the basic model reported in Table 6, I have, then, introduced social 
capital in the analyses, using different specifications and combinations of the variables 
listed in Table 3. The main results are summarised in Table 7. This table reports the 
marginal effects and the coefficients from separate estimations. Hence, each result 
reported in the table has been extracted from the results of the estimations of the basic 
model with the addition of one component of social capital variables at the time: 
structural bonding, structural bridging and cognitive, in their disaggregated or 
aggregated form
68
. As for the results in Table 6, robust standard errors where used and, 
where appropriate, selection corrected OLS and probit coefficients are reported.  
The results in Table 7 suggest that, in line with the recent empirical evidence, social 
capital determinants of adoption should not be overlooked, especially in the analysis of 
the simple discrete decision to adopt or not adopt. Hence, social capital components are 
observed to be strongly and positively associated with the adoption decisions.  
More specifically, among the structural bridging social capital, the adoption of mango is 
associated with having contacts and a strong relationship with several change agents, 
such as input suppliers, extension officers and development agencies. The strongest size 
of the association with adoption is observed for development agencies, which supports 
the evidence that development agencies have played an important role as change agents 
in the adoption of exotic varieties of mango in Ghana.  
Compared to previous literature, the size of the results tends to be quite consistent. For 
example, a relationship with extension officers would increase the probability to adopt 
by 14 percentage points ceteris paribus in my analysis, while Schipmann and Qaim find 
an effect equal to 11 percentage points.  
                                                 
68 The choice to include them one at the time is due to the nature of the social capital variables themselves that are 
highly correlated with each other. A detailed multicollinearity test can be found in Appendix. 
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Furthermore, the estimates in Table 7 suggest that having a relationship with 
development agencies would increase the probability to adopt, ceteris paribus, by 45 
percentage points. The association between adoption and relationship with development 
agencies has rarely been investigated empirically. Amongst the few studies that do 
investigate the effect of different components of social capital, van Rijn et al., (2012) 
find a strong and positive association between adoption of agricultural innovation in 
Sub-Saharan countries and a set of structural bridging social capital actors. The results 
of their poisson models suggest that a for a one unit change in bridging social capital, 
the difference in the logs of the innovation count variable (1-20) is expected to change 
by 4.31, which corresponds to an increase on the average number of innovations by 
about 20%. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) do not explicitly investigate the role of 
development agencies in adoption. However, they use as control variable participation 
in development programs, which is found to increase the probability to adopt by, on 
average, 30 percentage points. Although imprecise due to different modelling 
approaches, the comparison with these previous studies shows that the association 
estimated between relationship with development agencies and adoption in this analysis 
is higher than what observed in the past empirical evidence. A possible reason could be 
that the role of development agencies in the context of exotic varieties of mango in 
Ghana has been more intense that in the other two cases presented. Hence, while van 
Rijn et al. (2012) investigate the role of social capital on a variety of different 
innovations, for which the role of different bridging agents may be averaged, Bandiera 
and Rasul, 2006 studies the adoption of one crop, sunflower, which was provided by 
only one NGO
69
.  
Moving from the discrete decision to adopt to its dimensions (time and intensity), some 
differences in the role of different bridging actors can be observed. For example, in the 
analysis of time of adoption which highlights inter-regional differences (absolute cut-
off) NGOs, credit providers as well as input suppliers but not development agencies are 
observed as the main change agents.
                                                 
69 In addition, the size of the coefficients might be due to problems of endogeneity of the social capital variables in 
my analysis, which might have caused an upward bias and as such a higher magnitude of the association. 
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Table 7 Social capital 
Note: this table includes only the social capital variables. The full models can be found in Appendix 3 
Basic model and social capital   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Adoption Time adoption 
Absolute cut-
off70 
Time adoption 
Relative cut-
off71 
Intensity 
  Probit Probit Heck72/Probit Heck17/OLS 
VARIABLES   mfx mfx mfx coeff 
      
Structural bonding social capital      
Relationship with Farmers’ 
Organisation (FO) 
(0/1) 0.317*** 0.120 -0.096
1 0.849*** 
  (0.084) (0.085) (0.092) (0.197) 
Membership in Farmers’ Organisation 
(FO) 
(0/1) 0.275*** 0.194* -0.090
1 0.430**1 
  (0.095) (0.103) (0.084) (0.194) 
Social network # -0.161* 0.017 0.234***
1 0.031 
  (0.088) (0.233) (0.077) (0.229) 
Strength of relationship with other 
farmers 
(1/5) 0.056 0.086 0.019 0.097 
 (0.055) (0.074) (0.037) (0.066) 
Structural bridging social capital      
Relationship with input suppliers (0/1) 0.383*** -0.428*** dropped 0.544 
  (0.148) (0.068)  (0.565) 
Relationship with credit providers (0/1) -0.433** -0.087* -0.004
1 0.675 
  (0.217) (0.047) (0.124) (0.557) 
Relationship with extension officers (0/1) 0.144*** 0.070 0.139**1 -0.402 
  (0.035) (0.102) (0.064) (0.339) 
Relationship with Dev Agencies (0/1) 0.454*** 0.093 -0.081
1 0.579* 
  (0.052) (0.260) (0.222) (0.306) 
Relationship with NGOs (0/1) 0.084 -0.217*** -0.146
1 0.192 
  (0.057) (0.083) (0.111) (0.441) 
Strength of relationship with input 
suppliers 
(1/5) 0.046*** -0.062** -0.099***1 -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.031) (0.020) (0.040) 
Strength of relationship with credit 
providers 
(1/5) -0.059 -0.048*** -0.032
1 -0.003 
 (0.056) (0.014) (0.023) (0.048) 
Strength of relationship with extension 
officers 
(1/5) 0.025 0.030 0.050*1 -0.028 
 (0.018) (0.037) (0.027) (0.041) 
Strength of relationship with Dev 
Agencies 
(1/5) 0.177*** 0.024 -0.041
1 0.164*** 
 (0.021) (0.066) (0.046) (0.042) 
Strength of relationship with NGOs (1/5) 0.026 -0.063* -0.031
1 -0.035 
  (0.018) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037) 
Cognitive social capital      
Trust in input suppliers (1/3) 0.091* -0.145** -0.224***1 0.082 
  (0.051) (0.060) (0.040) (0.057) 
Trust in credit providers (1/3) -0.064 -0.103*** -0.052
1 -0.020 
  (0.076) (0.033) (0.034) (0.059) 
Trust in extension officers (1/3) 0.038 0.083*** 0.086***1 -0.011 
  (0.033) (0.030) (0.009) (0.057) 
Trust in Farmers’ Organisation (FO) (1/3) 0.072** -0.014 -0.0451 0.270*** 
  (0.029) (0.040) (0.043) (0.082) 
Trust in Development Agencies (1/3) 0.192*** 0.040 -0.008
1 0.152** 
  (0.028) (0.115) (0.094) (0.071) 
Trust in NGOs (1/3) 0.016 -0.070 -0.0211 -0.087* 
  (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) 
Trust in other farmers (1/3) -0.006 0.312*** 0.152***1 -0.059 
  (0.041) (0.109) (0.035) (0.145) 
Aggregates      
Structural Bridging Index # 0.167*** -0.075 -0.080**1 0.029 
  (0.027) (0.057) (0.113) (0.054) 
Structural Bonding Index # 0.126*** 0.032 -0.054*1 0.195** 
                                                 
70
 =1 if late adopter; = 0 if early adopter. Cut-off year=2006 
71
 =1 if later adopter; =0 if earlier adopter. Cut-off year= regional median of year of adoption 
72
 Heckman corrected  
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Basic model and social capital   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Adoption Time adoption 
Absolute cut-
off70 
Time adoption 
Relative cut-
off71 
Intensity 
  Probit Probit Heck72/Probit Heck17/OLS 
VARIABLES   mfx mfx mfx coeff 
  (0.043) (0.067) (0.013) (0.075) 
Cognitive Index  # 0.214*** 0.078 0.027 0.279*** 
  (0.049) (0.050) (0.044) (0.060) 
Diversity social capital  # 0.159*** -0.006 -0.055
1 0.094* 
  (0.012) (0.051) (0.043) (0.055) 
Intensity of diversity of social capital # 0.046*** -0.002 -0.014*1 0.029** 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) 
General trust # 0.063*** 0.013 0.005 0.045*** 
  (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) 
Diversity of selected change agents # 0.228*** -0.013 -0.059
1 0.178*** 
  (0.021) (0.091) (0.071) (0.062) 
Intensity of diversity of selected change 
agents  
# 0.066*** -0.003 -0.004 0.055*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) 
Trust in selected change agents # 0.084*** 0.020 0.013 0.076*** 
  (0.016) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) 
 
The role of NGOs, credit providers and input suppliers as facilitator of early adoption is 
in line with the fact that the some activities, especially the ones related to NGOs and 
credit providers, have been carried out at different times in different regions. Late 
adopters (absolute cut-off) are, indeed, more located in the Northern region where 
activities in support of mango adoption came much later than, for example, in the 
Southern belt.  
On the other hand, when intra-regional differences are taken into account in the analysis 
of the time of adoption (regional cut-off), the role of NGOs is not significant anymore. 
Instead, a positive association between earlier adoption is observed with input suppliers 
only. Furthermore, the results also show that extension officers might delay the time of 
adoption within regions. This result could be justified by the fact that extension officers 
working for the Ministry of Agriculture have very little experience with innovation 
activities, especially with regards to exotic varieties of mango. From field observation 
and focus group discussions carried out during the field work, farmers claimed that the 
amount of information provided by extension officers is generally quite low and not 
accurate. As a consequence, it might be plausible to think that extension officers might 
be expression of the “conformity” norm of the cognitive social capital, which is often 
found negatively associated with innovation and early adoption.  
This finding contrasts with previous empirical evidence as, for example, in the analysis 
of time of adoption in Schipmann and Qaim (2010). Using a duration model, they found 
that the speed of adoption increases quite substantially if the farmer has a contact with 
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extension officers. Nonetheless, the product innovation investigated in that case was 
sweet pepper which was introduced as product innovation in early 2000s, similarly to 
exotic varieties of mango, but its diffusion was much more rapid across producers and 
domestic consumers. Also, it is not clear from their study how extension officers are 
defined. In this analysis, extension officers are explicitly identified with officers of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and as such other types of extension activities are excluded 
from this category, which might not be the case in analysis such as Schipmann and 
Qaim (2010).  
Moreover, aside from the different definition of extension officers, the inconsistency of 
my results with this type of literature might support the importance of understanding the 
nature of the social capital relevant for the specific innovation under scrutiny. In this 
analysis of exotic varieties of mango in Ghana, I believe that extension officers cannot 
be considered the main innovators or change agents for earlier adoption as exotic 
varieties of mango were introduced via other actors, which could explain the observed 
negative association in the analysis of time of adoption.  
This type of association could also be driven by the negative flow of information 
generated by current adopters, due to shocks and harvest losses and probably shared 
with local extension officers. Bush fires and floods in the Northern regions as well as 
pest and diseases in the South have sometimes completely destroyed entire mango 
farms. More recently in December 2014, the abundance of rain has caused the 
nationwide abortion of flowering of mango trees which has reduced to the minimum the 
production expectation for the next harvest season. These developments might have 
generated negative expectations on the return of the innovation and as such induced a 
delay in the adoption. This is in line with what Moser and Barrett (2006) claim about 
the role of negative expectations on adoption of innovations and could explain why 
relationship with local extension officer is found to delay adoption, as they might have 
contacts with previous adopters and share their experiences with other farmers in the 
community. 
Bonding social capital and the effect of social network are often found to be positively 
associated with innovation adoption (e.g. Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). The results in 
Table 7 show that being a member of a farmers’ organisation and having contact with a 
farmers’ organisation play a positive effect on the decision to adopt and its intensity, 
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supporting the argument that homophilus ties are important in the adoption decision 
(Matuscke and Qaim, 2009).  
The size of the effects of bonding social capital on adoption tend to be quite consistent 
with previous findings as bonding social capital, measured as membership or contacts 
with farmers’ organisation, is found to increase the probability to adopt from 28 to 32 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. For example, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) find an 
average effect of 39 percentage points, with a minimum of 27 to a maximum of 58 
percentage points, depending on the size of the social network, while Isham (2002) 
finds that bonding social capital increases the probability to adopt fertilizer in Tanzania 
by 30 percentage points.  
On the other hand, the finding on the role of the size of the social network on adoption 
contradicts the expectation because it is found to be negatively associated with the 
discrete adoption decision and earlier adoption, when a relative cut off is used. 
Similarly, being a member of farmers’ organisation seems to delay the adoption in the 
analysis of inter-regional differences (absolute cut-off).  
These results could support the argument that, although bonding social capital is 
important for the decision to adopt per se, having contacts with other farmers may 
induce future adopters to wait for “better” times in order to acquire more information on 
the innovation itself. Two possible reasons have been used in the literature to explain 
the nature of this relationship: “over-crowding” effect and negative returns of the 
innovation. The over-crowding effect refers to the sigmoid distribution of the adoption 
rates drawn from the sociological literature (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). This literature 
assumes that the speed of diffusion of adoption will be positive until a maximum 
amount of adopters is reached, after which the speed of adoption will decrease until no 
one else will adopt the innovation under scrutiny.  
This argument could play a role in this analysis and it may be highly linked to the nature 
of the sampling strategy. Hence, villages and districts with a high concentration of 
adopters have been purposively selected during the sampling process. It is indeed 
possible that the adoption rates might be quite high in the location chosen and that an 
overcrowding effect could be playing a role. Another possible explanation is the effect 
of the experience of negative returns from innovation from a number of adopters in the 
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village, as described above. This idea, common among the learning by “seeing” 
scholars, fits the context of the mango adoption in Ghana.  
The effect of cognitive social capital is usually quite difficult to estimate, as it requires 
detailed information on trust and community norms and rules. The variables on trust 
that I use are, indeed, quite limited in their ability to capture such complex dynamics. 
Nonetheless, I believe that they show some interesting and consistent results. Hence, 
trust in input suppliers, farmers’ organisation and development agencies is found to be 
strongly significantly and positively associated with the discrete adoption decision. 
Once again, the role of the development agencies as change agent is the strongest for 
mango adoption. The decision to adopt earlier than others is instead affected negatively 
by the trust in other farmers and in extension officers. As explained above, it is likely 
that a negative flow of information on the negative returns of mango production might 
have been channelled through these two change agents. A higher trust in these agents 
could then indeed delay the adoption process.  
The negative effect of cognitive social capital is consistent with the results of previous 
studies, such as van Rijn et al., (2012), Dakhli and de Clercq, (2004) and Kaasa (2009), 
who claim that cognitive social capital, in the form of conformity and good citizenship 
rules, may hinder adoption and early adoption.  
However, although as mentioned above, this explanation may hold for trust in extension 
officers, I believe that the negative association between trust in other farmers observed 
in this analysis does not relate to the role of these community rules but, instead, 
provides support to the argument that bonding social capital is indeed quite important in 
the adoption decision. Farmers do trust each other and do communicate about both 
failures and successes. As a consequence of the numerous difficulties that adopters are 
facing in the production of exotic varieties of mango, it is plausible to believe that, 
indeed, adoption and its dimensions are affected negatively if farmers trust other 
farmers.  
Finally, the results of the aggregate measures of social capital confirm that social capital 
matters in the innovation process. A strongly significant and positive relationship is 
observed for all the aggregate variables for the discrete adoption decision and its 
intensity. On the other hand, the time of adoption at inter-regional level (absolute cut-
off) seem not be affected by any of these variables, suggesting that more disaggregated 
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measures of social capital could be more appropriate in this analysis across different 
regions. Nonetheless, the results of the intra-regional analysis of the time of adoption 
(relative cut-off) show that, in line with previous social network studies, bonding social 
capital is positively associated with earlier adoption. However, the findings also suggest 
that other social capital components, such as bridging social capital, should not be 
overlooked, as it is also found to be positively associated with earlier adoption in this 
analysis
73
.  
The role of social capital in reducing barriers to adoption 
One of the main arguments in support of the importance of social capital in the context 
of innovation adoption in developing countries is their ability to provide farmers with 
access to information that otherwise, due to institutional and market inefficiencies, they 
might not be able to obtain.  
In order to understand whether social capital can help farmers overcoming physical and 
human capital deficiencies in the context of the adoption of exotic varieties of mango, I 
estimate the basic model as in Table 6 with the addition of interaction of aggregate 
measures of social capital with selected common determinants of adoption. The 
equation (6) is then re-formulated as follows: 
𝑌ℎ 
𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴ℎ + 𝛽2𝐺ℎ + 𝛽3𝐼ℎ+𝛽4SKℎ+𝛽5SKℎ ∗ 𝑖ℎ + 𝜀  (7) 
where 𝑖ℎ is a vector of farm size, land ownership, credit, ownership of communication 
assets, such as radio, and risk aversion. The results of the models with the interactions 
between aggregate measures of social capital and selected adoption determinants are 
summarised in the Appendix 3.5 and not presented here for exposition purpose.  
The results show that, while the usual determinants remain statistically significant, 
social capital may mitigate the relevance of some of the classical determinants of 
adoption and its time but not for its intensity. For example, bridging social capital 
facilitates and accelerates adoption if the farmers are not extreme risk averse. Moreover, 
this type of social capital facilitates adoption and early adoption if farmers have larger 
                                                 
73 In order to validate the robustness of the results I have also run additional estimations on a subset of farmers. One 
of the main differences between adopters and non-adopters highlighted in Section 3 was the size of the cultivated 
farm. In order to reduce the systematic difference in farm endowments between adopters and non-adopters I have run 
the analysis of the adoption and its dimensions on the subset of farmers with similar farm size. The results show that 
the estimations discussed above do not change much when the biggest farmers are dropped from the analysis. The 
size, the significance as well as the direction of the coefficients estimated in the full model remain very similar also in 
these estimations. The full discussion and results can be found in Appendix 3.4. 
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farm size. When intra-regional differences are taken into account, the higher the 
bridging social capital the lower is the effect of farm size on earlier adoption. Finally, 
the effect of land ownership on adoption is reduced in the presence of higher bridging 
social capital.  
On the other hand, the effect of bonding social capital is mainly significant for credit 
and ownership of radio in the case of the discrete adoption decision and for farm size 
and ownership of radio for the decision on when to adopt. More specifically, having a 
higher bonding social capital reduces the importance of having access to credit, which is 
overall found to decrease adoption
74
.  
Finally, cognitive social capital affects the effects of credit and risk aversion for the 
adoption decision, and the effects of road conditions, credit, risk aversion, farm size and 
ownership of radio for the decision on when to adopt. Having a higher cognitive social 
capital facilitate and accelerate adoption for those farmers with access to credit and who 
are less risk averse. Furthermore, a stronger cognitive social capital seems to help 
farmers in overcoming bad road conditions, i.e. farmers located in villages where roads 
are impassable for a higher number of months tend to adopt earlier than others. 
Nonetheless, cognitive social capital per se is found to increase adoption but also to 
increase the time of the adoption itself
75
. 
These analyses use aggregate measures of social capital. As a consequence, although 
providing interesting results, do not allow the identification of specific change agents 
that might be relevant in the adoption context. As a consequence, in order to understand 
the effect on the adoption decisions of single change agents, I also estimate the basic 
model for sub-samples of farmers who are observed to have a relationship with some of 
the actors used in the social capital analysis. I use these samples one at the time and run 
the basic model analysis of the determinants of adoption and its dimensions in separate 
estimations, as expressed as follows: 
𝑌ℎ 
𝑖 |(SKℎ
𝑖 = 1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴ℎ + 𝛽2𝐺ℎ + 𝛽3𝐼ℎ + 𝜀  (8) 
                                                 
74 However, ownership of radio hinders adoption even more in presence of higher bonding social capital, suggesting a 
complementarity between bonding social capital and ownership of communication assets for access to information. 
Similar results are observed in the analysis of the time of adoption. 
75 The role of social capital in reducing transaction costs related to the road conditions is also observed in the 
estimations when other measures of social capital are included, as, for example, the diversity indicators, the intensity 
of diversity of social capital and general trust. 
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Where the adoption status 𝑌ℎ 
𝑖  is conditional to household h to have relationship with 
specific change agent, (SKℎ
𝑖 = 1).More specifically, following the results in Table 6, I 
have selected the relevant social capital actors for each dimension of the adoption 
process
76
. Table 8 shows only the most insightful results, which are observed in the case 
of farmers with relationship with farmers’ organisation or extension officers77.  
Table 8 Determinants of adoption, subsets of farmers 
 
Adoption Intensity Time adoption - abs Adoption Time adoption-rel 
VARIABLES FO FO FO Extension officers Extension officers 
            
Age head1  -0.002*** -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
Male head 0.035 0.641* -0.160 0.093 0.020 
 (0.021) (0.346) (0.293) (0.093) (0.227) 
Higher education -0.007 0.626*** -0.147*** -0.102*** -0.009 
 (0.024) (0.236) (0.051) (0.029) (0.059) 
Farm labour1 0.001 -0.022 0.125*** -0.007 0.150*** 
 (0.002) (0.047) (0.013) (0.027) (0.031) 
Farm size1  0.001 0.028*** -0.015*** 0.011*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Land ownership 0.027 -0.087 -0.143 0.054** -0.152** 
 (0.022) (0.194) (0.199) (0.022) (0.064) 
Production other cash crops -0.010 -0.735** -0.137 -0.063*** 0.142*** 
 (0.013) (0.288) (0.215) (0.002) (0.036) 
Livestock ownership 0.000** 0.002 -0.002* 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income 0.009 -0.022 0.031 0.023 -0.043 
 (0.006) (0.088) (0.071) (0.029) (0.043) 
Access to credit 0.004 0.144 0.173 0.076 0.207*** 
 (0.005) (0.150) (0.153) (0.059) (0.056) 
Ownership of tractor dropped -0.230 dropped dropped dropped 
 
 
(0.576) 
 
 
 Ownership of mobile -0.013** -0.043 0.172 0.094 0.369** 
 (0.006) (0.121) (0.217) (0.171) (0.157) 
Ownership of radio -0.010 0.157 0.239*** -0.059 -0.017 
 (0.012) (0.144) (0.031) (0.045) (0.218) 
Ownership of bicycle 0.000 -0.062 -0.037 0.008 0.016 
 (0.005) (0.182) (0.228) (0.045) (0.171) 
Ownership of motorcycle -0.001 0.467*** -0.140 -0.019 -0.104 
 (0.004) (0.121) (0.182) (0.039) (0.128) 
Ownership of car dropped 0.430* -0.028 0.080** -0.039 
 
 
(0.228) (0.085) (0.038) (0.043) 
Road conditions 0.005 0.068 0.041 -0.024** 0.063*** 
 (0.005) (0.046) (0.029) (0.010) (0.019) 
Moderate risk averse 0.039*** -0.205 0.067 0.171*** 0.046 
 (0.011) (0.176) (0.158) (0.049) (0.171) 
No risk averse 0.008 -0.196 -0.010 0.078 -0.028 
 (0.009) (0.237) (0.148) (0.064) (0.234) 
Impatient  -0.049 -0.175 -0.167 -0.077** -0.014 
 (0.040) (0.124) (0.120) (0.032) (0.095) 
Experience in farming1 -0.001** -0.001 0.005 -0.008*** 0.008* 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.005) 
Training  0.908*** -0.063 0.132 0.244*** -0.146*** 
 
(0.060) (0.356) (0.270) (0.063) (0.035) 
    
 
 
                                                 
76 For the discrete adoption decision I re-run the basic model for those farmers who have a relationship with: 1) input 
suppliers; 2) extension officers; 3) development agencies and 4) farmers’ organisation. These actors were found quite 
consistently significant in the determinant of the adoption. Similarly, for the inter-regional analysis of the time of 
adoption I use the sub-sample of adopters with a relationship with: 1) input suppliers; 2) credit providers; 3) NGOs 
and 4) farmers’ organisation. For the intra-regional analysis of the time of adoption, only the relationships with input 
providers and extension officers are considered. Finally, for the analysis of the intensity of adoption I select a sub-
sample of adopters with a relationship with development agencies and farmers’ organisation.  
77 The full results can be found in Appendix 3.5.  
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Adoption Intensity Time adoption - abs Adoption Time adoption-rel 
VARIABLES FO FO FO Extension officers Extension officers 
            
Observations 117 123 123 188 153 
1At the time of adoption for mango farmers; current for non-mango farmers; FO=farmers’ organisation 
These results tend to suggest that when focusing on the role of single change agents the 
contribution of social capital in mitigating innovation barriers might differ compared to 
the analyses that use aggregate measures. For example, in contrast with what discussed 
above, these results show that bonding social capital, in the form of membership in 
farmers’ organisation, does reduces some transaction costs, as measured by road 
conditions and ownership of radios, on both the discrete adoption decision and its 
intensity, while it does not change much the estimation of the determinants of time of 
adoption. This finding could suggest that farmers’ organisations could act as substitute 
for a common source of information, such as radio, and could facilitate access to 
relevant information for mango adoption and its intensity, that common transaction 
costs might hinder
78
.  
Also, in the decision to adopt, for members of farmers’ organisations, most of physical 
capital, such as farm size and land ownership, which are often strategic in the learning 
by doing process, become not significant
79
.  This result could suggest that being part of 
a farmers’ organisation might reduce the need of the farmers for trials and 
experimentation on own land as similar information on failures and successes related to 
the innovation adoption may be obtained from simply participating in activities within 
farmers’ organisation and by interacting with other farmers and, possibly, previous 
adopters.  
Aside from the role of farmers’ organisation (bonding social capital), the results also 
suggest that having a relationship with local extension officers (bridging social capital) 
might affect the determinants of the decision to adopt and the time of adoption, both 
between and within regions. In the decision of whether to adopt or not, the findings of 
these estimations suggest that the adoption decision is not associated anymore with 
transport and farm assets, such as tractor, but it is associated with lower age and 
                                                 
78 The results also show that ownership of mobile phones is found to reduce the probability to adopt if the farmer is 
member of a farmers’ organisation. This counterintuitive result might suggest that farmers with mobiles are able to 
gather information also from other sources, not necessarily linked with local farmers’ organisation, which might 
hinder the decision to adopt. 
79 According to these results, the consistent role of, for example, farm size and land ownership, found in previous 
empirical evidence and in this chapter, in the adoption decision described above seems to be reduced by social 
capital. 
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education, lower endowment with communication assets, such as mobile phones, and 
lack of access to credit. Instead, for the group of farmers who are observed to have a 
relationship with extension officers the probability to adopt is positively associated with 
low education, with ownership of a car and with less impatience than other farmers. On 
the other hand, for the decision on when to adopt, farmers with a relationship with 
extension officers are more likely to adopt earlier if they are younger, they don’t have 
access to credit and they don’t own communication assets such as mobiles. In addition, 
the major determinants observed in the estimation of the full sample, such as farm size 
and land ownership, are still significant and with the same sign. In addition, gender does 
not affect the adoption anymore, while farm size and land ownership are still significant 
in this analysis. The analysis of the time of adoption also suggests a relationship with 
extension officers, especially if combined with access to credit, would delay adoption of 
mango.  
A similar story is observed for the subsample of farmers with a relationship with NGOs 
in the analysis of inter-regional differences of the time of adoption. More specifically, 
these results tend to show that early adopters are farmers with lower education, with 
bigger farm size, with land ownership and less experienced in farming. Also, the access 
to non-farm income for these farmers tends to delay the adoption. However, differently 
from the analysis of extension officers, having contacts with NGOs is found to reduce 
some communication transaction costs, as the ownership of radio becomes not 
significant while the ownership of a mobile becomes relevant for early adoption. These 
results might find support in the fact that farmers with contacts with NGOs gather 
information via these change agents and owning a mobile phone might facilitate this 
information exchange. However, the sample of farmers for this estimation is quite small 
(69) and as such further interpretation of these results might be misleading
80
.  
The findings of these additional analyses tend to support, overall, the idea that adoption 
decisions are affected by social capital. More specifically, the analyses of the 
interactions of aggregate measures of social capital and selected adoption determinants 
show that, although social capital goes in parallel with some of the main constraints of 
                                                 
80 Among other forms of structural bridging social capital, development agencies for the intensity analysis and input 
suppliers for the discrete adoption decision and its time do not seem to affect the relevance of the main determinants 
of adoption. 
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the adoption process, such as farm size, it might facilitate early adoption for landless 
farmers, farmers with no access to credit and located in more remote areas.  
The results also suggest that a certain degree of disaggregation in the measures of social 
capital might provide additional insights on the role of single change agents. More 
specifically, while membership in farmers’ organisation is observed to play a role in 
reducing farmers’ constraints in the adoption process, especially related to access to 
information, conventional forms of bridging social capital, such as extension officers, 
could also favour adoption of lower educated and poorly endowed farmers, although 
they do not affect farm size and land ownership constraints. 
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Section 6. Conclusion 
Exotic varieties of mango, such as Kent and Keitt, can be considered an innovation in 
the Ghanaian context as they have been introduced on massive scale in the late 90s by a 
NGO (ADRA). Since then, several donors and national agencies in Ghana have tried to 
attenuate farmers’ difficulties in the accessing the expected benefits of so called “golden 
fruit”. Their main interventions focus on the establishment and consolidation of 
farmers’ organisations, better extension services and training within an overall poverty 
reduction strategy. 
Notwithstanding the strong political interest and the amount of national and 
international financial investments in the sector, the latest estimates from the Living 
Standards Surveys show that the number of producers has been falling in the past 20 
years. The numerous production and weather related challenges, that mango adopters 
face, provides support for the argument that adoption decision regarding exotic varieties 
of mango might not be straightforward, especially among small farmers.  
Past literature has investigated the adoption of product innovation mostly focusing on 
traditional cash crops, such as cocoa, or horticultural crops, fruits and vegetables. 
However, apart from few studies, such as Conley and Udry (2010), few authors have 
empirically investigated the decision to adopt non-traditional cash crops in Ghana.   
This paper contributes to the product innovation adoption literature as it investigates the 
determinants of the adoption of exotic varieties of mango, a non-traditional cash crop 
for Ghana, with primary data collected in 2012 from both adopters and non-adopters. In 
order to provide a comprehensive overview of the adoption process, I also investigate 
the factors that affect the decisions of when and how much to adopt.  
The analysis dedicates a special attention to the role of social capital and its components 
(structural bonding, structural bridging and cognitive) in the adoption process. The 
relevance of social capital in the adoption of innovation has only recently re-gained 
recognisance in the literature. Nonetheless, seminal papers such as Bandiera and Rasul 
(2006) as well as Conley and Udry (2010) mostly focus on the role of one of the many 
components of social capital, the bonding component within social network analysis. 
Only few authors in the adoption of innovation literature, especially in the context of 
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agricultural innovation, have investigated the role of social capital in all of its 
components (structural bridging, bonding and cognitive).  
My paper follows the latter strand of the literature as it tries to empirically unveil the 
role of the social capital in all of its components, in both the most disaggregated way (at 
change agent level) as well as in its aggregate specification, using composite indexes.  
Overall, the main results of the analysis suggest that social capital determinants of 
adoption should be not overlooked in the adoption of exotic varieties of mango in 
Ghana, supporting the recent evidence in the literature of innovation adoption that there 
exists a positive relationships between the “know-who” and the adoption dynamics.  
Also, in line with Kaasa (2009) and van Rijn et al. (2012), the findings support the 
importance of retaining a high level of disaggregation of the social capital variables in 
the adoption models as it contributes in unveiling links and direction of effects that may 
be change-agent specific.  
For example, among structural bridging social capital, the role of development agencies 
tend to be relevant in the decision of how much to adopt but not in the time of adoption, 
in which case NGOs, credit and input suppliers might be more important. On the other 
hand, extension officers are found to delay the adoption decision. This is in line with the 
fact that extension officers are generally not considered innovators within local 
communities and with the argument of expectations of negative returns from innovation 
by Moser and Barrett (2006). 
Trust and cognitive social capital, although within the limitation of the data, are also 
found to be relevant in the adoption decisions. Overall, similar change agents observed 
for the bridging social capital are also relevant in the case of cognitive social capital. 
For example, the results suggest once again a negative effect of extension officers on 
the adoption decisions. This finding is in line with previous empirical evidence that 
cognitive social capital might hinder adoption because of conservative local rules and 
norms of good citizenship and status quo.  
Finally, the most consistent result regarding social capital determinants concerns the 
effect of structural bonding capital. Contrary to what found in van Rijn et al., (2012) but 
in line with Bandiera and Rasul (2006), bonding social capital, measured as 
membership in farmers’ organisation, is found strongly and positively associated with 
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the adoption and adoption’s intensity decisions, supporting the strong effort of 
development agencies and national government in enforcing these local institutions. 
Hence, in the context of mango adoption, farmers’ organisations do play a considerable 
role. They do not only provide technical advice on how to face production and climate 
related challenges, they also provide a network of contacts among other farmers and 
local and international buyers. They, indeed, offer a social capital platform where 
farmers can acquire information for making an “informed” adoption decision. An 
informed decision that, in line with Moser and Barrett (2006), might also be a “non-
adoption” or a “delayed-adoption” decision. This argument could explain why the size 
of social network has a negative effect on the decision to adopt and why trust in other 
farmers is associated with later adoption. 
In conclusion, this analysis, notwithstanding its limitations in addressing causality, is in 
line with the recent empirical evidence, in supporting the argument that social capital 
endowments are important determinants in the innovation decisions. Although bonding 
social capital seems to be more relevant in the context of mango adoption, also other 
social capital components, bridging and cognitive, play a role in the farmers’ decision to 
adopt and, as such, should take part in the innovation adoption theoretical framework.  
This analysis is one of the few that explicitly investigate the role of social capital for 
mango in Ghana and I believe it provides interesting insights for future policy 
interventions, one of which regarding the strengthening of the role of farmers’ 
organisations and a better integration of national extension services in the diffusion of 
innovation at local level.  
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CHAPTER 4  
The analysis of the impact of mango adoption on poverty 
A case study from Ghana 
Introduction 
Among western African countries Ghana has been one of the fastest growing economies 
in the recent decades. The share of population under the poverty line has decreased 
considerably in less than two decades, from above 50% in 1991/1992 to about 32% in 
2005/06 and 24% in 2012 (World Bank Data, 2015). The Human Development Index 
ranked Ghana 135
th
 out of 187 countries in 2013, showing a constant improvement in 
other measures of well-being, such as life expectancy, literacy and education (UNDP, 
Human Development Report, 2013).  Although an overall reduction of poverty, 
estimated as the equivalent for a minimum food basket providing 2,900 calories per 
adult equivalent per day, has been observed, regional differences are found across the 
country, with northern regions being poorer than southern and central regions (Figure 
1). 
Figure 1 Poverty Incidence (%) 
 
Source 3 GLSS 6, Poverty report (2015)
81
 
                                                 
81 The report estimated the poverty profile using data from GLSS 5 and GLSS 6 on household food and non-food 
expenditures, adjusted for regional differences in cost of living. GLSS official poverty line (GhC 1,314) is estimated 
as the equivalent of a minimum food basket providing 2,900 calories per adult equivalent per day. As there are many 
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The lack of infrastructure, missing or poorly-functioning markets, inadequate skills 
development, financial services and technical assistance are only some of the major 
constraints in these regions. As a consequence, farmers tend to experience substantial 
difficulties in accessing assets and credit that would facilitate a shift from subsistence to 
a more commercialised agriculture, and higher living standards (Coulombe and Wodon, 
2007).  
The adoption of cash crops, both traditional and non-traditional, has been always 
welcomed by the international community as a gateway for providing premium prices 
and, hence, better livelihood opportunities to farmers in developing countries. The 
exotic varieties of mango are an innovation in the Ghanaian context as described in 
Chapter 3. The adoption of these varieties has been widely advocated in the past decade 
by development agencies and national government as one of the biggest and potentially 
very effective agricultural development in addressing small farmers’ poverty. Its 
potential in reducing poverty derives from the possibility for farmers to access premium 
prices that international markets can offer.  
Nonetheless, its real impact on farmers’ poverty remains unclear. Access to premium 
prices for exotic varieties of mango requires the production of high quality fruits which 
is sometimes challenging for poorly endowed farmers. Some of the main challenges in 
delivering high quality mangoes are occurrence of pests and diseases, lack of 
appropriate knowledge on pre- and post-harvest management techniques, uncertainty on 
quality requirements as well as lack of structured marketing information systems. As a 
consequence, poorer, less skilled, and less commercialised farmers might be excluded 
from the expected gains. 
In the light of the difficulties that mango production poses for farmers, my analysis aims 
to evaluate the impact that adoption of exotic varieties of mango had on poverty in rural 
Ghana. I will answer this question with primary data collected in Ghana between July 
2012 and September 2012, as described in Chapter 2.  
                                                                                                                                               
ways of specifying the poverty lines the full report provides the full distribution of consumption around this poverty 
line.   
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 1 describes the conceptual 
framework and empirical evidence of the impact of innovation adoption on poverty; 
Section 2 describes the measures of poverty used in this paper and presents selected 
farmers’ characteristics according to their poverty status; Section 3 discusses the 
evaluation problem and the preferred empirical strategy; Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results of the impact of adoption of mango on both objective and 
subjective measures of poverty. This section also describes the results of the impact 
analysis on different subsets of mango farmers (late or early adopters vis-à-vis non-
adopters) and it provides insights on differences between mango and non-mango 
farmers that help to understand the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
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Section 1. Conceptual framework and empirical evidence 
Adoption of innovation is often motivated by the desire to generate a positive 
improvement in the adopter’s economic status and it is generally supported by national 
and international agencies in the context of poverty reduction. The effect of the adoption 
of product innovations
82
, and specifically high-value crops, on poverty has received 
wide attention in the literature (e.g. von Braun and Immink, 1994; McCulloch and Ota, 
2002; Mendola, 2007). The relationship between adoption and poverty is generally 
expressed as: 
    𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖, 𝜀𝑖)                              (1) 
                                  𝐷𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖, 𝜂i);   𝐷 = 1,0     (2) 
Where 𝑌𝑖 refers to the measure of poverty of the household i and 𝐷𝑖 represents the 
discrete innovation adoption decision that takes the value of 1 if the household i decides 
to adopt and 0 otherwise. The poverty status of the household i in (1) is function of a set 
of observable characteristics (𝑋𝑖) and a set of unobservable characteristics (𝜀𝑖). The 
adoption of the innovation is driven by a sub-set of observable household’s 
characteristics (𝑥𝑖) and unobservables expressed in 𝜂𝑖. 
Since the seminal work by von Braun et al. (1989), several studies have investigated the 
impact of adoption 𝐷𝑖 on poverty and well-being outcomes 𝑌𝑖 and have found that 
adoption of innovations, both product and process, does, indeed, have a positive effect 
on the adopter’s income and poverty compared to non-adopters (e.g. von Braun and 
Immink, 1994; McCulloch and Ota, 2002; Berdegué et al., 2006; Mendola, 2007; 
Schipmann and Qaim, 2010).  
The main direction of causality between adoption and poverty outcomes often 
materializes through what Minot and Roy (2007) call the direct “farm linkage” between 
adoption and poverty. The farm linkage describes the effect that the production of high-
                                                 
82 Innovations can be of two types: process innovation and product innovation. In the context of agricultural systems, 
process innovation refers to the adoption of improved varieties, tools or production systems that are deemed to 
improve the efficiency and the productivity of the current cultivations. On the other hand, product innovation 
describes the adoption of crops, tools and machineries as well as systems that are completely new to the adopter and 
are seen as potential substitutes of the old equivalents. The decision to adopt a new product, for example, a new crop, 
is explained by classical model of adoption as driven by the expectation of higher profits from the cultivation of one 
crop instead of the other (see Chapter 3). Generally, the literature defines these crops as “high-value crops”, whose 
higher value is generated by the access to premium prices offered by the international market. This is, for example, 
the case for tropical fruit and vegetables and, in the case of this analysis, exotic varieties of mango in Ghana.  
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value crops may generate on farmers’ income, directly. According to the general 
conceptual framework set up by Minot and Roy (2007), the overall observed increase in 
demand for the product innovation would increase producers’ income via access to 
higher prices, in the short run, and, as such, decrease poverty in the long run. However, 
Minot and Roy (2007) also recognize that the poverty effects will only materialize if 
poor farmers are involved in the production, in the short run, and if the production itself 
is labour intensive, in the long run. Thus, under the assumption that adopters are 
relatively poorer, smaller and more labour abundant than other farmers, Minot and Roy 
(2007) framework predicts that the adoption of high-value crops should foster poverty 
reduction effects
83
.  
The empirical evidence supports this argument. For example, von Braun and Immink 
(1994) in their study of the effect of the adoption of snow peas in Guatemala, argue that, 
indeed, the effect of the adoption on farm’s income is quite noticeable. They observe a 
38% higher increase in adopters’ income during the time of their survey (1983-85) 
compared to non-adopters. Similarly, in their study of the adoption of export 
horticulture crops by small farmers in Kenya, McCulloch and Ota (2002) find that 
adopters had four times as much income per adult equivalent than non-adopters. 
Although the evidence supports the adoption-income positive linkage, whether higher 
income translates into poverty reduction is often not explicitly investigated. In addition, 
these studies usually aim to capture associations between adoption and farmers’ income, 
without addressing the issue of causality between the two. One of the more recent 
studies that aims to capture a causal effect of adoption on poverty is the one by Mendola 
(2007)
84
. She directly models the poverty impact of adoption of high yielding varieties 
of rice in rural Bangladesh using a propensity score matching methodology. Through 
this impact evaluation approach, she finds a strong and positive causal relationship 
between adoption and household’s well-being as well as a negative consistent 
relationship between adoption and the probability to be poor for small and medium 
farmers.  
                                                 
83 Poorer farmers are deemed to be generally small farmers and labour abundant and as such considered to be more 
effective in the management of labour intensive cultivations (Lipton, 2006; Murphy, 2012) than larger farmers, due to 
the relaxation of the common agency problems. 
84 Similarly, causality is addressed by Carletto et al (2011) who use instead a Diff-in-Diff methodology on a long 
panel dataset started by von Braun and Immink in early 90s.  
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In addition to the direct poverty effect of adoption, Minot and Roy (2007) also describe 
three other linkages that are claimed to capture indirect poverty effects:  backward, 
employment and consumer price linkages. The backward linkage refers to the effect that 
the adoption has on the activities that support agricultural production.
85
 Labour inputs 
might also be affected by the adoption of non-traditional cash crops, as this type of 
crops might require higher labour intensity than staple crops. The higher labour 
intensity could translate in more intense use of family labour and new opportunities for 
hired labour, which, in turn, could increase wages
86
. Higher wage and employment 
opportunities generated by both backward and employment linkages could, then, 
generate additional income flows and, as such, produce a poverty reduction effect
87
. 
Finally, the substitution of staple crops production with high-value crops cultivation 
could increase the price of the former via increase demand and reduced supply in the 
local market (Little, 1994). Higher food prices, then, would negatively affect net food 
buyers and, overall, generate an increase of poverty. However, the empirical evidence 
does not unequivocally suggest that this effect occurs in the context of developing 
countries (Minot and Baulch, 2003)
88
. 
In conclusion, adoption of non-traditional cash crops, especially if they can be 
considered product innovations, might have a poverty reducing effect, via increased 
farm income and increases employment and wage opportunities.  
The next section describes the approach I aim to use for the investigation of the impact 
that the adoption of exotic varieties of mango had on a sample of 305 adopters and non-
adopters in Ghana.  
                                                 
85 This is the case, for example, of input provision. The adoption of non-traditional cash crops increases the demand 
for non-traditional inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides, which could generate new business opportunities and 
higher income flow for existing suppliers. The additional cash flow generated could improve the general economic 
status of input suppliers, which can increase local employment opportunities. The empirical evidence supports the 
existence of backward linkages between adoption and poverty (e.g. Kimenye, 2002; Ali and Abedullah, 2002).   
86 Moreover, if the main destination of sales of non-traditional cash crops is the international market there is scope for 
locals to establish business partnership with export companies for both processing and shipping activities, which 
could spur self and wage employment in both farm and non-farm sectors.  
87 However, as in the case of the farm linkage described above, the poverty impacts could vary considerably, 
depending on the type of crop adopted as well as on the degree of involvement of poor farmers in different sectors, 
(production, processing, input provision or wage employment) (Minot et al., 2007). 
88 For example, Minot and Baulch (2003), in their study on adoption of coffee, fruits and vegetable in Vietnam, find 
that the substitution effect for the cultivation of staple crops, such as rice, did not produce negative outcomes as far as 
food accessibility is concerned. Instead, the product innovation was accompanied by the increase in food cropping 
intensity and productivity, which counteracted the reduction of land availability for staple crops. 
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Section 2. Analysis of the impact of innovation adoption on 
poverty  
The data used in this analysis come from the fieldwork carried out in 2012. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the field survey did not contain a detailed consumption or 
income module and, instead, focused on assets and a set of subjective well-being 
questions to identify poor households
89
. The poverty measures used in this paper are in 
line with the consideration of providing the best measures of welfare and well-being 
possible under tight budget and time constraints of small surveys. The following 
paragraphs describe the construction and the characteristics of both objective and 
subjective measures of poverty. 
2.1 The objective measure of poverty: the wealth index 
The wealth index was estimated using principal component analysis (PCA). Following 
the methodology set out by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and McKenzie (2003) the choice 
of wealth components included the following assets: farm size, drinking water, private 
toilet, ownership of a tractor, ownership of a motorcycle, ownership of a car and 
ownership of a generator
90
. The main results of the construction of the wealth index 
using PCA are summarised in Table 1 below.  
Table 1 Results of the PCA 
Principal components analysis 
Variable (standardised) 
Comp1 
Standard 
deviation 
Impact factor  
(Score comp1/SD) Unexplained 
Farm size (acres) 0.3801 14.99 0.0254 0.5823 
Drinking water (0/1) 0.4385 0.401 1.0945 0.4443 
Private toilet (0/1) 0.3970 0.474 0.8381 0.5445 
Tractor (0/1) 0.1584 0.139 1.1388 0.9275 
Motorcycle (0/1) 0.2534 0.442 0.5728 0.8144 
Car (0/1) 0.3913 0.319 1.2257 0.5573 
Fridge (0/1) 0.4254 0.437 0.9735 0.4769 
Generator (0/1) 0.2868 0.170 1.6920 0.7622 
Cumulative variance explained by 1st component= 0.3613 
Kmo measure of sampling adequacy =0.7683    
 
                                                 
89 A brief review of the different poverty measures can be found in Appendix 4.1.  
90 In Appendix 4.2 describe in detail the main results and the methodology followed in the estimation of the wealth 
index. The assets listed above were selected because they provided the highest cumulative variance explained by the 
first component (36%) and the highest KMO measure of sampling adequacy (0.76).  
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The results of the PCA show that all the assets included in the estimation have a 
positive score or weight in the identification of the social-economic status of the 
households in the sample. The highest impact factors (column 4, Table 1), calculated as 
the ratio the standard deviation to the score of the first component, are attributed to the 
ownership of a generator, a car or a tractor, while the lowest is calculated for farm size. 
The interpretation of the score is quite straightforward. For example, a household that 
owns a generator has an asset index which is higher by 1.69 points than a household that 
does not own it. Similarly, owning a car increases the asset index by 1.123 points. These 
weights are generally in line with expectations and previous findings in Ghana (e.g. 
Booysen et al., 2008). 
Figure 2 reports the distribution of the wealth index across the sample. The majority of 
the farmers are located in the left hand side of the distribution (blue line), which 
suggests that a high proportion of farmers in the sample has a low level of wealth, under 
the assumption that the selected components included in the index are good predictors 
of wealth itself. At regional level, farmers located in the Brong-Ahafo region are 
observed to be better off that the rest of the sample (red line) while farmers in the 
Northern regions are the worse off.  
Figure 2 Distribution of the wealth index, total and by regions 
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Using the index of wealth, I then construct the measure of poverty based on the 
imposition of an arbitrary threshold. The definition of poverty threshold based on the 
wealth index has not been unequivocal in the literature, where different procedures have 
been suggested (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). Nonetheless, for this analysis I follow 
Filmer and Prichett (2001) approach, which defines poor households as those 
households at the bottom 40% of the distribution of the wealth index and rich 
households as those located at the top 20% of the distribution
91
.  
According to this definition, 42% (127) of the households in the sample can be defined 
as “poorly endowed” or poor, while 21% (64 households) are “well-endowed”, or non-
poor, and the remaining 114 households have intermediate socio-economic status and 
they are included in the empirical analysis in the group of “non-poor households”, for a 
total of 178 non-poor households. 
2.2 The subjective measures of poverty 
Following the literature on subjective well-being (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; 
Ravallion and Loshkin, 2010; Ravallion, 2012), I collected data on the four subjective 
poverty measures: “Economic Ladder”, the “Minimum Income”, the “Income 
Evaluation” and “Consumption Adequacy”. These measures of subjective poverty will 
be used for two main purposes: testing the validity of the poverty measure using the 
asset index and to calibrate the objective poverty analysis. The main measurement of 
poverty is based on the Economic Ladder question, while the other subjective measures 
of well-being (minimum income, income evaluation and consumption adequacy) for 
explaining empirical results and for testing internal coherence of the subjective poverty 
line (in Appendix 4.4). 
                                                 
91 An alternative to this definition would be to identify a poverty line following the rule suggest by Rawls in 1971, 
whereby the poverty line is set at the ½ the median of the index. However, the 40% threshold is appropriate in the 
context of this analysis because, as shown in Appendix 4.5, the distribution of wealth is pretty similar before this 
threshold while it jumps right after the threshold to reach the highest wealth level for about 20% of the sample. 
Nonetheless, to check the sensitivity of the poverty rates to the choice of the wealth index threshold I re-estimated the 
number of poor and non-poor households by region and districts using two additional thresholds: bottom 30% and 
50%.Appendix 4.3 shows the number of households that are poor and non-poor under the three different thresholds, 
30%, 40% and 50%. Generally, the choice of a higher or lower threshold tend not affect the poverty ranking across 
regions and districts, with the Northern regions being the poorest and the Brong-Ahafo the wealthier. It is the severity 
of the poverty within each region that seems to be slightly more sensitive to the choice of the threshold. For example, 
in the Northern region, the choice of a lower cut off would reduce the group of poor households by 25% (17 
households out of 68 households) while the choice of a higher thresholds will increase it by 34% (23 households out 
of 68 households).  
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The “Economic Ladder” question was formulated as follows: “Please imagine a 9-step 
ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest 
step, the ninth, stand the rich. On which step are you TODAY and 12 MONTHS AGO?”.  
Figure 3 shows that the majority of the households report that they are amongst the 
poorest fraction of the population in their villages (step 3 and 4). The regional analysis 
shows that households are relatively poorer in the Northern region which is consistent 
with the regional distribution of objective poverty, observed in Figure 2. 
However, the nature of the economic ladder question is merely local and context 
specific as it specifically asks the farmer to relate him or herself to other people. 
Assuming that such a comparison is more likely to happen with people located close by, 
I define “poor” those households who placed themselves on a lower step than the 
median value of the economic ladder measured at district level. This definition also 
follows the “relative deprivation” argument according to which poverty is mostly a 
relative/contextual concept (Ravallion and Loshkin, 2010). Using this definition of 
subjective poverty, 113 households can be defined as subjective poor in the total sample 
and 192 can be defined as subjectively non-poor.  
Figure 3 Economic Ladder, total and by region 
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The comparison between subjective and objective measures of poverty shows that there 
is a positive correlation between these two measures (Figure 4)
92
. Overall, 60 farmers 
are “consistently poor”, defined as poor for both the objective and subjective measure of 
poverty, while 125 farmers are “consistently non-poor”, as they fall in the non-poor 
category regardless of the type of poverty measure used. Nonetheless, for 120 farmers 
the poverty status changes when a different measure is used: 67 farmers, defined 
subjective non-poor are instead poor according to the objective poverty definition, while 
53 farmers, subjectively poor, fall in the category of objectively non-poor .  
Figure 4 Objective and Subjective poverty, compared 
 
When looking at poverty rates at regional and district levels, the use of different poverty 
measures provides insights on how poverty is perceived (subjectively) and experienced 
(objectively) at regional level (Figure 5).  
Figure 5 Objective and Subjective poverty, by region 
 
                                                 
92 A positive correlation between objective and subjective measures of well-being persists and it holds for any 
measure of subjective poverty used (Appendix 4.5). 
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Although farmers located in the Northern region are generally the poorest using the 
wealth index criterion, subjective poverty rates are the lowest in one of the Northern 
region’s districts (Tamale) when compared to all the other regions and districts in the 
sample, followed by farmers in the Eastern region. Hence, Brong Ahafo farmers, the 
richest according to the objective measure of poverty, are, instead, the poorest when a 
subjective measure of poverty is used. In fact, households in the Northern region feel 
much richer than what they actually are, according to the wealth index, and relative to 
the other regions in the sample
93
.  
2.3 Are mango farmers better off than non-mango farmers? 
Mango farmers in the sample tend to be better off than non-mango farmers, regardless 
of the measure of poverty used (Figure 6).  
Figure 6 Poverty status, by mango adoption 
 
Table 2 reports summary statistics by adoption and poverty status. Considering the 
similarities of the results when using objective or subjective measures of poverty, I only 
report in this section the results of the analysis of the objective poverty
94
.   
 Overall, the lower poverty status of mango farmers does not seem related to specific 
characteristics. Hence, mango and non-mango farmers tend to be quite similar in terms 
                                                 
93 The differences between objective and subjective poverty rates have been explained in the past literature simply as 
a consequence of the “relative deprivation” concept of poverty, whereby the personal socio-economic status is mainly 
determined in relation to the well-being of neighbours or friends. It is worth specifying that the relative concept of 
poverty is however not a prerogative of the subjective measures. It could be used only with more objective measures 
of wealth. In the context of this study, however, only subjective measures are used in a relative perspective. 
Furthermore, Ravallion (2013) argues that inconsistency between subjective and objective poverty rates may be 
caused by the so called “latent heterogeneity of scales”. According to this idea, farmers may not be aware of the 
different living standards existing in other regions and they interpret the scale using different definitions of poverty 
and welfare. The latent heterogeneity in scales could induce the “frame of reference bias” but it poses non negligible 
methodological problems if an econometrical model is estimated using the subjective measure of poverty. However, 
this is not the case of this paper, as I am going to use this subjective measure of poverty for providing support and 
calibrating the poverty analysis based on the wealth index. 
94 Appendix 4.6 shows some summary statistics by poverty status across the entire sample. The additional summary 
statistics for subjective measures of poverty according to the adoption status can be found in Appendix 4.7.  
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of household, farm and livelihood characteristics. However, while characteristics of 
poor farmers do not differ much according to their adoption status, a higher degree of 
discrepancies between mango and non-mango farmers can be observed within the group 
of non-poor households.  
More specifically, non-poor mango farmers are generally older, better educated, less 
impatient and better endowed with household, farm and transport assets than non-poor 
non-mango farmers, including farm size and land ownership. They also hire more 
labour than non-mango farmers, they received more training and more visits by local 
extension officers and they are more often members of farmers’ organisations.  
Poor mango farmers are generally similar to poor non-mango farmers in terms of asset 
endowment. Nonetheless compared to non-mango farmers, they tend to live in bigger 
households, where more people are married, have awarded higher education and are 
engaged in non-farm employment. Moreover, the number of livestock they own is on 
average higher than non-mango farmers and they own more often transport assets, such 
as bicycles. As for non-poor households, mango farmers received more training, 
participate more often in farmers’ organisation and received more visits by local 
extension officers compared to non-mango farmers. 
In conclusion, this exploratory data screening suggest that the adoption of product 
innovation does not necessarily lead to a higher economic status contrary to what 
predicted by previous studies as a number of mango farmers are also poor. At the same 
time, this simple explanatory analysis might also indicated that mango adoption occurs 
mostly amongst better off and better equipped farmers, which could explain the 
systematic differences among non-poor farmers
95
. In order to control for these 
differences between mango and non-mango farmers across the entire sample, the 
following paragraphs describe the approach I use for the analysis of the impact of 
adoption on well-being via matching techniques.  
                                                 
95 This could be explained by the high initial investment and the high quality requirement necessary for the 
establishment of the mango trees that could put off the poorest farmers. On the other hand, these results could also 
suggest that poor mango farmers have yet to benefit from their adoption and as a consequence the differences in 
terms of their characteristics cannot be observed yet.  
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Table 2 Selected summary statistics, by mango adoption 
  Objective  non poor Objective poor 
  Non 
mango Mango  Non mango Mango 
   Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
        
Male head (0/1) 0.88 0.94 0.121 0.83 0.92 0.129 
Age head Years 46.38 51.56 0.009*** 47.19 48.18 0.669 
Primary education head (0/1) 0.13 0.07 0.270 0.06 0.04 0.677 
Higher education head (0/1) 0.34 0.60 0.062* 0.27 0.49 0.060* 
No risk aversion (0/1) 0.20 0.15 0.415 0.06 0.05 0.951 
Impatience (0/1) 0.54 0.40 0.096* 0.55 0.46 0.334 
HH size  # 5.84 6.24 0.290 5.25 5.92 0.091* 
Dependency ratio (%) 80.40 71.91 0.517 76.17 70.62 0.615 
N. Married # 2.00 2.20 0.176 1.68 2.28 0.002*** 
N. Male adults # 1.86 2.11 0.227 1.77 2.00 0.273 
N. HH members with higher education  (%) 6.86 11.90 0.054* 3.21 6.84 0.053* 
N. HH members with non-farm employment  (%) 12.74 14.61 0.452 9.94 16.01 0.037** 
        
Fridge  (0/1) 0.27 0.52 0.002*** 0.00 0.00 . 
Radio  (0/1) 0.91 0.94 0.433 0.89 0.85 0.567 
TV  (0/1) 0.52 0.73 0.005*** 0.15 0.27 0.111 
Mobile  (0/1) 0.80 0.93 0.016** 0.72 0.80 0.297 
Sewing machine  (0/1) 0.14 0.30 0.029** 0.08 0.04 0.399 
Drinking water  (0/1) 0.13 0.44 0.000*** 0.00 0.00 . 
Bicycle  (0/1) 0.59 0.64 0.525 0.66 0.80 0.084* 
Car  (0/1) 10.71 23.77 0.042** 0.00 0.00 . 
        
Farm size  (acres) 4.51 13.95 0.002*** 3.42 3.43 0.971 
Farm size1  (acres) 4.51 12.40 0.007*** 3.42 2.93 0.114 
Land ownership  (0/1) 0.50 0.76 0.000*** 0.53 0.50 0.755 
N. Livestock  # 24.23 26.83 0.683 13.36 20.68 0.049** 
Hired  # 6.36 13.43 0.002*** 4.62 6.15 0.293 
Tractor  (0/1) 0.04 0.03 0.921 0.00 0.00 . 
        
Cash crops production (0/1) 0.30 0.37 0.399 0.13 0.12 0.862 
Training  (0/1) 0.32 0.80 0.000*** 0.19 0.76 0.000*** 
FO (0/1) 0.18 0.61 0.000*** 0.11 0.65 0.000*** 
N. visits extension off. # 1.34 3.71 0.013** 1.02 4.49 0.025** 
Innovation # 0.36 0.24 0.271 0.38 0.20 0.151 
N        
1At the time of adoption for mango farmers; current for non-mango farmers 
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Section 3. The evaluation problem and the empirical strategy 
The literature described above suggests that adopting a product innovation does, indeed, 
generate positive outcomes in terms of increase income, employment opportunities and 
also poverty. However, the descriptive statistics related to the sample of mango and 
non-mango farmers used in this analysis suggests that adoption might not necessarily 
lead to higher well-being. The following paragraphs describe the challenges and 
solution adopted for the evaluation of the impact that adoption of mango had on 
objective and subjective poverty in my sample. 
The main challenge in the empirical analysis of the adoption poverty impact is reverse 
causality between adoption and poverty, whereby poverty can affect adoption and 
adoption can affect poverty. The latter is the aim of the evaluation question and can be 
expressed as in (1). The reverse effect that poverty has on the adoption occurs because 
the vector of observable characteristics 𝑥𝑖   also includes the poverty status 𝑌 of the 
household i: 
𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 
In the presence of reverse causality, the evaluation framework requires the identification 
of a counterfactual for comparison of  poverty outcomes. The ideal counterfactual for a 
rigorous impact evaluation would require observing the same household both in 
adoption and non-adoption status (Rosembaum and Rubin, 1983).  In other words, the 
impact of the adoption would be estimated as the difference between the case when the 
household decides to adopt and the case had it not adopted, the so called average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) expressed as: 
 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
1 − 𝑌𝑖
0| 𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
1 | 𝐷𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0 | 𝐷𝑖 = 1)  (3) 
where 𝑌𝑖
1 is the poverty status of the household i in the case of adoption, 𝐷𝑖=1, and 𝑌𝑖
0 is 
the poverty status of the household i had it not adopted, 𝐷𝑖 = 0. In reality, this scenario 
does not materialize as we observe household i in either one or the other adoption status 
(treatment or control group, in the impact evaluation jargon). As a consequence, the 
problem of finding a comparison household that could approximate the ideal 
counterfactual arises.   
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In comparing different households, two main issues need to be taken into account: 1) 
systematic differences between adopters and non-adopters, which lead to selection 
biases; and, 2) heterogeneity in the group of non-adopters. 
In the context of experimental analysis, using data collected via randomised control 
trials, these issues can be rightly considered negligible. The innovation adoption and 
non-adoption is, indeed, followed from the start and spill-overs between adopters and 
non-adopters are kept under control until the end of the intervention under scrutiny. 
However, impact evaluations of this type are generally quite costly both money and 
time wise
96
.  
Non-experimental impact evaluations rely on specific assumptions and parametric 
methods to identify unbiased counterfactual within the heterogeneous group of non-
adopters based on selected unobservables, as in the case of instrumental variables and 
selection models a-la Heckman, or simply controlling for as many as possible 
observable characteristics, as, for example, in the case of propensity score matching 
techniques (PSM).  
The main idea of the matching estimators is to identify observations who are very 
similar based on specific characteristics and evaluate, on them, the average impact as 
the difference between the effect on the treated and what would had been the effect on 
the treated had they not adopted. Similarly to other econometrical methods mentioned 
above, the first stage of the matching procedure is the estimation of the selection model. 
The results of this estimation are then used for the calculation of the propensity scores, 
according to which observations are matched.   
In this paper, I chose to use propensity score models for the impact evaluation analysis. 
Matching methods have, indeed, some advantages with respect to standard regression 
methods that try to control for selection bias, such as instrumental variables and 
Heckman models. The main advantage lies on the higher flexibility in the functional 
form. Hence, matching models do not require assumption on the functional form of the 
equation to estimate, whereas usual regression methods impose often a linear form of 
the relationship which may or may not be accurate (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
                                                 
96 Also, quite often, even experimental evaluations are forced to use non- experimental techniques to address 
unexpected implementation issues that jeopardised the random nature of the innovation adoption as well as the 
containment of spillovers between groups. 
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Secondly, with matching, the assumption of constant additive treatment effects across 
individuals, which is required in simple regression, Heckman and bivariate normal 
selection estimation procedures, can be relaxed (Mendola, 2007). Hence, heterogeneous 
treatment effects are permitted, and can be retrieved via sub-group analysis. This 
involves selecting the sub-group of interest and re-matching within that group and it 
makes PSM a flexible tool for studying programme effects on groups of particular 
interest (Bryson et al., 2002; Mendola, 2007). Finally, matching avoid the anguish of 
looking for valid instruments, which often proves a quite questionable solution.  
Notwithstanding the advantages in using matching techniques, these methods are not 
free of limitations themselves. Matching only on specific characteristics does not allow 
controlling for unobservables that might drive technology adoption and poverty, which 
are, instead, controlled for by IV and Heckman models. Moreover, as only observable 
characteristics are controlled for in the matching models, the actual selection of these 
characteristics, i.e. matching criteria, requires specific accuracy.  
Although the seminal and extensive work by Barbara Sianesi (e.g. Sianesi, 2004) and 
the paper by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide useful guidance for the definition of 
the selection model, only few practical established rules exist (Kassie et al., 2011; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Rosembaum, 2002). Table 3 summarises some of the 
desirable and essential criteria used in the past literature for the choice of the matching 
observables.  
Table 3 Rules for Selection of matching variables 
Desirable Essential 
1. The economic theory should guide the 
choice of the covariates 
2. Only variables that affect simultaneously 
the participation and outcome should be 
included 
3. Only variables that are statistically 
significant at conventional level should be 
retained in the model  
4. As many variables as possible should be 
included to reduce the unobservable 
heterogeneity bias (CIA condition) 
5. The matching variables should guarantee 
enough overlap of the observations in the 
sample (Balance and Common support 
conditions) 
6. Exogeneity: Time-invariant variables 
should be included 
7. Exogeneity: only variables calculated prior 
to the participation/adoption should be 
included 
 
According to these rules, the first desirable source of matching criteria should be drawn 
from the economic theory on the determinants of the treatment investigated, which is in 
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this case the adoption of innovation. Nonetheless, in order for these observable 
characteristics identified by the economic theory to be valid in the choice of a valid 
counterfactual, three essential conditions need to be satisfied: 1) Conditional 
Independence Assumption, 2) balance and 3) common support.  
According to the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA, Lechner, 2000) or the 
ignorable treatment assignment assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), for a given 
set of covariates, participation in a program (or adoption in my case) must be 
independent of potential outcomes, such that there may be systematic differences 
between treated and non-treated even after controlling for observables that can be 
attributed to the treatment effect on the outcome (Smith and Todd, 2005). Following 
Sianesi (2004) and the literature cited therein, the CIA can be defined as:   
    𝑌𝑖
0┴ 𝐷𝑖| 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖     (4) 
where 𝑋𝑖 are the covariates used in the selection model for the calculation of the 
propensity scores. If the CIA condition holds, the required counterfactual can be 
identified as follows: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0|𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝐸𝑋𝑖|𝐷𝑖=1[𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0|𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = 1)]      (5) 
=  𝐸𝑋𝑖|𝐷𝑖=1[𝐸(𝑌𝑖
0|𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = 0)] 
𝐸𝑋𝑖|𝐷𝑖=1[𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = 0)] 
where the observed outcomes of the counterfactual 𝐷𝑖 = 0 are averaged with respect to 
the distribution of the covariates 𝑋𝑖 in the treatment group 𝐷𝑖 = 1 . This condition 
requires that conditional on the choice of 𝑋𝑖, there would be no unobserved 
heterogeneity left that affects both the outcome and the selection in the adoption 
process. In other words, it requires the chosen set of covariates to be as broad as 
possible (criterion 4, in Table 3). In order for this assumption to hold an extensive 
knowledge of the factors that affects the adoption process as well as outcome of the 
analysis is required.  
Equation (5) links the CIA to the other two conditions necessary for the matching 
procedure: balance and common support. The balance condition requires that 𝑃(𝐷𝑖) =
1|𝑋𝑖 < 1 over the set of 𝑋𝑖 covariates. This condition assures that every observation in 
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the treatment group have a counterpart in the control group based on the chosen 
covariates. This should, in turn, guarantee the estimation of a propensity score that 
statistically balance the covariates between treated and control subpopulations and 
provides enough overlap for the matching procedure to be applicable (the common 
support and balance conditions) (Rubin and Thomas, 1992b). 
After choosing the favourite specifications of the selection model that satisfies the 
essential conditions of the matching procedure, it is crucial to verify that the matching 
actually works correctly. The verification of the quality of the matching between treated 
and control group is usually done using the following criteria (Rosembaum and Rubin, 
1983; Diprete and Gangl, 2004; Kassie et al., 2011; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008):  
1. The difference in means of most of the covariates should be not significant after 
matching so that  
2. The reduction of the standardised bias after matching should be substantial and in 
the region of 3-5%. The standardised bias is defined as follows: 
𝑆𝐵(𝑋) = 100
?̅?𝑡−?̅?𝑁𝑇
√
𝑉𝑇(𝑋)+𝑉𝑁𝑇(𝑋)
2
      (6) 
Where ?̅?𝑡 − ?̅?𝑁𝑇is the difference in sample means of the treatment and control 
groups and 𝑉𝑇(𝑋) + 𝑉𝑁𝑇(𝑋)is the sum of the corresponding variances. The bias 
reduction is then calculated as: 
𝐵𝑅 = 100 (1 −
𝐵(𝑋)𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝐵(𝑋)𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
)     (7) 
3. The Pseudo-Rsquared should be lower after matching.  
4. Similarly, the Likelihood Ratio Test should be lower and not significant after 
matching. 
Once the internal validity of the matching is tested, then, different algorithms can be 
used for the estimation of the ATET, which include nearest neighbours, kernel and 
mahalanobis and their variants. The following section describes the implementation of 
matching techniques to my sample. 
The empirical strategy in detail 
Following the literature, I estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated as in 
(3) of the adoption of mango. The objective of this analysis is to understand whether the 
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adoption of mango may or may not have had an effect on the farmers’ poverty, using 
the data collected during the field work. More specifically, the analysis aims to estimate 
the average effect of the adoption of mango on mango farmers’ poverty as specified in 
(3), where 𝑌𝑖
1 is the observed poverty status for the mango farmers and 𝑌𝑖
0 is the poverty 
status of the mango farmers had they not adopted mango. The analysis falls in the 
category of the non-experimental impact evaluation analysis.  
The identification of the counterfactual 
The identification of the counterfactual has been carried out using matching techniques. 
The match is estimated using observable characteristics of mango and non-mango 
farmers. Following the criteria set out above, I have first considered those observable 
characteristics that economic theory of innovation adoption described in Chapter 3 
predicts as determinants of adoption: demographic, farm and household’s characteristics 
as well as different types of social capital. A selection model based on the full set of 
adoption determinants satisfy most of the desirable criteria for the selection of the 
matching criteria (1 and 2) as well as some of the essential conditions because it 
includes a considerable number of dimensions affecting the adoption process which 
attempts to reduce the extent of the unobservable bias on the impact of adoption on 
poverty. However, this model fails to satisfy the balance and the common support 
conditions (Rubin and Thomas, 1992b). 
97
.  
As a consequence, I chose to use a more parsimonious model specification for the 
matching estimations than what predicted by the economic theory. Sianesi (2004) 
argues that an in-depth knowledge of the institutional context under analysis could 
provide useful insights for the matching methodology. One of the advantages of being 
an active participant in the collection of the data is that I gained important insights of 
the differences between mango and non-mango farmers that could inform the selection 
of matching criteria. Using this information, the models in Table 4 proved to be the best 
for the identification of a valid counterfactual, as far as common support is concerned 
(Figure 7). 
                                                 
97 Using the set of covariates of the model drawn from the economic theory does not provide enough overlap between 
observations in my sample (in Appendix 4.8). The ability to generate a good balance and common support is crucial 
for the validity of the evaluation analysis.  In order to overcome the lack of common support, I tried, following the 
procedure suggested by Heckman et al (1998), to includes in the matching criteria only variables that are statistically 
significantly different between treatment and control group at conventional level. Notwithstanding several iterations 
and attempts to find the right matching model, this method also failed to provide a good common support.  
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Table 4 Selection models 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Primary education 
(0/1) 
Primary education 
(0/1) 
Primary education 
(0/1) 
Primary education 
(0/1) 
Primary education 
(0/1) 
HH members in 
non- farm 
employment (%) 
HH members in non- 
farm employment 
(%) 
HH members in non- 
farm employment 
(%) 
HH members in non- 
farm employment 
(%) 
HH members in non- 
farm employment 
(%) 
N. male adult (#) N. male adult (#) N. male adult (#) N. male adult (#) N. male adult (#) 
N. Married (#) N. Married (#) N. Married (#) N. Married (#) N. Married (#) 
Hired labour (0/1) Hired labour (0/1) Hired labour (0/1) Hired labour (0/1) Hired labour (0/1) 
Age head (years) Age head (years) Age head (years) Age head (years) Age head (years) 
Age head squared Age head squared Age head squared Age head squared Age head squared 
Male head (0/1) Male head (0/1) Male head (0/1) Male head (0/1) Male head (0/1) 
Impatience (0/1) Impatience (0/1) Impatience (0/1) Impatience (0/1) Impatience (0/1) 
Cash crop 
production (0/1) 
Cash crop 
production (0/1) 
Cash crop 
production (0/1) 
Cash crop 
production (0/1) 
Cash crop 
production (0/1) 
HH size HH size HH size HH size HH size 
Training* Training* Training* Training* Training* 
FO* FO* FO* FO* FO* 
Extension office Extension office Extension office Extension office Extension office 
 Innovations* Innovations* Innovations* Innovations* 
  No risk aversion 
(0/1) 
No risk aversion 
(0/1) 
No risk aversion 
(0/1) 
   Farm size** Farm size** 
    Land ownership 
(0/1) 
Common support: from 187 (M1) to 297 (M5)   
* Village level; ** At the time of adoption for adopters; current values for non-adopters  
 
Aside from common support, these models also satisfy the other matching quality 
requirements and conditions described above. First of all, the standardised bias, which is 
caused by the lack of balance, i.e. differences in means of the matching criteria before 
and after the matching, reduces substantially after matching. Also, its size is often lower 
than the suggested threshold of 5%. Additionally, after matching Pseudo R-squared 
values are lower and Likelihood Ratio Test is most of the times insignificant, which 
support the validity of the selection models M1-M5.  
These results together with the existence of a good common support suggest that the 
quality of the matching estimation could be considered satisfactory
98
. 
 
 
                                                 
98 The full list of results can be found in the Appendix 4.9. 
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Figure 7 Common support 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Full adoption model
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
M1
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
M2
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
M3
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
M4
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
M5
168 
 
Section 4. The average treatment effect on the treated 
Following the methodology described in Section 3, I estimate the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated (ATET) of the mango adoption on poverty. This section presents 
and discusses the results of the ATET estimation. I carry out two separate analyses. The 
first uses the objective measure of poverty estimated using principal component analysis 
on a set of household’s and farm’s assets. The second uses the subjective measures of 
poverty, based on the Economic Ladder question, as described in Section 2. I use 
different algorithms for the estimation of the ATET and the overall results are discussed 
below
99
. Table 5 summarises the results of the estimations. 
The findings show that adopting mango would reduce the chance of being poor by 
between 5% (objective) and 20% points (subjective), on average across the different 
matching algorithms. The size of this effect is in line with findings in previous studies. 
For example, Mendola (2007) estimates that adopting innovation decreases poverty 
from 9% to 18% points in her study of technology adoption in rural Bangladesh. Using 
a treatment effect model instead of PSM techniques, Carletto et al. (2011) also find 
similar results. More specifically, they estimate a reduction in monetary and non-
monetary poverty (consumption and asset based index, respectively) from a minimum 
of 7% to a maximum of about 30% for continuous adopters of snow pea in Guatemala.  
However, the results in the Table 5 also show that the significance of the impact 
estimated changes according to the measure of poverty used. Hence, while the effect of 
the adoption of mango on objective poverty, measured by the wealth index, is never 
statistically significant, when the subjective measure is used, the effect of adopting 
mango is almost always negative and statistically significant at conventional levels
100
.  
 
                                                 
99 More specifically, the ATET estimations have been carried out using the following matching algorithms: Nearest, 
nearest 10 and 20 Neighbours, with and without specific level of caliper, with and without replacement; Kernel, 
Kernel normal, with and without specific level of band width and mahalanobis. 
100 The underestimation of the ATET using objective measures of poverty is in line with previous studies, as, for 
example, the recent analysis by Posel and Rogan (2014) who compare the use of objective and subjective measures of 
poverty in South Africa.  
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Table 5 Average treatment effect on the treated, mango adoption 
Mango adoption NN Caliper 01 NN_Norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective 0.016 0.018 -0.009 -0.072 -0.051 -0.074 -0.038 -0.038 -0.039 0.016 -0.027 0.016 -0.129* 
ATET subjective -0.172* -0.152 -0.174*** -0.169* -0.211*** -0.224*** -0.146* -0.146 -0.190*** -0.172* -0.127* -0.172 -0.172** 
N. On support 295 280 218 192 295 295 280 280 295 295 280 295 295 
M2 
ATET objective -0.027 -0.028 -0.037 -0.083 -0.081 -0.068 -0.063 -0.063 -0.052 -0.027 -0.05 -0.027 -0.118 
ATET subjective -0.187** -0.190* -0.174*** -0.250*** -0.256*** -0.247*** -0.215** -0.215*** -0.225*** -0.187** -0.209** -0.187* -0.214*** 
N. On support 296 288 218 193 296 296 288 288 296 296 288 296 296 
M3 
ATET objective -0.09 -0.097 -0.046 -0.011 -0.093 -0.089 -0.089 -0.089 -0.061 -0.09 -0.105 -0.09 -0.149* 
ATET subjective -0.191** -0.205** -0.183** -0.149 -0.260*** -0.265*** -0.228*** -0.228*** -0.228*** -0.191** -0.218** -0.191** -0.229*** 
N. On support 297 285 218 196 297 297 285 285 297 297 285 297 297 
M4 
ATET objective -0.08 -0.102 0 -0.064 -0.086 -0.059 -0.079 -0.079 -0.041 -0.08 -0.087 -0.08 -0.115 
ATET subjective -0.115 -0.121 -0.156** -0.115 -0.237*** -0.243*** -0.117 -0.117 -0.208*** -0.115 -0.119 -0.115 -0.201** 
N. On support 283 266 218 187 283 283 266 266 283 283 266 283 283 
M5 
ATET objective -0.038 -0.042 -0.028 0.026 -0.053 -0.049 -0.055 -0.055 -0.066 -0.038 -0.05 -0.038 -0.148** 
ATET subjective -0.242** -0.242** -0.174** -0.192** -0.213*** -0.217*** -0.229** -0.229** -0.231*** -0.242** -0.239*** -0.242** -0.192** 
N. On support 291 274 218 187 291 291 274 274 291 291 274 291 291 
*Note: NN=nearest neighbour; Caliper 01= nearest neighbour with caliper width of 0.01; NN_Norep= nearest neighbour, no replacement; NN_Norepcal= nearest neighbour, no replacement with caliper width 
of 0.01; NN 10= nearest 10 neighbours; NN 20= nearest 20 neighbours; NN 10 cal= nearest 10 neighbours with caliper width of 0.01; NN 20 cal= nearest 20 neighbours with caliper width of 0.01; Kepan= 
kernel; Knorm=kernel normal; Kbw01=kernel with bandwidth of 0.01; Knormbw01=kernel normal with bandwidth of 0.01 
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4.1 Discussion of ATET results on subjective poverty 
The impact on subjective poverty reduction is also supported by the data on the 
alternative measures of subjective well-being collected during the field work. Table 6 
shows that poor mango farmers, although with similar income requirement per adult 
equivalent, do value their income and food consumption more than non-mango farmers.  
Table 6 Subjective measures of poverty 
 Subjective non-poor Subjective poor 
 
Non mango Mango 
 
Non mango Mango 
  Mean Mean P-value Mean Mean P-value 
       
Minimum income-pae (Ghc/month) 770.22 826.65 0.703 556.12 638.12 0.428 
Income evaluation (current; 1-5) 3.23 3.39 0.212 2.54 3.09 0.001*** 
Income evaluation (12 months ago; 1-5) 2.94 3.01 0.551 2.63 2.93 0.039** 
Food consumption adequacy (current; 1-5) 3.58 3.50 0.464 2.79 3.39 0.000*** 
Food consumption adequacy (12 months ago; 1-5) 3.26 3.31 0.674 2.80 3.23 0.000*** 
N 53 139  56 57  
 
The impact on these difference measures of subjective poverty might be due to two 
dynamics: 1) perceptions of own well-being relative to other farmers located close by 
and 2) expectations that adoption will increase well-being in the future. Perceptions may 
be changing faster than asset endowments and may not reflect temporary reduction in 
actual wealth if this reduction is caused by covariant shocks, shared with other people in 
the village, or when there is expectation of idiosyncratic recover from the shock itself.  
Both of these possible explanations might be relevant to this analysis, as shocks related 
to mango production might be shared across the village (as, for example, fruit flies or 
excessive rains). Also, the impression from field observations and focus group 
discussions supports the argument that farmers in my sample do generally believe that 
mango production will provide them with consistent positive returns in the future.  
These results are in line with the empirical evidence on the determinants of subjective 
well-being as, for example, Ravallion and Lokshin in 2002 who point out the role of 
perceptions of past and future income on current self-rate economic welfare in Russia. 
Similarly, Knight et al. (2009) show that past and future income shapes the extent of 
current happiness and poverty in rural China.  
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4.2 Discussion of ATET results on objective poverty 
The lack of significance of the impact on objective poverty suggests that mango 
adoption does not necessarily lead to a higher wealth. This result contrasts with 
previous empirical evidence from the literature on adoption of product innovation, 
especially cash crops, which usually find a positive impact on farmers’ objective wealth 
(e.g. von Braun and Immink, 1994; Mendola, 2007; Schipmann and Qaim, 2010)
101
.  
The inconsistency of these findings, however, might be explained by the specific nature 
of the innovation analysed. In the paragraph 4.2.1) I discuss why mango farmers might 
not be benefitting from adoption, focusing on the differences in agricultural returns, 
shocks, farming ability and marketing opportunities (Table 7). 
Aside from differences between adopters and non-adopters, the lack of a significant 
impact on objective wealth might be related to the heterogeneity within the group of 
mango farmers itself. Following the argument by Carletto et al. (2011), it might be that 
some adopters have yet to experience gains from adoption because of the relatively 
short experience with the innovation. In order to investigate whether the time of 
adoption has contributed to these results, I estimate the ATET separately for late and 
early adopters (Table 8 and Table 9, in paragraph 4.2.2). 
Finally, I conclude with a discussion on the reasons why some mango farmers are poor, 
highlighting the heterogeneity of the group of mango farmers in terms of intensity and 
quality of production as well as with regards to access to different marketing 
opportunities (4.2.3). I then estimate the ATET for the sample without poor mango 
farmers (Table 11) and also without poor non-mango farmers (Table 12), to investigate 
whether the difficulties faced by poor mango farmers, in particular, do affect the final 
results. 
                                                 
101 In order to verify whether this contrasting evidence is specifically related to the nature of the innovation 
investigated here, I also estimate the ATET for a more generic group of cash crops producers, which also includes 
mango adopters.  The findings, in Appendix 4.10, suggest that, differently from the case of mango adoption, 
producing cash crops such as cocoa, cashew, coffee, etc. (including mango), reduces both objective and subjective 
poverty. In addition, the ATETs on these two measures of wealth are very close to each other but they are also both 
negative and often statistically significant. Thus, when a more general definition of cash crop is used, the results of 
the analysis tend to be often consistent with the previous literature.   
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4.2.1. Direct and indirect channels of impact of adoption on poverty 
Recalling the discussion of Section 1, the main direct channel through which the 
adoption of mango could affect poverty is via higher farm income from higher value of 
sales, conditional on the access to the premium international price for the sale of good 
quality fresh fruits. In addition, increased employment in non-farm and off-farm sectors 
is also claimed to contribute to the poverty reduction effect of non-traditional cash crops 
adoption. 
Comparing mango and non-mango farmers in the sample
102
, Table 7 shows that mango 
farmers do not have either statistically significant different agricultural returns than 
other farmers or higher access to non- and off-farm employment opportunities than non-
mango farmers.  
More specifically, although higher in the case of non-poor households, neither farm 
income, defined as the percentage of total income earned from agriculture, nor the total 
value of sales differ significantly between mango and non-mango farmers
103
. Moreover, 
although mango farmers are found to produce on average more crops, no difference in 
both commercialisation index (estimated as in Chapter 3) and in the proportion of sales 
is observed between mango and non-mango farmers, who however tend to consume 
slightly more of their harvest compared to mango farmers.  
These findings seem to suggest that in relation to farm income, contrary to what 
predicted by Minot and Roy (2007), adopters of exotic varieties of mango have not 
benefited from the product innovation at least in the 12 months before the data 
collection. And this could explain why the ATET results do not show a significant 
impact of adoption on objective poverty.  
In order to investigate why mango farmers have not been able to access higher 
agricultural returns, I now analyse production and marketing constraints that might have 
affected mango farmers’ earnings. 
Experts of the mango sector claim that in the past years mango production has been 
affected enormously by the occurrence of different shocks, as, for example pests and 
                                                 
102 I use here the sample of farmers who fall in the common support of the most comprehensive model (M5), as 
presented in Table 4. 
103 I have also explored the differences between mango farmers and other cash crops and food only producers and the 
results are generally similar to the ones presented in this section and, thus, not presented for exposition purposes. 
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diseases
104
. As a consequence of these shocks, the lack of quality in mango produce 
might have undermined the access to the premium price and, as a consequence, affected 
the sales returns at the time of the data collection.  
This argument finds support in the data (Table 7), which shows that mango farmers 
have experienced more often pests and disease shocks, in the 12 months before data 
collection, compared to other farmers in the sample. In addition, mango farmers are 
found to live in villages where theft and frauds are claimed to be more serious compared 
to villages where non-mango farmers are located. These results find support from the 
field discussions when some farmers, especially in the Northern region, claimed that 
they were reluctant in investing on their mango production because, for example, of the 
risk that other farmers could steal from their plot, especially when land is communal. 
Land insecurity and the consequent reluctance in production enhancing investments 
might have impacted on the quality of their produce.  
Aside from production shocks, another potential constraint in accessing higher returns, 
could be the lack of the necessary skills in harvest and post-harvest management 
techniques that would allow farmers to produce high quality crops and sell them for 
higher prices. This argument does not seem to hold in my sample as some mango 
farmers also awarded organic production certifications, which should suggest that some 
of them are, indeed, able to produce high quality mangoes. However, the proportion of 
mango farmers with a certification is, instead very small, although statistically different 
from non-mango farmers.   
In addition to production ability and occurrence of shocks, the lack of higher 
agricultural returns for mango farmers might be related to the different marketing 
channels that they might have access to. Looking at the type of buyers and preferred 
selling points by adoption and poverty status shows that mango farmers do generally 
trade with market women, especially if poor, and their most common selling point is at 
the farm gate. Conversely, non-mango farmers are found to have access to a wider 
spectrum of marketing opportunities, including pack-houses and local traders (Figure 
8). These discrepancies in marketing channels occurs despite similar distances to 
periodic market between mango and non-mango farmers and better road conditions for 
                                                 
104 From discussion with main mango value chain operators. in December 2014, for example, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2 and 3, the excess of rain caused flower abortions in almost all the mango farms nationwide which will 
affect not only the quality but also the size of the production in the next major harvest season (starting in May 2015). 
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the former (Table 7) and suggest that mango farmers might not have necessarily 
different access to better marking channels, as argued by supporters of mango adoption. 
Overall, this exploratory analysis suggests that adoption of exotic varieties of mango did 
not affect the direct or the indirect poverty impact channels as identified by Minot and 
Roy (2007). This could be explained by the poor quality of the mango harvest in the 12 
months preceding the data collection, which could have been caused by the higher 
occurrence of harvest and post-harvest shocks or by the heterogeneous ability to cope 
with these shocks. The low quality of mango might have hindered the access to 
premium sales opportunities and as a consequence to higher production returns.  
In order to investigate whether mango production related factors can also explain 
poverty within mango farmers the next paragraphs discuss the main differences 
regarding mango cultivation between poor and non-poor mango farmers.  
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Table 7 Selected direct and indirect indicators of objective poverty impacts 
  Total  Objective Non-poor Objective Poor 
 
 
Non mango Mango 
 
Non 
mango 
Mango 
 
Non 
mango 
Mango 
 
 
 Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
Farm income %, total 70.57 67.43 0.219 66.64 65.78 0.814 74.72 69.84 0.155 
Trade income %, total 17.53 17.50 0.988 21.09 18.25 0.395 13.78 16.41 0.385 
Total value of sales GhC 7465 15559 0.517 12644 24223 0.453 1992 1276 0.453 
Total value of sales* GhC 1972 3030 0.171 1952 4121 0.453 1992 1276 0.453 
           
N. crops # produced 2.34 2.64 0.011** 2.27 2.63 0.050** 2.42 2.65 0.080* 
Harvest consumed %, total 27.28 22.22 0.059* 23.29 15.85 0.030** 31.50 31.51 0.998 
Harvest sold %, total 66.97 66.27 0.824 71.48 73.39 0.623 62.21 55.88 0.199 
CI1 (%) 33.03 30.62 0.363 37.48 34.98 0.528 28.32 24.25 0.192 
Distance to market 
Periodic 
market, Km 
4.64 4.46 0.709 4.87 4.90 0.963 4.41 3.82 0.406 
Roads   
# months 
impassable  
3.56 2.90 0.005*** 3.51 3.09 0.156 3.61 2.64 0.009*** 
Non-farm  
# in non-
farm 
employment 
0.66 0.81 0.154 0.73 0.81 0.569 0.58 0.80 0.150 
Non-farm se 
# in non-
farm self-
employment 
0.57 0.68 0.224 0.61 0.64 0.794 0.53 0.74 0.136 
Non- farm we 
# in non-
farm wage 
employment 
0.09 0.13 0.480 0.13 0.18 0.533 0.06 0.05 0.951 
Off-farm 
# in off-
farm 
employment 
0.00 0.01 0.440 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.01 0.400 
Pests (0/1) 0.37 0.77 0.000*** 0.45 0.80 0.000*** 0.28 0.74 0.000*** 
Theft  
 Seriousness 
(1/5) 
2.81 3.05 0.046** 2.55 2.90 0.043** 3.08 3.27 0.238 
Fraud  
Seriousness 
(1/5) 
3.93 3.55 0.027** 3.50 3.23 0.296 4.38 4.01 0.051* 
Land disputes 
Seriousness 
(1/5) 
3.50 3.42 0.658 3.34 3.33 0.982 3.68 3.54 0.634 
Ethnic conflict 
Seriousness 
(1/5) 
4.53 4.38 0.324 4.64 4.48 0.328 4.42 4.24 0.519 
Certification  (0/1) 0.01 0.13 0.000*** 0.02 0.15 0.009*** 0.00 0.11 0.013** 
N  109 182  56 108  53 74  
1 Household Commercialisation Index: ratio value sales to value of production. 
Figure 8 Marketing channels, by adoption and poverty status 
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4.2.2. Heterogeneity of mango farmers 
The lack of a significant impact on objective poverty might be also cause by the 
heterogeneity in the group of the mango farmers in the sample that might have hindered 
their ability to reach higher returns from the adoption itself. The first source of 
heterogeneity that I explore here is the time of adoption. Then I investigate what are the 
main discrepancies between poor and non-poor mango farmers and I adapt the ATET 
analysis in order to understand whether this type of heterogeneity affects the 
significance of the poverty impacts. 
Heterogeneous time of adoption and impact on poverty 
As described in Chapter 3, there is a considerable difference within the group of mango 
farmers. Differences in the time of adoption might affect the ability of adopters in 
accessing the benefits of the innovation. More specifically, following the argument by 
Carletto et al. (2011), it might be that later adopters have yet to benefit from mango 
adoption compared to earlier adopters.  
In order to investigate whether the time of adoption affected the ATET results, I 
estimate the ATET for the samples of early and late mango adopters. Table 8 
summarises the results of the ATET estimation which compares late adopters to non-
adopters of mango. Table 9 shows the ATET results comparing early and non-adopters.  
The results from these two additional estimations show that, overall, while a negative 
effect is still observed especially for the subjective poverty, suggesting that even late 
adopters do feel less poor than non-adopters, the size of the impact is reduced 
substantially compared to Table 5. The findings also suggest that the poverty impacts 
are rarely significant in the case of late adopters, while they are significant, for 
subjective poverty, in the case of early adopters (Table 9). These results are in line with 
previous findings, as, for example, in Carletto et al. (2011) who found that, although the 
impact of adoption of the product innovation on poverty was negative and significant 
for earlier adopters, the impact becomes much smaller and non-significant for later 
adopters. 
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Table 8 Average treatment effect on the treated, late adopters vs non adopters
105
 
Later adopter NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective -0.105 -0.083 0.047 -0.017 0.048 0.064 0.018 0.018 0.046 -0.105 -0.006 -0.105 -0.058 
ATET subjective -0.105 -0.095 -0.174 -0.172 -0.144 -0.134* -0.054 -0.054 -0.135* -0.105 -0.067 -0.105 -0.174* 
N. On support  195  193  195  167  195  195  193  193  195  195  193 195   195 
M2 
ATET objective 0.081 0.104 0.058 0.161 0.041 0.050 0.016 0.016 0.041 0.081 0.037 0.081 -0.035 
ATET subjective -0.093 -0.104 -0.151* -0.143 -0.137 -0.149 -0.108 -0.108 -0.141* -0.093 -0.102 -0.093 -0.140* 
N. On support  195  186  195  165  195  195  186  186  195  195  186  195  195 
M3 
ATET objective 0.057 0.083 0.046 -0.021 0.045 0.035 0.041 0.041 0.011 0.057 0.051 0.057 -0.034 
ATET subjective -0.253* -0.181 -0.149* -0.188* -0.148 -0.137* -0.158 -0.158 -0.159 -0.253** -0.162 -0.253* -0.161* 
N. On support 196 181  196  157  196  196  181  181  196  196 181   196  196 
M4 
ATET objective -0.011 -0.014 0.046 -0.039 0.041 0.035 0.064 0.064 0.012 -0.011 0.047 -0.011 -0.023 
ATET subjective -0.161 -0.137 -0.172** -0.216* -0.139 -0.136 -0.144 -0.144 -0.158* -0.161 -0.155 -0.161 -0.149 
N. On support  196  182  196  160  196  196  182  182  196  196  182  196  196 
M5 
ATET objective 0.116 0.158 0.023 0.078 0.019 0.019 0.077 0.077 0.009 0.116 0.116 0.116 -0.058 
ATET subjective -0.128 -0.145 -0.140* -0.098 -0.136* -0.106 -0.140 -0.140 -0.131 -0.128 -0.144 -0.128 -0.140 
N. On support  195  185  195  160  195  195  185  185  195  195  185  195  195 
 
Table 9 Average treatment effect on the treated, early vs non-adopters 
Early adopters (212) NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective 0.000 0.011 -0.194*** -0.058 -0.104 -0.122 -0.057 -0.057 -0.114 0.000 -0.046 0.000 -0.245*** 
ATET subjective -0.143 -0.146 -0.276*** -0.346*** -0.230*** -0.286*** -0.236** -0.236** -0.248** -0.143 -0.219** -0.143 -0.214*** 
N. On support  207  198  207  161  207  207  198  198  207  207  198  207  207 
M2 
ATET objective -0.194* -0.198 -0.194*** -0.120 -0.087 -0.111 -0.177 -0.177* -0.102* -0.194* -0.176 -0.194 -0.224** 
ATET subjective -0.255** -0.267** -0.296*** -0.360*** -0.266*** -0.336*** -0.229* -0.229** -0.256*** -0.255** -0.224* -0.255** -0.276*** 
N. On support  207  195  207  159  207  207  195  195  207  207 195   207  207 
M3 
ATET objective -0.143 -0.129 -0.184*** -0.167 -0.115 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.143 -0.127 -0.143 -0.265*** 
ATET subjective -0.224* -0.226** -0.296*** -0.313** -0.268*** -0.326*** -0.205* -0.205* -0.257*** -0.224** -0.208* -0.224* -0.245** 
N. On support  207  202  207  157  207  207  202  202  207  207  202  207  207 
M4 
ATET objective -0.181 -0.130 -0.108 -0.061 -0.027 -0.047 -0.038 -0.038 -0.043 -0.181 -0.071 -0.181 -0.169* 
ATET subjective -0.289** -0.333** -0.289*** -0.327*** -0.267*** -0.249** -0.314** -0.314*** -0.272*** -0.289** -0.319** -0.289*** -0.181** 
N. On support  192  178  192  158  192  192  178  178  192  192  178  192  192 
M5 
ATET objective -0.119 -0.114 -0.143* -0.040 -0.077 -0.076 -0.078 -0.078 -0.084 -0.119 -0.081 -0.119 -0.179* 
ATET subjective -0.286** -0.266** -0.274*** -0.280** -0.248** -0.249*** -0.243* -0.243* -0.271*** -0.286** -0.263** -0.286** -0.202* 
N. On support  193  188  193  159  193  193  188  188  193  193  188  193  193 
                                                 
105 I have also estimated the ATET between early and late adopters using both the absolute and relative cut off as defined in Chapter 3. Although the signs of the effects are in line with the 
expectations (being a late (later) adopters increases poverty), the results are not consistent throughout. The full results can be found in Appendix 4.10. I have then estimated ATET also for the 
subsample of large (more than 3 acres) and small farmers (less than 3 acres) separately. The results show that small farmers have not benefited either in objective and subjective terms from 
mango adoption. 
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Other sources of heterogeneity between mango farmers 
The previous analysis still suggests that the impact of the adoption on objective poverty 
does not occur and that mango farmers are not benefitting from adoption, regardless of 
the heterogeneity driven by their time of adoption. This might suggest that 
heterogeneity within the group of mango farmers might be driven by other 
characteristics. The following paragraphs discuss differences in terms of intensity and 
quality of mango production, social capital and marketing opportunities between poor 
and non-poor mango farmers.  
Although the majority of mango farmers are classified as objectively non-poor, 38% of 
the sample of mango farmers (74 households) is, instead, defined poor
106
.  Aside from 
differences in livelihood and production choices (in Appendix 4.6), poor mango farmers 
are found to differ in relation to their involvement in the mango production. Table 10 
shows that poor mango farmers are low-scale mango producers with an average of 90 
trees per farmers which corresponds to one acre of land under mango cultivation. 
Moreover, poor mango farmers have earned substantially less from the production of 
mango than non-poor mango farmers. The total value of sales is about 2700 GhC for 
non-poor farmers compared to 237 GhC of poor farmers.   
Table 10 Selected summary statistics, mango farmers 
   Objective  non poor Objective poor 
    Mean Mean P-value 
 
 
   
Total value of sales of mango GhC 2687 237 0.009*** 
Price mango per kg Ghc 0.62 0.31 0.158 
N. Trees  # 380 90 0.001*** 
Variety produced  Keitt, Kent Keitt, Kent   
Harvest consumed % 15.38 31.51 0.000*** 
Harvest sold % 74.07 55.88 0.000*** 
Training (0/1) 0.80 0.76 0.444 
Certification (0/1) 0.20 0.11 0.084* 
Year adoption mango  2004 2005 0.125 
N  122 74  
 
Although not significant at conventional levels, the selling price of mango received by 
non-poor mango farmers is twice as big compared to poor mango farmers, which could 
be related to the different quality of mango produced by poor and non-poor farmers.  
                                                 
106 Using the subjective measure of poverty, the proportion of poor mango farmers is 30% of the sample (57 
households). This proportion, however, varies considerably by region and district, as seen in Figure 5. 
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An indicator of this poor quality could be the grade at which the produce is sold. Grades 
are normally defined by national agencies or buyers and they establish a selection of 
criteria on colour, size and weight, which need to be satisfied for the product to be 
accepted. While for other more consolidated crops, for example cocoa, grading systems 
are well established and known, obtaining accurate data on quality criteria related to the 
mango production is quite difficult in Ghana as the grading system is not well 
established at institutional level
107
. Figure 9 shows that there is certain degree of 
difference in terms of farmers’ perception of the quality of their produce and that poor 
mango farmers might not have been able to access premium prices compared to non-
poor farmers due to the lower quality of their produce.  
Figure 9 Mango grading, by poverty status 
 
The access to information about harvest and post-harvest management techniques might 
provide insights on the differences in the ability of mango farmers in dealing with 
production difficulties. The access to relevant information might occur via different 
channels, such as longer experience in mango production, access to training and social 
capital. The experience in mango farming mango does not seem to differ between poor 
and non-poor mango farmers, although poor mango farmers adopted mango generally 
slightly later than non-poor mango farmers. Similarly no major differences can be 
                                                 
107 Nonetheless, farmers do have a common knowledge on what the grades are and what could be the premium prices 
associated with a higher grade. During focus group discussions, farmers generally claim that grade “A” is generally 
the highest and mangoes that reach this grade are generally sold fresh for export, at the highest price per unit. The 
grading scale goes down to the grade D, which includes mangoes of lower quality (for shape, colour and 
imperfections) that are normally sold in the local market or to processing companies, at lower price. This information 
was gathered from discussion with stakeholders of the mango value chain. During the field activities, I perceived that 
every farmer would have associated his/her own production of mango to the highest grade possible. A question in the 
survey asked farmers to rate their production according to the grading system they normally use. The answers to this 
question show that poor farmers produced more low quality mangoes, graded C or lower; whereas the majority of 
non-poor mango farmers produced A graded mangoes or a combination of them with lower quality ones. 
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observed in the access to training opportunities in the 12 months preceding the data 
collection
108
. 
Finally, one last exploratory analysis regards the marketing opportunities. Hence, it may 
be plausible to think that the incapability of poor farmers to have access to premium 
prices may be related to a lower market orientation compared to non-poor mango 
farmers (Figure 10).  
Figure 10 Mango farmers marketing channels, by poverty status 
  
These findings show that poor mango farmers, although producing similar number of 
crops and the same variety of mango (mainly Keitt and Kent) than non-poor mango 
farmers, tend to be less market oriented, i.e. they consume more and sell less of their 
produce than non-poor mango farmers; they produce mango less intensively, and of 
lower quality; they tend to sell exclusively to market women while non-poor farmers 
also trade with processors and other local traders; they sell mostly at the farm or in the 
local market and not in dedicated pack-houses, compared to non-poor farmers. Finally, 
                                                 
108
 I also investigate if there is any difference in in social capital between poor and non-poor mango farmers. The 
measures used are the ones used in Chapter 3. The only different measure is the “social network” variable, which is, 
in this case, directly drawn from the questions in the survey. The question directly asked mango farmers the number 
of previous adopters known at the time of adoption (1=none; 2=less than 10 and 3= more than 10). The results, in 
Appendix, show that, although non-poor mango farmers have stronger relationship with input suppliers, and poor 
farmers have a stronger relationship with land owners overall social capital tend not to systematically differ between 
poor and non-poor mango farmers, suggesting that mango farmers can have access to similar sources of information. 
The latter result is explained by the fact that, as described above, poor farmers do not generally own land. 
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poor mango farmers also tend to be involved in contract farming and block farm 
systems while non-poor farmers are generally independent sellers
109
.  
These results tend to suggest that overall mango adopters differ quite considerably 
according to their poverty status and that mango adoption did not necessarily benefit 
less endowed, less market oriented and low skilled farmers. In order to reduce the 
heterogeneities within the group of mango farmers, I now estimate the ATET on two 
sub-samples: 1) non-mango farmers and non-poor mango farmers (231 households, 
Table 11); 2) non-poor farmers (both mango and non-mango farmers; 178 households, 
Table 12)
 110
.  
The results show that when poor mango farmers are dropped from the sample, the 
impact of adoption on poverty changes considerably. More specifically, the findings 
show that a strong and significant poverty reducing effect for both objective and 
subjective measures of poverty, which is consistent with previous empirical evidence. 
Similar results are also found for the subsample of “only” non-poor farmers (both non-
mango and mango farmers), although the ATET estimations are less consistent 
throughout the different matching algorithms.  
Overall, these additional estimations tend to suggest that the heterogeneity within the 
group of mango farmers might affect the impact that the adoption has on farmers’ well-
being. This heterogeneity might be related to the relative different experience in dealing 
with difficulties related to the production and marketing of mango itself. Poor mango 
farmers tend to produce low quality crops that are sold at a much lower price than crops 
produced by non-poor mango farmers. The difficulties that poor farmers are facing in 
benefitting from mango adoption are considerable and they affect the analysis of the 
ATET in my sample.  
                                                 
109 This last finding contrasts the empirical evidence of the past literature on the benefits of contract farming 
especially for small farmers (Minten et al., 2009; Miyata et al., 2009). In my sample, contract farmers are normally 
located in the Northern region, where ITFC operates. The first impressions from the field suggested that these farmers 
did not have enough understanding about mango production and its potentiality. Their waiting attitude contrasted 
enormously with the one, mostly business oriented, of the farmers located in Brong-Ahafo and Eastern regions where 
independent production is more common.  The results of this analysis seem to confirm the observation gathered from 
the field that, indeed, mango farmers located in the Northern region are lagging behind mango farmers located in 
other parts of the country.  
110 I re-estimated the asset index and the subjective measure of poverty for each of these subsamples. The ATETs 
between only poor farmers cannot be estimated because there is no variance in asset endowments for this group of 
farmers which hinders the possibility to re-estimate the asset index for this subsample of farmers.  
182 
 
Table 11 Average treatment effect on the treated, non-poor mango farmers 
Non  poor mango 
farmers (231) 
NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective -0.190* -0.221** -0.422*** -0.367*** -0.287*** -0.324*** -0.267*** -0.267*** -0.265*** -0.190 -0.253** -0.190* -0.431*** 
ATET subjective -0.241** -0.317*** -0.284*** -0.267*** -0.234*** -0.279*** -0.290*** -0.290*** -0.225** -0.241** -0.297** -0.241** -0.259*** 
N. On support 225 213 218 169 225 225 213 213 225 225 213 225 225 
M2 
ATET objective -0.259*** -0.294*** -0.422*** -0.373*** -0.279*** -0.324*** -0.275*** -0.275*** -0.262*** -0.259*** -0.274** -0.259** -0.397*** 
ATET subjective -0.233** -0.255** -0.284*** -0.220** -0.236*** -0.276*** -0.235** -0.235** -0.232** -0.233** -0.234** -0.233* -0.293*** 
N. On support 225 211 218 168 225 225 211 211 225 225 211 225 225 
M3 
ATET objective -0.259** -0.279** -0.422*** -0.328*** -0.283*** -0.322*** -0.258** -0.258** -0.262*** -0.259** -0.269*** -0.259** -0.431*** 
ATET subjective -0.190 -0.231* -0.284*** -0.230* -0.235*** -0.278*** -0.246** -0.246** -0.230*** -0.190* -0.259** -0.190* -0.276*** 
N. On support 225 213 218 170 225 225 213 213 225 225 213 225 225 
M4 
ATET objective -0.267** -0.293** -0.386*** -0.283*** -0.275*** -0.325*** -0.281** -0.281** -0.243** -0.267*** -0.280** -0.267** -0.406*** 
ATET subjective -0.059 -0.107 -0.267*** -0.113 -0.204** -0.238*** -0.134 -0.134 -0.159* -0.059 -0.118 -0.059 -0.257*** 
N. On support 210 184 210 162 210 210 184 184 210 210 184 210 210 
M5 
ATET objective -0.374*** -0.388 -0.394*** -0.356*** -0.323*** -0.356*** -0.357*** -0.357*** -0.338*** -0.374*** -0.370*** -0.374*** -0.354*** 
ATET subjective -0.212* -0.247* -0.263*** -0.237** -0.194** -0.215** -0.262** -0.262** -0.212** -0.212* -0.271** -0.212* -0.172** 
N. On support 208 194 208 194 208 208 194 194 208 208 194 208 208 
 
Table 12 Average treatment effect on the treated, non-poor farmers 
Non  poor mango and non- 
farmers (178) 
NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective -0.339*** -0.365*** -0.321*** -0.350*** -0.305** -0.293*** -0.381*** -0.381*** -0.291*** -0.339*** -0.382*** -0.339** -0.275** 
ATET subjective -0.202 -0.219 -0.089 -0.200 -0.187* -0.177* -0.208 -0.208 -0.186* -0.202 -0.231* -0.202 -0.138 
N. On support 165 152 112 96 165 165 152 152 165 165 152 165 165 
M2 
ATET objective -0.342*** -0.363** -0.321*** -0.310** -0.289*** -0.276*** -0.320** -0.320** -0.280** -0.342*** -0.333*** -0.342*** -0.198* 
ATET subjective -0.234 -0.275** -0.089 -0.119 -0.186* -0.174* -0.198 -0.198 -0.180** -0.234* -0.227* -0.234** -0.207* 
N. On support 167 158 112 98 167 167 158 158 167 167 158 167 167 
M3 
ATET objective -0.211 -0.228 -0.304*** -0.349** -0.261** -0.296*** -0.185 -0.185 -0.226* -0.211* -0.188 -0.211 -0.229* 
ATET subjective -0.174 -0.207* -0.089 -0.140 -0.139 -0.159 -0.134 -0.134 -0.153 -0.174 -0.150 -0.174 -0.202** 
N. On support 165 148 112 99 165 165 148 148 165 165 148 165 165 
M4 
ATET objective -0.189 -0.222 -0.268*** -0.190 -0.207* -0.232** -0.164 -0.164 -0.186 -0.189 -0.189 -0.189 -0.222** 
ATET subjective -0.111 -0.111 -0.089 -0.048 -0.076 -0.071 -0.080 -0.080 -0.089 -0.111 -0.093 -0.111 -0.144 
N. On support 146 137 112 98 146 146 137 137 146 146 137 146 146 
M5 
ATET objective -0.235 -0.342** -0.232** -0.342** -0.245** -0.240** -0.333** -0.333** -0.250** -0.235 -0.334** -0.235 -0.216* 
ATET subjective -0.059 -0.101 -0.089 -0.079 -0.122 -0.087 -0.089 -0.089 -0.097 -0.059 -0.098 -0.059 -0.039 
N. On support 158 135 112 94 158 158 135 135 158 158 135 158 158 
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Section 5. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the impact of the adoption product innovation on poverty. The 
product innovation analysed is the exotic varieties of mango (mostly Keitt and Kent) in 
the context of rural Ghana. The data were collected during the field work carried out in 
2012 and it included 196 adopters and 109 non adopters of mango. 
The empirical methodology uses propensity score matching techniques for the 
identification of the counterfactual among the heterogeneous group of non-adopters. I 
explore different matching criteria and methods for the selection of the valid 
counterfactual and, then, I estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated.  
I use two types of poverty measures: objective and subjective. The objective measure is 
based on the estimation of an asset index using principal component analysis, while the 
subjective measure is derived from the “Economic Ladder” survey question. The 
identification of the poverty thresholds follows the previous literature. More 
specifically, a household is defined “objective” poor if its asset index is below the 40th 
percentile of the entire distribution, while a household is defined “subjective” poor if its 
answer to the Economic Ladder question was below the median answer at district level. 
Following these definitions, 127 “objectively” poor households and 113 “subjectively” 
poor households can be identified in the sample. Although a certain degree of 
overlapping can be observed between objective and subjective poverty rates, there exist 
some difference in poverty rates within and between regions depending on the poverty 
measure used. More specifically, farmers located in the Northern region are generally 
subjectively less poor than they “objectively” are, while the reverse is observed for 
farmers in Brong-Ahafo region.  
The main advantage of using a subjective measure of poverty is that it provides a more 
comprehensive picture of the household’s poverty profile, which is in line with the 
argument of multi-dimensional nature of poverty. Moreover, the use of subjective 
measures also helps addressing the underestimation of wealth that can occur when only 
objective measures are used (Posel and Ragan, 2014).  
The main findings of this analysis suggest that mango adoption has a significant poverty 
reducing impact. However, this impact regards almost exclusively the subjective 
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poverty. Mango adoption is, indeed, found to not impact objective poverty. Although in 
contrast with previous findings, the lack of impact might have been caused by the 
occurrence of shocks in the period preceding the data collection, which in turn might 
have affected farmers’ asset endowments, suggesting that the results might be 
dependent on peculiarities of the crops investigated, exotic varieties of mango. Poor 
mango farmers in the sample do, indeed, struggle to produce a high quality fruit that 
could be exported or sold at a higher price than the one offered in the local market. The 
results also show that when the group of poor mango farmers is excluded from the 
analysis, the effect of adoption on objective poverty becomes significant, suggesting 
that the difficulties that poor mango farmers are facing in reaching objective returns 
from the innovation should not be overlooked.  
Nonetheless the poverty reducing impact observed in the case of subjective poverty 
suggests that farmers do feel less poor as a consequence of their adoption status. This 
might be driven by the experience of past high production returns or from positive 
expectations from the future. This result is in line with previous literature as, for 
example, Ravallion and Lokshin (2002) and Knight et al. (2009), who show that past 
and future income shapes the extent of current happiness and poverty.  
Overall, notwithstanding its limitations (cross sectional nature of the data, limited 
number of matching criteria, etc.), this analysis provides some interesting insights on 
the effect and the perception of the effect that a product innovation, such as exotic 
varieties of mango, had in rural Ghana. To my knowledge this is the first study that 
explicitly attempted to evaluate the issue empirically and as such it could be a valuable 
source of information for future, more rigorous impact evaluations. 
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CONCLUSION 
The recent developments in the national agricultural policies in Ghana identify market 
participation and innovation adoption as two of the most important priorities for 
agricultural transformation and poverty reduction. Notwithstanding the financial and 
political commitment received, market participation and innovation adoption rates 
remain considerably low in rural Ghana.  
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate farmers’ decision to participate in the 
market and to adopt product innovation as well as the impact of the latter on poverty in 
rural Ghana. I use both secondary data, from the Ghana Living Standard Surveys, as 
well as primary data collected during the summer 2012.  
Chapter 1 analyses the determinants of market participation and commercialisation 
using a sample of rural households from three rounds of the GLSS (GLSS4, GLSS5, 
GLSS6). The analysis is run at both household and crop level, with the latter focused on 
one of the most common staple crops in Ghana, maize. A Heckman two step approach 
is used to control for self-selection into market participation. Specific attention is given 
to the role of transaction costs in market participation decisions. Both measures of 
proportional and fixed costs are included in the models and estimated together with 
classic explanatory variables (household, farm and village characteristics). The results 
of this chapter show that, aside from classic determinants, such as farm size or land 
ownership, transaction costs play a relevant role in the decision to participate in the 
market in Ghana. Within the measures of proportional transaction costs, the results 
show an unexpected, positive, relationship between remoteness and market 
participation, i.e. being further away from the market increases the likelihood of 
participating in the market. Although inconsistent with past empirical evidence, this 
result finds support from studies of commercialisation specific to the Ghanaian context. 
Zanello et al. (2014) and Martey et al. (2012) both suggest that remoteness might not be 
as important in Ghana as it might be in other developing countries, as it is personal ties 
and relationships with buyers which favour market participation and play a significant 
role in reducing transaction costs. Furthermore, in the past decades several projects have 
been put in place by development agencies and national government aiming to create 
strong linkages between primary producers, especially if located in remote areas, other 
farmers, and buyers (both processors and exporters), who mostly operate closely to 
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markets. The existence of stronger linkages between primary producers and other 
relevant actors of wider social networks, across and within different value chains (food 
and/or cash crops), might explain this unexpected positive association between 
remoteness and market participation.  
GLSS data do not offer a wide range of information that would allow the investigation 
of the role of social networks and social capital, defined as linkages with other operators 
along the lines of relevant value chains. This motivated the collection of primary data 
that I have carried out in the summer 2012. The field work focused on the adoption of 
one non-traditional cash crop targeted for its poverty reduction potential by the Ghana 
Export Horticulture Cluster Strategic Profile Study (2008), i.e. exotic varieties of 
mango. I collected data on household, farm and social capital characteristics from 305 
farmers (196 mango adopters and 109 non-adopters). I use this data to investigate the 
role of social capital on product innovation adoption (Chapter 3) and its effect on 
poverty (Chapter 4). 
Chapter 3 analyses the factors that affect the decision to adopt exotic varieties of 
mango, the decision of when to adopt and how much. The empirical investigation is 
based on probit, OLS and Heckman models and it includes measures of social capital in 
both aggregated and disaggregated fashion. More specifically, three components of 
social capital are considered: structural bridging, structural bonding and cognitive. The 
disaggregated measures are computed for seven innovation change agents (input 
suppliers, credit providers, extension officers, farmers’ organisation, development 
agencies, NGOs and other farmers). The results show that social capital plays a 
considerable role in the decision to adopt or not the product innovation under scrutiny, 
and that different change agents might influence the decision of when to adopt and how 
much to invest in the innovation. While development agencies are found to accelerate 
the decision to adopt, NGOs are instead found to affect the decision of how much to 
adopt. Moreover, farmers’ organisation and extension officers are found to facilitate the 
decision to adopt product innovation and, often, to reduce common small farmers’ 
constraints, such as farm size, land ownership and access to credit. On the other hand, 
having contracts with and trust in these change agents is also found to delay the decision 
to adopt, supporting the idea that the production difficulties that adopters are currently 
facing in the mango sector might have created negative expectations on the benefits 
187 
 
from adoption that might have been channelled to other farmers through these change 
agents and discouraged earlier adoption.  
Finally, Chapter 4 questions the impact that adoption of product innovation, such as 
exotic varieties of mango, has had on poverty in the sampled areas. Development 
agencies have been advocating the poverty reducing potential of this product innovation 
since early 2000s but few studies have attempted to investigate it empirically. Using 
propensity score matching techniques, I estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated comparing mango and non-mango farmers. I use two measures of poverty. An 
“objective” measure, which is computed based on asset data using the principal 
component analysis, and a “subjective” measure of poverty, constructed using the 
“Economic Ladder” question, as presented in Ravallion (2012). The estimations of the 
ATETs show that the adoption of innovation has had, indeed, a positive effect on 
farmers’ poverty reduction. However, a statistically significant effect is only observed 
in the case of subjective poverty, suggesting that mango farmers “feel” less poor that 
they actually are. The lack of effect on objective poverty contrasts with previous 
empirical evidence (e.g. von Braun and Immink, 1994; Mendola, 2007). In order to 
explain why adopters’ poverty has not changed in objective terms, I investigate whether 
different sources of heterogeneity within the group of mango farmers affected the 
results. I first re-estimate the ATETs comparing non-adopters and sub-samples of either 
late or early adopters of mango and then I investigate whether other sources of 
heterogeneity, such as intensity and quality of mango production, might have 
contributed to the unexpected lack of impact on objective poverty. Interestingly, when 
the ATET is estimated excluding mango farmers who are struggling in achieving high 
quality of their produce, the impact on objective poverty becomes highly significant, 
suggesting that mango production difficulties are effectively constraining mango 
farmers, especially if poor, in achieving benefits from its adoption. 
The main limitation of the analyses in this thesis is the presence of endogeneity, due to 
reverse causality and selection bias. Although the use of Heckman models attempts to 
minimise the effect that endogeneity has on the final results, the extent to which the 
effect is limited can be questionable. This is because self-selection bias is controlled for 
using purposively selected observable characteristics. These observable characteristics 
are much clearer in the market participation conceptual framework, which identifies in 
measures of fixed transaction costs the controls for self-selection, than they are in the 
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adoption models. The identification of the variables that can capture selection bias can, 
indeed, be quite difficult without a specific conceptual framework that justifies their 
use
111
.  
Apart from selection biases, reverse causality of other control variables such as access 
to credit, food only production and access to non-farm income, might have affected the 
results. The main challenge in identifying instrumental variables for addressing this 
issue is linked to the fact that similar factors that are believed to affect the potentially 
endogenous variables (such as farm size, land ownership and so on) are also believed to 
affect market participation and adoption, and their role in addressing endogeneity 
specifically for these analyses can be considered questionable. 
Furthermore, specifically for the analysis of the determinants of innovation adoption 
(Chapter 3) and its impact on poverty (Chapter 4) two additional problems might be 
affecting the precision of the results. The first is heterogeneity in the units of 
comparison and the second is related to the measures of social capital variables. The 
heterogeneity originates from the fact that the sample of non-adopters may be 
incorrectly composed of dis-adopters, i.e. farmers who adopted mango in the past and 
then dis-adopted; future adopters and “never” adopters. Also within the group of 
adopters, farmers might be systematically different with respect to the intensity, time 
and quality of their adoption as shown in the end of Chapter 4. Ideally, farmer’s 
heterogeneity needs to be control for at the time of the adoption and adopters should be 
compared to “never” adopters at the time of adoption. The use of recall data, 
disaggregating the samples according to selected sources of heterogeneity and the use of 
propensity score marching techniques in the poverty analysis aimed to reduce the 
potential systematic differences within the group of adopters and across the entire 
sample.  
The information on social capital used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 was obtained using a 
simple approach during the data collection, mainly drawn from value chain analysis. 
The social capital measures can be improved on two fronts. Firstly the use of recall data 
                                                 
111 Nonetheless, due to the similarities between innovation adoption and market participation analysis in the case of 
this thesis, I assume that self-selection might be driven by similar observable characteristics in both the decision to 
participate in the market and in the adoption of a crop, mango, whose main adoption driver is its marketability. Thus, 
I control for self-selection in the adoption process also using measures of fixed transaction costs. In addition, in the 
analysis of the time and intensity of innovation adoption I control for self-selection also using risk aversion variables. 
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for social capital at the time of the adoption
112
. In addition, social capital measures can 
be improved using social network analysis approaches. For example, within the 
structural component, a measure of social network, as in Maertens and Barrett (2012) or 
Bandiera and Rasul (2006), would provide more precise insights on the role that social 
networks, and their size, play in the innovation decisions. Similarly, more 
comprehensive information on communal norms and rules could also enrich the 
definition of cognitive social capital and improve the estimation of its effect on adoption 
decisions. These measures require more time that I had during the data collection and, 
as such, were not used
113
.  
Moreover, due to time and budget constraints, it was only possible to collect cross 
section data during the field work. Panel data based on revisits to the household in the 
sample would offer additional insights and help to address some of the endogeneity 
problems. Revisiting the households in the sample would also be beneficial in light of 
the difficulties that mango farmers faced in the harvest season preceding the data 
collection.  
The collection of additional data could also focus more on the use of inputs in the 
context of mango production. Considering the importance of the correct use of inputs 
such as pesticides, in pre- and post-harvest mango management techniques, further 
analysis is needed to understand what determines the choice of inputs and the intensity 
of their use, and what role social capital plays also in this context, in line with the 
framework set up by Conley and Udry (2010) within the pineapple sector.  
An input-level analysis could also be beneficial in the analysis of market participation in 
Chapter 1, with a focus on the determinants of demand for inputs, following, for 
example, Alene et al. (2008). In addition to an input level analysis, considering the 
importance that gender of the head of the household has on market participation 
decisions, a disaggregated gender analysis could provide additional insights on the role 
of gender of the household in the decision to commercialise or not in both the input and 
                                                 
112 Recall data on social capital was not collected during the field work based on two assumptions: 1) social capital 
tend not to change drastically within a short amount of time; 2) the time of adoption was expected to be much more 
uniform and recent than what observed in the field. 
113 However, notwithstanding these challenges, the fact that several different social capital variables produce 
consistent results across several different specifications and models is somehow reassuring.  Also, in order to 
minimise the effect of multicollinearity, I include different social capital variables separately (one at the time) in the 
adoption models, which although does not allow to capture joint effects of different types of social capital on the 
innovation adoption, provides, I believe, satisfactory and consistent results throughout.  
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output sides. Finally, the analysis of market participation with GLSS data would benefit 
from additional data at market transaction level for a wider set of crops. Following 
Zanello et al. (2014), detailed data on how market transactions occur, including 
communication assets used and costs involved, would provide a better approximation of 
the transaction costs involved in the decision to participate in the market. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this thesis contributes to the literature on several 
fronts. First, I use the latest Ghana Living Standard Survey, collected in 2012/2013 and 
only recently released for public use. To my knowledge no other previous studies on 
market participation has used this dataset. Moreover, the collection of primary data from 
mango producers constitutes a useful contribution to the adoption of innovation in the 
Ghanaian context. Only a couple of other studies
114
 have empirically investigated the 
adoption processes and their effect on poverty for those non-traditional cash crops that 
have been targeted by international and national actors for their poverty reducing 
potential. As far as I know, no other studies had carried out a similar analysis for exotic 
varieties of mango at the time of my field work. I believe that the data collected in 2012 
offers valid insights for future researchers in the field of exotic mango adoption, 
especially in relation with the role of different types of social capital.   
The use of disaggregated measures of social capital within the context of innovation 
adoption also constitutes an additional contribution to the study of non-traditional cash 
crops in Ghana. Conley and Udry (2010) have carried out a similar analysis for the 
pineapple sector, but they only focused on one component of the social capital realm, 
i.e. structural bonding, measured as the size of social networks. In this thesis, I widen 
the spectrum of social capital components, investigating the role of a wider range of 
innovation agents and types of social capital. Although challenging at times, as, for 
example, in the case of cognitive social capital, the approach used in Chapter 3 aims to 
be one of the initial steps towards a more comprehensive investigation of the role that 
social capital plays in innovation adoption in the Ghanaian context, where, as discussed 
above, social capital might be more relevant in the market participation and innovation 
decisions than in other developing countries.  
Some puzzling results of this thesis tend to reflect the particular features of the 
Ghanaian agricultural context and, in a way, contribute to re-affirm the importance of 
                                                 
114 CATRD (2006) and van Melle and Buschmann (2013). 
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taking in to account location specific peculiarities for empirical analyses. This is the 
case, for example, of the positive relationship between remoteness and market 
participation. As discussed above, this unexpected result can be explained looking 
specifically at the Ghanaian marketing systems and their development through times. 
Similarly, the different role observed for development agencies, NGOs, farmers’ 
organisation and extension officers in the decision to innovate and its dimensions, found 
in Chapter 3, is typical of the recent history of agricultural transformation occurred in 
Ghana.  
The adherence of the results to location specific characteristics creates the scope for 
some policy recommendations that could help to foster market participation, innovation 
adoption and its impact on poverty, specifically within the Ghanaian context. These 
policy recommendations cover more general aspects of market participation and 
innovation adoptions, as, for example, education systems, marketing information and 
provision of interventions that are specific for the mango sector.  
The first policy recommendation regards the role of education in market participation. 
The results suggest that education does not favour market participation. Instead, more 
educated farmers refrain from participating in the agricultural market. This might 
suggest that either the agricultural sector does not allow for adequate returns of 
education or that the education system does not link appropriately with the farming 
sector. Specific interventions are required in fostering the linkages between education 
and agriculture especially in the context of accessing better opportunities via market 
participation and adoption of innovation, where the ability to access and interpret 
different information is essential. 
Given that households with higher education are likely to have access to higher return 
activities off-farm or in non-farm activities, the improvement of the primary or lower 
years of the secondary education system with a higher focus on commercialisation, 
business skills and use of innovative technologies for market access might yield benefits 
for households where agriculture is an important activity. This should be accompanied 
by a systematic reform of the marketing information system. Platforms such as that 
created by Esoko, which provide marketing information (prices, potential buyers and so 
on) on mobiles phones, should become the common tools for farmers, especially in light 
of the recent development in mobile network coverage in Ghana. In addition, and 
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specifically for the non-traditional cash crops sector, more clarity on the quality 
standards required for the access to the export market should be achieved at national 
level.  
A better information flow should involve more closely farmers’ organisations that are 
observed to play a relevant role in fostering innovation in the case of exotic varieties of 
mango. While strengthening of farmers’ organisation is widely supported by national 
and international actors in Ghana, and in light of the results of this thesis should be 
supported even more, much wider attention should be given to the role of Ministry of 
Agriculture extension officers, who are found to influence both the decision to adopt 
and the decision of when to adopt. However, from focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews, farmers and other actors in the mango sectors claim that extension 
officers often lack of the necessary knowledge and skills to support local adopters. The 
Ministry of Agriculture should support a bigger involvement of these figures in the 
innovation processes, especially with regards to the production of exotic varieties of 
mango, that require timely interventions during all production stages. Technical training 
and participation of extension officers in the definition and implementation of 
innovation related interventions might help fostering the diffusion and sustainability of 
the innovation adoption process in the rural Ghana. 
Finally, still in the context of innovation adoption, not enough support has been 
provided in the past years on pre- and post-harvest management techniques for exotic 
varieties of mango. During TIPCEE an intense assistance to mango farmers was started 
and GIZ is currently working with a selection of farmers’ organisation for the provision 
of these activities
115
. However, field observations and the results of this thesis tend to 
suggest that farmers do still suffer from the occurrence of pest and diseases, as well as, 
unexpected weather shocks that seem to have affected their economic returns in the year 
before the data collection. A better and timely provision of technical assistance on the 
use of inputs, such as specific pesticides for fruit flies (including traps) and irrigation, 
should be guaranteed. As suggested above, a better involvement of extension officers 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, who are closely located to farmers, might also 
contribute to this purpose. Finally, a wider coverage of training for awarding 
                                                 
115 Water tanks, for example, were provided for example in the Northern region but left in disuse after few years of 
the completion of the specific interventions. Moreover, pesticides were also distributed by GIZ but some farmers 
failed to use them correctly and some mango trees were severely damaged as a consequence of this misuse. 
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certifications for high-quality produce should go hand-in-hand with these activities, in 
order for farmers to access export markets benefits and for the poverty reducing 
potential of the innovation adoption to fully materialise also for the poorest group of 
adopters.  
And this is specifically because the majority of mango farmers do truly believe in the 
benefits of the adoption and that mango is, indeed, a “golden fruit” or a “pension fund”, 
as some of them claimed during the focus group discussions. A timely and more 
focused attention to the needs especially of small and poorly endowed mango producers 
could indeed make a big difference in their ability to finally achieve the expected, and 
hoped, economic returns. Further research is, of course, needed to understand how these 
needs change with time and this thesis represents a step towards that goal.  
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Appendix 1.1. Market participation analysis for farming households with more than 20% of total income 
from agriculture 
Table 1 Determinants of market participation, agriculture income > 20% of total income 
Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(8) (8) (8) (9) (9) (9) (10) (10) (10) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
   
         
Male head (0/1) 0.08*** 1.98*** 1.53 0.06*** 1.30* 1.23 0.06*** 1.23 0.94 
 
 (0.01) (0.77) (0.94) (0.01) (0.79) (0.88) (0.01) (0.79) (0.87) 
Age head Years -0.00*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Basic education (0/1) -0.02** 0.85  -0.02** 0.78  -0.02** 0.85  
 
 (0.01) (0.72)  (0.01) (0.72)  (0.01) (0.72)  
Higher education (0/1) -0.02 2.78*** 2.50*** -0.02 2.67*** 2.37*** -0.01 2.85*** 2.55*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.94) (0.87) (0.01) (0.95) (0.87) (0.01) (0.95) (0.87) 
Farm labour 
# member of household who 
work on own farm 0.01*** -0.67*** -0.76*** 0.01*** -0.70*** -0.73*** 0.01*** -0.71*** -0.78*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.16) (0.18) (0.00) (0.16) (0.18) (0.00) (0.16) (0.18) 
Farm size Hectares 0.00*** 0.04* 0.03*** 0.00*** 0.03* 0.03*** 0.00*** 0.03* 0.03** 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.01** 3.52*** 3.67*** -0.01** 3.46*** 3.57*** -0.01** 3.50*** 3.66*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.58) (0.59) (0.01) (0.58) (0.59) (0.01) (0.58) (0.59) 
Livestock # 0.01* -0.00*** -0.00* 0.01 -0.00*** -0.00* 0.01 -0.00*** -0.00* 
 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Access to non-farm income 
(0/1) - 1 if household has 
access to self-employment non-
farm income; 0 otherwise -0.02*** 2.12*** 2.33*** -0.02*** 2.01*** 2.15*** -0.02*** 2.07*** 2.29*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.66) (0.68) (0.01) (0.66) (0.68) (0.01) (0.66) (0.68) 
Food only production 
(0/1) - 1 if household produces 
only food crops; 0 otherwise -0.11*** 0.87 1.78 -0.12*** 0.88 1.42 -0.12*** 0.97 1.93* 
 
 (0.01) (0.79) (1.19) (0.01) (0.79) (1.08) (0.01) (0.79) (1.07) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.04*** -0.47 -0.70 0.03*** -0.56 -0.65 0.03*** -0.65 -0.85 
 
 (0.01) (0.59) (0.64) (0.01) (0.59) (0.62) (0.01) (0.59) (0.62) 
Processing  
(0/1) - 1 if household processes 
any crop or fish; 0 otherwise 0.06*** -4.65*** -5.06*** 0.06*** -4.59*** -4.82*** 0.06*** -4.64*** -5.04*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.69) (0.78) (0.01) (0.69) (0.75) (0.01) (0.69) (0.74) 
Radio (0/1)    0.02*** 2.40*** 2.39*** 0.02*** 2.41*** 2.32*** 
 
    (0.01) (0.59) (0.60) (0.01) (0.58) (0.60) 
Bicycle (0/1)    0.04*** 0.59  0.04*** 0.64  
207 
 
Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(8) (8) (8) (9) (9) (9) (10) (10) (10) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
   
         
 
    (0.01) (0.68)  (0.01) (0.68)  
Distance to market 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
median; 0 otherwise 
      
0.03*** 2.57*** 2.35*** 
 
       (0.01) (0.58) (0.60) 
Distance to extension officer 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
median; 0 otherwise 
      
-0.02*** -1.60*** -1.41** 
 
       (0.01) (0.57) (0.59) 
Lambda    -4.71   -2.61   -4.72 
 
   (4.54)   (3.92)   (3.87) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  11347 9368 11347 11347 0.12 11347 11347 9368 11347 
Censored observations    1979   1979   1979 
Obs. P %  83   83   83   
Predicted obs %  89   89   89   
LR chi2  1884***   1933***   1958***   
R-squared  0.18 0.13  0.18 0.13  0.18 0.13  
Wald    1218***   1244***   1250*** 
Rho    -0.18   -0.10   -0.18 
Sigma    25.82   25.71   25.77 
1Marginal effects are presented 
2OLS Un-corr= OLS on market participants only; not corrected for self-selection into market participation 
3OLS corr=2nd stage of Heckman two step; corrected for self-selection into market participation 
4 Extreme values have been replaced with average values of each round of GLSS. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1.2. Market participation analysis with a lower cut-off of Household Commercialisation Index 
Table 2 Determinants of market participation and its extent, lower cut-off (25% HCI) 
Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (18-100) 
(11) (11) (11) (12) (12) (12) (13) (13) (13) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
Male head (0/1) 0.12*** 1.36** 0.85 0.11*** 0.79 -0.31 0.11*** 0.74 -0.69 
 
 (0.01) (0.69) (1.76) (0.01) (0.71) (1.37) (0.01) (0.70) (1.37) 
Age head Years -0.00*** 0.01 0.01 -0.00*** 0.01 0.02 -0.00** 0.01 0.02 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Basic education (0/1) -0.02* 0.15 IV -0.02* 0.13 IV -0.02* 0.19 IV 
 
 (0.01) (0.64)  (0.01) (0.64)  (0.01) (0.64)  
Higher education (0/1) -0.05*** 2.30*** 2.41*** -0.05*** 2.25*** 2.65*** -0.05*** 2.38*** 2.86*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.81) (0.92) (0.01) (0.81) (0.88) (0.01) (0.81) (0.88) 
Farm labour 
# member of household who work on own farm 
0.01** -0.34** -0.37** 0.01** -0.36** -0.42** 0.01** -0.37** -0.45** 
 
(0.00) (0.16) (0.19) (0.00) (0.16) (0.18) (0.00) (0.16) (0.18) 
Farm size Hectares 0.00 0.03 0.03** 0.00 0.03 0.03** 0.00 0.03 0.03** 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.03*** 3.30*** 3.17*** 0.03*** 3.27*** 2.93*** 0.03*** 3.30*** 2.85*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.53) (0.69) (0.01) (0.53) (0.63) (0.01) (0.53) (0.64) 
Livestock # -0.00 1.03 1.03 -0.00 0.88 0.92 -0.00 0.87 0.90 
 
 (0.00) (0.79) (0.63) (0.00) (0.71) (0.64) (0.00) (0.71) (0.64) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) - 1 if household has access to self-employment non-farm income; 0 
otherwise 
-0.05*** 0.55 0.79 -0.06*** 0.44 1.09 -0.05*** 0.51 1.32 
 
(0.01) (0.58) (0.94) (0.01) (0.58) (0.83) (0.01) (0.58) (0.83) 
Food only production 
(0/1) - 1 if household produces only food crops; 0 otherwise 
-0.17*** 2.43*** 3.18 -0.17*** 2.38*** 4.42** -0.17*** 2.40*** 4.97** 
 
(0.01) (0.70) (2.45) (0.01) (0.70) (1.93) (0.01) (0.70) (1.94) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.02** -0.77 -0.86 0.02** -0.86 -1.05* 0.02** -0.93* -1.17** 
 
 (0.01) (0.54) (0.61) (0.01) (0.53) (0.58) (0.01) (0.53) (0.59) 
Processing  
(0/1) - 1 if household processes any crop or fish; 0 otherwise 
0.04*** -4.71*** -4.89*** 0.04*** -4.67*** -5.13*** 0.04*** -4.75*** -5.33*** 
 
(0.01) (0.62) (0.82) (0.01) (0.62) (0.75) (0.01) (0.62) (0.75) 
Radio (0/1)    0.03*** 1.70*** 1.45** 0.03*** 1.71*** 1.38** 
 
    (0.01) (0.54) (0.63) (0.01) (0.54) (0.64) 
Bicycle (0/1)    0.04*** 0.90 IV 0.04*** 0.93 IV 
 
    (0.01) (0.62)  (0.01) (0.62)  
Distance to market 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above the median; 0 otherwise 
      0.04*** 2.12*** 1.52** 
 
      (0.01) (0.53) (0.69) 
Distance to extension officer 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above the median; 0 otherwise 
      -0.01 -1.23** -1.04* 
 
      (0.01) (0.53) (0.56) 
Lambda     -3.01   -7.77   -9.95 
 
   (9.26)   (7.19)   (7.23) 
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Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (18-100) 
(11) (11) (11) (12) (12) (12) (13) (13) (13) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  14,736 8,250 14,736 14,736 8,250 14,736 14,736 8,250 14,736 
Censored observations    6486   6486   6486 
Obs. P %  56   56   56   
Predicted obs %  57   57   57   
LR chi2  1790***   1814***   1834***   
R-squared  0.09 0.11  0.09 0.11  0.09 0.11  
Wald    671***   653***   642*** 
Rho    -0.14   -0.34   -0.43 
Sigma    22.22   22.84   23.28 
1Marginal effects are presented 
2OLS Un-corr= OLS on market participants only; not corrected for self-selection into market participation 
3OLS corr=2nd stage of Heckman two step; corrected for self-selection into market participation 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 1.3. Market participation in the Upper East Region 
Figure  shows that Upper East experienced the lowest rates with a minimum of 36% 
during 2012/2013. The rates have been declining since 1998/99 when the average 
market participation rate was about 68%. A possible explanation for this negative trend 
could be the change in production and marketing preferences of the farmers located in 
the area, towards perennial or longer gestation crops for which the market participation 
would maybe occur in the future. However, a closer look at the Upper East crop 
portfolio, suggests that farmers are not more involved in the production of perennial 
crops, such as mango or palm oil (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Upper East production and marketing choices across GLSS rounds 
 
 
 
If production choice is not the main problem, then looking the drop in market 
participation rates could be increase in productivity of the occurrence of shocks and 
stressors in the region. According to the Agricultural Stress Index by FAO, the Upper 
East experienced the highest level of agricultural stress in 2004 (100%) and a milder, 
although still very high (above 50%), agricultural stress in 2007/08 Figure 2). 
Neighbouring regions, such as Upper West and Northern regions, seem to have 
experienced similar stressors in 2004, although at lower intensity, as in the case of 
0%
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Upper West, or at a minimum intensity, as in the Northern region. The higher risk in 
agricultural production in this region might have pushed less productive farmers out of 
the market. If so, we would expect market participants to be better endowed after 2004 
for this region. Figure 2 shows the average values of selected farm characteristics of 
market and non-market participants in Upper East across the three GLSS rounds. The 
results seem to support the idea that, indeed, market participants after 2004 (GLSS5) are 
better endowed than farmers in GLSS4. The difference, however, seems to lower in 
2012 (GLSS6). For example, farm size, value of farm equipment and for access to credit 
are substantially higher in 2005/06 for market participants which could suggest that a 
higher threshold for market access.  
  
Table 3 Farm endowment, Upper East Region 
  Market participants Non-Market participants 
  GLSS4 GLSS4 GLSS4 GLSS4 GLSS4 GLSS4 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Farm labour # 2.79 3.41 2.42 2.59 2.81 2.02 
Farm size Ha 2.79 12.30 3.13 2.01 1.71 2.65 
Tractor (0/1) 0.02 0.35 0.57 0.00 0.16 0.29 
Value of farm equipment GhC 0.00 60.62 116.63 0.00 36.15 72.73 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.17 0.16 0.28 0.14 0.09 0.25 
0
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Source 4 FAO, 2014 
Figure 2 Agricultural Stress Index, Northern Ghana 
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Appendix 1.4. The estimation of the asset index 
The Asset Index is constructed using the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). 
Previous studies (e.g. Traisac and Martin – Prevel, 2012116; Booysen et al., 2008117) 
have shown that MCA is more appropriate for the analysis of binary and categorical 
variables, than, for example, principal component analysis. The MCA, an extension of 
the simple correspondence analysis, allows to visualize and analyse the correlation 
between variables. The results are then used to predict an index using the first 
dimension of the correspondence matrix, under the condition that the first condition 
explains the highest possible cumulative variance of the outcome predictors used in the 
estimations of the index. If appropriately estimated, the results of MCA will produce a 
polarization between positive and negative predictors of the chosen outcome variable.  
The asset index has been estimated separately for the three GLSS rounds and the results 
are shown below. The variables that have been used for the estimations are described in 
Table 4: 
Table 4 MCA components 
Variable Values 
Source of drinking water 
1 river/stream/lake  
2 unprotected well  
3 protected well 
4 borehole 
5 public standpipe  
6 Water truck or vendor 
7 Indoor pipe or pumping 
Source of light 
1 solar/candle  
2 kerosene/gas  
3 electricity" 
Type of toilet 
1 bush  
2 public toilet 
3 bucket/kvip 
4 pit/flush 
Ownership of fridge 
0 No 
1 Yes 
Ownership of a sewing machine 
0 No 
1 Yes 
Ownership of stove. 
0 No 
1 Yes 
 
The categorical variables have been re-coded in a way that higher values correspond to 
higher “valued” assets. For example, type of toilet is defined as follows: 1"bush" 
2"public toilet" 3"bucket/kvip" 4"pit/flush"; light is defined as: 1"solar/candle" 
2"kerosene/gas" 3"electricity" and so on. The dummy variables take the value of 1 if the 
asset (fridge, sewing machine or stove) is owned and 0 otherwise.  
On average, the first dimension of the asset indices estimated explained almost 80% of 
the cumulative variance, which suggests that the indices are capturing well the 
                                                 
116 Traissac, P. and Y. Martin-Prevel (2012). “Alternatives to principal components analysis to derive asset-based 
indices to measure socio-economic position in low- and middle-income countries: the case for multiple 
correspondence analysis”. Int. J. Epidemiol. (2012) 41 (4):1207-1208. 
117 Booysen F. et al. (2008). “Using an asset index to assess trends in poverty in seven Sub-Saharan African 
countries”, World Development, 36. 
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association between the selected variables. Because in all the three cases a higher value 
of the index corresponds with smaller endowments, the inverse of the index has been 
used for the analysis, to help with the interpretation, i.e. the higher the asset index, the 
more endowed is the household.  
GLSS4 
Multiple/Joint correspondence analysis            Number of obs      =      3117 
                             Total inertia      = .0522961 
Method: Burt/adjusted inertias               Number of axes     =         2 
 
 
 principal  cumul 
Dimension inertia percent percent 
Dim1 0.041871 80.07 80.07 
Dim2 0.00303 5.79 85.86 
Dim3 0.000405 0.78 86.63 
Dim5 6.43E-05 0.12 86.76 
Total  0.052296 100  
Statistics for column categories in principal normalization   
 Overall Dim 1 Dim 2 
 mass quality %inert    coord sqcorr contrib    coord sqcorr contrib 
Water 
         Vendor/rai~e  0.073 0.739 0.022   0.093 0.555 0.015   0.054 0.184 0.07 
Well unpro~d  0.023 0.624 0.016    0.030 0.025 0.001   -0.147 0.599 0.167 
Well prote~d  0.054 0.623 0.009    0.073 0.619 0.007    0.006 0.004 0.001 
Public sta~e  0.013 0.798 0.097   -0.559 0.781 0.095   -0.082 0.017 0.028 
Own pipe  0.004 0.905 0.113   -1.209 0.903 0.127    0.060 0.002 0.004 
Light 
         solar/candle  0 0.531 0.005   0.270 0.125 0.001  -0.488 0.406 0.038 
kerosene/gas  0.148 0.846 0.026    0.088 0.837 0.027    0.009 0.008 0.004 
electricity  0.018 0.848 0.222   -0.741 0.842 0.233   -0.060 0.006 0.021 
Toilet 
         No toilet  0.04 0.773 0.042   0.157 0.448 0.023  -0.133 0.325 0.233 
Pit latrine  0.1 0.736 0.024    0.064 0.332 0.01    0.070 0.403 0.164 
Improved p~t  0.027 0.888 0.132   -0.475 0.871 0.143   -0.066 0.017 0.038 
Fridge 
         No  0.161 0.908 0.006   0.041 0.904 0.006  -0.003 0.004 0 
Yes  0.006 0.908 0.15   -1.083 0.904 0.169    0.069 0.004 0.01 
Sewing m.  
        No  0.112 0.914 0.014   0.065 0.639 0.011  -0.043 0.274 0.067 
Yes  0.055 0.914 0.029   -0.133 0.639 0.023    0.087 0.274 0.137 
Stove 
         No  0.16 0.924 0.004   0.035 0.914 0.005  -0.004 0.011 0.001 
Yes  0.007 0.924 0.09   -0.776 0.914 0.103    0.085 0.011 0.017 
 
Figure 3 MCA Asset Index, GLSS 4
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GLSS 5 
Multiple/Joint correspondence analysis          Number of obs        =      4136 
                       Total inertia         =  .0354055 
Method: Burt/adjusted inertias              Number of axes      =         2 
 
 principal  cumul 
Dimension  inertia percent percent 
Dim  1   0.027003 76.27 76.27 
Dim  2  0.001992 5.63 81.89 
Dim  3  0.000683 1.93 83.82 
Dim  4  5.05E-05 0.14 83.96 
Dim  5  2.22E-05 0.06 84.03 
Dim  6  5.00E-06 0.01 84.04 
Dim  7  2.57E-08 0 84.04 
Total  0.035406 100  
Statistics for column categories in principal normalization                 
 Overall Dim 1 Dim 2 
Categories  mass quality %inert  coord sqcorr contrib    coord sqcorr contrib 
Water                   
river/stre~e  0.044 0.766 0.053  0.148 0.513 0.036    0.104 0.253 0.24 
unprotecte~l  0.01 0.58 0.014  0.152 0.452 0.008   -0.081 0.128 0.032 
protected ~l  0.008 0.737 0.005  -0.102 0.484 0.003    0.073 0.253 0.023 
borehole  0.093 0.623 0.016  -0.031 0.151 0.003   -0.054 0.473 0.138 
public sta~e  0.009 0.783 0.035  -0.316 0.734 0.033    0.081 0.049 0.03 
Water truc~r  0 0.388 0.007  -0.669 0.366 0.003   -0.165 0.022 0.003 
Indoor pip~g  0.002 0.953 0.023  -0.585 0.948 0.029   -0.039 0.004 0.002 
Light                   
solar/candle  0.001 0.341 0.003  0.18 0.177 0.001   -0.174 0.164 0.009 
kerosene/gas  0.135 0.829 0.046  0.1 0.828 0.05    0.002 0 0 
electricity  0.031 0.826 0.201  -0.434 0.826 0.218   -0.003 0 0 
Toilet                 
bush  0.065 0.864 0.062  0.159 0.746 0.061   -0.063 0.117 0.129 
public toi~t  0.019 0.785 0.089  -0.358 0.754 0.088   -0.072 0.031 0.049 
bucket/kvip  0.013 0.837 0.053  -0.339 0.806 0.056   -0.066 0.031 0.029 
pit/flush  0.07 0.599 0.027  0.011 0.009 0    0.090 0.59 0.287 
Fridge                 
No  0.159 0.837 0.009  0.042 0.836 0.01   -0.002 0.002 0 
Yes  0.007 0.837 0.203  -0.901 0.836 0.223    0.041 0.002 0.006 
Sewmach                
No  0.136 0.987 0.010  0.051 0.981 0.013   -0.004 0.006 0.001 
Yes  0.031 0.987 0.044  -0.222 0.981 0.057    0.017 0.006 0.004 
Stove                  
No  0.159 0.848 0.005  0.029 0.838 0.005   -0.003 0.01 0.001 
Yes  0.008 0.848 0.092  -0.585 0.838 0.101    0.063 0.01 0.016 
 
Figure 4 MCA Asset Index, GLSS5 
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GLSS 6 
Multiple/Joint correspondence analysis          Number of obs      =      7412 
                       Total inertia      =  .0463324 
Method: Burt/adjusted inertias              Number of axes     =         2 
 
 
principal 
 
cumul 
Dimension  inertia percent percent 
Dim  1  0.037448 80.82 80.82 
Dim  2  0.001683 3.63 84.46 
Dim  3  0.000663 1.43 85.89 
Dim  4  4.24E-05 0.09 85.98 
Dim  5  9.91E-06 0.02 86 
Dim  6  7.25E-06 0.02 86.02 
Dim  7  4.14E-07 0 86.02 
Total  0.046332 100 
 Statistics for column categories in principal normalization 
 Overall Dim 1 Dim 2 
Categories     mass quality %inert    coord sqcorr contrib  coord sqcorr contrib 
Water  
         river/stre~e   0.035 0.598 0.035   0.122 0.327 0.014  0.112 0.272 0.261 
unprotecte~l    0.009 0.77 0.013    0.218 0.743 0.012  0.042 0.028 0.01 
protected ~l    0.004 0.119 0.001   -0.002 0 0.000  0.045 0.119 0.004 
borehole    0.098 0.59 0.009    0.038 0.323 0.004  -0.034 0.266 0.068 
public sta~e    0.012 0.727 0.045   -0.335 0.654 0.036  -0.112 0.073 0.09 
Water truc~r    0.004 0.892 0.084   -0.959 0.879 0.091  0.116 0.013 0.03 
Indoor pip~g    0.005 0.832 0.032   -0.506 0.825 0.032  -0.045 0.006 0.006 
Light  
         solar/candle   0.102 0.821 0.081   0.173 0.813 0.081  0.018 0.008 0.019 
kerosene/gas    0.008 0.165 0.006    0.073 0.163 0.001  0.007 0.002 0 
electricity    0.057 0.834 0.153   -0.322 0.825 0.157  -0.033 0.009 0.036 
Toilet  
         bush   0.082 0.894 0.049   0.155 0.876 0.053  -0.022 0.018 0.024 
public toi~t    0.039 0.865 0.021   -0.136 0.753 0.019  -0.052 0.112 0.064 
bucket/kvip    0.009 0.983 0.036   -0.431 0.971 0.044  -0.046 0.011 0.011 
pit/flush    0.036 0.677 0.028   -0.102 0.286 0.010  0.119 0.391 0.304 
Fridge 
         No   0.154 0.87 0.018   0.069 0.869 0.019  -0.003 0.001 0.001 
Yes    0.013 0.87 0.212   -0.811 0.869 0.228  0.031 0.001 0.008 
Sewmach 
         No   0.144 0.954 0.004   0.033 0.919 0.004  -0.006 0.036 0.004 
Yes    0.023 0.954 0.023   -0.206 0.919 0.026  0.041 0.036 0.022 
Stove 
         No   0.159 0.913 0.007   0.042 0.903 0.007  -0.004 0.01 0.002 
Yes    0.007 0.913 0.144   -0.905 0.903 0.161  0.093 0.01 0.038 
Figure 5 MCA Asset Index, GLSS 6 
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Appendix 1.5. Additional estimations – Tobit and Craggit 
Table 5 Tobit and Craggit 
 Dependent variable: HCI (0-100) (14) (15) (16) (17) (17) (18) (18) (19) (19) 
  
Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Craggit   Craggit  Craggit   
VARIABLES 
 
HCI HCI HCI Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 
               
Male head (0/1) 10.62*** 9.05*** 8.94*** 0.43*** 3.81*** 0.37*** 2.91** 0.36*** 2.82** 
  
(0.79) (0.82) (0.82) (0.03) (1.20) (0.03) (1.24) (0.03) (1.23) 
Age head Years -0.06*** -0.05** -0.04** -0.00*** -0.01 -0.00*** -0.01 -0.00*** -0.00 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
Basic education (0/1) -1.91** -1.89** -1.73** -0.10*** 0.28 -0.10*** 0.20 -0.09*** 0.33 
  
(0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.03) (1.11) (0.03) (1.11) (0.03) (1.11) 
Higher education  (0/1) -1.89* -2.00** -1.72* -0.15*** 1.41 -0.15*** 1.24 -0.15*** 1.49 
  
(0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.04) (1.36) (0.04) (1.36) (0.04) (1.36) 
Farm labour 
# member of household who work on own farm 
0.75*** 0.62*** 0.59*** 0.07*** -1.11*** 0.06*** -1.14*** 0.06*** -1.17*** 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.01) (0.29) (0.01) (0.29) (0.01) (0.29) 
Farm size Hectares 0.02* 0.02* 0.02 0.00 0.06*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.00 0.06*** 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) 
Land ownership (0/1) 3.07*** 2.92*** 2.99*** 0.01 6.98*** 0.01 6.90*** 0.01 6.94*** 
  
(0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.03) (0.95) (0.03) (0.95) (0.03) (0.95) 
Livestock owned # -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Access to non-farm income  (0/1) - 1 if household has access to self-employment 
non-farm income; 0 otherwise 
-3.95*** -4.14*** -3.97*** -0.19*** -0.40 -0.20*** -0.54 -0.19*** -0.40 
 
(0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.03) (1.02) (0.03) (1.02) (0.03) (1.02) 
Food only producer (0/1) - 1 if household produces only food crops; 0 
otherwise 
-13.13*** -13.35*** -13.24*** -0.70*** 2.00* -0.71*** 2.01* -0.71*** 2.07* 
 
(0.79) (0.80) (0.79) (0.03) (1.20) (0.03) (1.20) (0.03) (1.20) 
Access to credit (0/1) 1.43** 1.10* 1.03 0.12*** -0.66 0.10*** -0.79 0.10*** -0.89 
  
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.03) (0.94) (0.03) (0.94) (0.03) (0.94) 
Processing (0/1) - 1 if household processes any crop or fish; 0 
otherwise 
1.06 1.06 0.97 0.25*** -6.75*** 0.25*** -6.68*** 0.25*** -6.73*** 
 
(0.73) (0.73) (0.73) (0.03) (1.04) (0.03) (1.04) (0.03) (1.04) 
Radio  (0/1)  2.91*** 2.90***   0.08*** 3.07*** 0.08*** 3.05*** 
  
 (0.65) (0.65)   (0.03) (0.95) (0.03) (0.95) 
Bicycle (0/1)  4.18*** 4.17***   0.19*** 0.89 0.19*** 0.91 
  
 (0.75) (0.75)   (0.03) (1.09) (0.03) (1.09) 
Distance to periodic market 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above the median; 0 otherwise 
  4.11***     0.13*** 3.67*** 
 
  (0.63)     (0.03) (0.92) 
Distance to extension officer 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above the median; 0 otherwise 
  -1.75***     -0.05** -1.37 
 
  (0.63)     (0.03) (0.92) 
Sigma  34.71*** 34.65*** 34.60***  34.22***  34.19***  34.15*** 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)  (0.43)  (0.42)  (0.42) 
Region dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Dependent variable: HCI (0-100) (14) (15) (16) (17) (17) (18) (18) (19) (19) 
  
Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Craggit   Craggit  Craggit   
VARIABLES 
 
HCI HCI HCI Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 Tier1 Tier2 
               
Observations 
 
14,736 14,736 14,736 14,736 14,736 14,736 14,736 14,736 14,736 
Left censorerd obs.  3736 3736 3736       
LR chi2   2542*** 2601*** 2643*** 1919***  1964***  1983***  
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Appendix 1.6. Market participation analysis: endogeneity checks 
Table 6 Market participation determinants, endogenous variables 
Dependent variable: Market participation (0/1) 
(20) (21) (22) (23) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS2 
VARIABLES  mfx1 mfx1 mfx1 mfx1 coeff coeff coeff coeff 
           
Male head (0/1) 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 1.62** 1.61** 1.62** 3.21*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (1.01) 
Age head Years -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Basic education (0/1) -0.02* -0.01 -0.02* -0.03*** 0.05 0.06 0.09 IV 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)  
Higher education (0/1) -0.03** -0.02** -0.03*** -0.05*** 1.06 1.09 1.22 IV 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.84) (0.85) (0.85)  
Farm labour 
# member of household who 
work on own farm 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.57*** -0.35* 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) 
Farm size Hectares 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00 3.60*** 3.60*** 3.60*** 3.75*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) 
Livestock # -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00* 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Processing  
(0/1) - 1 if household has 
access to self-employment non-
farm income; 0 otherwise 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** -4.43*** -4.42*** -4.39*** -3.63*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.64) (0.65) (0.65) (0.75) 
Radio 
(0/1) - 1 if household produces 
only food crops; 0 otherwise 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 1.69*** 1.70*** 1.72*** 2.17*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.58) 
Bicycle (0/1) 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.54 0.55 0.58 IV 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63)  
Distance to market 
(0/1) - 1 if household processes 
any crop or fish; 0 otherwise 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 1.96*** 1.95*** 1.96*** 2.36*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.59) 
Distance to extension officer (0/1) -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.80 -0.80 -0.82 -1.01* 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.55) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1)  -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06***  -0.24 -0.16 -0.74 
 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.58) (0.59) (0.69) 
Credit 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
median; 0 otherwise   0.04*** 0.03***   -0.64 -0.17 
 
   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.54) (0.57) 
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Dependent variable: Market participation (0/1) 
(20) (21) (22) (23) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS2 
VARIABLES  mfx1 mfx1 mfx1 mfx1 coeff coeff coeff coeff 
           
Food only production 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
median; 0 otherwise    -0.21***    -1.22 
 
    (0.01)    (1.46) 
Region dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  14736 14736 14736 14736 11000 11000 11000 14736 
Censored obs         3736 
Obs. P %  75 75 75 75     
Predicted obs %  77 77 77 77     
LR chi2  1622*** 1656*** 1682*** 2205***     
R-squared  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13  
Wald         1316** 
Rho         7.98 
Sigma         26.45 
1Marginal effects are reported 2 Heckman corrected. Lambda== 7.98* 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
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Appendix 1.7. Market participation analysis, by survey year  
Table 7 Market participation determinants estimated separately by survey year 
Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(24) (25) (26) 
GLSS4 GLSS5 GLSS6 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
   
         
Male head (0/1) 0.09*** 2.44* 1.15 0.09*** 1.97 3.15* 0.12*** 1.04 -0.05 
 
 (0.02) (1.35) (1.84) (0.02) (1.34) (1.68) (0.02) (1.09) (1.39) 
Age head Years -0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.00*** 0.01 -0.00 -0.00** -0.02 -0.01 
 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) 
Basic education (0/1) -0.01 -0.96 -0.90 0.01 1.66 IV -0.05*** -0.73 IV 
 
 (0.02) (1.12) (1.17) (0.02) (1.21)  (0.02) (1.06)  
Higher education (0/1) -0.03 0.04 0.35 -0.05 5.30** 4.24* -0.06*** 0.53 IV 
 
 (0.03) (2.01) (2.13) (0.03) (2.38) (2.26) (0.02) (1.06)  
Farm labour # member of household who work 
on own farm 
0.02*** -0.32 -0.67 0.03*** -0.48* -0.32 0.01** -0.56** -0.64*** 
 
(0.01) (0.45) (0.55) (0.00) (0.27) (0.39) (0.00) (0.22) (0.24) 
Farm size Hectares 0.01*** 0.19* 0.15* -0.00 0.02 0.02* 0.00*** 0.18 0.17*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.10) (0.08) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.13) (0.05) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.08*** 6.92*** 5.73*** 0.00 4.14*** 4.23*** -0.03*** 1.46* 1.74** 
 
 (0.02) (1.03) (1.46) (0.01) (1.01) (1.02) (0.01) (0.84) (0.86) 
Livestock # -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* 0.16*** 2.06 2.73 0.02** -0.29 -0.38 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (2.12) (2.55) (0.01) (0.70) (0.71) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) - 1 if household has access to 
self-employment non-farm income; 
0 otherwise 
0.02 0.82 0.63 -0.05*** -0.55 -0.84 -0.13*** -0.49 0.71 
 (0.02) (1.03) (1.06) (0.01) (0.96) (1.09) (0.01) (1.07) (1.38) 
Food only production (0/1) - 1 if household produces only 
food crops; 0 otherwise 
-0.21*** 3.51** 7.02** -0.23*** 2.85** 1.07 -0.19*** -0.73 1.03 
 
(0.02) (1.65) (3.10) (0.02) (1.25) (2.75) (0.01) (1.04) (1.73) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.05*** 1.23 0.57 0.04*** -1.21 -0.87 0.02* -0.39 -0.41 
 
 (0.02) (1.05) (1.21) (0.01) (0.98) (1.07) (0.01) (0.85) (0.84) 
Processing  (0/1) - 1 if household processes any 
crop or fish; 0 otherwise 
0.06** -1.21 -2.03 0.04*** -3.68*** -3.34*** 0.13*** -6.05*** -7.06*** 
 
(0.02) (1.54) (1.60) (0.02) (1.19) (1.28) (0.01) (0.95) (1.21) 
Radio (0/1) 0.00 1.40 1.42 0.03** 1.64 2.10* 0.02** 1.44* 1.21 
 
 (0.02) (1.01) (1.04) (0.02) (1.13) (1.21) (0.01) (0.78) (0.81) 
Bicycle (0/1) 0.04* 1.28  0.04** 0.15 IV 0.06*** 0.05 IV 
 
 (0.02) (1.29)  (0.02) (1.22)  (0.01) (0.90)  
Distance to market (0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
median; 0 otherwise 
0.01 -0.73 -0.93 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 0.08*** 3.26*** 2.55*** 
 
(0.02) (1.12) (1.15) (0.01) (1.09) (1.08) (0.01) (0.77) (0.95) 
Distance to extension officer (0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
median; 0 otherwise 
0.05*** -2.57** -3.25*** -0.01 0.13 0.05 -0.02* 1.04 1.24 
 
(0.02) (1.05) (1.20) (0.01) (1.06) (1.06) (0.01) (0.78) (0.80) 
Lambda (0/1)   -11.04   5.43   -6.80 
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Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(24) (25) (26) 
GLSS4 GLSS5 GLSS6 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
   
         
 
   (9.26)   (7.71)   (5.34) 
Region dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yead dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3117 2374 3117 4172 3186 4172 7447 5440 7447 
Censored observations    743   986   2007 
Obs. P %  76   76   73   
Predicted obs %  79   80   77   
LR chi2  458***   645***   1426***   
R-squared  0.13 0.13  0.14 0.11  0.16 0.10  
Wald    270***   378***   455*** 
Rho    -0.46     0.21   -0.24 
Sigma    23.84   25.18   27.76 
1Marginal effects are presented 
2OLS Un-corr= OLS on market participants only; not corrected for self-selection into market participation 
3OLS corr=2nd stage of Heckman two step; corrected for self-selection into market participation 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 1.8. Market participation analysis, with distance variables in Km 
Table 8 Market participation determinants, distances in Km 
Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(27) (27) (27) (28) (28) (28) (29) (29) (29) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
Male head (0/1) 0.14*** 2.19*** 5.68*** 0.12*** 1.68** 3.61*** 0.12*** 1.68** 3.51*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.70) (1.23) (0.01) (0.72) (1.02) (0.01) (0.72) (1.02) 
Age head Years -0.00*** -0.00 -0.02 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.01 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Basic education (0/1) -0.03*** 0.14 IV -0.03*** 0.08 IV -0.03*** 0.09 IV 
 
 (0.01) (0.66)  (0.01) (0.66)  (0.01) (0.66)  
Higher education (0/1) -0.05*** 1.26 IV -0.05*** 1.15 IV -0.05*** 1.14 IV 
 
 (0.01) (0.85)  (0.01) (0.85)  (0.01) (0.85)  
Farm labour # member of household who work 
on own farm 
0.02*** -0.53*** -0.03 0.02*** -0.54*** -0.27 0.02*** -0.54*** -0.28 
 
(0.00) (0.15) (0.23) (0.00) (0.15) (0.20) (0.00) (0.15) (0.20) 
Farm size Hectares 0.00 0.04** 0.04*** 0.00 0.04** 0.04*** 0.00 0.04** 0.04*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.00 3.72*** 3.80*** 0.00 3.67*** 3.72*** 0.00 3.68*** 3.73*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.54) (0.57) (0.01) (0.54) (0.55) (0.01) (0.54) (0.55) 
Livestock # -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) - 1 if household has access to 
self-employment non-farm 
income; 0 otherwise 
-0.06*** -0.13 -1.63** -0.06*** -0.20 -1.03 -0.06*** -0.20 -0.97 
 (0.01) (0.58) (0.78) (0.01) (0.58) (0.70) (0.01) (0.58) (0.70) 
Food only production (0/1) - 1 if household produces 
only food crops; 0 otherwise 
-0.21*** 1.09 -4.55** -0.21*** 1.09 -1.92 -0.21*** 1.12 -1.71 
 
(0.01) (0.71) (1.84) (0.01) (0.71) (1.48) (0.01) (0.71) (1.47) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.03*** -0.45 0.37 0.03*** -0.53 -0.04 0.03*** -0.56 -0.09 
 
 (0.01) (0.55) (0.61) (0.01) (0.55) (0.57) (0.01) (0.55) (0.57) 
Processing  (0/1) - 1 if household processes 
any crop or fish; 0 otherwise 
0.08*** -4.35*** -2.60*** 0.08*** -4.32*** -3.38*** 0.08*** -4.35*** -3.46*** 
 
(0.01) (0.65) (0.85) (0.01) (0.65) (0.76) (0.01) (0.65) (0.76) 
Radio (0/1)    0.03*** 1.75*** 2.26*** 0.03*** 1.76*** 2.24*** 
 
    (0.01) (0.55) (0.58) (0.01) (0.55) (0.58) 
Bicycle (0/1)    0.06*** 0.47 IV 0.06*** 0.48 IV 
 
    (0.01) (0.63)  (0.01) (0.63)  
Distance to market 
Km 
      0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
      (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Distance to extension officer 
Km 
      -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 
      (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lambda    18.68***   10.21**   9.61** 
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Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(27) (27) (27) (28) (28) (28) (29) (29) (29) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
    (5.63)   (4.42)   (4.40) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  14,736 11000 14,736 14,736 11000 14,736 14,736 11000 14,736 
Censored observations    3736   3736   3736 
Obs. P %  75   75   75   
Predicted obs %  77   77   77   
LR chi2  2121***   2180***   2182***   
R-squared  0.13 0.12  0.13 0.12  0.13 0.12  
Wald    1188***   1297***   1303*** 
Rho      0.65     0.38   0.36 
Sigma    28.57   26.77   26.68 
1Marginal effects are presented 
2OLS Un-corr= OLS on market participants only; not corrected for self-selection into market participation 
3OLS corr=2nd stage of Heckman two step; corrected for self-selection into market participation 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 1.9. Market participation analysis, with “mean” distance thresholds 
Table 9 Market participation determinants, "mean" distances thresholds 
Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(30) (30) (30) (31) (31) (31) (32) (32) (32) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
Male head (0/1) 0.14*** 2.19*** 5.68*** 0.12*** 1.68** 3.61*** 0.12*** 1.67** 3.27*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.70) (1.23) (0.01) (0.72) (1.02) (0.01) (0.72) (1.02) 
Age head Years -0.00*** -0.00 -0.02 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.01 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Basic education (0/1) -0.03*** 0.14 IV -0.03*** 0.08 IV -0.03*** 0.10 IV 
 
 (0.01) (0.66)  (0.01) (0.66)  (0.01) (0.66)  
Higher education (0/1) -0.05*** 1.26 IV -0.05*** 1.15 IV -0.05*** 1.17 IV 
 
 (0.01) (0.85)  (0.01) (0.85)  (0.01) (0.85)  
Farm labour 
# member of household who work 
on own farm 0.02*** -0.53*** -0.03 0.02*** -0.54*** -0.27 0.02*** -0.54*** -0.32 
 
 (0.00) (0.15) (0.23) (0.00) (0.15) (0.20) (0.00) (0.15) (0.20) 
Farm size Hectares 0.00 0.04** 0.04*** 0.00 0.04** 0.04*** 0.00 0.04** 0.04*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.00 3.72*** 3.80*** 0.00 3.67*** 3.72*** 0.00 3.65*** 3.69*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.54) (0.57) (0.01) (0.54) (0.55) (0.01) (0.54) (0.54) 
Livestock # -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Access to non-farm income 
(0/1) - 1 if household has access to 
self-employment non-farm income; 
0 otherwise -0.06*** -0.13 -1.63** -0.06*** -0.20 -1.03 -0.06*** -0.19 -0.83 
 
 (0.01) (0.58) (0.78) (0.01) (0.58) (0.70) (0.01) (0.59) (0.70) 
Food only production 
(0/1) - 1 if household produces only 
food crops; 0 otherwise -0.21*** 1.09 -4.55** -0.21*** 1.09 -1.92 -0.21*** 1.11 -1.32 
 
 (0.01) (0.71) (1.84) (0.01) (0.71) (1.48) (0.01) (0.71) (1.48) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.03*** -0.45 0.37 0.03*** -0.53 -0.04 0.03*** -0.55 -0.12 
 
 (0.01) (0.55) (0.61) (0.01) (0.55) (0.57) (0.01) (0.55) (0.57) 
Processing  
(0/1) - 1 if household processes any 
crop or fish; 0 otherwise 0.08*** -4.35*** -2.60*** 0.08*** -4.32*** -3.38*** 0.08*** -4.30*** -3.54*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.65) (0.85) (0.01) (0.65) (0.76) (0.01) (0.65) (0.76) 
Radio (0/1)    0.03*** 1.75*** 2.26*** 0.02*** 1.75*** 2.18*** 
 
    (0.01) (0.55) (0.58) (0.01) (0.55) (0.58) 
Bicycle (0/1)    0.06*** 0.47 IV 0.06*** 0.48 IV 
 
    (0.01) (0.63)  (0.01) (0.63)  
Distance to market (0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
mean; 0 otherwise 
      0.03*** 0.88 1.20* 
 
      (0.01) (0.61) (0.63) 
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Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(30) (30) (30) (31) (31) (31) (32) (32) (32) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
Distance to extension officer (0/1) - 1 if distance is above the 
mean; 0 otherwise 
      -0.00 -0.32 -0.33 
 
      (0.01) (0.56) (0.57) 
Lambda     18.68***   10.21**   8.27* 
 
   (5.63)   (4.42)   (4.44) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  14736 11000 14736 14736 11000 14736 14736 11000 14736 
Censored observations    3736   3736   3736 
Obs. P %  75   75   75   
Predicted obs %  77   77   77   
LR chi2  2121***   2180***   2192***   
R-squared  0.13 0.13  0.13 0.12  0.13 0.12  
Wald    1187***   1297***   1308*** 
Rho    0.65   0.38   0.31 
Sigma    28.56   26.77   26.50 
1Marginal effects are presented 
2OLS Un-corr= OLS on market participants only; not corrected for self-selection into market participation 
3OLS corr=2nd stage of Heckman two step; corrected for self-selection into market participation 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 1.10. Market participation analysis, with distance variables in Km and no extreme values of 
distance to market 
Table 10 Market participation determinants, no extreme values of distance to market 
Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(33) (33) (33) (34) (34) (34) (35) (35) (35) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
Male head (0/1) 0.14*** 2.19*** 5.68*** 0.12*** 1.68** 3.61*** 0.12*** 1.69** 3.47*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.70) (1.23) (0.01) (0.72) (1.02) (0.01) (0.72) (1.02) 
Age head Years -0.00*** -0.00 -0.02 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.01 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Basic education (0/1) -0.03*** 0.14 IV -0.03*** 0.08 IV -0.03*** 0.08 IV 
 
 (0.01) (0.66)  (0.01) (0.66)  (0.01) (0.66)  
Farm labour # member of household who 
work on own farm 
-0.05*** 1.26 IV -0.05*** 1.15 IV -0.05*** 1.16 IV 
 
(0.01) (0.85)  (0.01) (0.85)  (0.01) (0.85)  
Farm size Hectares 0.02*** -0.53*** -0.03 0.02*** -0.54*** -0.27 0.02*** -0.53*** -0.28 
 
 (0.00) (0.15) (0.23) (0.00) (0.15) (0.20) (0.00) (0.15) (0.20) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.00 0.04** 0.04*** 0.00 0.04** 0.04*** 0.00 0.04** 0.04*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Livestock # 0.00 3.72*** 3.80*** 0.00 3.67*** 3.72*** 0.00 3.64*** 3.69*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.54) (0.57) (0.01) (0.54) (0.55) (0.01) (0.54) (0.55) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) - 1 if household has access 
to self-employment non-farm 
income; 0 otherwise 
-0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Food only production (0/1) - 1 if household produces 
only food crops; 0 otherwise 
-0.06*** -0.13 -1.63** -0.06*** -0.20 -1.03 -0.06*** -0.18 -0.91 
 
(0.01) (0.58) (0.78) (0.01) (0.58) (0.70) (0.01) (0.58) (0.70) 
Access to credit (0/1) -0.21*** 1.09 -4.55** -0.21*** 1.09 -1.92 -0.21*** 1.14 -1.59 
 
 (0.01) (0.71) (1.84) (0.01) (0.71) (1.48) (0.01) (0.71) (1.47) 
Processing  (0/1) - 1 if household processes 
any crop or fish; 0 otherwise 
0.03*** -0.45 0.37 0.03*** -0.53 -0.04 0.03*** -0.55 -0.09 
 
(0.01) (0.55) (0.61) (0.01) (0.55) (0.57) (0.01) (0.55) (0.57) 
Radio (0/1)    0.03*** 1.75*** 2.26*** 0.03*** 1.77*** 2.24*** 
 
    (0.01) (0.55) (0.58) (0.01) (0.55) (0.58) 
Bicycle (0/1)    0.06*** 0.47 IV 0.06*** 0.50 IV 
 
    (0.01) (0.63)  (0.01) (0.63)  
Distance to market Km, no extreme values4       0.00* 0.03** 0.03** 
 
       (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Distance to extension officer Km       -0.00** -0.02** -0.03** 
 
       (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lambda    18.68***   10.21**   9.30** 
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Dependent variable Probit: Market participation (0/1) 
Dependent variable OLS: Commercialisation Index (0-100) 
(33) (33) (33) (34) (34) (34) (35) (35) (35) 
Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
 
   (5.63)   (4.42)   (4.40) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  14,736 11000 14,736 14,736 11000 14,736 14,736 11000 14,736 
Censored observations    3736   3736   3736 
Obs. P %  75   75   75   
Predicted obs %  77   77   77   
LR chi2  2121***   2179***   2185***   
R-squared  0.13 
0.12 
 
 0.13 0.12  0.13 0.12  
Wald    1187***   1297***   1307*** 
Rho    0.65   0.38     0.35 
Sigma    28.58   26.77   26.63 
1Marginal effects are presented 
2OLS Un-corr= OLS on market participants only; not corrected for self-selection into market participation 
3OLS corr=2nd stage of Heckman two step; corrected for self-selection into market participation 
4 Extreme values have been replaced with average values of each round of GLSS. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 1.11. Maize Market participation analysis 
Table 11 Determinants of market participation, maize only producers 
 Maize producers only  (36) (36) (36) (37) (37) (37) (38) (38) (38) 
 
 Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
Male head (0/1) 0.118*** 3.262*** 1.666 0.100*** 2.883*** 2.106** 0.099*** 2.829*** 1.844* 
 
 (0.011) (0.750) (1.114) (0.011) (0.770) (1.006) (0.011) (0.769) (1.005) 
Age head Years -0.001*** -0.020 -0.014 -0.001** -0.018 -0.016 -0.001** -0.015 -0.012 
 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.019) (0.000) (0.019) (0.018) (0.000) (0.019) (0.018) 
Basic education (0/1) -0.021** 0.362  -0.019* 0.275  -0.017* 0.358  
 
 (0.010) (0.690)  (0.010) (0.692)  (0.010) (0.692)  
Higher education (0/1) -0.042*** 0.974  -0.041*** 0.852  -0.038*** 1.062  
 
 (0.013) (0.909)  (0.013) (0.912)  (0.013) (0.913)  
Farm labour 
# member of household who 
work on own farm 0.013*** -0.532*** -0.770*** 0.012*** -0.536*** -0.666*** 0.012*** -0.554*** -0.716*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.158) (0.199) (0.002) (0.159) (0.188) (0.002) (0.158) (0.188) 
Farm size Hectares 0.005*** 0.040** 0.034*** 0.004*** 0.040** 0.036*** 0.004*** 0.040** 0.036*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.020) (0.013) (0.001) (0.019) (0.012) (0.001) (0.019) (0.013) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.006 3.322*** 3.379*** -0.007 3.295*** 3.338*** -0.006 3.299*** 3.346*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.569) (0.580) (0.008) (0.569) (0.571) (0.008) (0.568) (0.573) 
Livestock # -0.000 -0.003*** -0.003 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.003 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.003 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Access to non-farm income 
(0/1) - 1 if household has 
access to self-employment 
non-farm income; 0 otherwise -0.059*** 0.044 0.999 -0.061*** -0.024 0.517 -0.060*** 0.064 0.733 
 
 (0.009) (0.618) (0.762) (0.009) (0.618) (0.724) (0.009) (0.619) (0.721) 
Food only production 
(0/1) - 1 if household 
produces only food crops; 0 
otherwise -0.166*** 1.110 3.712** -0.169*** 1.161 2.537** -0.168*** 1.188 2.933** 
 
 (0.010) (0.742) (1.451) (0.010) (0.744) (1.274) (0.010) (0.744) (1.269) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.038*** 0.132 -0.299 0.035*** 0.091 -0.108 0.034*** 0.033 -0.216 
 
 (0.008) (0.574) (0.630) (0.008) (0.574) (0.606) (0.008) (0.574) (0.607) 
Processing  
(0/1) - 1 if household 
processes any crop or fish; 0 
otherwise 0.068*** -2.836*** -3.739*** 0.067*** -2.826*** -3.316*** 0.066*** -2.844*** -3.457*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.702) (0.807) (0.010) (0.703) (0.766) (0.010) (0.704) (0.765) 
Radio (0/1)    0.017** 1.638*** 1.473** 0.017** 1.622*** 1.413** 
 
    (0.008) (0.576) (0.593) (0.008) (0.576) (0.595) 
Bicycle (0/1)    0.051*** 0.029  0.051*** 0.046  
 
    (0.009) (0.678)  (0.009) (0.677)  
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 Maize producers only  (36) (36) (36) (37) (37) (37) (38) (38) (38) 
 
 Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES  mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 mfx1 un-corr2 corr3 
                     
Distance to market 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above 
the median; 0 otherwise       0.035*** 2.487*** 2.063*** 
 
       (0.008) (0.570) (0.612) 
Distance to extension officer 
(0/1) - 1 if distance is above 
the median; 0 otherwise       -0.018** -0.569 -0.366 
 
       (0.008) (0.564) (0.582) 
Lambda     -10.707**   -5.795   -7.370* 
 
   (5.071)   (4.331)   (4.317) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  12,156 9,386 12156 12,156 9,386 12156 12,156 9,386 12156 
Censored observations    2770   2770   2770 
Obs. P %  77   77   77   
Predicted obs %  81   81   81   
LR chi2  1678.66***   1717.45***   1738.93***   
R-squared  0.1287 0.093   0.1316 0.094   0.1333 0.096  
Wald    749.97***   783.58***   784*** 
Rho    -0.408   -0.226   -0.286 
Sigma    26.23   25.63   25.75 
1Marginal effects are presented           
2OLS Un-corr= OLS on market participants only; not corrected for self-selection into market participation  
3OLS corr=2nd stage of Heckman two step; corrected for self-selection into market participation 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12 MNL - market participation for maize producers 
 Base: Non seller Households (39) (39) (40) (40) (41) (41) 
VARIABLES Market trader Farm gate Market trader Farm gate Market trader Farm gate 
              
Male head 0.695*** 0.477*** 0.610*** 0.471*** 0.603*** 0.465*** 
 
(0.069) (0.088) (0.071) (0.090) (0.071) (0.091) 
Age head -0.008*** -0.003 -0.007*** -0.003 -0.007*** -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Basic education -0.108 -0.088 -0.101 -0.100 -0.093 -0.085 
 
(0.070) (0.089) (0.070) (0.089) (0.070) (0.090) 
Higher education -0.313*** -0.079 -0.313*** -0.094 -0.299*** -0.061 
 
(0.089) (0.112) (0.089) (0.112) (0.090) (0.113) 
Farm labour 0.040** 0.080*** 0.034* 0.081*** 0.035* 0.080*** 
 
(0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) 
Farm size 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Land ownership -0.050 -0.156** -0.062 -0.160** -0.055 -0.156** 
 
(0.058) (0.074) (0.059) (0.075) (0.059) (0.075) 
Livestock -0.000 -0.007 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.093) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.007) 
Access to non-farm income -0.364*** -0.400*** -0.372*** -0.402*** -0.367*** -0.395*** 
 
(0.061) (0.079) (0.061) (0.080) (0.061) (0.080) 
Food only production -0.796*** -1.036*** -0.811*** -1.029*** -0.809*** -1.030*** 
 
(0.068) (0.089) (0.068) (0.089) (0.068) (0.090) 
Access to credit 0.199*** 0.209*** 0.184*** 0.210*** 0.188*** 0.204*** 
 
(0.060) (0.077) (0.061) (0.077) (0.061) (0.077) 
Processing  0.330*** 0.439*** 0.330*** 0.439*** 0.326*** 0.431*** 
 
(0.067) (0.087) (0.067) (0.087) (0.068) (0.087) 
Crop portfolio size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Radio 
  
0.118** 0.104 0.118** 0.106 
 
  
(0.057) (0.075) (0.057) (0.075) 
Bicycle 
  
0.299*** -0.092 0.302*** -0.093 
 
  
(0.068) (0.090) (0.068) (0.091) 
Distance to market 
    
0.168*** 0.487*** 
 
    
(0.057) (0.074) 
Distance to extension officer 
    
-0.041 -0.225*** 
 
    
(0.057) (0.075) 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.106*** -2.571*** -1.292*** -2.546*** -1.329*** -2.627*** 
 
(0.176) (0.235) (0.180) (0.239) (0.183) (0.243) 
Observations 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
231 
 
Appendix 1.12. An analysis of market participation by farm size –  
Farm size has been found quite important in the analysis of market participation in this 
analysis and in previous studies. In order to understand whether there is any difference 
in the determinants of the decisions to participate in the market I also estimate the 
models of market participation separately for small and big farmers. I defined small 
farmers as those households with a farm size smaller than the median and bigger 
farmers those households with a land holding bigger than the median farm size.  
The results in Table 13 show that the majority of the determinants identified in the main 
estimations in Table 3 and Table 4 are relevant regardless of the farm size. However, 
some discrepancies compared to the analysis of the whole sample can be pointed out. 
For example, the decision to sell produce in the market for small farmers is not affected 
by the size of farm labour, or ownership of radio and distance to extension officers as 
observed in the whole sample. Instead, a bigger relevance in this decision is exerted by 
the size of the farm. Among small farmers, the difference in the size of land holding 
affects considerably the probability to participate in the market. Conversely, land 
ownership is negatively associated with market participation for both small and bigger 
farmers. Compared to small farmers, the decision to participate for households with a 
bigger land holding is also affected by the size of livestock herd and by access to credit, 
suggesting that these alternative sources for cash income might complement market 
participation. On the other hand, the decision of how much to sell for small farmers is 
positively associated with food only production suggesting that food crops might foster 
commercialisation as well as other traditional cash crops, while for big farmers this 
decision is mainly associated with low family labour, land ownership, low size of the 
herd and no processing.  
Finally, the association between remoteness and market participation is once again 
positive and significant, although it is found not relevant in the decision of the extent of 
market participation for small farmers.  
  
Table 13 Determinants of market participation, by farm size 
 Dependent variable:  
Market participation (0/1) 
HCI (0-100) 
6) (6) (7) (7) 
Small Small Large Large 
Probit OLS  Probit OLS  
VARIABLES 
 
mfx coeff coeff*118 coeff 
           
Male head (0/1) 0.06*** -0.74 0.376*** 0.635 
  
(0.01) (0.97) (0.060) (1.143) 
Age head Years -0.00*** -0.02 -0.001 -0.015 
  
(0.00) (0.03) (0.001) (0.023) 
Basic education (0/1) -0.03* 0.35 -0.062 0.217 
  
(0.02) (0.97) (0.054) (0.890) 
Higher education  (0/1) -0.05*** 0.87 -0.045 1.781 
  
(0.02) (1.26) (0.069) (1.145) 
Farm labour # member of household who work on own 
farm 
0.01 -1.53*** 0.032*** -0.463*** 
 
(0.00) (0.32) (0.012) (0.173) 
Farm size Hectares 0.15*** 2.92*** -0.001 0.023 
  
(0.01) (0.68) (0.000) (0.015) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.02* 2.55*** -0.140*** 3.039*** 
  
(0.01) (0.79) (0.046) (0.737) 
Livestock owned # -0.00 0.70 0.782*** -0.003*** 
  
(0.02) (2.24) (0.118) (0.000) 
Access to non-farm income  (0/1) - 1 if household has access to self-
employment non-farm income; 0 otherwise 
-0.06*** 0.11 -0.230*** -0.242 
 
(0.01) (0.84) (0.046) (0.802) 
Food only producer (0/1) - 1 if household produces only food 
crops; 0 otherwise 
-0.21*** 3.83*** -0.700*** 0.063 
 
(0.02) (0.97) (0.058) (1.050) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.02 -0.86 0.120*** -1.046 
  
(0.01) (0.81) (0.046) (0.727) 
Processing (0/1) - 1 if household processes any crop or 
fish; 0 otherwise 
0.07*** -4.63*** 0.287*** -4.597*** 
 
(0.01) (0.96) (0.050) (0.867) 
Radio  (0/1) 0.01 1.57* 0.050 0.867 
  
(0.01) (0.81) (0.043) (0.730) 
Bicycle (0/1) 0.04*** 0.63 0.091* -0.547 
  
(0.02) (0.99) (0.049) (0.828) 
Distance to periodic market (0/1) - 1 if distance is above the median; 0 
otherwise 
0.03*** 0.84 0.163*** 2.568*** 
 
(0.01) (0.79) (0.043) (0.733) 
Distance to extension officer (0/1) - 1 if distance is above the median; 0 
otherwise 
0.01 -0.86 -0.176*** -1.088 
 
(0.01) (0.78) (0.042) (0.722) 
Region dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (0/1) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
7,650 4,929 7,086 6,071 
Pseudo/R-squared 
 
0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 
LR chi2   1218.87***  812.37***  
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
                                                 
118 For this estimation I report coefficients as the estimation of marginal effect produced very low values.  
  
CHAPTER 3: APPENDICES
  
Appendix 3.1. Selected multicollinearity tests 
Household level variables 
Test n.1  
 Collinearity Diagnostics 
 VIF VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
Rel. with input suppliers       5.71 2.39 0.1751 0.8249 
Rel. with credit providers 47.1 6.86 0.0212 0.9788 
Rel. with extension officers    25.02 5 0.04 0.96 
Rel. with development agencies     37.56 6.13 0.0266 0.9734 
Rel. with NGOs 55.93 7.48 0.0179 0.9821 
Rel. other farmers 2.32 1.52 0.4305 0.5695 
Trust input suppliers 6.07 2.46 0.1646 0.8354 
Trust credit providers 48.33 6.95 0.0207 0.9793 
Trust extension officers 26.31 5.13 0.038 0.962 
Trust development agencies 39.46 6.28 0.0253 0.9747 
Trust NGOs      55.97 7.48 0.0179 0.9821 
Trust other farmers 2.56 1.6 0.3906 0.6094 
  Mean VIF     29.36 
                            
 Eigenval Cond Index 
1 8.6243 1 
2 1.5554 2.3548 
3 1.2509 2.6258 
4 0.8909 3.1113 
5 0.4866 4.21 
6 0.1283 8.1995 
7 0.0189 21.3673 
8 0.012 26.8499 
9 0.0097 29.8149 
10 0.0069 35.3725 
11 0.0065 36.5001 
12 0.0063 37.084 
13 0.0035 49.8487 
 Condition Number        49.8487  
 
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept) 
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000 
 
  
Test n.2 
  Collinearity Diagnostics 
 VIF VIF Tolerance R- Squared 
Rel. with input suppliers       5.72 2.39 0.1747 0.8253 
Rel. with credit providers 48.8 6.99 0.0205 0.9795 
Rel. with extension officers    23.69 4.87 0.0422 0.9578 
Rel. with development agencies     62.26 7.89 0.0161 0.9839 
Rel. with NGOs 53.89 7.34 0.0186 0.9814 
Rel. with FO 51.89 7.2 0.0193 0.9807 
Trust input suppliers 6.07 2.46 0.1646 0.8354 
Trust credit providers 49.76 7.05 0.0201 0.9799 
Trust extension officers 25.65 5.06 0.039 0.961 
Trust FO 53.69 7.33 0.0186 0.9814 
Trust development agencies 64.24 8.02 0.0156 0.9844 
Trust NGOs 54.29 7.37 0.0184 0.9816 
  Mean VIF     41.66 
 
 Eigenval Cond Index 
1 8.3626 1 
2 1.5432 2.3279 
3 1.119 2.7337 
4 1.0688 2.7971 
5 0.4526 4.2986 
6 0.3296 5.0369 
7 0.0668 11.1854 
8 0.0226 19.2313 
9 0.011 27.6202 
10 0.0072 33.9814 
11 0.0069 34.72 
12 0.0063 36.3486 
13 0.0032 51.0461 
 
 Condition Number        51.0461  
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept) 
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000 
 
  
Appendix 3.2. PCA Social Capital Indexes  
Structural bridging social capital index 
Principal components/correlation                 Number of obs    =       305 
Number of comp.  =         2 
Trace            =         5 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)     Rho              =    0.6001         
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 | 1.97972 0.958951 0.3959 0.3959 
Comp2 | 1.02076 0.259929 0.2042 0.6001 
Comp3 | 0.760835 0.0762946 0.1522 0.7523 
Comp4 | 0.684541 0.130397 0.1369 0.8892 
Comp5 | 0.554144 . 0.1108 1 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors)  
        Variable     Comp1 Comp2  Unexplained 
Rel. with input suppliers       0.4842 -0.3906 0.3802 
Rel. with credit providers 0.3069 0.7647 0.2167 
Rel. with extension officers    0.5355 -0.1101 0.4199 
Rel. with development agencies     0.4583 0.3529 0.457 
Rel. with NGOs 0.4178 -0.3551 0.5257 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
        Variable        kmo  
Rel. with input suppliers       0.6631 
Rel. with credit providers 0.6472 
Rel. with extension officers    0.6714 
Rel. with development agencies     0.7129 
Rel. with NGOs 0.7535 
         Overall       0.6870 
 
 
 
Test for univariate normality 
Variable Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Rel. with input suppliers       0.0000          0.0473 17.56 0.0002 
Rel. with credit providers 0.0000 0.0032          66.48 0.0000 
Rel. with extension officers    0.2066 . . . 
Rel. with development agencies     0.0000 0.0000               . 0.0000               
Rel. with NGOs 0.0000 0.3351   41.43 0.0000 
 
Doornik-Hansen test for bivariate normality 
Pair of variables           chi2     Df Prob>chi2 
relinput~rhh  relcredi~rhh 925.89      4 0.0000 
relexten~rhh 105.86 4 0.0000 
reldevel~rhh      322.40      4 0.0000 
relngos_~rhh  482.49     4 0.0000 
relcredi~rhh  relexten~rhh    892.05   4 0.0000 
reldevel~rhh  1010.83     4 0.0000 
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Pair of variables           chi2     Df Prob>chi2 
relngos_~rhh   1412.77    4 0.0000 
relexten~rhh  reldevel~rhh  300.24 4 0.0000 
relngos_~rhh      526.91 4 0.0000 
reldevel~rhh  relngos_~rhh  769.48      4 0.0000 
 
Test for multivariate normality 
Mardia mSkewness =  6.544799     chi2(35) =  337.068    Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
Mardia mKurtosis =  34.53275   chi2(1) =    0.238    Prob>chi2 =  0.6258 
Henze-Zirkler    =  13.59917   chi2(1) = 1661.269 Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
Doornik-Hansen                   chi2(10) = 1317.926 Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
Structural bonding social capital index 
Principal components/correlation                 Number of obs    =       305 
Number of comp.  =         2 
Trace            =         3 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)     Rho              =    0.7657 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 |      1.31425      0. 331443              0.4381          0.4381 
Comp2 | 0.982804 0.279854                     0.3276 0.7657 
Comp3 | 0.702949                .           0.2343       1.0000 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
Variable Comp1      Comp2  Unexplained 
Rel. other farmers 0.5061     0.7084 0.1701 
Rel. FO 0.6971 -0.0002 0.3614 
Rel. social network -0.5078     0.7058 0.1715 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable kmo 
Rel. other farmers 0.4932 
Rel. FO 0.4966 
Rel. social network 0.4933 
         Overall 0.4949 
 
 
 
 
Test for univariate normality  
Variable Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Rel. other farmers 0.0000          0.0001 30.11        0.0000          
Rel. FO 0.0036 . . . 
Rel. social network 0.0000          0.5281           41.33 0.0000          
 
Doornik-Hansen test for bivariate normality 
Pair of variables           chi2     Df Prob>chi2 
relo~s_strhh relfo_strhh   174.39      4 0.0000 
socnetDall    535.70      4 0.0000 
relfo_strhh   socnetDall    579.91      4 0.0000 
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Test for multivariate normality 
    Mardia mSkewness =   2.88246     chi2(10) =  148.695    Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
    Mardia mKurtosis =  15.18893     chi2(1) =    0.091 Prob>chi2 =  0.7633 
Henze-Zirkler    =  21.01848      chi2(1) =  364.696    Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
    Doornik-Hansen                    chi2(6) =  582.163 Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
 
Cognitive social capital index 
Principal components/correlation                 Number of obs    =       305 
Number of comp.  =         2 
Trace            =         5 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)     Rho              =    0.6560 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 | 2.33959 1.39935              0.4679        0.4679 
Comp2 | 0.940235      0.0880816 0.1880        0.6560 
Comp3 | 0.852154       0.260945              0.1704        0.8264 
Comp4 |    0.591209       0.314392              0.1182        0.9446 
Comp5 | 0.276817             . 0.0554        1.0000 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors)  
 Variable Comp1      Comp2  Unexplained 
Trust input suppliers 0.2858     0.8072    0.1963 
Trust extension officers 0.4609     0.2839 0.4273 
Trust development agencies 0.5435    -0.1965 0.2725 
Trust FO 0.5608    -0.2188 0.2192 
Trust other farmers    0.3099    -0.4258 0.6048 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable kmo 
Trust input suppliers   0.7520 
Trust extension officers 0.7987  
Trust development agencies 0.6538 
Trust FO 0.6362 
Trust other farmers 0.8488 
         Overall 0.6905 
 
Test for univariate normality 
Variable Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Trust input suppliers 0.0000          0.0164           34.12        0.0000               
Trust extension officers 0.2174               .               .               .               
Trust development agencies 0.0000          0.0000               . 0.0000               
Trust FO 0.0097               . . . 
Trust other farmers 0.0000          0.0000               45.41        0.0000               
Doornik-Hansen test for bivariate normality 
Pair of variables           chi2     Df Prob>chi2 
    trustinput~h  trustexten~h 178.87      4 0.0000 
trustdevel~h 385.76      4 0.0000 
trustfohh 279.53      4 0.0000 
trustoth~shh 126.77      4 0.0000 
    trustexten~h  trustdevel~h 270.58      4 0.0000 
                  trustfohh     174.16      4 0.0000 
trustoth~shh 141.54      4 0.0000 
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Pair of variables           chi2     Df Prob>chi2 
    trustdevel~h  trustfohh     107.17      4 0.0000 
trustoth~shh 324.22      4 0.0000 
   trustfohh     trustoth~shh 207.17      4 0.0000 
 
Test for multivariate normality 
Mardia mSkewness =  5.906812     chi2(35) =  304.210    Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
Mardia mKurtosis =  37.89869 chi2(1) =    9.153    Prob>chi2 =  0.0025 
Henze-Zirkler    =  13.36953      chi2(1) = 1640.389    Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
Doornik-Hansen                   chi2(10) =  278.085    Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix 3.3. Full estimation results 
Basic model 
Table 1 Determinants of adoption - Probit results 
Dep. var=mango adoption 
(0/1) 
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) 
Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
                 
Age head1  Years -0.004* -0.006** -0.006** -0.005* -0.005** -0.006** -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male head (0/1) 0.172* 0.203*** 0.181* 0.139*** 0.140** 0.140*** 0.181*** 
  (0.094) (0.076) (0.096) (0.050) (0.055) (0.051) (0.062) 
Higher education (0/1) 0.118** 0.045 0.048 0.020 0.035 0.043 -0.003 
  (0.059) (0.070) (0.076) (0.067) (0.069) (0.064) (0.013) 
Farm labour1 # -0.024*** -0.018* -0.024 -0.030 -0.028* -0.029** -0.017 
  (0.005) (0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) 
Farm size1  Acres 
 
0.013** 0.012* 0.011** 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 
  
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Land ownership (0/1) 
 
0.145* 0.173** 0.203*** 0.189** 0.226*** 0.230*** 
  
 
(0.080) (0.068) (0.064) (0.090) (0.083) (0.063) 
Production other 
cash crops 
(0/1) 
 
-0.026 -0.057* -0.047 -0.088 -0.083 -0.091*** 
  
 
(0.027) (0.031) (0.043) (0.057) (0.054) (0.035) 
Livestock ownership # 
  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm 
income 
(0/1) 
  
0.060 0.058 0.049 0.055 0.064* 
  
  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046) (0.038) 
Access to credit (0/1) 
  
0.153 0.159 0.174 0.195* 0.112 
  
  
(0.104) (0.114) (0.113) (0.106) (0.085) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) 
   
-0.302*** -0.258** -0.317*** -0.346*** 
  
   
(0.098) (0.130) (0.118) (0.066) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 
   
0.110 0.099 0.102* 0.087 
  
   
(0.077) (0.065) (0.060) (0.118) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) 
   
-0.120*** -0.123*** -0.140*** -0.093*** 
  
   
(0.044) (0.043) (0.048) (0.027) 
Ownership of 
bicycle 
(0/1) 
   
0.123 0.053 0.037 0.057** 
  
   
(0.076) (0.070) (0.079) (0.026) 
Ownership of 
motorcycle 
(0/1) 
   
0.069 0.062 0.071 0.006 
  
   
(0.059) (0.068) (0.074) (0.053) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 
   
0.120*** 0.105*** 0.110*** -0.032*** 
  
   
(0.020) (0.003) (0.012) (0.009) 
Road conditions # 
    
-0.043*** -0.047*** -0.035** 
  
    
(0.008) (0.006) (0.018) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 
     
0.157*** 0.123*** 
  
     
(0.038) (0.036) 
No risk averse (0/1) 
     
0.006 0.034 
  
     
(0.068) (0.078) 
Impatient  (0/1) 
     
0.041 -0.022 
  
     
(0.041) (0.064) 
Experience in 
farming1 
Years 
      
-0.012*** 
  
      
(0.002) 
Training  (0/1) 
      
0.503*** 
  
      
(0.112) 
Observations  305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2 Determinants of time of adoption - absolute cut off 
 Dep. var=later adoption 
(0/1) 
Cut-off=2006 
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) 
Time 
adoption-
abs 
Time 
adoption- 
abs 
Time 
adoption- 
abs 
Time 
adoption- 
abs 
Time 
adoption- 
abs 
Time 
adoption- 
abs 
Time 
adoption- 
abs 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
                 
Age head1  Years -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) -0.051 -0.105 -0.128 -0.139 -0.135 -0.121 -0.074 
  (0.301) (0.288) (0.290) (0.284) (0.273) (0.268) (0.252) 
Higher 
education 
(0/1) 
-0.202* -0.085* -0.069 -0.091 -0.102** -0.100* -0.080** 
  (0.123) (0.044) (0.047) (0.061) (0.048) (0.053) (0.039) 
Farm labour1 # 0.116*** 0.129*** 0.137*** 0.144*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.147*** 
  (0.012) (0.024) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.012) 
Farm size1  Acres 
 
-0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
  
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Land ownership (0/1) 
 
-0.203*** -0.182** -0.214* -0.216* -0.220* -0.206 
  
 
(0.078) (0.075) (0.119) (0.113) (0.119) (0.139) 
Production other 
cash crops 
(0/1) 
 
-0.095** -0.115*** -0.127*** -0.121*** -0.115*** -0.101*** 
  
 
(0.045) (0.022) (0.043) (0.044) (0.031) (0.007) 
Livestock 
ownership 
# 
  
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000* -0.001 
  
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Access to non-
farm income 
(0/1) 
  
0.002 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.011 
  
  
(0.033) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
Access to credit (0/1) 
  
0.159 0.164 0.158 0.171 0.154 
 
 
  
(0.147) (0.144) (0.149) (0.133) (0.137) 
Ownership of 
mobile 
(0/1) 
   
0.067 0.085 0.085 0.085 
  
   
(0.186) (0.160) (0.156) (0.169) 
Ownership of 
radio 
(0/1) 
   
0.177*** 0.169** 0.156*** 0.137*** 
  
   
(0.068) (0.069) (0.046) (0.032) 
Ownership of 
bicycle 
(0/1) 
   
-0.028 -0.015 -0.021 -0.040 
  
   
(0.141) (0.125) (0.142) (0.114) 
Ownership of 
motorcycle 
(0/1) 
   
-0.086 -0.083 -0.078 -0.068 
  
   
(0.160) (0.158) (0.158) (0.142) 
Ownership of 
car 
(0/1) 
   
-0.011 -0.005 -0.005 0.028 
  
   
(0.090) (0.099) (0.095) (0.093) 
Road conditions # 
    
0.018 0.018 0.020 
  
    
(0.029) (0.028) (0.032) 
Moderate risk 
averse 
(0/1) 
     
0.040 0.042 
  
     
(0.084) (0.065) 
No risk averse (0/1) 
     
-0.009 -0.033 
  
     
(0.111) (0.078) 
Impatient  (0/1) 
     
-0.064 -0.060 
  
     
(0.089) (0.095) 
Experience in 
farming1 
Years 
      
0.006 
  
      
(0.005) 
Training  (0/1) 
      
-0.043 
 
 
      
(0.221) 
Observations  196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3 Determinants of time of adoption - relative cut off 
 Dep. var=later adoption 
(0/1) 
Cut-off=regional 
median 
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) 
Time 
adoption-
rel 
Time 
adoption- 
rel 
Time 
adoption- 
rel 
Time 
adoption- 
rel 
Time 
adoption- 
rel 
Time 
adoption- 
rel 
Time 
adoption- 
rel 
VARIABLE
S 
 
mfx 
mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx Heck-mfx 
   
       Age head1  Years -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 0.005 
Male head (0/1) -0.112 -0.134 -0.146 -0.136 -0.127 -0.120 IV 
  (0.158) (0.140) (0.144) (0.139) (0.132) (0.141) 
 Higher 
education 
(0/1) 
-0.103 -0.023 -0.006 -0.018 -0.047 -0.046 -0.013 
  (0.087) (0.035) (0.036) (0.056) (0.038) (0.044) 0.070 
Farm labour1 # 0.098*** 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.134*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) 0.015 
Farm size1  Acres 
 
-0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.021*** 
  
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 0.007 
Land 
ownership 
(0/1) 
 
-0.079 -0.056 -0.089 -0.091 -0.088 IV 
  
 
(0.087) (0.081) (0.130) (0.121) (0.136) 
 Production 
other cash 
crops 
(0/1) 
 
0.027 0.009 -0.001 0.017 0.020 0.087* 
  
 
(0.059) (0.031) (0.052) (0.062) (0.051) 0.046 
Livestock 
ownership 
# 
  
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 
  
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.001 
Access to 
non-farm 
income 
(0/1) 
  
-0.004 0.000 0.010 0.006 0.008 
  
  
(0.030) (0.024) (0.032) (0.038) 0.027 
Access to 
credit 
(0/1) 
  
0.137 0.141 0.123 0.131 0.112 
 
 
  
(0.134) (0.123) (0.135) (0.128) 0.134 
Ownership of 
mobile 
(0/1) 
   
0.094 0.138 0.134 0.132 
  
   
(0.185) (0.152) (0.147) 0.149 
Ownership of 
radio 
(0/1) 
   
0.124 0.106 0.098 IV 
  
   
(0.141) (0.163) (0.149) 
 Ownership of 
bicycle 
(0/1) 
   
-0.050 -0.016 -0.021 -0.050 
  
   
(0.126) (0.116) (0.126) 0.116 
Ownership of 
motorcycle 
(0/1) 
   
-0.118 -0.113 -0.110 -0.107 
  
   
(0.152) (0.145) (0.142) 0.150 
Ownership of 
car 
(0/1) 
   
-0.033 -0.018 -0.012 0.052 
  
   
(0.065) (0.072) (0.073) 0.060 
Road 
conditions 
# 
    
0.045 0.045* 0.053* 
  
    
(0.029) (0.027) 0.030 
Moderate 
risk averse 
(0/1) 
     
0.024 IV 
  
     
(0.059) 
 No risk 
averse 
(0/1) 
     
-0.031 IV 
  
     
(0.122)  
Impatient  (0/1) 
     
-0.027 0.005 
  
     
(0.073) 0.077 
Experience in 
farming1 
Years 
      
0.010** 
  
      
0.004 
Training  (0/1) 
      
-0.200* 
 
 
      
0.112 
Observations  196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4 Determinants of intensity of adoption 
Dep var=ln(n. trees)  (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) 
 
 Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
                 
Age head1  Years 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) 0.818** 0.644** 0.588** 0.539** 0.523** 0.573** 0.421* 
  (0.323) (0.286) (0.272) (0.263) (0.257) (0.258) (0.254) 
Higher education (0/1) 0.653** 0.503** 0.542** 0.499** 0.475** 0.470** 0.372* 
  (0.253) (0.209) (0.212) (0.203) (0.206) (0.200) (0.195) 
Farm labour1 # -0.004 -0.045 -0.044 -0.046 -0.045 -0.052 -0.063 
  (0.073) (0.061) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.061) (0.055) 
Farm size1  Acres 
 
0.038*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
  
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership (0/1) 
 
-0.229 -0.174 -0.166 -0.112 -0.197 -0.133 
  
 
(0.259) (0.250) (0.248) (0.245) (0.227) (0.216) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) 
 
-0.341* -0.374* -0.268 -0.263 -0.229 -0.311 
  
 
(0.205) (0.204) (0.198) (0.199) (0.200) (0.199) 
Livestock ownership # 
  
0.004*** 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 
  
0.068 0.055 0.072 0.071 0.089 
  
  
(0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.096) (0.101) 
Access to credit (0/1) 
  
0.270* 0.234 0.205 0.200 0.143 
  
  
(0.155) (0.149) (0.152) (0.154) (0.160) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) 
   
0.156 0.145 0.208 0.042 
  
   
(0.561) (0.567) (0.584) (0.535) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 
   
-0.165 -0.133 -0.112 -0.154 
  
   
(0.126) (0.128) (0.125) (0.126) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) 
   
0.302* 0.309** 0.274* 0.324** 
  
   
(0.155) (0.154) (0.163) (0.146) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 
   
-0.019 -0.011 0.008 0.139 
  
   
(0.157) (0.158) (0.160) (0.156) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) 
   
0.469*** 0.450*** 0.468*** 0.415*** 
  
   
(0.134) (0.133) (0.134) (0.130) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 
   
0.444** 0.474** 0.451** 0.386** 
  
   
(0.211) (0.212) (0.206) (0.194) 
Road conditions # 
    
0.051 0.057 0.056 
  
    
(0.034) (0.037) (0.037) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 
     
-0.020 -0.080 
  
     
(0.153) (0.138) 
No risk averse (0/1) 
     
0.177 0.123 
  
     
(0.237) (0.224) 
Impatient  (0/1) 
     
-0.272* -0.270** 
  
     
(0.142) (0.136) 
Experience in farming1 (0/1) 
      
-0.009 
  
      
(0.005) 
Training  (0/1) 
      
0.619*** 
 
 
      
(0.186) 
Constant  4.139*** 4.251*** 4.034*** 3.969*** 3.672*** 3.780*** 3.398*** 
 
 (0.447) (0.492) (0.458) (0.463) (0.480) (0.472) (0.444) 
 
 
       Observations  196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
R-squared  0.141 0.443 0.472 0.531 0.535 0.548 0.589 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Basic model and bridging social capital 
Table 5 Determinants of adoption with bridging social capital 
Dep. var=mango adoption 
(0/1) 
 (A7) (A8) (A9) 
 Adoption Adoption Adoption 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx 
         
Age head1  Years -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Male head (0/1) 0.181*** 0.109 0.149** 
  (0.062) (0.074) (0.065) 
Higher education (0/1) -0.003 0.022*** 0.008 
  (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) 
Farm labour1 # -0.017 -0.030** -0.015 
  (0.022) (0.014) (0.013) 
Farm size1  Acres 0.013** 0.006* 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.230*** 0.225*** 0.249*** 
  (0.063) (0.038) (0.014) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.091*** -0.037 -0.038* 
  (0.035) (0.043) (0.022) 
Livestock ownership # 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.064* 0.072*** 0.059*** 
  (0.038) (0.012) (0.012) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.112 0.221*** 0.139 
  (0.085) (0.078) (0.116) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) -0.346*** -0.205*** -0.143*** 
  (0.066) (0.068) (0.037) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.087 0.137 0.129* 
  (0.118) (0.097) (0.070) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) -0.093*** -0.031 -0.026 
  (0.027) (0.029) (0.044) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 0.057** 0.032 0.028 
  (0.026) (0.071) (0.047) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) 0.006 0.013 0.007 
  (0.053) (0.074) (0.069) 
Ownership of car (0/1) -0.032*** -0.017 -0.053 
  (0.009) (0.081) (0.087) 
Road conditions # -0.035** -0.038*** -0.034** 
  (0.018) (0.006) (0.015) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 0.123*** 0.079*** 0.062*** 
  (0.036) (0.012) (0.009) 
No risk averse (0/1) 0.034 0.077** 0.059 
  (0.078) (0.038) (0.043) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.022 -0.039 -0.034 
  (0.064) (0.069) (0.047) 
Experience in farming1 Years -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Training  (0/1) 0.503*** 0.149 0.109 
 
 (0.112) (0.091) (0.111) 
Relationship with input suppliers (0/1) 
 
0.383*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.148) 
 Relationship with credit providers (0/1) 
 
-0.433** 
 
 
 
 
(0.217) 
 Relationship with extension officers (0/1) 
 
0.144*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.035) 
 Relationship with Dev Agencies (0/1) 
 
0.454*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.052) 
 Relationship with NGOs (0/1) 
 
0.084 
 
 
 
 
(0.057) 
 Strength of relationship with input suppliers (1/5) 
  
0.046*** 
 
 
  
(0.017) 
Strength of relationship with credit providers (1/5) 
  
-0.059 
 
(1/5) 
  
(0.056) 
Strength of relationship with extension officers (1/5) 
  
0.025 
 
(1/5) 
  
(0.018) 
Strength of relationship with Dev Agencies (1/5) 
  
0.177*** 
 
(1/5) 
  
(0.021) 
Strength of relationship with NGOs (1/5) 
  
0.026 
 
 
  
(0.018) 
Observations  305 305 305 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6 Determinants of time of adoption with bridging social capital - absolute cut-off 
 Dep. var=later adoption (0/1) 
Cut-off=2006 
 (A7) (A8) (A9) 
 Time adoption-abs Time adoption- abs Time adoption- abs 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx 
         
Age head1  Years -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Male head (0/1) -0.074 -0.040 -0.055 
  (0.252) (0.256) (0.275) 
Higher education (0/1) -0.080** -0.117** -0.116 
  (0.039) (0.047) (0.072) 
Farm labour1 # 0.147*** 0.156*** 0.153*** 
  (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) 
Farm size1  Acres -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.206 -0.089 -0.147 
  (0.139) (0.087) (0.097) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.101*** -0.046*** -0.055*** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Livestock ownership # -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.011 -0.001 0.004 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.011) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.154 0.148 0.240** 
 
 (0.137) (0.129) (0.120) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.085 0.055 0.074 
  (0.169) (0.146) (0.186) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) 0.137*** 0.177*** 0.160*** 
  (0.032) (0.055) (0.027) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) -0.040 -0.046 -0.057 
  (0.114) (0.134) (0.129) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) -0.068 -0.100 -0.098 
  (0.142) (0.159) (0.139) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.028 0.065 0.066 
  (0.093) (0.096) (0.105) 
Road conditions # 0.020 0.019 0.020 
  (0.032) (0.033) (0.028) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 0.042 0.018 0.029 
  (0.065) (0.061) (0.048) 
No risk averse (0/1) -0.033 -0.077*** -0.022 
  (0.078) (0.029) (0.050) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.060 -0.077 -0.093 
  (0.095) (0.074) (0.077) 
Experience in farming1 Years 0.006 0.007** 0.008*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Training  (0/1) -0.043 -0.022 -0.024 
 
 (0.221) (0.258) (0.223) 
Relationship with input suppliers (0/1) 
 
-0.428*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.068) 
 Relationship with credit providers (0/1) 
 
-0.087* 
 
 
 
 
(0.047) 
 Relationship with extension officers (0/1) 
 
0.070 
 
 
 
 
(0.102) 
 Relationship with Dev Agencies (0/1) 
 
0.093 
 
 
 
 
(0.260) 
 Relationship with NGOs (0/1) 
 
-0.217*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.083) 
 Strength of relationship with input suppliers (1/5) 
  
-0.062** 
 
 
  
(0.031) 
Strength of relationship with credit providers (1/5) 
  
-0.048*** 
 
(1/5) 
  
(0.014) 
Strength of relationship with extension officers (1/5) 
  
0.030 
 
(1/5) 
  
(0.037) 
Strength of relationship with Dev Agencies (1/5) 
  
0.024 
 
(1/5) 
  
(0.066) 
Strength of relationship with NGOs (1/5) 
  
-0.063* 
 
 
  
(0.037) 
Observations  196 196 196 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 7 Determinants of time of adoption with bridging social capital - relative cut-off 
 Dep. var=later adoption (0/1) 
Cut-off=regional median 
 (A7) (A8) (A9) 
 Time adoption-rel Time adoption- rel Time adoption- rel 
VARIABLES  Heck-mfx Heck-mfx Heck-mfx 
Age head1  Years -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) IV IV IV 
Higher education (0/1) -0.013 -0.037 -0.012 
  (0.070) (0.105) (0.138) 
Farm labour1 # 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.133*** 
  (0.015) (0.006) (0.004) 
Farm size1  Acres -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.012*** 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
Land ownership (0/1) IV IV IV 
Production other cash crops (0/1) 0.087* 0.104* 0.085 
  (0.046) (0.054) (0.056) 
Livestock ownership # -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.008 -0.011 -0.008 
  (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.112 0.132 0.180*** 
  (0.134) (0.108) (0.058) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.132 0.123 0.074 
  (0.149) (0.146) (0.154) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) IV IV IV 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) -0.050 -0.058 -0.071 
  (0.116) (0.161) (0.147) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) -0.107 -0.127 -0.122 
  (0.150) (0.126) (0.123) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.052 0.041 0.065 
  (0.060) (0.042) (0.051) 
Road conditions # 0.053* 0.068*** 0.062** 
  (0.030) (0.023) (0.025) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) IV IV IV 
No risk averse (0/1) IV IV IV 
Impatient  (0/1) 0.005 -0.000 -0.012 
  (0.077) (0.084) (0.080) 
Experience in farming1 Years 0.010** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Training  (0/1) -0.200* -0.185** -0.163* 
  (0.112) (0.091) (0.084) 
Relationship with input suppliers (0/1)  dropped  
     
Relationship with credit providers (0/1)  -0.004  
   (0.124)  
Relationship with extension officers (0/1)  0.139**  
   (0.064)  
Relationship with Dev Agencies (0/1)  -0.081  
   (0.222)  
Relationship with NGOs (0/1)  -0.146  
   (0.111)  
Strength of relationship with input suppliers (1/5)   -0.099*** 
    (0.020) 
Strength of relationship with credit providers (1/5)   -0.032 
 (1/5)   (0.023) 
Strength of relationship with extension officers (1/5)   0.050* 
 (1/5)   (0.027) 
Strength of relationship with Dev Agencies (1/5)   -0.041 
 (1/5)   (0.046) 
Strength of relationship with NGOs (1/5)   -0.031 
    (0.034) 
Observations  196 196 196 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 8 Determinants of intensity of adoption with bridging social capital 
Dep var=ln(n. trees)  (A7) (A8) (A9) 
 Intensity Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES  OLS OLS OLS 
   
   Age head1  Years 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) 0.421* 0.506** 0.517** 
  (0.254) (0.248) (0.248) 
Higher education (0/1) 0.372* 0.265 0.221 
  (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) 
Farm labour1 # -0.063 -0.052 -0.054 
  (0.055) (0.050) (0.049) 
Farm size1  Acres 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.133 -0.053 -0.081 
  (0.216) (0.224) (0.218) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.311 -0.274 -0.269 
  (0.199) (0.188) (0.184) 
Livestock ownership # 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.089 0.072 0.084 
  (0.101) (0.103) (0.101) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.143 0.028 0.050 
  (0.160) (0.218) (0.210) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) 0.042 0.226 0.352 
  (0.535) (0.490) (0.483) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) -0.154 -0.134 -0.113 
  (0.126) (0.137) (0.137) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) 0.324** 0.251 0.256 
  (0.146) (0.182) (0.182) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 0.139 0.212 0.217 
  (0.156) (0.151) (0.146) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) 0.415*** 0.432*** 0.422*** 
  (0.130) (0.124) (0.126) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.386** 0.326* 0.303 
  (0.194) (0.185) (0.184) 
Road conditions # 0.056 0.026 0.027 
  (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) -0.080 -0.070 -0.064 
  (0.138) (0.136) (0.132) 
No risk averse (0/1) 0.123 0.034 0.074 
  (0.224) (0.224) (0.220) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.270** -0.309** -0.318** 
  (0.136) (0.134) (0.136) 
Experience in farming1 Years -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Training  (0/1) 0.619*** 0.468** 0.428** 
 
 (0.186) (0.190) (0.188) 
Relationship with input suppliers (0/1) 
 
-0.079 
 
 
 
 
(0.134) 
 Relationship with credit providers (0/1) 
 
-0.008 
 
 
 
 
(0.167) 
 Relationship with extension officers (0/1) 
 
-0.140 
 
 
 
 
(0.170) 
 Relationship with Dev Agencies (0/1) 
 
0.570*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.178) 
 Relationship with NGOs (0/1) 
 
-0.152 
 
 
 
 
(0.123) 
 Strength of relationship with input suppliers (1/5) 
  
-0.009 
 
 
  
(0.040) 
Strength of relationship with credit providers (1/5) 
  
-0.003 
 
(1/5) 
  
(0.048) 
Strength of relationship with extension officers (1/5) 
  
-0.028 
 
(1/5) 
  
(0.041) 
Strength of relationship with Dev Agencies (1/5) 
  
0.164*** 
 
(1/5) 
  
(0.042) 
Strength of relationship with NGOs (1/5) 
  
-0.035 
 
 
  
(0.037) 
Constant  3.398*** 3.643*** 3.555*** 
 
 (0.444) (0.445) (0.481) 
 
 
   Observations  196 196 196 
R-squared  0.589 0.629 0.634 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Basic model and bonding social capital 
Table 9 Determinants of adoption with bonding social capital 
Dep. var=mango adoption 
(0/1) 
 (A7) (A10) (A11) (A12) (A13) 
 Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
             
Age head1  Years -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male head (0/1) 0.181*** 0.119 0.196*** 0.145 0.190*** 
  (0.062) (0.105) (0.059) (0.103) (0.056) 
Higher education (0/1) -0.003 0.032 -0.014 0.010 -0.004 
  (0.013) (0.030) (0.029) (0.019) (0.013) 
Farm labour1 # -0.017 -0.019 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) 
Farm size1  Acres 0.013** 0.011** 0.013** 0.012** 0.013** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.230*** 0.265*** 0.220*** 0.262*** 0.255*** 
  (0.063) (0.037) (0.079) (0.040) (0.064) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.091*** -0.097* -0.097*** -0.096* -0.088** 
  (0.035) (0.057) (0.032) (0.051) (0.038) 
Livestock ownership # 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.064* 0.056** 0.051 0.058** 0.061 
  (0.038) (0.022) (0.049) (0.024) (0.038) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.112 0.095 0.117 0.078 0.099 
  (0.085) (0.071) (0.089) (0.072) (0.086) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) -0.346*** -0.257*** -0.349*** -0.263*** -0.326*** 
  (0.066) (0.056) (0.077) (0.059) (0.058) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.087 0.071 0.084 0.075 0.102 
  (0.118) (0.115) (0.118) (0.117) (0.127) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) -0.093*** -0.117*** -0.096*** -0.115*** -0.108*** 
  (0.027) (0.037) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 0.057** 0.059* 0.057* 0.060* 0.052** 
  (0.026) (0.034) (0.029) (0.037) (0.023) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) 0.006 -0.008 0.016 -0.017 0.000 
  (0.053) (0.076) (0.056) (0.079) (0.058) 
Ownership of car (0/1) -0.032*** 0.025 -0.015 0.019 -0.029*** 
  (0.009) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.005) 
Road conditions # -0.035** -0.024 -0.040** -0.026 -0.037** 
  (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 0.123*** 0.081* 0.138*** 0.077* 0.119*** 
  (0.036) (0.045) (0.027) (0.046) (0.038) 
No risk averse (0/1) 0.034 -0.002 0.026 0.007 0.024 
  (0.078) (0.069) (0.091) (0.069) (0.078) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.022 -0.045 -0.047 -0.031 -0.022 
  (0.064) (0.071) (0.069) (0.070) (0.066) 
Experience in farming1 Years -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Training  (0/1) 0.503*** 0.339*** 0.491*** 0.364*** 0.499*** 
 
 (0.112) (0.082) (0.091) (0.086) (0.120) 
Relationship with other farmers (0/1) 
 
dropped dropped dropped dropped 
Relationship with FO (0/1) 
 
0.317*** 
   
 
 
 
(0.084) 
   Strength of relationship with other 
farmers 
(1/5) 
  
0.056 
  
 
 
  
(0.055) 
  Membership in FO (1/5) 
   
0.275*** 
 
 
 
   
(0.095) 
 Social network(ln) # 
    
-0.161* 
 
 
    
(0.088) 
Observations  305 305 305 305 305 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 10 Determinants of time of adoption with bonding social capital - absolute cut-off 
 Dep. var=later adoption 
(0/1) 
Cut-off=2006 
 (A7) (A10) (A11) (A12) (A13) 
 
Time 
adoption-abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
             
Age head1  Years -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) -0.074 -0.084 -0.052 -0.091 -0.074 
  (0.252) (0.240) (0.248) (0.235) (0.251) 
Higher education (0/1) -0.080** -0.082** -0.087** -0.082*** -0.080** 
  (0.039) (0.035) (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) 
Farm labour1 # 0.147*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.147*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) 
Farm size1  Acres -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.206 -0.182 -0.197 -0.177 -0.207 
  (0.139) (0.135) (0.136) (0.131) (0.162) 
Production other cash 
crops 
(0/1) 
-0.101*** -0.111*** -0.123*** -0.110*** -0.101*** 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005) 
Livestock ownership # -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm 
income 
(0/1) 
0.011 0.011 0.003 0.012 0.011 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.025) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.154 0.148 0.149 0.142 0.156 
 
 (0.137) (0.136) (0.139) (0.140) (0.169) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.085 0.085 0.078 0.091 0.083 
  (0.169) (0.164) (0.160) (0.157) (0.148) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.156*** 0.141*** 0.137*** 
  (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) -0.040 -0.056 -0.057 -0.064 -0.039 
  (0.114) (0.114) (0.103) (0.112) (0.121) 
Ownership of 
motorcycle 
(0/1) 
-0.068 -0.077 -0.064 -0.080 -0.067 
  (0.142) (0.149) (0.150) (0.153) (0.122) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.028 0.021 0.060 0.019 0.027 
  (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.103) 
Road conditions # 0.020 0.025 0.010 0.030 0.020 
  (0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.041) (0.032) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 0.042 0.029 0.071 0.018 0.042 
  (0.065) (0.066) (0.083) (0.063) (0.061) 
No risk averse (0/1) -0.033 -0.056 -0.035 -0.070 -0.032 
  (0.078) (0.065) (0.072) (0.061) (0.079) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.060 -0.065 -0.092 -0.065 -0.060 
  (0.095) (0.103) (0.094) (0.106) (0.095) 
Experience in farming1 Years 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Training  (0/1) -0.043 -0.120 -0.047 -0.169 -0.042 
 
 (0.221) (0.199) (0.221) (0.180) (0.210) 
Relationship with other 
farmers 
(0/1) 
 
dropped dropped dropped dropped 
Relationship with FO (0/1) 
 
0.120 
   
 
 
 
(0.085) 
   Strength of relationship 
with other farmers 
(1/5) 
  
0.086 
  
 
 
  
(0.074) 
  Membership in FO (0/1) 
   
0.194* 
 
 
 
   
(0.103) 
 Social network(ln) # 
    
0.017 
 
 
    
(0.233) 
Observations  196 196 196 196 196 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 11 Determinants of time of adoption with bonding social capital - relative cut-off 
 Dep. var=later adoption 
(0/1) 
Cut-off=2006 
 (A7) (A10) (A11) (A12) (A13) 
 Time 
adoption-rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
VARIABLES  Heck-mfx Heck-mfx mfx Heck-mfx Heck-mfx 
   
     
Age head1  Years -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) IV IV -0.091 IV IV 
    (0.109)   
Higher education (0/1) -0.013 -0.029 -0.007 -0.022 -0.012 
  (0.070) (0.076) (0.049) (0.075) (0.065) 
Farm labour1 # 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 0.124*** 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Farm size1  Acres -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.020*** 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
Land ownership (0/1) IV IV -0.078 IV IV 
    (0.151)   
Production other cash crops (0/1) 0.087* 0.077 0.031 0.083* 0.082* 
  (0.046) (0.051) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) 
Livestock ownership # -0.001* -0.001** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.112 0.105 0.121 0.113 0.136 
  (0.134) (0.125) (0.116) (0.125) (0.149) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.132 0.133 0.127 0.135 0.097 
  (0.149) (0.149) (0.163) (0.149) (0.143) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) IV IV 0.077 IV IV 
    (0.130)   
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) -0.050 -0.042 -0.057 -0.046 -0.030 
  (0.116) (0.132) (0.119) (0.131) (0.131) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) -0.107 -0.092 -0.100 -0.091 -0.092 
  (0.150) (0.136) (0.130) (0.139) (0.123) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.052 0.006 0.027 0.010 0.029 
  (0.060) (0.089) (0.072) (0.090) (0.074) 
Road conditions # 0.053* 0.050* 0.044 0.051* 0.054* 
  (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) IV IV 0.043 IV IV 
    (0.068)   
No risk averse (0/1) IV IV -0.052 IV IV 
    (0.122)   
Impatient  (0/1) 0.005 0.008 -0.024 0.006 0.010 
  (0.077) (0.085) (0.070) (0.082) (0.063) 
Experience in farming1 Years 0.010** 0.010** 0.008** 0.010** 0.011** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Training  (0/1) -0.200* -0.122*** -0.126** -0.137*** -0.158* 
  (0.112) (0.044) (0.062) (0.045) (0.092) 
Relationship with other 
farmers 
(0/1) 
 dropped dropped dropped dropped 
Relationship with FO (0/1)  -0.096    
   (0.092)    
Strength of relationship with 
other farmers 
(1/5) 
  0.019   
    (0.037)   
Membership in FO (0/1)    -0.090  
     (0.084)  
Social network(ln) #     0.234*** 
      (0.077) 
Observations  196 196 196 196 196 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 12 Determinants of intensity of adoption with bonding social capital 
Dep var=ln(n. trees)  (A7) (A10) (A11) (A12) (A13) 
 Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES  OLS OLS OLS Heck-OLS OLS 
             
Age head1  Years 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) 0.421* 0.407 0.446* 0.190 0.420* 
  (0.254) (0.247) (0.249) (0.238) (0.254) 
Higher education (0/1) 0.372* 0.339* 0.368* 0.405*** 0.374* 
  (0.195) (0.174) (0.195) (0.138) (0.195) 
Farm labour1 # -0.063 -0.044 -0.061 -0.040 -0.065 
  (0.055) (0.048) (0.055) (0.045) (0.054) 
Farm size1  Acres 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.133 -0.225 -0.152 IV -0.131 
  (0.216) (0.190) (0.211)  (0.217) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.311 -0.429** -0.332* -0.307** -0.309 
  (0.199) (0.174) (0.196) (0.135) (0.199) 
Livestock ownership # 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.089 0.058 0.076 0.060 0.090 
  (0.101) (0.096) (0.102) (0.073) (0.101) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.143 0.112 0.139 0.088 0.148 
  (0.160) (0.147) (0.157) (0.134) (0.171) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) 0.042 0.100 0.074 0.313 0.037 
  (0.535) (0.527) (0.528) (0.465) (0.534) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) -0.154 -0.157 -0.167 -0.162 -0.157 
  (0.126) (0.132) (0.129) (0.184) (0.123) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) 0.324** 0.189 0.335** 0.383* 0.326** 
  (0.146) (0.158) (0.145) (0.202) (0.148) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 0.139 0.137 0.130 -0.062 0.138 
  (0.156) (0.146) (0.154) (0.130) (0.155) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) 0.415*** 0.416*** 0.437*** 0.320*** 0.415*** 
  (0.130) (0.116) (0.132) (0.122) (0.130) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.386** 0.271 0.402** 0.438** 0.385* 
  (0.194) (0.176) (0.195) (0.173) (0.197) 
Road conditions # 0.056 0.045 0.040 0.108*** 0.057 
  (0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) -0.080 -0.119 -0.038 IV -0.080 
  (0.138) (0.130) (0.132)  (0.138) 
No risk averse (0/1) 0.123 0.020 0.127 IV 0.124 
  (0.224) (0.225) (0.224)  (0.224) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.270** -0.314** -0.304** -0.259** -0.268* 
  (0.136) (0.132) (0.145) (0.121) (0.140) 
Experience in farming1 Years -0.009 -0.005 -0.009* 0.000 -0.009 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Training  (0/1) 0.619*** 0.122 0.624*** -0.078 0.620*** 
 
 (0.186) (0.202) (0.187) (0.222) (0.187) 
Relationship with other farmers (0/1) 
 
dropped dropped dropped dropped 
Relationship with FO (0/1) 
 
0.849*** 
   
 
 
 
(0.197) 
   Strength of relationship with other 
farmers 
(1/5) 
  
0.097 
  
 
 
  
(0.066) 
  Membership in FO (1/5) 
   
0.430** 
 
 
 
   
(0.170) 
 Social network(ln) # 
    
0.031 
 
 
    
(0.229) 
Constant  3.398*** 3.948*** 3.125*** 3.939*** 3.375*** 
 
 (0.444) (0.415) (0.487) (0.416) (0.512) 
 
 
     Observations  196 196 196 196 196 
R-squared  0.589 0.644 0.592 0.645 0.589 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Basic model and cognitive social capital 
Table 13 Determinants of adoption with cognitive social capital 
 Dep. var=later adoption (0/1) 
Cut-off=2006 
 (A14) (A14) (A14) (A14) 
 Adoption Time adoption- abs Time adoption- rel Intensity 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx Heck-mfx coeff 
Age head1  Years -0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) 0.093*** -0.081 IV 0.508** 
  (0.034) (0.276)  (0.242) 
Higher education (0/1) 0.056*** -0.082 -0.031 0.237 
  (0.018) (0.069) (0.099) (0.183) 
Farm labour1 # -0.019 0.155*** 0.128*** -0.038 
  (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.046) 
Farm size1  Acres 0.006** -0.016*** -0.012*** 0.024*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.297*** -0.166** IV -0.129 
  (0.032) (0.065)  (0.188) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.048 -0.065 0.095 -0.361** 
  (0.050) (0.058) (0.061) (0.169) 
Livestock ownership # 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.044*** 0.012 0.012 0.048 
  (0.012) (0.033) (0.042) (0.102) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.126 0.328*** 0.163*** 0.102 
  (0.119) (0.018) (0.011) (0.222) 
Ownership of tractor  -0.098*** dropped dropped 0.264 
  (0.030)   (0.458) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.109 0.101 0.124 -0.143 
  (0.075) (0.133) (0.137) (0.138) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) -0.044 0.170*** IV 0.176 
  (0.057) (0.047)  (0.164) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 0.031 -0.089 -0.062 0.156 
  (0.050) (0.091) (0.123) (0.141) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) 0.007 -0.095 -0.132 0.410*** 
  (0.090) (0.178) (0.141) (0.128) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.027 0.081 0.029 0.270 
  (0.048) (0.089) (0.073) (0.167) 
Road conditions # -0.028*** 0.014 0.054 0.015 
  (0.007) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 0.056*** 0.072 IV -0.095 
  (0.012) (0.055)  (0.133) 
No risk averse (0/1) 0.047 -0.002 IV -0.025 
  (0.049) (0.041)  (0.220) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.071 -0.143* -0.011 -0.368** 
  (0.074) (0.083) (0.088) (0.142) 
Experience in farming1 Years -0.012*** 0.006* 0.011*** -0.005 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Training  (0/1) 0.091 -0.085 -0.160** 0.115 
  (0.105) (0.234) (0.069) (0.192) 
Trust in input suppliers (1/3) 0.091* -0.145** -0.224*** 0.082 
  (0.051) (0.060) (0.040) (0.057) 
Trust in credit providers (1/3) -0.064 -0.103*** -0.052 -0.020 
  (0.076) (0.033) (0.034) (0.059) 
Trust in extension officers (1/3) 0.038 0.083*** 0.086*** -0.011 
  (0.033) (0.030) (0.009) (0.057) 
Trust in FO (1/3) 0.072** -0.014 -0.045 0.270*** 
  (0.029) (0.040) (0.043) (0.082) 
Trust in Development Agencies (1/3) 0.192*** 0.040 -0.008 0.152** 
  (0.028) (0.115) (0.094) (0.071) 
Trust in NGOs (1/3) 0.016 -0.070 -0.021 -0.087* 
  (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) 
Trust in other farmers (1/3) -0.006 0.312*** 0.152*** -0.059 
  (0.041) (0.109) (0.035) (0.145) 
Observations  305 196 196 196 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Basic model and aggregate measures of social capital 
Table 14 Determinants of adoption with aggregates measure of social capital 
Dep. var=mango adoption 
(0/1) 
 (A7) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) 
 Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
                       
Age head1  Years -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Male head (0/1) 0.181*** 0.152*** 0.190*** 0.105** 0.069 0.108** 0.080 0.077 0.107** 0.101* 
  (0.062) (0.030) (0.064) (0.047) (0.061) (0.052) (0.050) (0.054) (0.047) (0.052) 
Higher education (0/1) -0.003 -0.014 -0.011 0.053*** 0.050** 0.023** 0.082*** 0.059** 0.029*** 0.070*** 
  (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (0.009) (0.026) (0.027) (0.007) (0.015) 
Farm labour1 # -0.017 -0.025 -0.008 -0.027 -0.032* -0.021 -0.025 -0.025 -0.015 -0.017 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) 
Farm size1  Acres 0.013** 0.009* 0.012** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009* 0.011*** 0.008** 0.007* 0.009*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.230*** 0.212*** 0.281*** 0.302*** 0.305*** 0.335*** 0.375*** 0.228*** 0.255*** 0.283*** 
  (0.063) (0.046) (0.032) (0.027) (0.057) (0.036) (0.017) (0.040) (0.027) (0.018) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.096* -0.069 -0.081* -0.090** -0.069 -0.117*** -0.135*** -0.103* 
  (0.035) (0.023) (0.053) (0.072) (0.049) (0.038) (0.058) (0.045) (0.044) (0.058) 
Livestock ownership # 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.064* 0.076** 0.038 0.048* 0.076*** 0.058** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.043** 0.046** 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.026) (0.013) (0.025) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.112 -0.012 0.086 0.075 -0.027 -0.046 -0.011 0.080 0.069 0.086 
  (0.085) (0.140) (0.068) (0.072) (0.082) (0.103) (0.070) (0.078) (0.079) (0.070) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) -0.346*** -0.278*** -0.281*** -0.190*** -0.222*** -0.205*** -0.156*** -0.165*** -0.138*** -0.147*** 
  (0.066) (0.055) (0.050) (0.008) (0.075) (0.070) (0.033) (0.060) (0.047) (0.011) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.087 0.046 0.110 0.057 0.042 0.041 0.039 0.008 0.013 0.016 
  (0.118) (0.100) (0.128) (0.111) (0.091) (0.092) (0.093) (0.088) (0.083) (0.095) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) -0.093*** -0.050* -0.130*** -0.080*** -0.074 -0.062* -0.078* -0.089 -0.082** -0.100** 
  (0.027) (0.029) (0.049) (0.030) (0.054) (0.035) (0.042) (0.057) (0.040) (0.042) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 0.057** 0.044** 0.046* 0.032 0.033 0.023 0.012 0.045 0.027 0.025 
  (0.026) (0.021) (0.025) (0.043) (0.037) (0.031) (0.027) (0.050) (0.044) (0.040) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) 0.006 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 -0.000 0.004 -0.002 -0.023 -0.009 -0.015 
  (0.053) (0.054) (0.074) (0.083) (0.057) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.078) (0.073) 
Ownership of car (0/1) -0.032*** -0.022 0.016 0.089*** 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.062*** 0.031*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) 
Road conditions # -0.035** -0.031* -0.040** -0.027 -0.015 -0.024* -0.020 -0.022 -0.034** -0.027* 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 0.123*** 0.165*** 0.115*** 0.124* 0.111*** 0.122*** 0.108** 0.093*** 0.114*** 0.112** 
  (0.036) (0.032) (0.043) (0.064) (0.027) (0.040) (0.053) (0.032) (0.033) (0.054) 
No risk averse (0/1) 0.034 0.063 -0.012 0.059 0.037 0.014 0.046 0.036 0.023 0.050 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dep. var=mango adoption 
(0/1) 
 (A7) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) 
 Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
                       
  (0.078) (0.061) (0.092) (0.045) (0.035) (0.039) (0.029) (0.041) (0.033) (0.040) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.022 -0.030 -0.063 -0.102 -0.053 -0.066 -0.080 -0.045 -0.054 -0.079 
  (0.064) (0.047) (0.078) (0.097) (0.067) (0.068) (0.077) (0.065) (0.062) (0.080) 
Experience in farming1 Years -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Training  (0/1) 0.503*** 0.256* 0.406*** 0.153 0.183** 0.137 0.161 0.078 0.059 0.103 
 
 (0.112) (0.142) (0.089) (0.115) (0.085) (0.103) (0.117) (0.104) (0.115) (0.133) 
Structural Bridging Index # 
 
0.167*** 
        
 
 
 
(0.027) 
        Structural Bonding Index # 
  
0.126*** 
       
 
 
  
(0.043) 
       Cognitive Index  # 
   
0.214*** 
      
 
 
   
(0.049) 
      Diversity social capital  # 
    
0.159*** 
     
 
 
    
(0.012) 
     Intensity of diversity of social capital # 
     
0.046*** 
    
 
 
     
(0.006) 
    General trust # 
      
0.063*** 
   
 
 
      
(0.012) 
   Diversity of selected change agents # 
       
0.228*** 
  
 
 
       
(0.021) 
  Intensity of diversity of selected change agents  # 
        
0.066*** 
 
 
 
        
(0.010) 
 Trust in selected change agents # 
         
0.084*** 
 
 
         
(0.016) 
 
 
          Observations  305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 15 Determinants of time of adoption with aggregates measure of social capital - absolute cut-off 
 Dep. var=later adoption (0/1) 
Cut-off=2006 
 (A7) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) 
 Time 
adoption-
abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption-abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
                       
Age head1  Years -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) -0.074 -0.068 -0.071 -0.077 -0.071 -0.072 -0.085 -0.071 -0.072 -0.087 
  (0.252) (0.267) (0.244) (0.224) (0.270) (0.264) (0.250) (0.268) (0.263) (0.252) 
Higher education (0/1) -0.080** -0.084** -0.085*** -0.076*** -0.081** -0.081** -0.071** -0.082** -0.080** -0.072** 
  (0.039) (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) (0.038) (0.040) (0.033) (0.037) (0.039) (0.034) 
Farm labour1 # 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.018) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) 
Farm size1  Acres -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.206 -0.211 -0.185 -0.149 -0.209 -0.212 -0.170 -0.207 -0.209 -0.183 
  (0.139) (0.151) (0.174) (0.143) (0.132) (0.149) (0.138) (0.136) (0.146) (0.135) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.101*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.094*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.095*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.104*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.018) (0.013) (0.006) 
Livestock ownership # -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.015 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.154 0.199 0.142 0.147 0.159 0.160 0.130 0.155 0.155 0.153 
 
 (0.137) (0.147) (0.154) (0.125) (0.136) (0.152) (0.129) (0.138) (0.141) (0.125) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.085 0.104 0.091 0.078 0.086 0.087 0.076 0.087 0.087 0.076 
  (0.169) (0.164) (0.148) (0.161) (0.164) (0.172) (0.165) (0.162) (0.172) (0.163) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) 0.137*** 0.130*** 0.139*** 0.156*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.153*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.143*** 
  (0.032) (0.044) (0.029) (0.032) (0.051) (0.046) (0.046) (0.040) (0.037) (0.033) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) -0.040 -0.033 -0.053 -0.073 -0.037 -0.036 -0.063 -0.036 -0.037 -0.062 
  (0.114) (0.111) (0.128) (0.127) (0.127) (0.130) (0.133) (0.125) (0.132) (0.129) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) -0.068 -0.052 -0.076 -0.093 -0.066 -0.066 -0.084 -0.066 -0.066 -0.081 
  (0.142) (0.152) (0.134) (0.157) (0.151) (0.142) (0.154) (0.151) (0.142) (0.156) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.028 0.057 0.037 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.023 
  (0.093) (0.065) (0.102) (0.099) (0.087) (0.086) (0.099) (0.077) (0.076) (0.094) 
Road conditions # 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.023 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.019 0.020 0.022 
  (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.032) (0.036) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 0.042 0.031 0.042 0.036 0.042 0.041 0.037 0.043 0.041 0.035 
  (0.065) (0.057) (0.068) (0.063) (0.063) (0.067) (0.066) (0.062) (0.066) (0.066) 
No risk averse (0/1) -0.033 -0.022 -0.044 -0.069 -0.031 -0.031 -0.049 -0.030 -0.031 -0.055 
  (0.078) (0.055) (0.082) (0.063) (0.066) (0.067) (0.071) (0.058) (0.063) (0.063) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.060 -0.084 -0.069 -0.081 -0.061 -0.061 -0.065 -0.063 -0.061 -0.064 
  (0.095) (0.068) (0.100) (0.122) (0.089) (0.091) (0.109) (0.079) (0.088) (0.108) 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Dep. var=later adoption (0/1) 
Cut-off=2006 
 (A7) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) 
 Time 
adoption-
abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption-abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
Time 
adoption- abs 
VARIABLES  mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
                       
Experience in farming1 Years 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Training  (0/1) -0.043 0.071 -0.075 -0.176 -0.029 -0.027 -0.117 -0.016 -0.024 -0.142 
 
 (0.221) (0.187) (0.188) (0.169) (0.192) (0.157) (0.179) (0.216) (0.131) (0.173) 
Structural Bridging Index # 
 
-0.075 
        
 
 
 
(0.057) 
        Structural Bonding Index # 
  
0.032 
       
 
 
  
(0.067) 
       Cognitive Index  # 
   
0.078 
      
 
 
   
(0.050) 
      Diversity social capital  # 
    
-0.006 
     
 
 
    
(0.051) 
     Intensity of diversity of social 
capital 
# 
     
-0.002 
    
 
 
     
(0.009) 
    General trust # 
      
0.013 
   
 
 
      
(0.015) 
   Diversity of selected change 
agents 
# 
       
-0.013 
  
 
 
       
(0.091) 
  Intensity of diversity of selected 
change agents  
# 
        
-0.003 
 
 
 
        
(0.016) 
 Trust in selected change agents # 
         
0.020 
 
 
         
(0.026) 
 
 
          Observations  196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 16 Determinants of time of adoption with aggregates measure of social capital - relative cut-off 
 Dep. var=later adoption 
(0/1) 
Cut-off=regional median 
 (A7) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) 
 Time 
adoption-rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption-rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
VARIABLES  Heck-mfx Heck- mfx Heck- mfx mfx Heck- mfx Heck- mfx mfx Heck- mfx mfx mfx 
   
          
Age head1  Years -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Male head (0/1) IV IV IV -0.099 IV IV -0.101 IV -0.087 -0.107 
     (0.110)   (0.126)  (0.130) (0.126) 
Higher education (0/1) -0.013 -0.041 -0.015 -0.004 -0.047 -0.036 -0.002 -0.050 -0.007 0.001 
  (0.070) (0.086) (0.060) (0.044) (0.086) (0.074) (0.044) (0.087) (0.049) (0.044) 
Farm labour1 # 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.122*** 0.132*** 0.134*** 0.127*** 0.132*** 0.134*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 
  (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
Farm size1  Acres -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.014** -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Land ownership (0/1) IV IV IV -0.062 IV IV -0.066 IV -0.083 -0.068 
     (0.138)   (0.143)  (0.155) (0.143) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) 0.087* 0.087*** 0.067 0.039 0.079* 0.074 0.040 0.083 0.036 0.036 
  (0.046) (0.034) (0.066) (0.043) (0.046) (0.057) (0.039) (0.055) (0.050) (0.046) 
Livestock ownership # -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.008 0.001 0.014 0.011 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.011 
  (0.027) (0.040) (0.027) (0.035) (0.034) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.112 0.152 0.114 0.120 0.134 0.131 0.113 0.092 0.123 0.122 
  (0.134) (0.121) (0.135) (0.107) (0.138) (0.132) (0.105) (0.129) (0.118) (0.106) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.132 0.162 0.102 0.128 0.161 0.147 0.126 0.166 0.130 0.125 
  (0.149) (0.123) (0.133) (0.159) (0.145) (0.142) (0.162) (0.134) (0.169) (0.159) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) IV IV IV 0.077 IV IV 0.079 IV 0.072 0.075 
     (0.142)   (0.153)  (0.140) (0.138) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) -0.050 -0.048 -0.024 -0.064 -0.030 -0.029 -0.063 -0.041 -0.049 -0.066 
  (0.116) (0.118) (0.144) (0.124) (0.139) (0.140) (0.133) (0.141) (0.134) (0.127) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) -0.107 -0.095 -0.091 -0.109 -0.093 -0.091 -0.107 -0.093 -0.098 -0.108 
  (0.150) (0.137) (0.117) (0.141) (0.145) (0.130) (0.141) (0.142) (0.130) (0.141) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.052 0.075 0.007 0.023 0.019 0.014 0.025 0.011 0.027 0.020 
  (0.060) (0.069) (0.080) (0.072) (0.080) (0.076) (0.074) (0.077) (0.062) (0.072) 
Road conditions # 0.053* 0.063*** 0.052** 0.047 0.051* 0.052** 0.047 0.055** 0.047* 0.048 
  (0.030) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) IV IV IV 0.036 IV IV 0.035 IV 0.034 0.033 
     (0.064)   (0.065)  (0.064) (0.066) 
No risk averse (0/1) IV IV IV -0.063 IV IV -0.059 IV -0.051 -0.066 
     (0.117)   (0.117)  (0.115) (0.114) 
Impatient  (0/1) 0.005 -0.009 0.019 -0.027 -0.002 0.001 -0.021 -0.006 -0.018 -0.022 
  (0.077) (0.068) (0.068) (0.099) (0.071) (0.072) (0.090) (0.061) (0.081) (0.091) 
Experience in farming1 Years 0.010** 0.010*** 0.010** 0.008** 0.011** 0.011** 0.008*** 0.011** 0.008*** 0.008** 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Dep. var=later adoption 
(0/1) 
Cut-off=regional median 
 (A7) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) 
 Time 
adoption-rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption-rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
Time 
adoption- rel 
VARIABLES  Heck-mfx Heck- mfx Heck- mfx mfx Heck- mfx Heck- mfx mfx Heck- mfx mfx mfx 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Training  (0/1) -0.200* -0.083*** -0.102 -0.169*** -0.060** -0.059*** -0.155*** -0.063 -0.101*** -0.181** 
  (0.112) (0.024) (0.098) (0.061) (0.029) (0.022) (0.058) (0.079) (0.035) (0.074) 
Structural Bridging Index # 
 
-0.080**  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
(0.035)  
 
  
 
 
  
Structural Bonding Index # 
  
-0.054** 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
(0.023) 
 
  
 
 
  
Cognitive Index  # 
  
 0.027   
 
 
  
  
   
(0.044)   
 
 
  
Diversity social capital  # 
    
-0.055  
 
 
  
  
    
(0.043)  
 
 
  
Intensity of diversity of 
social capital 
# 
     
-0.014* 
 
 
  
  
     
(0.008) 
 
 
  
General trust # 
      
0.005    
  
      
(0.014)    
Diversity of selected change 
agents 
# 
      
 -0.059   
  
      
 (0.071)   
Intensity of diversity of 
selected change agents  
# 
      
  -0.004  
  
      
  (0.013)  
Trust in selected change 
agents 
# 
      
   0.013 
  
      
   (0.022) 
  
          
Observations  196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 17 Determinants of intensity of adoption with aggregates measure of social capital 
Dep var=ln(n. trees) (A7) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) 
 
 Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
                       
Age head1  Years 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) 0.421* 0.418 0.470* 0.436* 0.386 0.397 0.394 0.386 0.403 0.382 
  (0.254) (0.254) (0.249) (0.234) (0.252) (0.248) (0.243) (0.256) (0.247) (0.244) 
Higher education (0/1) 0.372* 0.369* 0.326* 0.330* 0.362* 0.348* 0.365* 0.376** 0.346* 0.370* 
  (0.195) (0.196) (0.185) (0.185) (0.196) (0.195) (0.193) (0.190) (0.189) (0.189) 
Farm labour1 # -0.063 -0.062 -0.034 -0.051 -0.061 -0.054 -0.057 -0.059 -0.050 -0.058 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.050) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
Farm size1  Acres 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership (0/1) -0.133 -0.135 -0.185 -0.216 -0.166 -0.136 -0.164 -0.207 -0.193 -0.218 
  (0.216) (0.219) (0.203) (0.208) (0.226) (0.217) (0.219) (0.223) (0.216) (0.217) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.311 -0.314 -0.380** -0.390** -0.331 -0.329* -0.346* -0.375* -0.374* -0.385** 
  (0.199) (0.201) (0.186) (0.189) (0.202) (0.197) (0.201) (0.199) (0.191) (0.195) 
Livestock ownership # 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.089 0.092 0.056 0.076 0.098 0.088 0.094 0.089 0.078 0.086 
  (0.101) (0.102) (0.101) (0.098) (0.105) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.100) (0.099) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.143 0.129 0.064 0.120 0.072 0.064 0.066 0.137 0.136 0.142 
  (0.160) (0.171) (0.152) (0.160) (0.187) (0.175) (0.178) (0.163) (0.161) (0.162) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) 0.042 0.066 0.190 0.275 0.131 0.168 0.184 0.186 0.283 0.256 
  (0.535) (0.532) (0.515) (0.458) (0.498) (0.486) (0.472) (0.482) (0.474) (0.472) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) -0.154 -0.160 -0.130 -0.223* -0.180 -0.190 -0.202* -0.194 -0.208* -0.213* 
  (0.126) (0.123) (0.126) (0.130) (0.121) (0.123) (0.122) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) 0.324** 0.326** 0.257* 0.219 0.317** 0.326** 0.294** 0.280* 0.278* 0.240 
  (0.146) (0.146) (0.152) (0.144) (0.152) (0.145) (0.147) (0.154) (0.147) (0.151) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 0.139 0.138 0.139 0.171 0.125 0.118 0.134 0.130 0.120 0.145 
  (0.156) (0.157) (0.148) (0.148) (0.158) (0.155) (0.154) (0.154) (0.151) (0.151) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) 0.415*** 0.409*** 0.440*** 0.420*** 0.410*** 0.408*** 0.413*** 0.414*** 0.418*** 0.423*** 
  (0.130) (0.129) (0.127) (0.120) (0.128) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) (0.123) (0.124) 
Ownership of car (0/1) 0.386** 0.375* 0.377** 0.315* 0.354* 0.345* 0.360* 0.307 0.300 0.314* 
  (0.194) (0.199) (0.184) (0.172) (0.198) (0.195) (0.192) (0.195) (0.190) (0.185) 
Road conditions # 0.056 0.056 0.025 0.023 0.055 0.048 0.043 0.053 0.040 0.039 
  (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) -0.080 -0.075 -0.048 -0.052 -0.073 -0.049 -0.068 -0.086 -0.047 -0.076 
  (0.138) (0.138) (0.133) (0.133) (0.138) (0.136) (0.138) (0.136) (0.132) (0.136) 
No risk averse (0/1) 0.123 0.118 0.088 0.031 0.109 0.099 0.083 0.092 0.097 0.058 
  (0.224) (0.224) (0.216) (0.207) (0.222) (0.220) (0.218) (0.218) (0.214) (0.212) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.270** -0.264* -0.338** -0.368*** -0.274** -0.277** -0.302** -0.259* -0.273** -0.305** 
  (0.136) (0.139) (0.147) (0.137) (0.136) (0.136) (0.134) (0.136) (0.135) (0.136) 
 1 Values at the time of adoption for mango farmers; current values for non-mango farmers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dep var=ln(n. trees) (A7) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) 
 
 Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
                       
Experience in farming1 Years -0.009 -0.009 -0.009* -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Training  (0/1) 0.619*** 0.577*** 0.469** 0.213 0.426** 0.394** 0.402** 0.289 0.252 0.301 
 
 (0.186) (0.197) (0.187) (0.186) (0.193) (0.188) (0.177) (0.201) (0.207) (0.195) 
Structural Bridging Index # 
 
0.029 
        
 
 
 
(0.054) 
        Structural Bonding Index # 
  
0.195** 
       
 
 
  
(0.075) 
       Cognitive Index  # 
   
0.279*** 
      
 
 
   
(0.060) 
      Diversity social capital  # 
    
0.094* 
     
 
 
    
(0.055) 
     Intensity of diversity of social capital # 
     
0.029** 
    
 
 
     
(0.013) 
    General trust # 
      
0.045*** 
   
 
 
      
(0.017) 
   Diversity of selected change agents # 
       
0.178*** 
  
 
 
       
(0.062) 
  Intensity of diversity of selected change agents  # 
        
0.055*** 
 
 
 
        
(0.017) 
 Trust in selected change agents # 
         
0.076*** 
 
 
         
(0.023) 
Constant  3.398*** 3.355*** 3.341*** 3.393*** 3.278*** 3.284*** 3.355*** 3.354*** 3.395*** 3.473*** 
 
 (0.444) (0.448) (0.446) (0.415) (0.434) (0.436) (0.429) (0.443) (0.434) (0.434) 
 
 
          Observations  196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
R-squared  0.589 0.589 0.610 0.628 0.596 0.600 0.602 0.604 0.612 0.610 
 
  
Appendix 3.4. Estimation without large farmers 
In order to validate the robustness of the results I have also run additional estimations 
on a subset of farmers. One of the main differences between adopters and non-adopters 
highlighted in Section 3 was the size of the cultivated farm. Adopters, early adopters as 
well as more intense adopters were observed to have consistently higher farm size that 
the respective comparison group. These differences might have been driven by the 
existence in the sample of very big mango farmers. The exploratory analysis suggests 
that among non-mango farmers the biggest farm size is about 21 acres while among 
mango farmers the largest farm is 127 acres (Figure 6). In order to reduce the systematic 
difference in farm endowments between adopters and non-adopters I have run the 
analysis of the adoption and its dimensions on the subset of farmers with similar farm 
size (with 21 or less acres). As a result of this selection, 20 mango farmers were 
excluded from the analysis. Using this sample, I have re-run the basic model as in Table 
6 and the model with social capital variables as in Table 7. The results in Table 18 show 
that the estimations discussed above do not change much when the biggest farmers are 
dropped from the analysis. The size, the significance as well as the direction of the 
coefficients estimated in the full model remain very similar also in these estimations. 
However, some differences can be pointed out. 
First, farm size becomes not significant in the discrete decision to adopt mango. This 
result is, however, expected as, in this sample, mango and non-mango farmers are more 
similar in terms of farm endowment (right graph in Figure 6).  
Figure 6 Farm size, by adoption status 
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More differences can be noticed for the time of adoption. In these analyses, land 
ownership becomes not significant, suggesting that when similar size farms are 
compared, owning land increases the probability to adopt earlier than others. Moreover, 
the production of other cash crops also becomes not significant for both analyses of the 
time of adoption. This result might be explained with the fact that the production of 
other cash crops is more evenly distributed between early (earlier) and late (later) 
adopters (85 farmers vs 88 farmers compared to 103 farmers vs 93 farmers in the case 
of the full sample).  
In the analysis of the intensity of adoption, higher education and gender of the head of 
the household becomes not significant while the ownership of tractor and experience in 
farming become now statistically relevant. These changes might suggest that for 
relatively similar farmers in terms of land cultivated, the intensity of adoption is more 
affected by farm assets and skills than human capital characteristic. More specifically, 
these results tend to indicate that, although the majority of the estimation results are 
quite robust to the different sample specification, when reducing the differences in 
terms of farm size, farm assets and farm related skills might become more important for 
the adoption decision. 
The robustness of the previous estimations is also confirmed by the result of the model 
which includes social capital variables (Table 19). Overall, the results do not change 
much with regards to the majority of the measures of social capital, regardless of what 
dimension of the adoption decision is analysed. The only difference that can be pointed 
out is the higher importance for farmers of similar farm size of having a relationship 
with input or credit providers, which are found to be positively associated with early 
adoption. Extension services are still found to increase the time of adoption also for this 
group of farmers. Nonetheless, both cognitive and social capital associations with 
adoption decision and its dimensions do not change much suggesting that the presence 
of big farmers in the previous estimations did not significantly affects the results. A 
similar story is observed for the majority of the aggregate measures of social capital.
  
Table 18 Determinants of adoption, basic model (no large mango farmers) 
   (A24) (A25) (A27) (A28) 
 
 
Adoption 
Time adoption 
Absolute cut-off119 
Time adoption 
Relative cut-off120 
Intensity 
VARIABLES  Probit Probit Probit OLS 
  mfx mfx mfx coeff. 
           
Age head121 Years -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male head (0/1) 0.197*** -0.067 -0.117 0.400 
  (0.071) (0.266) (0.095) (0.252) 
Higher education (0/1) 0.007 -0.054 0.010 0.182 
  (0.009) (0.079) (0.084) (0.196) 
Farm labour14 # -0.012 0.114*** 0.106*** -0.041 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.008) (0.049) 
Farm size14  Acres -0.001 -0.040*** -0.029*** 0.089*** 
  (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.019) 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.277*** -0.237*** -0.125** -0.097 
  (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.229) 
Production other cash crops (0/1) -0.081* -0.082 0.093*** -0.525** 
  (0.042) (0.059) (0.016) (0.201) 
Livestock ownership # 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Access to non-farm income (0/1) 0.080** 0.057 0.015 0.086 
  (0.037) (0.058) (0.056) (0.109) 
Access to credit (0/1) 0.120 0.148 0.146 0.167 
  (0.091) (0.143) (0.121) (0.168) 
Ownership of tractor (0/1) -0.369*** dropped dropped 0.903*** 
  (0.049) 
  
(0.324) 
Ownership of mobile (0/1) 0.091 0.131 0.161 -0.178 
  (0.127) (0.156) (0.144) (0.132) 
Ownership of radio (0/1) -0.095*** 0.148*** 0.087 0.296** 
  (0.034) (0.025) (0.109) (0.144) 
Ownership of bicycle (0/1) 0.063** -0.051 -0.071 0.078 
  (0.029) (0.109) (0.125) (0.147) 
Ownership of motorcycle (0/1) -0.005 -0.030 -0.029 0.262* 
  (0.053) (0.199) (0.192) (0.136) 
Ownership of car (0/1) -0.044*** 0.081 0.102 0.457** 
  (0.002) (0.099) (0.075) (0.221) 
Road conditions # -0.031 0.026 0.050** 0.066* 
  (0.020) (0.036) (0.025) (0.036) 
Moderate risk averse (0/1) 0.145*** 0.043 0.025 -0.034 
  (0.035) (0.068) (0.073) (0.128) 
No risk averse (0/1) 0.063 0.028 -0.013 0.055 
  (0.082) (0.092) (0.122) (0.243) 
Impatient  (0/1) -0.015 -0.056 -0.020 -0.311** 
  (0.072) (0.105) (0.078) (0.134) 
Experience in farming1 Years -0.013*** 0.009** 0.011*** -0.014** 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
Training  (0/1) 0.531*** -0.064 -0.152** 0.510*** 
  (0.116) (0.229) (0.059) (0.180) 
Constant  
   
3.246*** 
 
 
   
(0.450) 
Observations  285 176 176 176 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
    
                                                 
119
 =1 if late adopter; = 0 if early adopter. Cut-off year=2006 
120
 =1 if later adopter; =0 if earlier adopter. Cut-off year= regional median of year of adoption 
121
 At the time of adoption for mango farmers; current for non-mango farmers. 
  
Table 19 Social capital (no large mango farmers) 
Basic model and social capital   (A28) (A30) (A31) (A32) 
  Adoption Time adoption 
Absolute cut-off122 
Time adoption 
Relative cut-off123 
Intensity 
  Probit Heck/Probit Heck/Probit Heck/ OLS 
VARIABLES   mfx mfx mfx coeff 
      
Structural bonding social capital      
Relationship with FO (0/1) 0.352*** 0.164 -0.047 0.715*** 
  (0.084) (0.118) (0.095) (0.204) 
Strength of relationship with other 
farmers 
(0/1) 
0.060 0.091 0.024 0.075 
  (0.061) (0.079) (0.040) (0.065) 
Membership in FO (0/1) 0.303*** 0.178 0.056124 0.766*** 
  (0.096) (0.117) (0.334) (0.190) 
Social network # -0.198* 0.104 0.327** -0.076 
  (0.109) (0.213) (0.136) (0.220) 
Structural bridging social capital      
Relationship with input suppliers (0/1) 0.411*** -0.406*** dropped -0.001 
  (0.145) (0.039)  (0.119) 
Relationship with credit providers (0/1) -0.460** -0.190*** -0.660***24 0.099 
  (0.209) (0.044) (0.252) (0.179) 
Relationship with extension officers (0/1) 0.164*** 0.039 0.521**24 -0.262 
  (0.037) (0.110) (0.204) (0.174) 
Relationship with Dev Agencies (0/1) 0.505*** 0.109 0.47724 0.333* 
  (0.062) (0.252) (0.649) (0.181) 
Relationship with NGOs (0/1) 0.085 -0.195** -0.29324 -0.211 
  (0.080) (0.087) (0.178) (0.128) 
Strength of relationship with input 
suppliers 
(1/5) 
0.058** -0.030 -0.053*** -0.009 
  (0.023) (0.030) (0.012) (0.039) 
Strength of relationship with credit 
providers 
(1/5) 
-0.075 -0.071*** -0.073*** 0.019 
  (0.066) (0.016) (0.018) (0.048) 
Strength of relationship with 
extension officers 
(1/5) 
0.030 0.008 0.041 -0.044 
  (0.023) (0.029) (0.030) (0.040) 
Strength of relationship with Dev 
Agencies 
(1/5) 
0.220*** 0.030 0.009 0.103** 
  (0.028) (0.066) (0.057) (0.045) 
Strength of relationship with NGOs (1/5) 0.027 -0.064 -0.031 -0.060 
  (0.024) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) 
Cognitive social capital      
Trust in input suppliers (1/3) 0.117* -0.117** -0.199*** 0.09424 
  (0.066) (0.048) (0.044) (0.072) 
Trust in credit providers (1/3) -0.080 -0.136*** -0.103*** -0.01024 
  (0.086) (0.052) (0.009) (0.074) 
Trust in extension officers (1/3) 0.043 0.069*** 0.102*** -0.07524 
  (0.040) (0.023) (0.019) (0.052) 
Trust in FO (1/3) 0.093*** 0.001 -0.050 0.227***24 
  (0.036) (0.049) (0.046) (0.060) 
Trust in Development Agencies (1/3) 0.232*** 0.039 0.035 0.09124 
  (0.030) (0.115) (0.093) (0.057) 
Trust in NGOs (1/3) 0.005 -0.067 -0.013 -0.05624 
  (0.058) (0.044) (0.040) (0.051) 
Trust in other farmers (1/3) -0.005 0.307*** 0.166*** -0.06124 
  (0.052) (0.117) (0.049) (0.124) 
Aggregates      
Structural Bridging Index # 0.179*** -0.077 -0.046 -0.046 
  (0.031) (0.059) (0.046) (0.053) 
Structural Bonding Index # 0.144*** 0.028 -0.061 0.177** 
  (0.044) (0.075) (0.048) (0.072) 
Cognitive Index  # 0.246*** 0.082 0.018 0.223*** 
  (0.055) (0.060) (0.045) (0.061) 
Diversity social capital  # 0.175*** 0.000 -0.029 0.043 
  (0.009) (0.054) (0.051) (0.057) 
Intensity of diversity of social capital # 0.052*** -0.001 -0.009 0.016 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) 
General trust # 0.073*** 0.013 -0.000 0.036** 
                                                 
122
 =1 if late adopter; = 0 if early adopter. Cut-off year=2006 
123
 =1 if later adopter; =0 if earlier adopter. Cut-off year= regional median of year of adoption 
124
 Heckman corrected 
  
Basic model and social capital   (A28) (A30) (A31) (A32) 
  Adoption Time adoption 
Absolute cut-off122 
Time adoption 
Relative cut-off123 
Intensity 
  Probit Heck/Probit Heck/Probit Heck/ OLS 
VARIABLES   mfx mfx mfx coeff 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Diversity of selected change agents # 0.252*** -0.000 0.09024 0.166* 
  (0.023) (0.099) (0.260) (0.087) 
Intensity of diversity of selected 
change agents  
# 
0.074*** -0.001 -0.008 0.033** 
  (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) 
Trust in selected change agents # 0.096*** 0.023 0.009 0.056** 
  (0.018) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022) 
 
  
Appendix 3.5. The role of social capital in reducing barriers to adoption 
Table 20 Sub-sample by type of change agents 
  (A33) (A34) (A35) (A36) (A37) (A38) (A39) (A40) (A41) (A42) (A43) (A44) 
 
Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Intensity Intensity 
Time 
adoption - 
abs 
Time 
adoption - 
abs 
Time 
adoption - 
abs Time adoption - abs 
Time 
adoption-rel 
Time 
adoption-rel 
VARIABLES 
Input 
suppliers Extension officers 
Development 
agencies FO 
Development 
agencies FO 
Input 
suppliers 
Credit 
providers NGOs FO 
Input 
suppliers 
Extension 
officers 
                         
Age head1  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.007 -0.004 -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
Male head 0.124** 0.093 0.999*** 0.035 1.028*** 0.641* -0.100 -0.000 -0.021 -0.160 -0.108 0.020 
 (0.061) (0.093) (0.001) (0.021) (0.279) (0.346) (0.256) (0.000) (0.305) (0.293) (0.116) (0.227) 
Higher education -0.022 -0.102*** dropped -0.007 0.923*** 0.626*** -0.074** dropped 0.206* -0.147*** 0.008 -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.029) 
 
(0.024) (0.340) (0.236) (0.034) 
 
(0.111) (0.051) (0.053) (0.059) 
Farm labour1 -0.030 -0.007 -0.000 0.001 0.046 -0.022 0.150*** -0.000 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.143*** 0.150*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.000) (0.002) (0.062) (0.047) (0.011) (0.000) (0.026) (0.013) (0.012) (0.031) 
Farm size1  0.011* 0.011*** -0.000 0.001 0.023*** 0.028*** -0.014*** -0.000 -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Land ownership 0.219** 0.054** -0.564*** 0.027 0.213 -0.087 -0.156 -0.149** -0.326* -0.143 -0.034 -0.152** 
 (0.088) (0.022) (0.063) (0.022) (0.331) (0.194) (0.134) (0.072) (0.189) (0.199) (0.154) (0.064) 
Production other cash crops -0.060 -0.063*** dropped -0.010 -0.215 -0.735** -0.091*** -1.000*** 0.048 -0.137 0.030 0.142*** 
 (0.039) (0.002) 
 
(0.013) (0.408) (0.288) (0.009) (0.000) (0.041) (0.215) (0.054) (0.036) 
Livestock ownership -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000** 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Access to non-farm income 0.054* 0.023 -0.000 0.009 -0.165 -0.022 0.004 0.000 0.101* 0.031 -0.004 -0.043 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.000) (0.006) (0.126) (0.088) (0.030) (0.000) (0.052) (0.071) (0.038) (0.043) 
Access to credit 0.052 0.076 dropped 0.004 0.350 0.144 0.124 dropped dropped 0.173 0.087 0.207*** 
 (0.066) (0.059) 
 
(0.005) (0.215) (0.150) (0.121) 
 
 (0.153) (0.111) (0.056) 
Ownership of tractor -0.428*** dropped dropped 
 
0.263 -0.230 dropped dropped dropped 
    (0.061) 
   
(0.596) (0.576) 
  
 
   Ownership of mobile 0.114 0.094 0.000 -0.013** -0.257 -0.043 0.040 0.000 -0.497*** 0.172 0.083 0.369** 
 (0.122) (0.171) (0.000) (0.006) (0.177) (0.121) (0.141) (0.000) (0.162) (0.217) (0.145) (0.157) 
Ownership of radio -0.055*** -0.059 0.000 -0.010 0.300* 0.157 0.163*** 0.765*** -0.083 0.239*** 0.094 -0.017 
 (0.018) (0.045) (0.000) (0.012) (0.159) (0.144) (0.046) (0.084) (0.110) (0.031) (0.159) (0.218) 
Ownership of bicycle 0.055 0.008 -0.000 0.000 0.086 -0.062 -0.027 -0.117* 0.014 -0.037 -0.056 0.016 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.000) (0.005) (0.216) (0.182) (0.127) (0.061) (0.114) (0.228) (0.146) (0.171) 
Ownership of motorcycle -0.014 -0.019 0.000 -0.001 0.654*** 0.467*** -0.067 -0.020*** 0.155 -0.140 -0.121 -0.104 
 (0.052) (0.039) (0.000) (0.004) (0.152) (0.121) (0.148) (0.005) (0.209) (0.182) (0.131) (0.128) 
Ownership of car 0.066*** 0.080** 
  
0.565* 0.430* 0.032 0.179** 0.173 -0.028 0.046 -0.039 
 (0.019) (0.038) 
  
(0.302) (0.228) (0.093) (0.081) (0.140) (0.085) (0.077) (0.043) 
Road conditions -0.027 -0.024** -0.000 0.005 0.100 0.068 0.021 -0.000 -0.036 0.041 0.049* 0.063*** 
  
  (A33) (A34) (A35) (A36) (A37) (A38) (A39) (A40) (A41) (A42) (A43) (A44) 
 
Adoption Adoption Adoption Adoption Intensity Intensity 
Time 
adoption - 
abs 
Time 
adoption - 
abs 
Time 
adoption - 
abs Time adoption - abs 
Time 
adoption-rel 
Time 
adoption-rel 
VARIABLES 
Input 
suppliers Extension officers 
Development 
agencies FO 
Development 
agencies FO 
Input 
suppliers 
Credit 
providers NGOs FO 
Input 
suppliers 
Extension 
officers 
                         
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.000) (0.005) (0.062) (0.046) (0.031) (0.000) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.019) 
Moderate risk averse 0.151*** 0.171*** dropped 0.039*** -0.140 -0.205 0.011 0.758*** -0.076 0.067 0.002 0.046 
 (0.040) (0.049) 
 
(0.011) (0.211) (0.176) (0.070) (0.096) (0.064) (0.158) (0.067) (0.171) 
No risk averse 0.053 0.078 dropped 0.008 -0.112 -0.196 -0.029 0.010 -0.024 -0.010 -0.110 -0.028 
 (0.059) (0.064) 
 
(0.009) (0.284) (0.237) (0.065) (0.008) (0.068) (0.148) (0.106) (0.234) 
Impatient  -0.006 -0.077** -0.002** -0.049 -0.382** -0.175 -0.030 0.000 0.187 -0.167 -0.005 -0.014 
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.001) (0.040) (0.164) (0.124) (0.092) (0.000) (0.246) (0.120) (0.077) (0.095) 
Experience in farming1 -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.006 -0.001 0.005 -0.000 0.011*** 0.005 0.008*** 0.008* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.005) 
Training  0.507*** 0.244*** dropped 0.908*** dropped -0.063 -0.047 dropped 0.046 0.132 -0.112 -0.146*** 
 
(0.058) (0.063) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.356) (0.215) 
 
(0.150) (0.270) (0.070) (0.035) 
         
 
   Observations 276 188 32 117 103 123 186 38 69 123 186 153 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 21 Social capital interactions (Bridging Social Capital) 
  (A1) (A45) (A2) (A46) (A3) (A47) (A4) (A48) 
 
Adoption Adoption Time adoption - abs Time adoption - abs Time adoption - rel Time adoption - rel Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
                  
Farm size  0.013** 0.009* -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership 0.230*** 0.213*** -0.206 -0.259* -0.080 -0.086 -0.133 -0.104 
 (0.063) (0.052) (0.139) (0.157) (0.150) (0.159) (0.216) (0.216) 
Radio -0.093*** -0.065*** 0.137*** 0.096** 0.073 0.050 0.324** 0.339** 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.032) (0.048) (0.136) (0.127) (0.146) (0.145) 
Access to credit 0.112 0.078 0.154 -0.254 0.122 0.220 0.143 0.375 
 
(0.085) (0.141) (0.137) (0.479) (0.114) (0.324) (0.160) (0.412) 
Road conditions -0.035** -0.075*** 0.020 0.202*** 0.046 0.121*** 0.056 0.009 
 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.032) (0.067) (0.029) (0.040) (0.037) (0.084) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.123*** -0.123* 0.042 0.346*** 0.035 0.014 -0.080 0.183 
 
(0.036) (0.070) (0.065) (0.062) (0.063) (0.144) (0.138) (0.323) 
No risk aversion 0.034 -0.110 -0.033 -0.108 -0.053 0.088* 0.123 -0.490 
 
(0.078) (0.131) (0.078) (0.131) (0.125) (0.050) (0.224) (0.726) 
Structural Bridging Index 
 
0.020 
 
0.139 
 
0.054 
 
0.023 
 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.126) 
i_roads1 
 
0.020 
 
-0.064*** 
 
-0.027 
 
0.018 
 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.026) 
i_credit1 
 
-0.022 
 
0.135 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.066 
 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.107) 
i_riskMOD1 
 
0.138*** 
 
-0.112*** 
 
0.006 
 
-0.094 
 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.104) 
i_riskNO1 
 
0.079** 
 
0.034 
 
-0.044 
 
0.170 
 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.200) 
i_farm1 0.009*** -0.007*** 0.003** -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
i_land1  -0.086**  -0.105  -0.075  0.097 
  (0.042)  (0.138)  (0.097)  (0.096) 
i_radio1  -0.119  -0.003  -0.070  -0.131 
  (0.143)  (0.038)  (0.045)  (0.146) 
  
 
Table 22 Social capital interactions (Bonding Social Capital) 
  (A1) (A49) (A2) (A50) (A3) (A51) (A4) (A52) 
 
Adoption Adoption Time adoption - abs Time adoption - abs Time adoption - rel Time adoption - rel Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
                  
Farm size  0.013** 0.011* -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership 0.230*** 0.286*** -0.206 -0.193 -0.080 -0.104 -0.133 -0.176 
 (0.063) (0.033) (0.139) (0.180) (0.150) (0.187) (0.216) (0.204) 
Radio -0.093*** -0.134** 0.137*** 0.154*** 0.073 0.106 0.324** 0.263* 
 (0.027) (0.054) (0.032) (0.020) (0.136) (0.111) (0.146) (0.147) 
Access to credit 0.112 -0.138** 0.154 -0.046 0.122 -0.009 0.143 0.486 
 
(0.085) (0.059) (0.137) (0.161) (0.114) (0.152) (0.160) (0.370) 
Road conditions -0.035** -0.063 0.020 0.015 0.046 0.079 0.056 -0.024 
 
(0.018) (0.056) (0.032) (0.081) (0.029) (0.075) (0.037) (0.088) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.123*** -0.094 0.042 0.189 0.035 -0.137 -0.080 0.066 
 
(0.036) (0.199) (0.065) (0.212) (0.063) (0.259) (0.138) (0.300) 
No risk aversion 0.034 0.034 -0.033 -0.270 -0.053 -0.567** 0.123 -0.059 
 
(0.078) (0.160) (0.078) (0.361) (0.125) (0.238) (0.224) (0.676) 
Structural Bonding Index 
 
0.004 
 
0.046 
 
-0.073 
 
0.205 
 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.141) 
i_roads2 
 
0.011 
 
0.002 
 
-0.013 
 
0.018 
 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.032) 
i_credit2 
 
0.092** 
 
0.062 
 
0.045 
 
-0.133 
 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.092) 
i_riskMOD2 
 
0.098 
 
-0.062 
 
0.061 
 
-0.034 
 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.107) 
i_riskNO2 
 
-0.010 
 
0.068 
 
0.200 
 
0.051 
 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.225) 
i_farm2 0.001 -0.016*** -0.004* -0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
i_land2  -0.050  0.094  -0.081  0.103 
  (0.114)  (0.075)  (0.058)  (0.126) 
i_radio2  -0.032**  0.194***  0.311**  -0.031 
  (0.015)  (0.028)  (0.126)  (0.090) 
  
 
Table 23 Social capital interactions (Cognitive Social Capital) 
  (A1) (A53) (A2) (A54) (A3) (A55) (A4) (A56) 
 
Adoption Adoption Time adoption - abs Time adoption - abs Time adoption - rel Time adoption - rel Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
                  
Farm size  0.013** 0.009** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership 0.230*** 0.320*** -0.206 -0.187 -0.080 -0.086 -0.133 -0.211 
 (0.063) (0.026) (0.139) (0.169) (0.150) (0.156) (0.216) (0.220) 
Radio -0.093*** -0.096*** 0.137*** 0.145*** 0.073 0.053 0.324** 0.228 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.041) (0.136) (0.133) (0.146) (0.142) 
Access to credit 0.112 -0.082 0.154 -0.276** 0.122 0.054 0.143 0.317 
 
(0.085) (0.145) (0.137) (0.134) (0.114) (0.102) (0.160) (0.377) 
Road conditions -0.035** -0.083*** 0.020 0.124 0.046 0.124* 0.056 0.054 
 
(0.018) (0.028) (0.032) (0.088) (0.029) (0.067) (0.037) (0.083) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.123*** -0.067 0.042 0.242 0.035 0.030 -0.080 0.160 
 
(0.036) (0.057) (0.065) (0.201) (0.063) (0.236) (0.138) (0.273) 
No risk aversion 0.034 0.102 -0.033 0.185*** -0.053 0.086 0.123 -0.369 
 
(0.078) (0.070) (0.078) (0.043) (0.125) (0.093) (0.224) (0.671) 
Cognitive Index  
 
0.066* 
 
0.211** 
 
0.102 
 
0.341*** 
 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.094) 
i_roads3 
 
0.024 
 
-0.031* 
 
-0.024** 
 
-0.008 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.021) 
i_credit3 
 
0.066** 
 
0.119*** 
 
0.015 
 
-0.047 
 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.075) 
i_riskMOD3 
 
0.087*** 
 
-0.081 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.064 
 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.069) 
i_riskNO3 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.079*** 
 
-0.041 
 
0.095 
 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.164) 
i_farm3 -0.001 -0.016*** -0.002** -0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
i_land3  -0.056  -0.057  -0.100*  0.116 
  (0.058)  (0.082)  (0.057)  (0.096) 
i_radio3  -0.009  0.113*  0.119  -0.089 
  (0.072)  (0.061)  (0.079)  (0.082) 
  
Table 24 Social capital interaction (Diversity Social Capital) 
  (A1) (A57) (A2) (A58) (A3) (A59) (A4) (A60) 
 
Adoption Adoption Time adoption - abs Time adoption - abs Time adoption - rel Time adoption - rel Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
                  
Farm size  0.013** 0.011*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership 0.230*** 0.349*** -0.206 -0.256* -0.080 -0.103 -0.133 -0.129 
 (0.063) (0.048) (0.139) (0.149) (0.150) (0.162) (0.216) (0.246) 
Radio -0.093*** -0.074** 0.137*** 0.132** 0.073 0.039 0.324** 0.336** 
 (0.027) (0.037) (0.032) (0.056) (0.136) (0.152) (0.146) (0.155) 
Access to credit 0.112 -0.203 0.154 -0.458*** 0.122 0.194* 0.143 0.595 
 
(0.085) (0.210) (0.137) (0.143) (0.114) (0.111) (0.160) (0.495) 
Road conditions -0.035** -0.131*** 0.020 0.125* 0.046 0.115** 0.056 -0.045 
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.032) (0.076) (0.029) (0.057) (0.037) (0.108) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.123*** -0.144 0.042 0.233 0.035 -0.046 -0.080 0.089 
 
(0.036) (0.174) (0.065) (0.174) (0.063) (0.243) (0.138) (0.360) 
No risk aversion 0.034 0.157 -0.033 0.177** -0.053 -0.019 0.123 0.076 
 
(0.078) (0.149) (0.078) (0.076) (0.125) (0.089) (0.224) (0.802) 
Diversity social capital  
 
0.017 
 
0.059 
 
0.025 
 
0.069 
 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.109) 
i_roads4 
 
0.033*** 
 
-0.022*** 
 
-0.014*** 
 
0.020 
 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.020) 
i_credit4 
 
0.038 
 
0.124*** 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.091 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.076) 
i_riskMOD4 
 
0.073 
 
-0.046 
 
0.017 
 
-0.033 
 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.070) 
i_riskNO4 
 
-0.033 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.005 
 
0.001 
 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.138) 
i_farm4 0.003 -0.008*** 0.001*** -0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
i_land4  -0.109  -0.218*  -0.176**  0.106 
  (0.077)  (0.115)  (0.072)  (0.069) 
i_radio4  -0.090  0.088***  0.131  -0.034 
  (0.127)  (0.025)  (0.104)  (0.086) 
  
Table 25 Social capital interactions (Intensity) 
  (A1) (A61) (A2) (A62) (A3) (A63) (A4) (A64) 
 
Adoption Adoption Time adoption - abs Time adoption - abs Time adoption - rel Time adoption - rel Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
                  
Farm size  0.013** 0.009** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership 0.230*** 0.354*** -0.206 -0.256 -0.080 -0.100 -0.133 -0.109 
 (0.063) (0.045) (0.139) (0.158) (0.150) (0.167) (0.216) (0.223) 
Radio -0.093*** -0.081*** 0.137*** 0.121** 0.073 0.042 0.324** 0.352** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) (0.047) (0.136) (0.139) (0.146) (0.147) 
Access to credit 0.112 -0.188 0.154 -0.247 0.122 0.236 0.143 0.412 
 
(0.085) (0.154) (0.137) (0.283) (0.114) (0.181) (0.160) (0.416) 
Road conditions -0.035** -0.096*** 0.020 0.131* 0.046 0.119** 0.056 -0.006 
 
(0.018) (0.003) (0.032) (0.074) (0.029) (0.051) (0.037) (0.101) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.123*** -0.107 0.042 0.273* 0.035 -0.025 -0.080 0.268 
 
(0.036) (0.147) (0.065) (0.154) (0.063) (0.206) (0.138) (0.316) 
No risk aversion 0.034 0.188*** -0.033 -0.034 -0.053 -0.063 0.123 -0.113 
 
(0.078) (0.057) (0.078) (0.078) (0.125) (0.097) (0.224) (0.773) 
Intensity of diversity of social capital 
 
0.015* 
 
0.023 
 
0.010 
 
0.032 
 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.027) 
i_roads5 
 
0.006*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.005*** 
 
0.003 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.006) 
i_credit5 
 
0.010 
 
0.021** 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.017 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.018) 
i_riskMOD5 
 
0.020 
 
-0.015 
 
0.004 
 
-0.019 
 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.017) 
i_riskNO5 
 
-0.015* 
 
-0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.009 
 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.038) 
i_farm5 0.001 -0.002*** 0.000* -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
i_land5  -0.011  -0.027  -0.028  0.028 
  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.017)  (0.019) 
i_radio5  -0.029  0.022***  0.033  -0.032 
  (0.032)  (0.007)  (0.025)  (0.021) 
         
  
Table 26 Social capital interactions (General trust) 
  (A1) (A65) (A2) (A66) (A3) (A67) (A4) (A68) 
 
Adoption Adoption Time adoption - abs Time adoption - abs Time adoption - rel Time adoption - rel Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
                  
Farm size  0.013** 0.011*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership 0.230*** 0.394*** -0.206 -0.223 -0.080 -0.094 -0.133 -0.146 
 (0.063) (0.019) (0.139) (0.169) (0.150) (0.168) (0.216) (0.235) 
Radio -0.093*** -0.092*** 0.137*** 0.161** 0.073 0.057 0.324** 0.305** 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.065) (0.136) (0.159) (0.146) (0.152) 
Access to credit 0.112 -0.302*** 0.154 -0.408*** 0.122 -0.010 0.143 0.411 
 
(0.085) (0.084) (0.137) (0.153) (0.114) (0.117) (0.160) (0.411) 
Road conditions -0.035** -0.083*** 0.020 0.122 0.046 0.122** 0.056 0.021 
 
(0.018) (0.004) (0.032) (0.081) (0.029) (0.061) (0.037) (0.085) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.123*** -0.039 0.042 0.334* 0.035 0.110 -0.080 0.027 
 
(0.036) (0.072) (0.065) (0.191) (0.063) (0.264) (0.138) (0.287) 
No risk aversion 0.034 0.162* -0.033 0.393*** -0.053 0.217*** 0.123 -0.174 
 
(0.078) (0.094) (0.078) (0.045) (0.125) (0.047) (0.224) (0.637) 
General trust 
 
0.022 
 
0.055** 
 
0.030 
 
0.047 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.030) 
i_roads6 
 
0.008*** 
 
-0.008** 
 
-0.006** 
 
0.002 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.006) 
i_credit6 
 
0.026*** 
 
0.042*** 
 
0.008 
 
-0.023 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.022) 
i_riskMOD6 
 
0.018* 
 
-0.032* 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.007 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.019) 
i_riskNO6 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.039*** 
 
-0.024** 
 
0.018 
 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.041) 
i_farm6 0.001 -0.005*** 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
i_land6  -0.012  -0.047*  -0.053***  0.026 
  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.024) 
i_radio6  -0.030  0.021*  0.026  -0.023 
  (0.043)  (0.011)  (0.025)  (0.023) 
                  
  
Table 27 Social capital interaction (Diversity - selected agents) 
  (A1) (A69) (A2) (A69) (A3) (A70) (A4) (A71) 
 
Adoption Adoption Time adoption - abs Time adoption - abs Time adoption - rel Time adoption - rel Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
                  
Farm size  0.013** 0.009*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership 0.230*** 0.245*** -0.206 -0.258 -0.080 -0.100 -0.133 -0.170 
 (0.063) (0.032) (0.139) (0.162) (0.150) (0.173) (0.216) (0.228) 
Radio -0.093*** -0.091** 0.137*** 0.114*** 0.073 0.034 0.324** 0.314** 
 (0.027) (0.044) (0.032) (0.041) (0.136) (0.122) (0.146) (0.155) 
Access to credit 0.112 -0.006 0.154 -0.430*** 0.122 0.161 0.143 0.491 
 
(0.085) (0.175) (0.137) (0.118) (0.114) (0.106) (0.160) (0.432) 
Road conditions -0.035** -0.093*** 0.020 0.174** 0.046 0.128** 0.056 0.036 
 
(0.018) (0.030) (0.032) (0.083) (0.029) (0.063) (0.037) (0.097) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.123*** -0.112 0.042 0.145 0.035 -0.171 -0.080 0.046 
 
(0.036) (0.099) (0.065) (0.116) (0.063) (0.144) (0.138) (0.338) 
No risk aversion 0.034 -0.059 -0.033 -0.106 -0.053 -0.075 0.123 -0.591 
 
(0.078) (0.174) (0.078) (0.167) (0.125) (0.109) (0.224) (0.807) 
Diversity of selected change agents 
 
0.048 
 
0.108 
 
0.032 
 
0.175 
 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.133) 
 
(0.134) 
i_roads7 
 
0.033** 
 
-0.047*** 
 
-0.025* 
 
0.006 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.026) 
i_credit7 
 
0.042 
 
0.182*** 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.095 
 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.105) 
i_riskMOD7 
 
0.100** 
 
-0.038 
 
0.066 
 
-0.042 
 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.101) 
i_riskNO7 
 
0.052 
 
0.022 
 
0.010 
 
0.184 
 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.212) 
i_farm7 0.006 -0.009*** 0.002* -0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
i_land7  -0.158**  -0.254**  -0.226***  0.185* 
  (0.064)  (0.122)  (0.082)  (0.095) 
i_radio7  -0.115  0.193***  0.205*  -0.099 
  (0.122)  (0.025)  (0.116)  (0.155) 
  
Table 28 Social capital interactions (Intensity - selected agents) 
  (A1) (A72) (A2) (A73) (A3) (A74) (A4) (A75) 
 
Adoption Adoption Time adoption - abs Time adoption - abs Time adoption - rel Time adoption - rel Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
                  
Farm size  0.013** 0.007* -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership 0.230*** 0.259*** -0.206 -0.246 -0.080 -0.091 -0.133 -0.168 
 (0.063) (0.029) (0.139) (0.158) (0.150) (0.162) (0.216) (0.215) 
Radio -0.093*** -0.092*** 0.137*** 0.103*** 0.073 0.040 0.324** 0.301** 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.136) (0.123) (0.146) (0.143) 
Access to credit 0.112 0.040 0.154 -0.193 0.122 0.218 0.143 0.460 
 
(0.085) (0.162) (0.137) (0.232) (0.114) (0.173) (0.160) (0.384) 
Road conditions -0.035** -0.080*** 0.020 0.167** 0.046 0.128** 0.056 0.064 
 
(0.018) (0.004) (0.032) (0.081) (0.029) (0.057) (0.037) (0.094) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.123*** -0.042 0.042 0.206 0.035 -0.117 -0.080 0.236 
 
(0.036) (0.096) (0.065) (0.184) (0.063) (0.182) (0.138) (0.325) 
No risk aversion 0.034 0.092 -0.033 -0.237** -0.053 -0.163 0.123 -0.431 
 
(0.078) (0.087) (0.078) (0.095) (0.125) (0.126) (0.224) (0.723) 
Intensity of diversity of selected change agents  0.032** 
 
0.040 
 
0.014 
 
0.076** 
 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.037) 
i_roads8 
 
0.006** 
 
-0.013*** 
 
-0.007** 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.008) 
i_credit8 
 
0.006 
 
0.027*** 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.024 
 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.025) 
i_riskMOD8 
 
0.021* 
 
-0.015 
 
0.014 
 
-0.025 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.027) 
i_riskNO8 
 
-0.007 
 
0.016* 
 
0.009 
 
0.037 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.053) 
i_farm8 0.002** -0.002*** 0.001* -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
i_land8  -0.019  -0.038  -0.041**  0.043 
  (0.014)  (0.027)  (0.016)  (0.029) 
i_radio8  -0.017  0.051***  0.056**  -0.041 
  (0.022)  (0.003)  (0.025)  (0.035) 
  
Table 29 Social capital interactions (General trust - selected agents) 
  (A1) (A76) (A2) (A77) (A3) (A78) (A4) (A79) 
 
Adoption Adoption Time adoption - abs Time adoption - abs Time adoption - rel Time adoption - rel Intensity Intensity 
VARIABLES mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx coeff coeff 
                  
Farm size  0.013** 0.010*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Land ownership 0.230*** 0.295*** -0.206 -0.228 -0.080 -0.090 -0.133 -0.202 
 (0.063) (0.016) (0.139) (0.164) (0.150) (0.163) (0.216) (0.226) 
Radio -0.093*** -0.108*** 0.137*** 0.120*** 0.073 0.042 0.324** 0.252* 
 (0.027) (0.038) (0.032) (0.038) (0.136) (0.122) (0.146) (0.150) 
Access to credit 0.112 -0.066 0.154 -0.325** 0.122 0.053 0.143 0.396 
 
(0.085) (0.137) (0.137) (0.145) (0.114) (0.073) (0.160) (0.375) 
Road conditions -0.035** -0.076*** 0.020 0.147* 0.046 0.122* 0.056 0.060 
 
(0.018) (0.007) (0.032) (0.090) (0.029) (0.071) (0.037) (0.083) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.123*** -0.033 0.042 0.261 0.035 -0.005 -0.080 0.076 
 
(0.036) (0.049) (0.065) (0.218) (0.063) (0.259) (0.138) (0.296) 
No risk aversion 0.034 0.025 -0.033 0.214* -0.053 0.140* 0.123 -0.450 
 
(0.078) (0.145) (0.078) (0.112) (0.125) (0.082) (0.224) (0.641) 
Trust in selected change agents 
 
0.028 
 
0.085 
 
0.040 
 
0.091** 
 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.041) 
i_roads9 
 
0.009** 
 
-0.015** 
 
-0.009* 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.008) 
i_credit9 
 
0.029 
 
0.056*** 
 
0.006 
 
-0.026 
 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.031) 
i_riskMOD9 
 
0.027*** 
 
-0.036 
 
0.004 
 
-0.018 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.032) 
i_riskNO9 
 
0.007 
 
-0.035** 
 
-0.023* 
 
0.052 
 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.066) 
i_farm9 0.003* -0.006*** 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
i_land9  -0.020  -0.064**  -0.065***  0.043 
  (0.014)  (0.031)  (0.018)  (0.039) 
i_radio9  -0.028  0.043***  0.044  -0.037 
  (0.045)  (0.012)  (0.033)  (0.038) 
 
  
CHAPTER 4: APPENDICES
  
Appendix 4.1.  Brief review of poverty measures 
The poverty measurements have been widely analysed across the literature. The aim of 
these measures is to capture as much accurately as possible the socio-economic status of 
the unit of observation. Household’s income and household’s expenditures, per capita or 
per adult equivalent, are the most common candidates for this type of analysis and 
several practitioners and scholars have pointed out their advantages (Deaton and Zaidi, 
2002).  
However, the estimation of poverty using these measures is not as straightforward. 
Measurement errors, understatement, and difficulties in obtaining good estimates of 
earnings from some types of self-employment or the value of some housing services are 
only some of the challenges in measuring poverty using income and consumption data. 
Although consumption if often preferred to income indicators, collecting expenditure 
data could pose similar difficulties to the income measurement, because households, 
especially in developing countries, tend to understate their expenses in what they 
consider to be luxury goods, such as alcohol or sweets, or in illegal items and services, 
such as drugs and prostitution, or because their consumption level could not be as stable 
as it is expected, due to the limited access to credit. Furthermore, the length and the 
depth of the survey investigation required by the collection of accurate information on 
expenditures on both food and non-food items, durable and non-durable goods, and so 
on, pose serious financial and organisational difficulties in the case of small surveys.  
In addition, consumption and income measures of poverty have been also widely 
criticised for the inner inability to provide a comprehensive measure of well-being that 
goes beyond the monetary definition of welfare. The multi-dimensions of poverty has 
been inspired and supported by this school of thoughts and informed the establishment 
of analysis based on human and physical assets endowment as well as studies on 
subjective poverty (Ravallion, 2012). In addition, consumption and income poverty 
measures are usually more volatile than other measures of poverty based, for example, 
on asset endowment. 
A measure of poverty based on asset endowments is often believed to provide a better 
measure of the households’ poverty than the standard data on consumption or income 
for small and short surveys (Filmer and Prichett, 2001). However, many scholars claim 
that even this measure still provides an income-focused perspective of welfare and 
poverty (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Ravallion, 2012) and support the use of 
happiness and subjective well-being for the estimation of poverty profiles.  
The first studies on happiness were done by psychologists in the 1960s and one of the 
first attempts to quantify happiness in the economics framework dates back to 1965, 
when Cantril forged the idea of “ladder of life”. Nowadays, the main subjective 
measures of well-being and poverty are collected using the following survey tools: the” 
Economic ladder” question, whereby the respondent is asked the put him/herself on a 
step of a ladder of relative socio-economic status; “the minimum income” question, 
where respondents are asked to quantify the monetary value for accomplishing their 
minimum needs; “income evaluation and/or consumption adequacy” questions, that rate 
the income or consumption on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good) and finally the 
“satisfaction with life” question, which rates the satisfaction from 1 (lowest) to 5 
(highest). 
  
The main ideas of subjective measures of well-being and poverty is to provide a more 
comprehensive perspective of the socio-economic status that includes also non income 
dimension of well-being, that contextualizes the concept of welfare and attempts to 
capture those fundamental social functioning capabilities conceived by Sen.  
Although highly correlated with the objective measures of income, subjective measures 
have been found essential in the testing, calibrating or complementing classical income 
-focused welfare and poverty analyses (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Ravallion at al., 
2013). First of all, subjective measures favoured the emergence of a relative 
conceptualization of poverty. Several studies have argued that “relative deprivation” can 
substantially affect the perception of our own socio-economic status at any given 
income. And this is proved to be especially true for relatively richer countries where the 
concepts of rich and poor are mainly relative ideas. However, this phenomenon is not 
completely absent in developing countries, either (Ravallion and Loshkin, 2010).  
Furthermore, the use of subjective measures has also highlighted the importance of 
perceptions, expectations and aspirations in poverty analysis. For example, Ravallion 
and Lokshin in 2002 found that past income increases current subjective measures of 
welfare through the expectation of higher future income. Similarly, in a study of rural 
poverty in China, Knight et al. (2009) argue that future and past income can affect the 
perception of current economic status. On the other hand, Knight and Gunatilaka (2012) 
find that aspirations on future income could also decrease the current subjective 
perception of welfare and they propose the idea of the “hedonic treadmill”, whereby the 
access to a higher income does not current increase happiness or subjective well-being 
if the level of aspired income is not reached yet. 
Finally, the comparison between objective and subjective measures provided new 
insights in drawing poverty profiles. For example, household’s size which is one of the 
main determinants of the objective poverty, is argued to play a smaller role in the 
subjective poverty. Thus, when using subjective measures of wealth bigger households 
are not necessarily the poorer among the others, as usually argued when income or 
consumption data are analysed, and this can be explained by the exploitation of 
economies of scale in consumption (Posel and Rogan, 2014). 
 
  
Appendix 4.2.  The construction of the wealth index 
Main results 
Table 1 Full PCA estimation results 
Principal components/correlation Number of obs = 305 
 Number of comp. = 1 
 Trace   = 8 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal) Rho   = 0.3613 
 Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
 Comp1 2.89056 1.77799 0.3613 0.3613 
 Comp2 1.11257 0.199911 0.1391 0.5004 
 Comp3 0.912659 0.072147 0.1141 0.6145 
 Comp4 0.840511 0.113176 0.1051 0.7195 
 Comp5 0.727335 0.099742 0.0909 0.8105 
 Comp6 0.627593 0.146784 0.0784 0.8889 
 Comp7 0.480809 0.072843 0.0601 0.949 
 Comp8 0.407965 . 0.051 1 
 
Table 2 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable (standardised) kmo 
Farm size (acres) 0.7507 
Drinking water (0/1) 0.7655 
Private toilet (0/1) 0.7602 
Tractor (0/1) 0.5488 
Motorbicycle (0/1) 0.7827 
Car (0/1) 0.8235 
Fridge (0/1) 0.7990 
Generator (0/1) 0.7812 
Overall 0.7683 
 
Table 3 Internal coherence 
 
Rich top 20% Poor bottom 40% 
 
 
Mean Mean pvalue 
Farm size (acres) 20.99 3.42 0.000*** 
Drinking water (0/1) 0.73 0.00 0.000*** 
Private toilet (0/1) 0.84 0.00 0.000*** 
Tractor (0/1) 0.08 0.00 0.001*** 
Motorbicycle (0/1) 0.58 0.00 0.000*** 
Car (0/1) 0.48 0.00 0.000*** 
Fridge (0/1) 0.83 0.00 0.000*** 
Generator (0/1) 0.14 0.00 0.000*** 
N 64 127 
 
 
From the estimation of the PCA above, the choice of the first component is supported 
by the quite satisfactory variance explained by this component (36%) and both by the 
graphic examination and by the value of the sample adequacy obtained running the 
KMO test (0.76). The best set of variables proved to be the one without the number of 
livestock which provided a lower value of the combined variance explained by the first 
  
component (33%) and a lower value of sample adequacy (0.72). As a consequence this 
variable was not included in the final estimation.  
Methodology 
The seminal work by Filmer and Prichett (2001) was the first study that implemented 
the principal component analysis, whose main intuition is to identify a set of 
households’, farm, transport’s assets, etc that could be a good indicator of the 
household’s welfare, in absence of income or consumption data. The principal 
component analysis attributes different weights to each variables in the set as a measure 
of their relevance with respect to the outcome, in this case the wealth of the household. 
As a consequence the choice of the set of variables to include in the analysis proves to 
be crucial. 
Two main problems can arise from the mis-choice of the variables or wealth 
“determinants”. These problems are what McKenzie (2003) calls clumping and 
truncation. Clumping or clustering occurs when households in the sample are naturally 
grouped in a small number of cluster, while truncation refers to the case when the 
distribution of the combination of assets across the sample is too skewed, suggesting a 
high degree of similarity between households and making it very difficult to distinguish 
between poor and non-poor. These problems are likely to hold in my sample
125
. 
Nonetheless, to minimize the effect of clumping and truncation the choice of the 
variables needs to careful aim to the stability of the index, whereby the identification of 
poor and non-poor households should not be affected by the choice of the variable 
themselves. In other words, the assets used for the calculation of the index should aim to 
provide indication of welfare which is as close as possible to the reality. 
Asset indices for poverty analysis usually include a selection of farm assets, livestock, 
household’s assets and transport assets. For the choice of this selected set, different 
methods have been proposed in the literature (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). The 
following are some of the criteria for the choice of the variables for a stable index 
through the PCA:  
1. Variables with high standard deviation should be included 
PCA is known to work best when the assets are correlated and also when the 
distribution varies across the sample, for which PCA will give more weight (McKenzie, 
2003). A way to identify a low and high standard deviation is to calculate the coefficient 
of variation, whereby the standard deviation is normalised and so comparable across 
variables
126
. A coefficient higher than one is considered to reflect high standard 
deviation, while a coefficient lower than one is indicative of lower standard deviation. 
Using this procedure the following variables can be identified out of the entire range of 
assets available
127
 in the dataset: 
                                                 
125 My sample is mainly composed of very small farmers with a farm size less than three acres. They are indeed likely 
to own a similar composition of assets which could complicate the computation of the wealth index, which is likely to 
be left skewed. However, these groups of households represent 60% of the sample. The remaining 40% should allow 
for the discrimination between poor and non-poor households. 
126 The coefficient of variation is calculated dividing the standard deviation by the mean of the same variable. 
127 The full list of assets in the dataset is the following: Farm assets (water management tools, land management tools, 
tractor, wheel barrow, saws, spray pump, spray hose for tractors, micro - sprinklers, animal plough, weighing 
machine, simple tools (hoes, cutlass, etc); Transport assets (cart, bicycle, motorbicycle, car, open truck, refrigerated 
truck); Livestock (cow, oxen, donkey, goats, sheep, poultry); Household assets (fridge, radio, tv, computer, landline, 
mobile phone, washing machine, sewing machine, generator, ownership of households, drinking water, number of 
rooms, electric lighting, private toilet). 
  
 
Table 4 Asset index components 
 Mean Standard deviation  Min Max Coefficient of Variation 
Farm size (acres) 7.833 14.992 1 127 1.914 
Drinking water (0/1) 0.200 0.401 0 1 2.003 
Private toilet (0/1) 0.340 0.473 0 1 1.403 
Tractor (0/1) 0.020 0.139 0 1 7.071 
Motorbicycle (0/1) 0.266 0.442 0 1 1.666 
Car (0/1) 0.115 0.319 0 1 2.782 
Fridge (0/1) 0.256 0.437 0 1 1.709 
Generator (0/1) 0.030 0.170 0 1 5.744 
Number of livestock (#) 22.518 33.021 0 276 1.466 
N 305 
 
  
  
2. Related to one, variables with no variation should be dropped  
PCA will attribute no weight to those variables with no variation across the sample. 
Hence, these variables should be a priori excluded from the choice
128
. None of the 
variables listed in table 1 has no variation.  
3. Variables with missing values should be excluded.  
This criterion aims to maintain a wide variation in the distribution of the assets across 
the entire sample of households
129
. However, this procedure could induce to a reduction 
of the sample size itself and could generate a bias towards to better off households 
because of the higher likelihood to have missing values for poor households (Cortinovis 
et al. 1993, Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). Luckily, no variables listed in table 1 have 
any missing value
130
. 
After implementing these criteria, there is one more test that needs to be implemented 
before the estimation of the PCA. This is a test of multivariate normality, whereby you 
assess that the underlying assumption of the PCA is not rejected. If not rejected the 
estimation of the PCA can be run with the favourite set of variables. It is worth noting 
that if variables with different scales are included in the chosen set, PCA will attribute a 
higher weight to those variables such as farm size or a categorical variable compared to, 
for example, dummy variables. To minimize this issue, variables needs to be 
standardised before the computation of the PCA. The following table shows the 
variables summary statistics after the standardization.  
Using this procedure the distribution of each variable is expanded or reduced, 
depending to the original standard deviation, around the zero mean and standard 
deviation of one. For example, farm size and number of livestock had a very high 
standard deviation with a scale well above the range of values of the other variables 
(Table 5). If used with these scales in the computation of the asset index, by 
construction the PCA would over-weighted farm size and livestock in the wealth 
composition with respect to the other assets.  
                                                 
128 The condrop program in STATA can implement this task. 
129 Cortinovis et al. (1993) excluded households with at least one missing value from their analysis to develop socio-
economic groups. Gwatkin et al. (2000) replaced missing values with the mean value for that variable. 
130 An additional criteria would be to include those variables that are significantly correlated with expenditure data. 
As mentioned before, this data is not available in my dataset. However, the literature uses these criteria to minimize 
the impact of clumping and truncation with the inclusion in the PCA index of as many variables as possible. 
 
  
Table 5 Asset index components, standardised 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Farm size (acres) 0 1 -0.456 7.948 
Drinking water (0/1) 0 1 -0.499 1.997 
Private toilet (0/1) 0 1 -0.713 1.398 
Tractor (0/1) 0 1 -0.141 7.048 
Motorbicycle (0/1) 0 1 -0.600 1.660 
Car (0/1) 0 1 -0.359 2.772 
Fridge (0/1) 0 1 -0.359 2.773 
Generator (0/1) 0 1 -0.585 1.703 
Number of livestock (#) 0 1 -0.174 5.725 
N 305 
   
Before interpreting the results, another important decision to be taken is the choice of 
the component of the estimated PCA to retain for the computation of the wealth index. 
Although the researcher could potentially choose any number of components which 
follows the rule of thumb of having eigenvalues greater than one, there is a wide 
consensus in the literature that the first component is a representative measure of the 
economic status and that the addition of other components does not improve the 
stability of the index (Houweling et al. 2003; McKenzie, 2003; Vyas and. 
Kumaranayake, 2006; Filmer and Prichett, 2001). Nonetheless, two main tests can be 
used for the choice of the components: 1. Graphical examination using the screeplot 
command in Stata. 2. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. These tests 
will provide information on the variance explained by the first component, the index 
predicted and will evaluate ex-post the fitness of the asset variables chosen for the 
estimation.  
If the first component is chosen, the aim of the two tests mentioned is to achieve the 
highest possible variance explained by that component and several trials with different 
sets of variables included and excluded in to the PCA estimation should be 
implemented, during which variables previously selected should be discarded in favour 
of those that provide support for the choice of the first component.  
As mentioned above, the list of assets included in the PCA estimates provided the 
highest cumulative variance and the highest KMO measure when the first component 
was selected.  
 
  
Appendix 4.3. Objective poverty thresholds, sensitivity checks 
Figure 1 Sensitivity checks, objective poverty threshold 
 
 
Table 6 Poverty ranking, by district 
District Poverty ranking  
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Appendix 4.4. Subjective poverty, sensitivity checks  
The “Minimum Income”, the “Income evaluation” and “Consumption Adequacy” 
questions, although slightly different measures of subjective well-being, can help 
verifying the stability of the subjective poverty definition.  
The Minimum Income question was formulated as follows: “Living where you do now, 
what is the smallest income you and your family would need (after deductions) to make 
ends meet each month?”. Finally the Income and Consumption Adequacy questions: 
“How would you evaluate your income for reaching your needs?” and “Concerning 
your food consumption, which of the following is true?”, both of them using the 
following scale:“1=Very bad; 2 =Bad 3=Moderate;4=Good; 5=Very good”131.  
Table 7 shows that the median threshold used for defining poor and non-poor household 
according to the relative economic ladder could be appropriate in this analysis. Hence, 
subjective poor households defined using this threshold are observed to be relatively 
poorer also according to the Minimum Income and Consumption Adequacy question. 
More specifically, the subjective poor households are observed to need a lower 
minimum income than non-poor households and they consider their current and past 
income and consumption worse than non-poor households.  
Table 7 Assessment internal coherence, subjective poverty 
 Subjective non poor Subjective Poor p-value 
Minimum income (Ghc/month) 271.83 202.92 0.009*** 
Income evaluation (current; 1-5) 3.34 2.81 0.000*** 
Income evaluation (12 months ago; 1-5) 3 2.78 0.016** 
Food consumption adequacy (current; 1-5) 3.53 3.09 0.000*** 
Food consumption adequacy (12 months ago; 1-5) 3.30 3.02 0.000*** 
N 192 113  
 
Nonetheless, although generally poorer than other households, subjective poor 
households are observed to have experienced a more positive trend in their wealth than 
non-poor households in the previous 12 months (Income Evaluation questions). In order 
to see whether this is the case I plot the current and past values (12 months) for each of 
the subjective poverty measures.  
 
Figure 2 shows that there is a positive correlation between the current and past socio-
economic status for lower values and negative for higher values, suggesting that poorer 
households are indeed feeling better off than non-poor households compared to the 
past
132
.  
                                                 
131 As for the Economic ladder question, the adequacy questions were asked for current and past (12 months before 
the survey) values of income and consumption respectively.  
132 Also, if this is the case and poorer households are expecting to be better off in the future, we could expect 
subjective measures of well – being to be higher than actual objective measures of welfare in this case the asset index, 
at any given level of actual wealth. This could be supported by the fact that using subjective poverty measures 
identifies as poor a smaller number HHs than when using objective measures (113 HHs compared to 127 HHs). This 
  
 
 
Figure 2 Subjective poverty measures today and 12 months ago 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
result suggest that these subjective measures could be useful in calibrating the poverty analysis based on the asset 
index.  
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Appendix 4.5. Correlation between objective and subjective 
measures of poverty 
Figure 3 Correlation objective and subjective measures 
 
 
Table 8 Poverty ranking, by objective and subjective measures of poverty 
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Appendix 4.6. The poverty profile  
Using these definitions of poverty the following paragraphs describe main differences in 
household, farm and livelihood characteristics between poor and non-poor farmers. 
Table 9 reports some selected summary statistics by poverty status of the households in 
the sample.  
Overall, regardless of the measure of poverty used, poor farmers live in similar size 
household, with on average few members of the household engaged in non-farm 
employment.  The dependency ratio is significantly higher for subjective poor compared 
to both non-poor (subjective) and objective poor households
133
. Moreover, education 
level of poor household is generally lower than non-poor households, although the 
difference is only statistically significant for objective poor and non-poor households.  
Overall, poorer households are poorly endowed in farm and transport assets. While this 
is expected in the case of objective poverty measurements, which by constructions 
discriminate poverty status according to asset endowments, also subjective poor 
households are found to own less assets than non-poor households
134
. More specifically, 
non-poor farmers usually farm about 10 acres of land while poor farmers only cultivate 
3.4 acres (5 acres in the case of subjective poor), they usually own land and own several 
assets such as fridge, radio, TV or motorbicycle and cars. The main source of livelihood 
does not change much according to the poverty status. The majority of the households 
in the sample are involved in farming activities, which provides on average 70% of the 
total household income. However, although the number of crops produced does not 
differ between non-poor and poor household, the type of crops that feeds into the 
household’s crop portfolio is found to differ considerably depending on the poverty 
status.  
Figure 4 shows that poor households tend to have a very scarcely differentiated 
portfolio with respect to non-poor households, with 85% (108 households) of the 
objective poor households and 70% (78 households) of the subjective poor households 
producing only food crops (or food crops associated with mango) and only very few of 
them producing other cash crops, such as banana, cashew, palm oil, or pineapple.  
Furthermore, poor households tend to consume more of the crops produced and sell less 
and the differences are highly statistically significant. Aside for a lower market 
participation, poor households are also observed to participate in different marketing 
channels. Poor households mostly sell their produce to market women and to 
neighbours while non poor farmers tend to use a more diversified set of marketing 
channels. Nonetheless home, farm and local markets are the main selling points for the 
majority of the farmers regardless of their poverty status (Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
 
                                                 
133 This difference is mainly driven by the higher number of elderly people in the households, whose mean is 0.34 for 
subjective poor household compared to 0.18 (subjective non-poor), 0.22 and 0.25 for objective poor and objective 
non-poor, respectively. 
134 A major exception of this trend regards to ownership of a bicycle, which is observed to be more common in the 
case of objectively poorer households. This finding is in line with the common field observations that ownership of a 
bicycle does not necessarily links to better well-being and economic status.  
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Table 9 Selected summary statistics 
 Objective poverty 
Wealth index 
Subjective poverty 
Economic ladder 
 Non poor Poor  Non 
poor 
Poor  
 Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
       
HH size (#) 6.11 5.64 0.074* 5.91 5.93 0.933 
Dependency ratio (%) 74.58 72.94 0.848 66.26 86.87 0.017** 
N. HH members with secondary education (%) 13.16 6.130 0.000*** 12 8 0.037** 
N. HH members with higher education (%) 10.32 5.33 0.003*** 9 7 0.218 
N. HH members with non-farm employment (%) 14.29 12.85 0.422 14.1 13.00 0.549 
       
Fridge (0/1 ) 0.44 0.00 0.000*** 0.32 0.16 0.003*** 
Radio (0/1 ) 0.93 0.87 0.049** 0.92 0.88 0.194 
TV (0/1) 0.66 0.22 0.000*** 0.56 0.34 0.000*** 
Computer (0/1) 0.10 0.00 0.000*** 0.08 0.02 0.018** 
Telephone (0/1) 0.45 0.00 0.016** 0.04 0.88 0.144 
Mobile (0/1) 0.89 0.76 0.003*** 0.87 0.78 0.040** 
Sewing machine (0/1) 0.25 0.06 0.000*** 0.19 0.12 0.116 
Generator (0/1) 0.05 0.00 0.010** 00.5 0.00 0.019** 
Electric lighting (0/1) 0.72 0.44 0.000*** 0.65 0.52 0.029** 
Drinking water (0/1) 0.34 0.00 0.000*** 0.45 0.12 0.010** 
Private toilet (0/1) 0.58 0.00 0.000*** 0.36 0.31 0.284 
       
Farm size (acres) 0.11 0.03 0.000*** 0.10 0.49 0.009*** 
Land ownership (0/1) 0.68 0.51 0.003*** 0.62 0.61 0.825 
Tractor (0/1) 0.03 0.00 0.037** 0.03 0.00 0.058* 
N. Livestock (#) 0.26 0.18 0.028** 0.28 0.14 0.000*** 
       
Bicycle (0/1) 0.62 0.74 0.033** 0.70 0.63 0.212 
Motorbicycle (0/1) 0.46 0.00 0.000*** 0.34 0.14 0.000*** 
Car (0/1) 0.20 0.00 0.000*** 0.15 0.06 0.026** 
       
Farm income (% total income) 65.53 71.88 0.009*** 67.19 69.84 0.287 
N. crops produced (#) 2.67 2.55 0.346 2.61 2.65 0.783 
Harvest consumed (% total harvest) 17.87 31.51 0.000*** 22.01 26.16 0.112 
Harvest sold (% total harvest) 73.26 58.52 0.000*** 70.32 61.69 0.005*** 
Distance to market (Km) 4.59 4.06 0.257 4.05 4.92 0.071* 
Shocks – Pests (0/1) 0.69 0.55 0.012** 0.64 0.63 0.902 
Training (0/1) 0.65 0.52 0.021** 0.68 0.46 0.000*** 
Certification (0/1) 0.15 0.06 0.023** 0.16 0.04 0.001*** 
N 178 127  192 113  
Figure 4 Crop portfolio 
 
28% 
22% 22% 
36% 38% 
41% 
35% 
47% 49% 
31% 
Total Objective non poor Subjective non poor Objective poor Subjective poor
Food crops only Food crops and Mango (no other cash crops)
Food and Cash crops (no mango) Food crops, mango and other cash crops
Mango and other cash crops (no food crops) Mango only
Other cash crops only
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Figure 5 Marketing channels, objective poverty 
 
Figure 6 Marketing channels, subjective poverty 
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Appendix 4.7. Summary statistics by mango adoption (subjective 
poverty) 
Table 10 Summary statistics - mango adoption (subjective poverty) 
    Subjective  non poor Subjective poor 
 
 
Non 
mango 
Mango 
 
Non mango Mango 
     Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value 
        Male head (0/1) 0.87 0.94 0.086* 0.84 0.91 0.243 
Age head Years 44.15 50.29 0.001*** 49.25 50.26 0.697 
Primary education head (0/1) 0.08 0.06 0.793 0.11 0.05 0.289 
Higher education head (0/1) 0.28 0.32 0.589 0.21 0.39 0.047** 
No risk aversion (0/1) 0.13 0.12 0.856 0.13 0.09 0.524 
Impatience (0/1) 0.53 0.39 0.081* 0.55 0.51 0.637 
HH size  # 5.42 6.09 0.078* 5.68 6.18 0.216 
Dependency ratio (%) 67.11 65.93 0.900 88.97 84.80 0.812 
N. Married # 1.94 2.27 0.049** 1.75 2.16 0.030** 
N. Male adults # 1.75 2.16 0.047** 1.88 1.84 0.881 
N. HH members with higher education  (%) 0.34 0.60 0.062* 0.27 0.49 0.060* 
N. HH members with non-farm employment  (%) 12.74 14.61 0.452 9.94 16.01 0.037** 
        Fridge  (0/1) 0.05 0.26 0.002*** 0.23 0.35 0.113 
Radio  (0/1) 0.89 0.86 0.596 0.91 0.93 0.607 
TV  (0/1) 0.23 0.44 0.020** 0.45 0.60 0.059* 
Mobile  (0/1) 0.71 0.84 0.104 0.81 0.89 0.139 
Sewing machine  (0/1) 0.09 0.16 0.272 0.13 0.22 0.190 
Drinking water  (0/1) 0.07 0.18 0.095* 0.06 0.32 0.000*** 
Bicycle  (0/1) 0.50 0.75 0.005*** 0.75 0.68 0.292 
Car  (0/1) 0.08 0.17 0.089* 0.04 0.09 0.255 
        Farm size  (acres) 3.93 11.68 0.008*** 4.02 5.83 0.103 
Farm size1  (acres) 3.93 10.33 0.022** 4.02 5.15 0.276 
Land ownership  (0/1) 0.47 0.67 0.012** 0.55 0.65 0.304 
N. Livestock  # 25.85 28.37 0.678 12.41 15.07 0.503 
Hired  # 6.64 10.96 0.057* 4.45 10.00 0.000*** 
Tractor  (0/1) 0.04 0.03 0.751 0.00 0.00 . 
        Cash crops production (0/1) 0.21 0.27 0.404 0.23 0.30 0.431 
Training  (0/1) 0.23 0.85 0.000*** 0.29 0.63 0.000*** 
FO (0/1) 0.17 0.70 0.000*** 0.13 0.46 0.000** 
N. visits extension off. # 1.38 4.96 0.011** 1.00 1.67 0.095* 
Innovation # 0.66 0.24 0.001*** 0.09 0.18 0.242 
N   53 139   56 57   
1At the time of adoption for mango farmers; current for non-mango farmers 
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Appendix 4.8. Common Support based on matching criteria from 
economic model 
Table 11 Matching variables from Economic model 
Variable Description 
Age head* Years* 
Gender head =1 if head is a man; 0 otherwise 
Higher education =1 if head awarded secondary or higher education; 0 otherwise 
Farm labour Number of HH members working on own farm 
Farm size* Acres* 
Land ownership =1 if any land is owned; 0 otherwise 
Production of other cash crops =1 if other cash crops are produced; 0 otherwise 
Livestock ownership Number of livestock owned 
Access to credit =1 if any HH member had access to credit in the past 12 months; 0 otherwise 
Ownership of tractor  =1 if a tractor is owned; 0 otherwise 
Ownership of mobile =1 if a mobile phone is owned; 0 otherwise 
Ownership of radio =1 if a radio  is owned; 0 otherwise 
Ownership of bicycle =1 if a bicycle is owned; 0 otherwise 
Ownership of motorbicycle =1 if a motorbicycle is owned; 0 otherwise 
Ownership of car =1 if a car is owned; 0 otherwise 
Roads condition Number of months of impassable roads 
Moderate risk aversion =1 if head is moderately risk averse; 0 otherwise 
[Base= extreme risk aversion] 
No risk aversion =1 if head is no  risk averse; 0 otherwise 
[Base= extreme risk aversion] 
Impatience = 1 if head is impatient; 0 otherwise 
Experience in farming* Number of years of experience in farming 
Training = 1 if any HH member received any training; 0 otherwise 
Social capital See variables in Chapter 3 
 
Figure 7 Common support 
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Figure 8 Common support, different specification economic model 
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Appendix 4.9. Indicators of matching quality  
Table 12 ATET - additional results 
    NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
Pseudo Rsquare before matching  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.090  
Pseudo Rsquare after matching  0.024  0.025  0.007  0.010  0.023  0.024  0.023  0.023  0.004  0.019  0.018  0.019  0.039  
LRT p-value 0.083  0.105  0.992  0.990  0.109  0.082  0.149  0.149  1.000  0.774  0.864  0.774  0.124  
Median bias before matching  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  
Median bias after matching  6.344  5.798  1.907  5.513  7.500  8.629  5.949  5.949  3.162  4.571  4.683  4.571  4.255  
M2 
Pseudo Rsquare before matching  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  
Pseudo Rsquare after matching  0.027  0.023  0.007  0.014  0.027  0.030  0.027  0.027  0.009  0.026  0.015  0.026  0.052  
LRT p-value 0.047  0.183  0.995  0.978  0.053  0.028  0.079  0.079  0.993  0.582  0.941  0.582  0.031  
Median bias before matching  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  
Median bias after matching  7.927  6.805  3.124  4.681  7.065  6.460  5.586  5.586  2.407  8.590  3.574  8.590  5.562  
M3 
Pseudo Rsquare before matching  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095  
Pseudo Rsquare after matching  0.028  0.031  0.009  0.027  0.024  0.026  0.021  0.021  0.010  0.031  0.011  0.031  0.076  
LRT p-value 0.060  0.047  0.994  0.687  0.130  0.093  0.298  0.302  0.994  0.438  0.994  0.438  0.001  
Median bias before matching  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  21.557  
Median bias after matching  9.297  5.933  2.325  4.318  7.960  8.410  6.782  6.759  3.905  7.563  4.107  7.563  8.065  
M4 
Pseudo Rsquare before matching  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114  
Pseudo Rsquare after matching  0.045  0.047  0.015  0.040  0.025  0.025  0.035  0.035  0.007  0.057  0.025  0.057  0.062  
LRT p-value 0.002  0.003  0.935  0.428  0.195  0.206  0.050  0.050  1.000  0.050  0.870  0.050  0.026  
Median bias before matching  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  22.736  
Median bias after matching  11.340  12.052  3.951  7.795  8.273  7.976  10.666  10.666  3.131  7.111  4.267  7.111  8.803  
M5 
Pseudo Rsquare before matching  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  0.132  
Pseudo Rsquare after matching  0.034  0.027  0.016  0.029  0.032  0.036  0.030  0.030  0.009  0.031  0.015  0.031  0.069  
LRT p-value 0.032  0.224  0.933  0.837  0.052  0.020  0.151  0.151  0.999  0.612  0.992  0.612  0.010  
Median bias before matching  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  23.197  
Median bias after matching  4.533  4.398  4.516  4.411  7.801  8.766  5.553  5.553  4.387  5.479  5.098  5.479  9.802  
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Appendix 4.10. Additional ATET estimations 
Table 13 Average treatment effect on the treated, cash crop adoption 
  Cash crops adoption NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective -0.252*** -0.254** -0.034 -0.160* -0.205*** -0.185** -0.201** -0.201** -0.192*** -0.252*** -0.202** -0.252** -0.233*** 
ATET subjective -0.198** -0.194** -0.170** -0.240*** -0.177** -0.193** -0.204** -0.204** -0.182** -0.198** -0.210** -0.198** -0.149** 
N. On support  290  289  176  163  290  290  289  289  290  290  289  290  290 
M2 
ATET objective -0.170* -0.178* -0.068* -0.139 -0.167** -0.167** -0.185** -0.185* -0.180** -0.170* -0.196** -0.170* -0.210** 
ATET subjective -0.250*** -0.239*** -0.182** -0.111 -0.219*** -0.224*** -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.221*** -0.250** -0.262*** -0.250*** -0.175** 
N. On support  288  285  176  160  288  288  285  285  288  288  285  288  288 
M3 
ATET objective -0.239*** -0.246** -0.102 -0.093 -0.180** -0.169** -0.185** -0.185* -0.183** -0.239*** -0.193** -0.239** -0.199** 
ATET subjective -0.239*** -0.231** -0.182** -0.067 -0.222*** -0.227*** -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.217*** -0.239*** -0.232** -0.239** -0.214*** 
N. On support  289  287  176  163  289  289  287  287  289  289  287  289  289 
M4 
ATET objective -0.141 -0.138 -0.023 -0.070 -0.142* -0.136* -0.110 -0.110 -0.143* -0.141 -0.121 -0.141 -0.157** 
ATET subjective -0.108 -0.099 -0.148* -0.099 -0.190** -0.196** -0.128 -0.128 -0.171** -0.108 -0.124 -0.108 -0.178** 
N. On support  273  269  176  159  273  273  269  269  273  273  269  273  273 
M5 
ATET objective -0.105 -0.085 -0.034 -0.074 -0.195** -0.175** -0.144 -0.144 -0.169** -0.105 -0.138 -0.105 -0.209** 
ATET subjective -0.152 -0.131 -0.136* -0.265*** -0.216*** -0.192** -0.183* -0.183** -0.168** -0.152 -0.174** -0.152 -0.147* 
N. On support  274  264  176  156  279  279  264  264  279  279  264   279  279 
*Note: NN=nearest neighbour; Caliper 01= nearest neighbour with caliper width of 0.01; NN_Norep= nearest neighbour, no replacement; NN_Norepcal= nearest neighbour, no replacement with caliper width of 0.01; 
NN 10= nearest 10 neighbours; NN 20= nearest 20 neighbours; NN 10 cal= nearest 10 neighbours with caliper width of 0.01; NN 20 cal= nearest 20 neighbours with caliper width of 0.01; Kepan= kernel; 
Knorm=kernel normal; Kbw01=kernel with bandwidth of 0.01; Knormbw01=kernel normal with bandwidth of 0.01 
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Table 14 Average treatment effect on the treated, late vs early adopters (abs) 
Early vs later (196 Households) NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective 0.088 0.116 0.188** 0.073 0.173** 0.198** 0.113 0.113 0.103 0.088 0.103 0.088 0.200** 
ATET subjective 0.188* 0.188* 0.138* 0.200* 0.166** 0.171** 0.199** 0.199** 0.179** 0.188** 0.196* 0.188* 0.225*** 
N. On support 183  172  183  158  183  183  172  172  183  183  172  183  183 
M2 
ATET objective 0.039 0.127 0.208*** 0.100 0.175* 0.204*** 0.158 0.156 0.110 0.039 0.159 0.039 0.208** 
ATET subjective 0.156 0.127 0.130* 0.140 0.168** 0.151* 0.118 0.118 0.184** 0.156 0.124 0.156* 0.221** 
N. On support 180  166  180  153  180  180  166  166  180  180  166  180  180 
M3 
ATET objective 0.038 0.106 0.192** 0.130 0.181** 0.198** 0.125 0.125 0.116 0.038 0.149 0.038 0.205** 
ATET subjective 0.141 0.106 0.128 0.167* 0.178** 0.149** 0.130 0.130 0.180** 0.141 0.120 0.141 0.205** 
N. On support 181  169  181  157  181  181  169  169  181  181  169  181  181 
M4 
ATET objective 0.159 0.159 0.183** 0.109 0.129 0.188** 0.098 0.098 0.127 0.159 0.126 0.159 0.122 
ATET subjective 0.171 0.130 0.110 0.043 0.179** 0.124 0.126 0.126 0.178** 0.171 0.134 0.171* 0.146 
N. On support 185  172  185  149  185  185  172  172  185  185  172  185  185 
M5 
ATET objective 0.125 0.047 0.175** 0.021 0.090 0.173* 0.042 0.042 0.102 0.125 0.033 0.125 0.150 
ATET subjective 0.188* 0.188 0.100 0.128 0.135* 0.121 0.188 0.188 0.170* 0.188* 0.187 0.188* 0.138 
N. On support 183  167  183  150  183  183  167  167 183   183  167  183  183 
 
Table 15 Average treatment effect on the treated, later vs earlier (rel) 
Later vs Earlier (196 Households) NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective 0.107 0.110 0.103 0.067 0.128 0.139* 0.145 0.145 0.074 0.107 0.123 0.107 0.054 
ATET subjective 0.196** 0.154 0.103 0.050 0.138 0.148* 0.141 0.140 0.164** 0.196* 0.116 0.196** 0.196*** 
N. On support  190  169  156  138  190  190  169  169  190  190  169  190  190 
M2 
ATET objective 0.009 0.033 0.090 -0.054 0.106 0.136* 0.079 0.079 0.090 0.009 0.080 0.009 0.084 
ATET subjective 0.206** 0.176* 0.090 0.071 0.152* 0.156** 0.149 0.149 0.187** 0.206** 0.151 0.206** 0.178** 
N. On support  185  169  156  134  185 185   169  169 185  185   169  185  185 
M3 
ATET objective 0.093 0.144 0.090 0.036 0.124 0.128* 0.096 0.096 0.087 0.093 0.108 0.093 0.075 
ATET subjective 0.187* 0.144 0.077 0.109 0.172* 0.151* 0.136 0.136 0.185** 0.187* 0.134 0.187** 0.159** 
N. On support  185  168  156  133  185  185  168  168  185  185  168  185  185 
M4 
ATET objective 0.118 0.140 0.103 0.000 0.113 0.107 0.111 0.111 0.106 0.118 0.120 0.118 0.029 
ATET subjective 0.147 0.128 0.077 0.059 0.114 0.104 0.159* 0.159 0.145 0.147 0.164 0.147 0.108 
N. On support  180  164  156  129  180  180  164  164  180  180  164  180  180 
M5 
ATET objective 0.058 0.058 0.103 0.020 0.102 0.106 0.070 0.070 0.102 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.049 
ATET subjective 0.184* 0.174 0.077 0.082 0.110 0.099 0.174 0.174 0.145** 0.184 0.174 0.184 0.049 
N. On support  181  164  156  127  181 181  164  164  181  181  164  181  181 
*Note: NN=nearest neighbour; Caliper 01= nearest neighbour with caliper width of 0.01; NN_Norep= nearest neighbour, no replacement; NN_Norepcal= nearest neighbour, no replacement with caliper width of 0.01; 
NN 10= nearest 10 neighbours; NN 20= nearest 20 neighbours; NN 10 cal= nearest 10 neighbours with caliper width of 0.01; NN 20 cal= nearest 20 neighbours with caliper width of 0.01; Kepan= kernel; 
Knorm=kernel normal; Kbw01=kernel with bandwidth of 0.01; Knormbw01=kernel normal with bandwidth of 0.01
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Table 16 Average treatment effect on the treated, small farmers (3 or less acres) 
Small farmers (189 Households) NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective 0.064 0.030 0.107 0.103 0.072 0.057 0.065 0.065 0.094 0.064 0.059 0.064 0.055 
ATET subjective -0.018 -0.030 -0.040 -0.086 -0.106 -0.123 -0.098 -0.098 -0.083 -0.018 -0.105 -0.018 -0.064 
N. On support  184  175  150  133  184  184  175  175  184  184  175  184  184 
M2 
ATET objective 0.084 0.093 0.053 0.096 0.092 0.060 0.098 0.098 0.099 0.084 0.094 0.084 0.103 
ATET subjective -0.131 -0.103 -0.040 -0.077 -0.136 -0.125 -0.096 -0.096 -0.131 -0.131 -0.095 -0.131 -0.056 
N. On support  182  172  150  127    182    182  172  172  182  182  172  182  182 
M3 
ATET objective 0.092 0.071 0.053 0.060 0.078 0.051 0.058 0.058 0.089 0.092 0.056 0.092 0.110 
ATET subjective -0.064 -0.040 -0.040 -0.140 -0.144 -0.115 -0.110 -0.110 -0.130 -0.064 -0.092 -0.064 -0.064 
N. On support  184  174  150  125  184  184  174  174  184  184  174  184  184 
M4 
ATET objective 0.227* 0.200 0.027 0.091 0.119 0.064 0.154 0.154 0.141 0.227* 0.177 0.227* 0.073 
ATET subjective -0.118 -0.067 -0.093 -0.182 -0.125 -0.096 -0.112 -0.112 -0.179* -0.118 -0.108 -0.118 -0.036 
N. On support 185 165 150 119 185 185 165 165 185 185 165 185 185 
M5 
ATET objective 0.067 0.038 -0.013 0.026 0.038 0.023 0.065 0.065 0.074 0.067 0.065 0.067 0.000 
ATET subjective -0.095 -0.165 -0.107 -0.132 -0.073 -0.091 -0.147 -0.147 -0.039 -0.095 -0.143 -0.095 -0.105 
N. On support 180 154  150  113    180    180  154  154    180    180  154    180    180 
 
 
Table 17 Average treatment effect on the treated, large farmers (More than 3 acres) 
Big farmers (116 Households) NN caliper_01 NN_norep NN_norepcal NN10 NN20 NN10cal NN20cal Kepan Knorm Kbw01 Knormbw01 mahalanobis 
M1 
ATET objective -0.304* -0.415* -0.235** -0.438* -0.338** -0.318*** -0.435* -0.435* -0.371** -0.304* -0.420* -0.304* -0.362*** 
ATET subjective -0.536*** -0.488** -0.441*** -0.688*** -0.375*** -0.451*** -0.439* -0.439* -0.381** -0.536*** -0.456** -0.536*** -0.391** 
N. On support  103  75  68  50  103  103  75  75  103  103  75  103  103 
M2 
ATET objective -0.301* -0.256 -0.235** -0.313 -0.334*** -0.299** -0.233 -0.233 -0.318** -0.301* -0.243 -0.301* -0.315** 
ATET subjective -0.438** -0.442* -0.441*** -0.375* -0.396*** -0.440*** -0.395 -0.395 -0.322** -0.438** -0.405 -0.438** -0.479*** 
N. On support  107  77  68  50  107  107  77  77  107  107  77  107  107 
M3 
ATET objective -0.443** -0.409** -0.265** -0.333 -0.350*** -0.316** -0.360 -0.360* -0.373** -0.443** -0.376 -0.443** -0.371*** 
ATET subjective -0.314* -0.409* -0.471*** -0.600*** -0.414*** -0.446*** -0.424* -0.424 -0.339* -0.314 -0.423* -0.314 -0.471*** 
N. On support  104  78  68  49  104  104  78  78  104  104  78  104  104 
M4 
ATET objective -0.114 -0.074 -0.176 -0.133 -0.232 -0.248* -0.148 -0.148 -0.211 -0.114 -0.111 -0.114 -0.341*** 
ATET subjective -0.364* -0.222 -0.412*** -0.400 -0.318** -0.399*** -0.259 -0.259 -0.346* -0.364* -0.246 -0.364* -0.432*** 
N. On support  78  61  68  49  78  78  61  61  78  78  61  78  78 
M5 
ATET objective -0.250 -0.320 -0.147 -0.231 -0.184 -0.225* -0.300 -0.300 -0.228 -0.250 -0.304 -0.250 -0.295** 
ATET subjective -0.227 -0.120 -0.441*** -0.308 -0.393** -0.380*** -0.160 -0.160 -0.293 -0.227 -0.151 -0.227 -0.341** 
N. On support  78  59  68  47  78  78  59  59  78  78  59  78  78 
*Note: NN=nearest neighbour; Caliper 01= nearest neighbour with caliper width of 0.01; NN_Norep= nearest neighbour, no replacement; NN_Norepcal= nearest neighbour, no replacement with caliper width of 0.01; 
NN 10= nearest 10 neighbours; NN 20= nearest 20 neighbours; NN 10 cal= nearest 10 neighbours with caliper width of 0.01; NN 20 cal= nearest 20 neighbours with caliper width of 0.01; Kepan= kernel; 
Knorm=kernel normal; Kbw01=kernel with bandwidth of 0.01; Knormbw01=kernel normal with bandwidth of 0.01 
